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ABSTRACT 
 
Absolute prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm of international customary law 
that all states must comply with. Obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, to punish 
its perpetrators and to provide adequate redress to victims of torture, as well as to 
report on measures taken against torture are contained in several international 
human rights instruments to which Lesotho is a party. A key obligation contained in 
these instruments is for state parties to harmonise their national legal systems, as 
well as practices with standards contained in each instrument.  
 
Thus, the main question, which this thesis investigates, is the extent to which 
international human rights standards against torture are effectively implemented in 
Lesotho’s domestic legal regime. In order to respond to this question, the thesis 
seeks to answer four sub-questions aimed at identifying international human rights 
standards and states’ obligations against torture, to determine the relationship 
between international law and the legal system of Lesotho, to evaluate Lesotho’s 
legal and institutional frameworks against the international human rights standards 
identified and lastly, to extract from Lesotho’s political history the extent to which 
torture is practised in Lesotho, factors, which influence its commission, as well as 
those, which inhibit effective implementation of the international standards against it. 
 
In Chapter 1 of the thesis, the research is introduced, a definition of torture under 
both international human rights and international criminal law is provided and the 
structure of the thesis is set out. In Chapter 2, the history of international prohibition 
of torture is first discussed so as to provide the context in which the international 
standards against torture were adopted, and then the obligations against torture, 
which each international human rights instrument adopted by the United Nations 
(UN) and African Union imposes on state parties to them, are extrapolated. The 
overall states’ obligations in these instruments are: the obligation to prevent and 
prohibit torture, to prosecute and punish its perpetrators and to provide redress to 
victims of torture, as well as to report on measures taken against torture. In Chapter 
2, the specific ways in which states are mandated to implement these obligations are 
also discussed. In Chapter 3, the extent of implementation of these obligations in 
Lesotho’s legal and institutional frameworks are assessed, and in Chapter 4, their 
practical implementation by Lesotho’s three law enforcement institutions, the 
Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS), the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and the 
Lesotho Correctional Service (LCS) are evaluated. 
 
An analysis of Lesotho’s legal system in Chapter 3 reveals that the legal system is 
receptive of international law and that judicial activism has led to the application of 
international human rights instruments by the courts of Lesotho without probing into 
their domestication. Therefore, similar arguments may be used to apply Lesotho’s 
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international human rights obligations against torture in the legal system of Lesotho. 
A further review of the legal and institutional frameworks against torture in Chapter 3, 
as well as the practice of torture in Chapter 4, leads to a conclusion that the legal 
and institutional frameworks are weakened by both political instability and failure to 
implement international human rights standards. Failure to prohibit torture as a 
distinct crime and the granting of immunity and amnesty for politically motivated 
torture have resulted in the continued practice of torture, impunity for perpetrators 
and a lack of adequate redress to victims of torture.  
 
In the thesis, a multi-pronged approach to addressing these challenges is 
recommended. Firstly, the national legal framework must be reformed and 
harmonised with the international human rights standards against torture. A specific 
anti-torture legislation must be enacted. The existing laws must be reviewed and 
amended to incorporate Lesotho’s obligations under the relevant international human 
rights instruments, such as the UN and African regional levels. Laws, which are in 
conflict with the international standards, must be repealed and those not yet enacted, 
such as the Amnesty Bill, 2016 must not be enacted. Secondly, Lesotho’s institutions 
and offices, such as the LMPS, the Police Complaints Authority, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Judiciary must be 
capacitated through training and alignment of their mandates with international 
standards in order for them to effectively investigate allegations of torture, to 
prosecute perpetrators, to impose appropriate penalties on those convicted and to 
award reparative remedies to victims of torture. Because of the link between the 
prevalence of torture and the involvement of the military in Lesotho’s political 
instability, the dissolution of the LDF as a torture prevention measure is further 
recommended. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Prevention of torture requires an effective national legal framework that incorporates 
international human rights standards and includes specific provisions to prohibit and 
prevent torture.1 
 
The debates about the moral and legal nature of the prohibition of torture reflect 
widely divergent views, ranging from total prohibition to permissibility of some 
exceptions,2 especially in situations in which torture may be the only means to obtain 
information to prevent greater harm to innocent people.3 Notwithstanding the 
debates, central to this study is the generally accepted view that both customary 
international law and treaties to which Lesotho is a party totally prohibit torture.4 The 
main argument in this thesis is that because Lesotho is a party to international 
human rights instruments, which contain standards on total prohibition of torture, 
over and above its obligations under customary international law, it has created law 
for itself and therefore has an obligation to implement, at the domestic level, absolute 
prohibition of torture in accordance with both customary and treaty law.5 In this 
                                                          
1 Association for Prevention of Torture ‘National anti-torture laws and standards’ (2008) 
http://www.apt.ch/en/national-level/ [accessed 26 November 2013]. 
2 O Gross ‘The prohibition of torture and the limits of the law’ in S Levinson (eds.) Torture: A collection 
(2004) 1. 
3 These situations are also referred to as the ticking bomb situations. See M Farell ‘On Torture’ 
unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Liverpool (2011) 93 
https://aran.library.nuigalway.ie/handle/10379/2171 [accessed 6 July 2016]; K Ambos ‘May a state 
torture suspects to save life of innocents?’ (2008) 6 (2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 262. 
4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) 1948 article 5; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 article 7; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 1981 (African Charter) article 5; Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 
24 ‘Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant’, 4 November 1994 
UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/add.6 (HRC, GC 24); See also Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija Case No IT-
95-17/1-T Judgement 10 December 1998 para 153; See also National Commissioner of South African 
Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre & Others (2014) 2 SA 42 paras 36 
& 37. 
5 See principles of pacta sunt servanda in article 26 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) 1969; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA res. 2625, Annex, 
25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No 28), UN Doc A/5217 (1970); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
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thesis, it is argued that effective implementation of international human rights 
standards against torture requires the national legal and institutional frameworks to 
be consistent with the obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, to punish its 
perpetrators and to provide redress to its victims as well as to report on measures 
taken against torture. That is, the national legal framework must contain specific 
measures aimed at torture prevention,6  prohibit torture as a distinct crime,7 provide 
for appropriate penalties which take into account the gravity of the offence of 
torture,8 and also contain the appropriate redress which must be awarded to victims 
of torture. In like manner, there must exist, national institutions which are competent 
and impartial in their discharge of the obligations to investigate allegations of torture, 
to prosecute its perpetrators and to award and enforce appropriate redress to victims 
of torture.9 
  
This research is premised on the observation that despite clear prohibition of torture 
in international law, acts of torture continue to take place in Lesotho, perpetrators go 
unpunished and victims remain without redress. In chapter 4 it is illustrated that the 
law enforcement and security institutions in Lesotho employ torture for different 
purposes amongst which are those that Amnesty International10 has reported as 
common in other parts of the world. Members of the Lesotho Mounted Police Service 
(LMPS), Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and Lesotho Correctional Service (LCS) use 
torture in order to obtain information, to punish suspects, for intimidation or coercion 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission UN Doc A/56/10 (2001) 
articles 12 & 13; M Dixon Textbook on international law (2013) 30. 
6 ICCPR article 2(2); CAT article 2(1); African Charter article 1; HRC, General Comment 31 ‘The 
nature of the general legal obligation imposed on state parties to the Covenant’ 26 May 2004 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3 (HRC, GC 3); Committee against Torture General Comment 2 
‘Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties’, 24 January 2008, UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2 (Committee 
against Torture, GC 2). 
7 CAT article 4; Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 11; L Fernandez & L Muntingh ‘The 
criminalisation of torture in South Africa’ (2016) 60 (1) Journal of African Law 93. 
8 Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 11. See also Frenandez and Muntingh (note 7 above) 99. 
9 CAT article 14; Committee against Torture, General Comment 3 ‘Implementation of article 14 by 
states parties’ 19 November 2012 UN Doc CAT/C/GC/3 (Committee against Torture, GC 3) para 1; D. 
Shelton Remedies in international human rights law (2015) 32; Hall CK ‘The duty of states parties to 
the Convention Against Torture to provide procedures permitting victims to recover reparations for 
torture committed abroad’ (2007) 18 (5) European Journal of International Law 922. 
10 Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for 
observance of rights protected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and other 
international human rights instruments. www.amnesty.org/en/who_we_are [accessed 14 January 
2015]. 
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and for reasons based on discrimination.11 Analysis of human rights reports dating 
from the time when Lesotho gained independence to date, leads to the conclusion 
that many of the cases of torture in Lesotho are closely linked to the absence of anti-
torture laws and political instability in the country.12 The practice of torture during 
political instability is fuelled by enactment of laws which authorise prolonged 
detention,13 immunity and amnesty for perpetrators of torture as well as total neglect 
of redress to victims of torture.14 All these factors violate Lesotho’s international 
human rights obligations against torture. 
 
In this thesis the aim is to interrogate both general and specific obligations against 
torture under both customary international and treaty law.15 The international human 
rights obligations are used as a yardstick to measure Lesotho’s legal and institutional 
frameworks, as well as the practice of torture as reflected in court cases, reports of 
human rights organisations and Lesotho’s state party reports to various human rights 
treaty bodies.16 Analysis of the legal and institutional frameworks is aimed at 
assessing the implementation of international human rights standards against torture 
in theory (as contained in the laws), while analysis of case law and human rights 
reports, is aimed at assessing the practical implementation of international human 
rights standards against torture.17 The analysis also helps to identify factors, which 
inhibit effective domestic implementation of international standards against torture. It 
is on the basis of this analysis that an argument is made that alignment of the 
national legal framework with international human rights standards against torture, 
including enactment of an anti-torture law, is key to the eradication of torture in 
                                                          
11 See generally, Amnesty International ‘Torture in 2014: 30 years of broken promises’ (2014) 
http://www.amnesty.org/library/info/ACT40/004/2014/en [accessed 8 October 2014]. 
12 For a detailed analysis of the cases of torture within the security institutions in Lesotho see chapter 
4 of this thesis. 
13 Internal Security Act (General) of 1967 & International Security Act (General) of 1974, which gave 
the Commissioner of Police excessive detention powers and allowed detention for lengthy periods. 
For a detailed analysis of these laws, see chapter 3 of this thesis. 
14 For instance, section 3 of the Indemnity Order of 1988, prohibited the taking of legal proceedings, 
whether civil or criminal in any court of law against the crown, an officer or member of the military, the 
police force or any person employed in the public service for acts committed for the defence of the 
Kingdom of Lesotho or public safety, or for the prevention or suppression of mutiny or internal 
disorder between 24 February 1988 and 30 April 1988.  
15 See chapter 2. 
16 See chapter 3. 
17 See chapter 4. 
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Lesotho.18  
  
Human rights standards against torture are set out in human rights treaties and soft 
law adopted by the United Nations (UN), as well as other bodies in regional human 
rights systems such as the African, European and the Inter-American human rights 
systems. Lesotho is a member state of the UN and African Union (AU). Therefore, 
for purposes of examining Lesotho’s obligations, reference is made to instruments 
adopted by both the UN and AU to which Lesotho is a party. Instruments adopted in 
other regions are, however, used for interpretation and comparative purposes.  
 
Because the international human rights instruments referred to in this study do not 
only make reference to torture, but also to inhumane and degrading treatment 
(CIDT), torture is firstly defined and differentiated from other CIDT. This approach is 
adopted because the legal meaning of torture may not be as clear as its literal 
meaning when it is used to indicate moral outrage against certain acts.19 
Furthermore, the definition of torture and states’ obligations under national human 
rights law are quite different from those under international human rights law,20 as 
well as under international humanitarian law.21 In this study, the view of the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC)22 that ‘legal obligations against torture go beyond the 
normal understanding of torture and depend on the kind, purpose and severity of the 
act in question’23 is adopted. It is therefore important to first define torture before 
determining Lesotho’s international human rights obligations, which are specific to 
torture. It is also important to first define torture because the failure of international 
instruments adopted before the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
                                                          
18 See chapter 5. 
19 GH Miller ‘Defining Torture’ Flosheimer Centre Occasional Paper No. 3 (2005) 9. 
20 For a distinction between international human rights law and national human rights law, see F 
Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (2012) 6, stating that ‘international human rights law 
differs from national human rights law as to its source, in that its concretized content is found mainly 
in provisions of international human rights treaties’.  
21 A Orakhelashvili ‘The Interaction between human rights and humanitarian law: Fragmentation, 
conflict, parallelism, or convergence?’ (2008) 19 (1) European Journal of International Law 161. 
22 The Human Rights Committee is established in terms of article 28 of International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) to monitor its implementation. 
23 HRC, General Comment 7: ‘Article 7 (Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment’ 30 May 1982 para 2 (HRC, GC 7), which has since been replaced by General Comment 
20. 
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CAT)24 to provide a concrete 
definition of torture has shown to be problematic. The diversity of acts, victims and 
circumstances under which torture may be committed, posed challenges, which 
questioned the type of acts that constitute torture,25 the threshold of pain or suffering, 
which constitutes torture, as well as whether any and every person is capable of 
committing torture.  
 
Definitional challenges regarding the prohibition of torture under international law 
were first faced by the European Commission on Human Rights (European 
Commission) in 1969.26 In the case of Denmark v Greece (Greek case),27 the 
European Commission was called to interpret prohibition of torture under article 3 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention) 1950.28 In this case, the Commission held that 
torture is ‘inhuman treatment, which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of 
information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and it is generally an 
aggravated form of inhuman treatment’.29 Rodley argues that the Commission’s 
interpretation of torture in the Greek case influenced the definition of torture, which 
was later contained in article 1(2) of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (Declaration against Torture) adopted in 1975.30 The definition 
contained in the Declaration against Torture was then applied by both the European 
Commission and the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) in the case 
                                                          
24 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 
December 1984.    
25 Ireland v United Kingdom 25 European Court of Human Rights (1978) facts of which are considered 
later on in this section. 
26 European Commission is established to monitor implementation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights.  
27 Denmark v Greece Application 3321/67, Norway v Greece Application 3322/67, Sweden v Greece 
Application 3323/67 Netherlands v Greece Application 3344/67, Report of the Human Rights 
Commission volume 2 1 (Greek case). 
28 European Commission was called to interpret prohibition or torture under article 3 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) 
1950. 
29 Greek Case (note 27 above) 186. 
30 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Declaration against Torture) 1975 article 1(2) which 
provides that ‘Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’. See NS Rodley ‘The definition(s) of torture in international law’ (2005) 55 
Current Legal Problems 471. 
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of United Kingdom v Ireland31, which drew different conclusions. The European 
Court considered that Britain’s ‘interrogation in depth’, which involved wall standing, 
hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep and deprivation of food amount to 
inhuman treatment and not torture, whereas the European Commission had held 
earlier that these acts constitute torture.32 As will be illustrated in the next section of 
this chapter, with regard to the ICCPR, the HRC has refrained from defining torture 
and or differentiating it from CIDT.33 The HRC’s approach to the definition of torture 
considered in the next section shows that in many of the cases in which it found 
violation of article 7, it did not classify whether that was torture or CIDT. 34 
  
Because of the challenges, which faced bodies tasked with interpretation of the 
prohibition of torture under international law as illustrated above, torture was defined 
in article 1(1) of CAT.35 While there have been a few challenges regarding its 
interpretation,36 the CAT definition of torture, has been widely accepted as 
comprehensive.37  In the next section, the definition of torture, including its essential 
                                                          
31 Ireland v United Kingdom (note 25 above). See also J Conroy Unspeakable acts, ordinary people: 
The dynamics of torture (2000) 187.   
32 Ireland v United Kingdom (note 25 above). 
33 Rodley (note 30 above). 
34 For instance, in the case of Netto, Weismann & Lanza v Uruguay Communication 8/1977 (HRC) 3 
April 1980 UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 para 16 in which the author claimed that her aunt and uncle were 
arrested and subjected to torture during detention. The HRC held that their treatment violated a 
number of articles of ICCPR including article 7, but did not specify whether the violation constituted 
torture or CIDT. For a further discussion of unclassified cases before the HRC, see section 1.2.1, as 
well as NS Rodley & M Pollard The treatment of prisoners under international law (2009) 463. 
35 CAT definition of torture is discussed in detail in section 1.2 
36 For instance, the US Baybee Memo which interpreted the requirement of severe pain and suffering 
to mean suffering equivalent to death or organ failure was drafted when CAT was already in force. 
See LF Rouillard ‘Misinterpreting the prohibition of torture under international law: The Office of Legal 
Counsel Memorandum’ (2005) 21 (1) American University International Law Review 23. See also M 
Nowak, M Birk & T Crittin ‘The Obama administration and obligations under the Convention against 
Torture’ (2011) 20 (33) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 37. 
37 Rodley (note 30 above) 475. The European Commission has also endorsed and applied the CAT 
definition of torture in several cases including Selmouni v France, Application 25803/94 (European 
Court of Human Rights) 28 July 1999, para 100 in which the European Court relied on the definition of 
torture under CAT in order to determine whether the acts of ill-treatment and sexual abuse, which the 
author complained of amount to torture. Some other cases in which the European Court referred to 
the CAT definition of torture are Ilhan v Turkey, Application 2227/93 (European Court of Human 
Rights) 27 June 2000, para 85, Salman v Turkey, Application 21986/93 (European Court of Human 
Rights) 27 June 2000, para 114. See also Association for Prevention of Torture Guide to 
jurisprudence on torture and ill-treatment: Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights (2000) 16. The CAT definition of torture has also been applied in some cases under 
international criminal law. See Prosecutor v Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR) 2 September 
1998, paras 593 & 681. See also Y Dinstein Non-international armed conflicts in international law 
(2014) 168. See also O Hathaway, A Nowlan and J Spiegel ‘Tortured reasoning: The intent to torture 
7 
 
elements as accepted in international human rights law will be investigated taking 
into account the general comments and jurisprudence of the HRC and the 
Committee against Torture. The definition of torture under international criminal law 
is also considered so as to highlight the difference between torture as a human rights 
violation and torture as part of international crimes. It is important to note that for 
purposes of this study, the human rights definition of torture is adopted as a basis for 
assessing Lesotho’s implementation of international human rights standards against 
torture.  
  
1.2  Definition of torture  
 
1.2.1 Definition of torture under ICCPR 
 
Article 7 of the ICCPR provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be 
subjected without his free consent, to medical or scientific experimentation’. Article 7 
neither defines torture nor other CIDT. This fact has been acknowledged and 
reinforced by the HRC through general comments and jurisprudence.38  The types of 
acts, which the HRC has considered as a violation of article 7, are illustrated briefly 
in this section while the HRC’s general comments, jurisprudence and concluding 
observations concerning states’ obligations under article 7 are considered in chapter 
2.  
 
In its General Comment 20,39 the HRC acknowledged that ICCPR does not contain 
any definition of the concepts covered by article 7, such as torture and CIDT.40 It 
acknowledged further that it has not itself considered it necessary to draw up a list of 
prohibited acts.41 The HRC, however, noted that certain acts, such as prolonged 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
under international and domestic law’ Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Series Paper 4723 (2012) 
797. 
38 HRC, General Comment 20, ‘Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment’ 10 March1992 UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (HRC, GC 20) para 2 
39 As above. 
40 HRC, GC 20 para 4. 
41 As above. 
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solitary confinement42 and the manner in which the death penalty is carried out may 
violate article 7.43 It must be noted that, although there are instances in which the 
manner of carrying out the death penalty may violate article 7,44 the HRC has held 
that the death penalty itself does not constitute a violation of article 7.45 However, the 
Committee has held that ill-treatment or torture of detainees on death row violates 
article 7.46 
 
The trend of the HRC’s jurisprudence with regard to defining torture has been 
consistent with its stance in GC 20 in that it has refrained from differentiating torture 
from CIDT.47 In the majority of communications, it has held generally that article 7 
has been violated without stating whether the treatment complained about 
constitutes torture or CIDT.48 In some cases, involving the imposition of corporal 
punishment, the HRC has specifically held that corporal punishment constitutes 
                                                          
42 HRC, GC 20 para 6. HRC, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Denmark, 31 
October 2000, UN Doc CCPR/CO/70/DNK, para 12 in which the HRC stated that ‘the Committee is of 
the view that solitary confinement is a harsh penalty with serious psychological consequences and is 
justifiable only in case of urgent need; the use of solitary confinement other than in exceptional 
circumstances and for limited periods is inconsistent with article 10 paragraph 1’. Denmark was called 
to reconsider the practice of solitary confinement and to ensure that it is used only in cases of urgent 
necessity. See also Rodley & Pollard (note 34 above) 404. 
43 HRC, GC 20 para 6. 
44 For a detailed discussion of torture and CIDT in the execution of the death penalty see L Chenwi 
Towards the abolition of death penalty in Africa (2007) chapter four.  
45 Howell v Jamaica Communication 798/1998 (HRC), 21 October 2003 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/79/D/798/1998, para 6.3; Teesdale v Trinidad and Tobago Communication 677/1996 (HRC), 
1 April 2002 UN Doc CPR/C/74/D/677/1996, para 9.2; Wanza v Trinidad and Tobago Communication 
683/1996 (HRC), 26 March 2002 UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/683/1996, para 9.3. 
46 Wilson v The Philippines Communication 868/1999 (HRC), 30 October 2003 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/79/D/868/1999, para 7.4 in which the HRC found the state party to have violated article 7 in 
that while on death row, the author was subjected to torture and ill-treatment, which resulted in him 
having mental illness. 
47 Rodley (note 30 above) 484. 
48 Sathasivam and Saraswathi v Sri Lanka Communication 1436/2005 (HRC), 8 July 2008, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/93/D/1436/2005 para 6.7. In this communication, the HRC considered that the death of the 
author’s son who died in hospital after a four-day detention during which he sustained injuries 
amounted to violation of article 7. The HRC did not specify whether the violation amounted to torture 
or CIDT. See also Patricia Ndong Bee & Maria Jesus Bikene Communications 1152/2003 & 
1190/2003 (HRC), 31 October 2005 UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1152 & 1190/2003, para 6.1. In this 
combined communication, the HRC considered deprivation of food and drink for five consecutive days 
as violation of article 7 without stating which aspect of article 7; Turdukan Zhumbaeva v Kyrgyzstan 
Communication 1756/2008 (HRC), 19 July 2011 UN Doc CCPR/C/102/D/1756/2008, para 8.9. In this 
communication, the HRC considered that the death of the author’s son in police custody and injuries 
on his face and neck which were revealed by an autopsy report amount to violation of article 7. 
Similarly, in Isaeva v Uzbekistan Communication 1163/2003 (HRC) 20 March 2009, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/95/D/1163/2003, para 9.2, the HRC considered that the author’s son’s death in police 
custody amounted to violation of article 7. 
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CIDT.49 There are, however, limited cases in which the HRC specifically found a 
violation of article 7 to constitute torture. These cases involved a combination of acts, 
such as solitary confinement, food deprivation, systematic beatings as a result of 
which the victims’ health deteriorated,50 use of electric shocks and drowning,51 
parading victims naked and subjecting them to electric shocks in the genitalia.52 It is 
important to note that in some communications involving similar acts and/or 
combinations of these acts, the HRC had held generally that it finds a violation of 
article 7. It is not clear as to what influences the HRC’s general finding of a violation 
of article 7, as opposed to a specifc finding that torture or CIDT has been 
committed.53In the case of Chani v Algeria, the HRC held that it ‘recognises the 
degree of suffering involved in being held indefinitely without contact with the outside 
world’ 54  but did not mention whether that consideration leads to torture or CIDT. 
 
All in all, the HRC has not laid down specific factors or elements, which influence its 
decision on whether an act, which violates article 7 of ICCPR, constitutes torture or 
                                                          
49 Boodlal Sooklal v Trinidad and Tobago Communication 928/2000 (HRC), 25 October 2001, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/730/D/928/2000 para 4.6. See also Osbourne v Jamaica Communication 759/97 (HRC), 15 
March 2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/68/D/759/1997, para 9.1. in which the HRC said ‘irrespective of the 
nature of the crime for which one has been convicted, it is the firm opinion of the Committee that 
corporal punishment constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to 
article 7 of the Covenant’. 
50 Sendic v Uruguay Communication 063/1979 (HRC), 28 October 1981, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/14/D/63/1979, para 20. The HRC held that the state party’s violation of article 7 amounted to 
torture because the victim had developed a hernia as a result of the beatings to which he was 
subjected to while in detention; Chani v Algeria Communication 2297/2013 (HRC), 11 March 2016, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/116/D/2297/2013, para 7.3 in which the author was detained in communicado for 
about 20 days during which he was systematically slapped, kicked, punched, choked and urinated on. 
Conversely in Dunaev v Tajikistan Communication 1195/2003 (HRC), 30 March 2009, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/95/D/1195/2003, para 9.2, although the author had sustained two broken ribs as a result of 
the beatings, the HRC held generally that such treatment violated article 7 without classifying it as 
torture or CIDT. 
51 Angel Estrella v Uruguay Communication 074/1980 (HRC), 29 March 1983, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/18/D/74/1980, para 10 in which the author and other detainees were subjected to electric 
shocks, beatings with rubber truncheons, punches and kicks, hanging with hands behind their backs, 
pushed into the water until they were close to asphyxiation and were also made to stand with legs 
apart and arms raised for up to 20 hours and the HRC held that article 7 had been violated because 
‘Miguel Angel Estrella was subjected to torture during the first days of this detention’. (Emphasis 
added). 
52 Arzuaga Gilboa v Uruguay Communication 147/1983 (HRC), 1 November 1985, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/OP/2, paras 4.3 and 14. In this case, the victim was brutally beaten on the streets at the time 
of her arrest and while in detention, she was subjected to an ‘electric prod’ particularly in the genital 
area. She was also strung up naked out in the open yard, handcuffed and left naked in the presence 
of guards and her torturers. The HRC held that article 7 had been violated ‘because Lucia Arzuaga 
Gilboa was subjected to torture and degrading treatment in the period between 13 and 30 June 1983’. 
53 Rodley (note 30 above) 374. 
54 Chani v Algeria (note 50 above) para 7.3. 
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CIDT. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) has commended the HRC,  for this approach on the grounds that: 
 
[it] allows the Committee to develop a dynamic case law by broadening the concept of torture. 
This factual approach enables the Committee to encompass within the scope of this 
prohibition acts that would not necessarily fall within the concept of torture at the time where a 
strict legal definition would have been adopted.55 
 
The challenge with this approach however, is that it fails to highlight the gravity of the 
offence of torture as opposed to other CIDT. 
 
1.2.2 Definition of torture under CAT 
 
Article 1(1) of CAT defines torture in the following terms: 
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions.56 
 
From this definition, the following elements of torture can be identified: (a) actus 
reus, (b) mens rea, and (c) official capacity of the perpetrator.  
 
1.2.2.1  Actus reus (Infliction of severe pain or suffering) 
 
The first element of torture as contained in article 1(1) of CAT is that there must be 
an act, which has caused severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental. On 
this basis, the Committee against Torture57 has held that acts, such as the use of 
                                                          
55 OHCHR ‘Interpretation of torture in the light of the practice and jurisprudence of international 
bodies’ 2011 www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Torture/UNVFT/Interpretation_torture_2011_EN.pdf  
[accessed 19 March 2014].  
56 CAT article 1. 
57 Established in terms of CAT article17 with mandate to monitor implementation of CAT.  
11 
 
electric shocks on the body of a victim,58 severe beatings59 and solitary 
confinement60 amount to torture. In the case of Grasimov v Kazakhstan, the 
Committee against Torture found that the following treatment to which the author 
was subjected amounts to torture: infliction of several heavy blows to his kidneys, 
threatening him with sexual violence and subjecting him to a technique known as 
‘dry submarino’, which involved repeatedly suffocating him with a polypropylene bag 
and releasing it when he was about to suffocate.61 These are examples of ‘acts’, 
which cause severe pain or suffering to the victim. However, the OHCHR has 
warned that ‘torture is not an act itself, or specific type of acts, but it is the legal 
qualification of an event or behaviour’.62 Hence, the Committee against Torture has 
found a violation of article 1 in cases where failure of a person to act has resulted in 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering to a victim.63 It is therefore important that 
when determining whether an act or omission amounts to torture, the second leg, 
which is the effect of that act or omission, must be taken into account. 
 
The second leg to the element of actus reus is that the act or omission must have 
caused severe pain or suffering. In the recent case of R.O v Sweden, the Committee 
against Torture held that FGM constitutes torture because ‘it causes permanent 
physical harm and severe psychological pain to the victims, which may last for the 
                                                          
58 Alan v Switzerland Communication 21/1995 (Committee against Torture), 8 May 1996, UN Doc 
CAT/16/D/21/1995, paras. 2.1-2.5, 11.2-11.6 & 12.  
59 Niyonzima v Burundi Communication 514/2012 (Committee against Torture), 21 November 2014, 
UN Doc CAT/C/53/D/514/2014, para 8.2 in which beatings leading to profuse bleeding were held to 
be torture as defined in article 1. In Dmytro Slyusar v Ukraine Communication 353/2008 (Committee 
against Torture), 14 November 2011, UN Doc CAT/C/47/D/353/2008, para 9.2 it was held that severe 
beatings, deprivation of food and sleep amount to torture. 
60 Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined third to fifth periodic reports 
of the United States of America, 19 December 2014, UN Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 paras 19 to 21 in 
which the Committee raised its concern about allegations of the use of solitary confinement in 
immigration detention facilities, prisons and mental health facilities for purposes of punishment, 
discipline and protection, as well as for health-related reasons and noted that ‘solitary confinement for 
indefinite periods of time and its use with respect to juveniles and individuals with mental disabilities. 
Full isolation of 22 to 23 hours a day in super maximum security prisons is unacceptable’ and violates 
article 16 of CAT. 
61 Grasimov v Kazakhstan Communication 433/2010 (Committee against Torture), 10 July 2012, UN 
Doc CAT/C/48//D/433/2010, paras 2.2 and 2.3. 
62 OHCHR, 2011 (note 54 above) 2. 
63 In Dmytro Slyusar v Ukraine (note 59 above) deprivation of food and sleep was held to amount to 
torture when combined with severe beatings, exposure of the author to a temperature of 4 degrees 
Celsius and threats that his mother and wife would be harmed if he did not confess that he killed his 
father; M Nowak & E McArthur The UN Convention against Torture: A Commentary (2008) 75.  
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rest of their lives…’64  It has been the trend of the Committee against Torture to 
determine the effect, which an act has had on the victim before determining whether 
such act amounts to torture or not. For instance, whereas in the case of Dmytro 
Slyusar v Ukraine,65 the Committee had held that deprivation of food amounts to 
torture, in Kirsanov v Russian Federation it held that the author’s temporary 
confinement in a ward with no bedding, no toiletry items, no table, no toilet and sink 
and denial of walks outside did not amount to torture as defined in article 1 because 
such treatment did not cause ‘severe pain and suffering’ within the meaning of article 
1.66 
 
The question then becomes how this severity is measured. When addressing the 
confusion regarding the element of actus reus and the severity of pain, which the 
victim must have suffered, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other 
Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2004-2010), Manfred 
Nowak, stated that what qualifies conduct as torture is neither the conduct itself nor 
the severity of pain caused thereby, but the purpose of that conduct, as well as the 
powerlessness of the victim.67 Nowak’s approach thus highlights the 
interdependence of the three elements and also that, for torture to be proven, all 
elements must be present at the same time. Therefore, for an act or omission to 
constitute torture, there must also be a certain intention as discussed below.  
 
1.2.2.2 Mens rea (Intention to attain a prohibited purpose) 
 
The second element of torture is that the act or omission by which severe pain or 
                                                          
64 R.O. v Sweden Communication 644/2014 (Committee against Torture), 18 November 2016, UN 
Doc CAT/C/59/D/644/2014, para 8.7. See also Niyonzima v Burundi (note 59 above) para 8.2 in 
which the beating was held to amount to torture because ‘it caused acute pain and suffering’. See 
also N.Z. v Kazakhstan Communication 495/2012 (Committee against Torture), 28 November 2014, 
UN Doc CAT/C/53/D/495/2012, para 7.4 in which the Committee held that the ill-treatment, which 
resulted in broken toes caused severe physical and psychological pain. In Hanafi v Algeria 
Communication 341/2008 (Committee against Torture), 3 June 2011, UN Doc CAT/C/46/D/341/2008, 
in finding that the state party had violated article 1, the Committee considered that while still in 
detention, the victim suffered treatment so harsh that it led to his death shortly after being released. 
65 Dmytro Slyusar v Ukraine (note 59 above). 
66 Kirsanov v Russian Federation Communication 478/2011 (Committee against Torture), 18 June 
2014, UN Doc CAT/C/52/D/478/2011, para 11.2. 
67 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, 23 December 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/6 para 39. 
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suffering is inflicted must be done intentionally and for attaining a prohibited purpose, 
such as obtaining information,68 confession,69 punishment, intimidation, coercion or 
based on any ground of discrimination.70 The element of mens rea thus excludes 
merely negligent conduct from the offence of torture.71 In his 2010 Report to the 
Human Rights Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (2004-2010) 
highlighted that article 1 of CAT excludes negligent conduct, such as the one in 
which a prison official forgets to feed a detainee as a result of which the detainee 
suffers severe pain or suffering due to lack of food.72 He stated that there is no doubt 
that this conduct is a serious human rights violation. However, it does not amount to 
torture in as much as there is no intention on the part of the prison authorities to 
inflict such pain or suffering caused by lack of food.73 Negligent deprivation of food 
should, however, be distinguished from a conduct in which the detainee is deprived 
of food for purposes of extracting information from him or any other prohibited 
purpose listed in article 1(1) of CAT, such as intimidation, punishment or 
discrimination of whatever kind. In the latter case, the act of food deprivation would 
amount to torture, since the requisite intention would have been met.74 The element 
of mens rea is thus essential in distinguishing torture from CIDT. 
 
1.2.2.3 Official capacity of the perpetrator 
 
According to article 1(1) of CAT, in order for an offence to amount to torture, there 
must be an involvement of a person who acts in an official capacity, either as the 
                                                          
68 Josu Arkauz Arana v France Communication 63/1997 (Committee against Torture), 5 June 2000, 
UN Doc CAT/C/23/D/63/1997, para 2.1. In substantiating his case that his forcible return to Spain 
would be inconsistent with article 3 of CAT, the author gave account of victims of torture in Spain 
including his brother, who were subjected to torture in order to get information about the author’s 
whereabouts. 
69 See Dmytro Slyusar v Ukraine (note 59 above), para 2.4 in which the author was subjected to 
torture in order to force him to confess to killing his father.  
70 R.O. v Sweden (note 64 above) para 2.2 in which the author claimed that her three minor children 
would be subjected to FGM on the grounds of discrimination on the basis of their sex. 
71 JH Burgers & H Danelius The United Nations Convention against Torture: A handbook on the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (1988) 
41; Nowak & McArthur (note 63 above) 29.  
72 Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak  Addendum ‘Study on the phenomena of 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the world, including an assessment of 
conditions of detention’ 5 February 2010, UN Doc A.HRC.13.39.Add.5 para 34.  
73 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture 2010 (note 72 above) para 31. 
74 See Dmytro Slyusar v Ukraine (note 59 above). 
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actual perpetrator, an instigator or having given consent for the act to be committed. 
This element thus limits commission of torture under CAT to state-actors.75 It also 
draws a distinction between torture as a human rights violation and torture as an 
international crime. It is important, however, to note that CAT’s limitation of torture to 
state-actors has been a subject of debate. On the one hand, some scholars have 
criticised it and advocated for its removal from the definition of torture in order to 
cater for the prosecution of private individuals who commit torture.76 On the other 
hand, some scholars argue that there is no need to remove this requirement 
because states have a general human rights obligation to prevent torture and to 
protect individuals from the acts of third parties.77 As such, the acts of private 
individuals are, under human rights law, attributable to the state where the state, 
being able to prevent torture, has failed to do so;78 and also in cases where the state 
had the knowledge of the activities of non-state actors, and generally agreed with 
those actions or purposively refused to act.79 This thesis adopts the CAT definition of 
torture.  
 
1.2.3   Definition of torture under international criminal law 
 
International criminal law is a branch of public international law aimed at prohibiting 
and prosecuting human rights violations, commonly viewed as serious atrocities.80 
Torture, under international criminal law, is often committed as part of international 
crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  Initially, 
enforcement of international criminal law was done through ad hoc tribunals, which 
were established with a specific mandate and jurisdiction for the prosecution of 
                                                          
75 Definition of torture under article 1 of CAT limits commission to state actors except where 
‘authorities or others acting in their official capacity knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that 
acts of torture or ill-treatment had been committed by private actors and failed to exercise due 
diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such private actors in accordance with the 
Convention’ Committee against Torture, GC 3 para 7. 
76 A Cullen ‘Defining torture in international law: a critique of the concept employed by the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 31 (1) California West International Law Journal 29. 
77 Committee against Torture, GC 3 para 7. 
78 As above; L McGregor ‘Applying the definition of torture to the acts of non-state actors: The case of 
trafficking in human beings’ (2014) 36 Human Rights Quarterly 211. See also A Clapham Human 
rights obligations of non-state actors (2006) 342. See also R McCorquodale & R La Forgia ‘Taking off 
the blindfolds: Torture by non-state actors’ (2001) 1 Human Rights Law Review 217.  
79 A Edwards Violence against women under international human rights law (2010) 246.  
80 DP Steward International criminal law in a nutshell (2014) 3. 
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crimes, which took place in specific territories during specific periods.81 Examples of 
such ad hoc tribunals are the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). It was only in 1998 with the adoption of the Rome 
Statute (which entered into force in 2002) that jurisdiction over international crimes 
was conferred onto a permanent international court as opposed to ad hoc tribunals, 
namely the International Criminal Court (ICC).82 In this section, the definition of 
torture under international criminal law as defined in the statutes, and applied in the 
jurisprudence, of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC is investigated. 
     
The Rome Statute lists torture as a crime against humanity and also as a war 
crime.83 According to the Rome Statute, torture is a crime against humanity when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at any civilian 
population.84 In this context, torture is defined as: 
 
 The intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a 
person in the custody or under control of the accused; except that torture shall not include 
pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.85 
 
The similarities between the definition of torture under human rights law and 
international criminal law lie in the fact that both legal regimes require that there must 
be an act, which is the infliction of pain,86 and that the act must be carried out for a 
prohibited purpose. A slight difference with regard to the purposive element is that 
the international criminal tribunals have adopted different approaches as to whether 
the purposive element required under international criminal law is similar to the one 
which is envisaged under CAT.87  
                                                          
81 WA Schabas The UN international criminal tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone (2006) 3. 
82 International Criminal Court (ICC) was established by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
83 As above. 
84 Rome Statute article 7(1).  
85 Rome Statute article 2(2). However, the Rome Statute does not define war crime of torture. 
86 It is important to note that while CAT requires infliction of severe pain and suffering, ICCPR does 
not require severity. 
87 For instance, in the case of Prosecutor v Akayesu (note 37 above) the CAT definition of torture was 
imported with all its elements as a result of which the ICTR held that when committed with the 
requisite intention or purpose, rape can amount to the crime of genocide or torture. Similarly, in 
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The major definitional difference between international human rights law and 
international criminal law is that the former requires the third element of ‘official 
capacity’ while the latter does not. This difference was captured by the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY in the case of Prosecutor v Kunarac.88 In this case, the Trial 
Chamber made reference to two cases of the United States of America in which a 
distinction between torture under human rights law and international humanitarian 
law (IHL) was made. In Re Filartiga, the American Court of Appeals of the Second 
Circuit held that ‘deliberate torture perpetrated under the color of official authority 
violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights…’89 The 
same court in the subsequent case of Kadic v Karadzi held that in the Filartiga case, 
it had applied customary international human rights law, which proscribed torture 
only ‘when committed by state officials or under color of law’.90 It added that in that 
case, the claim was based on the Alien Tort Claims Act under which atrocities, such 
as torture are actionable regardless of state participation to the extent that such acts 
were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes.91 The Trial Chamber found the 
approach adopted by the American Court of Appeals instructive and adopted it. As 
far as IHL is concerned, the Trial Chamber enumerated three essential elements of 
torture as: 
 
Infliction, by act or omission of severe pain or suffering 
The act or omission must be intentional 
The act must be committed with the view to obtain information or a confession, punishing, 
intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or discriminating, on any ground, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Prosecutor v Zdravko Mucic aka “Pavo” Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo aka “Zenga”, Jeznil Delilac Case 
No. IT-96-21-Abis (ICTY Appeal Chamber), 8 April 2003, (Prosecutor v Mucic) para 470, the purposes 
referred to in CAT were regarded as representative and applied to find the accused guilty of the war 
crimes of torture.  
88 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic Case No.IT-96-23 & IT-96-
23/1-A (ICTY Trial Chamber), 12 June 2002, (Prosecutor v Kunarac) paras 473 & 474. 
89 Filártiga v Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit) 30 June 1980. http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/filartiga-630F2d876.html [accessed 
31 October 2015]. 
90 In the context of the American legal system, to act under the colour of law means to act beyond the 
bounds of legal authority, but in such a manner that the unlawful acts were done while the official was 
purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his official duties. See 
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/u002.htm  [accessed 17 January 2015]. See also Kadic v Karadzi 70F.3d 
232 (1995), paras 240-241 and 244-2445.  
91 Kadic v Karadzi (note 90 above) paras 243-245. 
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against the victim or a third person.92 
 
It follows therefore that while the official capacity of the perpetrator is a requirement 
under CAT, international criminal law does not require same. The Trial Chamber of 
the ICTY in the case of the Prosecutor v Kvocka, considered this element to be 
inconsistent with the principle of individual criminal responsibility for international 
crimes as detailed in international humanitarian law and international criminal law.93 
Justification for this distinction lies in the differences between international human 
rights law and international criminal law. One such difference is that international 
human rights law creates obligations for the state while international criminal law 
focuses on individual criminal responsibility.94 Because of the peripheral role played 
by the state under international criminal law, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in 
Prosecutor v Kunarac observed that the limitation of torture to state-actors in CAT is 
influenced by the fact that CAT is a human rights instrument and therefore not 
binding on the Tribunal as the accused persons were charged under international 
criminal law in which prosecution is based on individual criminal responsibility for 
violation of IHL, which does not depend on participation of the state.95  
 
The ICTY in the case of Prosecutor v Kunarac warned that there should be a 
distinction between torture as a human rights violation and torture as an international 
crime.96 The Trial Chamber emphasised that the distinctions lie mostly in the 
structural differences between these two bodies of law, namely that human rights law 
is aimed at protecting citizens from state-organised or state-sponsored violence and 
that the state itself is the ultimate guarantor of the rights protected, for which it has 
duties and responsibilities, while IHL focuses on individual criminal responsibility in 
which individuals and not states, are called to account. 
  
These differences notwithstanding, it is important to note that human rights treaty 
                                                          
92 Prosecutor v Kunarac (note 88 above) para 483. 
93Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvocka et al Case No IT-98-30/1-T (ICTY Trial Chamber) 2 November 2001 
para 139. 
94 In the cases of Prosecutor v Delalic (note 87 above), and Prosecutor v Furundzija (note 4 above), 
the ICTY noted that the CAT definition is not binding in all cases as article 1(1) explicitly states that the 
said definition is for purposes of ‘the present convention’ being CAT. 
95 Prosecutor v Kunarac (note 88 above) para 470. 
96As above. 
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bodies have at times been confronted with communications, which involve the 
violation of IHL.97 The European Commission has approached such cases by 
confining itself only to the violation of human rights, while the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (Inter-American Court) has applied IHL directly in communications, 
which involve the violation of both human rights and IHL. Hailbronner argues that the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) have an even greater 
opportunity to infuse the broad provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) with IHL standards and thereby provide a measure 
of justice to victims.98 One of the justifications advanced in advocating for human 
rights treaty bodies to deal with the violation of IHL is that human rights do not 
generally cease to be applicable in times of an armed conflict.99 
 
Taking into account that there are differences between torture as a human rights 
violation and torture as a violation of IHL, this research focuses on torture as a 
human rights violation. Therefore, although jurisprudence of international criminal 
tribunals and prohibition of torture under IHL is referred to every now and then, the 
differences between these two legal systems are borne in mind and the research 
assesses domestic implementation of international human rights standards against 
torture, as understood under international human rights law.   
 
1.3 Problem statement 
 
The problem, which has been identified by this study is that despite a comprehensive 
international legal framework to which Lesotho is a party, torture continues to take 
place in Lesotho; more so within security institutions. Factors, which have been 
                                                          
97 M Hailbronner ‘Laws in conflict: The relationship between human rights and international 
humanitarian law under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2016) 16 (2) African 
Human Rights Law Journal 340. See also F Viljoen ‘The relationship between international human 
rights and humanitarian law in the African human rights system: An institutional approach’ in J 
Kleffner & E de Wet (eds) Convergence and conflicts of human rights and international humanitarian 
law in military operations (2014) 333. 
98 Hailbronner (note 97 above) 363. 
99 (As above) 342. See also Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda Case No. TT 216-20 (ICJ), 19 
December 2005, paras 179 &180 in which the ICJ held that Uganda was an occupying power in the 
DRC and therefore had an obligation to respect both international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law during the armed conflict in the DRC. See also Legal Consequences for States of 
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Case No. 276/1970 (ICJ) 21 June 1971. 
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identified as contributing to the high incidence of torture in Lesotho are weak national 
legal and institutional frameworks, which do not incorporate international human 
rights standards against torture and also contain immunities and amnesties for its 
perpetrators,100 political instability, which contributes to reluctance on the part of the 
state to enact anti-torture legislation, failure of police officers to investigate 
allegations of torture, failure of the public prosecutors to prosecute suspects of 
torture, and failure of the courts of law to impose appropriate sanctions against 
perpetrators of torture and to award appropriate remedies to victims of torture.  
 
The problem of non-implementation of international human rights standards against 
torture has several facets to it. These are failure to prevent acts of torture before they 
actually happen, failure to effectively investigate allegations of torture and punish 
perpetrators thereof, failure to provide appropriate and adequate redress to victims 
of torture, and failure to submit state reports to relevant human rights treaty bodies 
on measures taken against torture.101 
 
1.3.1 Failure to prevent torture  
 
In chapter 4, reports compiled by several human rights organisations, as well as 
court cases highlight the magnitude of torture, as well as the severity of the acts 
committed by members of the security forces in Lesotho. The incidents and statistics 
of torture illustrate that Lesotho has failed to prevent torture. Factors, which have 
contributed to Lesotho’s failure to prevent torture, are highlighted in chapter 3, in 
which Lesotho’s legal and institutional frameworks are benchmarked against 
standards contained in the international legal framework. In this study, it is illustrated 
that unlike other jurisdictions in which torture is prevented through specific anti-
                                                          
100 For instance, the Amnesty Bill of 2016, which is discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
101 Lesotho acceded to the ICCPR on 9 September 1992. In terms of article 40, the initial report was 
due in September 1993 and thereafter when the HRC so requests. Lesotho’s initial report was 
submitted five years later in May 1998. No subsequent reports have been submitted to the HRC. 
Lesotho acceded to CAT on 12 November 2001. In terms of article 19, its initial report, which was due 
in 2002, is fifteen years overdue. Lesotho ratified CEDAW on 22 August 1995. Its initial report, which 
was due in 1996, was submitted sixteen years later in 2012. A subsequent periodic report under 
CEDAW was in terms of article 18 (2) due in 2016, but it has not yet been submitted and is therefore 
one year overdue. Lesotho ratified the African Charter on 10 February 1992. Article 62 mandates state 
parties to submit periodic reports every two years. The initial report was submitted on 1 August 2000 
and currently Lesotho has eight overdue reports. 
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torture legislation or included in other penal laws, in Lesotho none exists. Freedom 
from torture is provided for as a fundamental human right in the Constitution,102 and 
listed as one of the elements of war crimes and crimes against humanity in sections 
94 and 95 of the Penal Code, respectively. However, neither the Penal Code nor the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act prohibit torture as a distinct crime. As a result, 
there are no specific legislative or administrative measures put in place to prevent 
torture.  
 
Lesotho’s failure to prevent torture is amplified by the fact that over and above the 
absence of legislative measures to prevent torture, there are no effective 
administrative measures aimed at preventing torture. A number of international 
human rights instruments mandate states to establish independent visiting bodies 
vested with the mandate to monitor the treatment of detainees and conditions of 
detention facilities.103 Justification for the establishment of such bodies is succinctly 
captured by the Open Society Justice Initiative Report of 2011 in which it is observed 
that the risk of torture is higher in detention facilities, such as police cells and 
correctional institutions, and that independent visiting bodies should ensure that 
conditions, which pose the risk of torture are dealt with before torture actually takes 
place.104 Although the Prisons Proclamation of 1957 and the Basutoland Prison 
Service Rules of 1957 provided for the establishment of a visiting committee whose 
main mandate would be to have access to and monitor all places of detention and 
also detect human rights abuses in prison,105 such committees were never 
appointed. The Proclamation has been repealed and replaced by the Correctional 
Service Act of 2016,106 while the Prisons Service Rules remain in force pending 
adoption of new rules or regulations under the Correctional Service Act. A setback 
with the Correctional Service Act is that it does not provide for the establishment of 
                                                          
102 Constitution of Lesotho1993, section 8. 
103 For instance, Robben Island Guidelines adopted in terms of the African Commission Resolution on 
Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines) 2002, Robben Island Guideline 40 cites 
the prevention of mechanisms independent of the detention and enforcement authorities as one of 
torture prevention mechanisms. 
104 Open Society Justice Initiative ‘Pre-trial detention and torture: why pre-trial detainees face the 
greatest risk’ A global campaign for pre-trial justice report (2011) 11. 
105 Prisons Proclamation No.30 of 1957 section 31(2) (a) read with The Basutoland Prison Rules of 
1957 part C. 
106 Correctional Service Act No.3 of 2016. 
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any structures aimed at the prevention of torture and other human rights abuses in 
the correctional institutions at all.  
 
While the prison authorities have allowed a number of independent organisations 
and bodies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR),107 and the Transformation Resource Centre (TRC) to access places of 
detention, such as the Maseru Central Prison, they have done so on the basis of 
practice as there is no written law, which authorises such access. The absence of a 
law, which gives independent organisations and bodies access to prisons, poses a 
risk to the sustainability of the said practice.  
 
Other administrative measures linked to torture prevention include education and the 
dissemination of information on the inherent right to freedom from torture. This 
obligation includes the training of law enforcement personnel and the review of 
interrogation rules and instruction methods.108 Members of the LMPS, LDF and LCS 
undergo human rights training during recruitment, as well as during service.109 
However, the high occurrence of torture in Lesotho begs the question whether in 
practice the training is offered as it is reflected in the training manuals. 
  
1.3.2 Failure to prohibit and punish torture 
 
The second facet of the problem of torture in Lesotho is impunity. Despite the 
number of civil cases of allegations of torture, especially by the police and army 
officers, there are very few criminal cases in which perpetrators of torture are 
prosecuted. Several factors are attributed to the impunity of perpetrators of torture. 
The main factor is the absence of anti-torture legislation. While the Constitution 
protects the right to freedom from torture as an absolute right, there is no criminal 
                                                          
107 African Commission Mission Report on the joint promotion mission to the Kingdom of Lesotho 3-7 
September 2012 http://www.achpr.org/promo...achpr54_misrep (ACHPR Mission Report), which 
indicates that there were cases of torture of inmates by correctional officers in 2012. 
108 CAT article10. 
109 A Dissel, T Masuku M Tshehlo & S Tait ‘The police as friend and helper to the people: Assessing 
the Lesotho Mounted Police Service performance in terms of the Southern African Police Chiefs 
Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) Code of Conduct’ African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum 
(2011) 11.  
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law, which proscribes torture and prescribes punishment for its commission.110 
Because there is no law under which perpetrators are held accountable specifically 
for the commission of torture, they end up not being prosecuted. If prosecuted, upon 
conviction perpetrators of torture are not given a sentence, which takes into account 
the heinous nature of the offence of torture.  
 
Closely linked to the absence of anti-torture laws, is the lack of political will by those 
in power in Lesotho to enact it and in the meantime to use the Penal Code and 
common law to prosecute law enforcement officials who are implicated in acts of 
torture. This reluctance leads one to question whether the lack of prosecution is 
because there is no law under which the perpetrators would be charged, or whether 
there is no desire at all to prosecute perpetrators of torture because it is accepted as 
an interrogation or punishment technique. The absence of anti-torture legislation 
does not only affect the implementation of the obligation to prohibit torture, but 
negatively affects the entire justice system: from investigation, prosecution, 
punishment of perpetrators of torture to redress for its victims. Consequently, it 
encourages members of the security forces to commit torture with impunity. Although 
not ideal, members of the security forces who commit torture could be investigated 
and punished under other provisions of the Penal Code, which proscribe violent 
offences, such as murder, or assault, such is hampered by the exclusive vesting of 
investigation powers in the police and lack of similar powers in other oversight 
bodies, such as the Police Complaints Authority and Office of the Ombudsman, 
which are independent of the LMPS. 
 
Due to the loopholes in the Penal Code and the absence of specific anti-torture 
legislation, the obligation to investigate allegations of torture is also compromised. 
Although national human rights oversight bodies, such as the Office of the 
Ombudsman, the Police Complaints Authority and the Military Police established to 
deal with allegations of human rights violations by law enforcement agents exist in 
Lesotho, these bodies do not have full investigative powers and therefore refer the 
reported cases to the police for investigation. Because majority of the cases involve 
                                                          
110 As illustrated in chapter 3 of this thesis, the Penal Code Act makes reference to torture, but does 
not criminalise it as a distinct crime. 
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the police, they do not provide prompt and impartial investigation of allegation of 
torture.111 Consequently, Lesotho fails to implement the obligation to investigate 
allegations of torture and to punish its perpetrators. The failure is exacerbated by 
amnesty laws.112 
  
1.3.3 Failure to provide redress to victims of torture 
 
The third facet to the problem of Lesotho’s implementation of its international human 
rights obligations against torture is with regard to the redress for victims of torture. 
When interpreting this obligation, the Committee against Torture has stipulated that 
redress does not only refer to monetary compensation, but entails restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.113 
However, the reported cases of torture show that in Lesotho, redress focuses 
exclusively on monetary compensation and nothing is put in place for the restitution 
and rehabilitation of the victims of torture,114 including guarantees by the perpetrators 
that such acts would not be repeated. 
  
In a newspaper interview, the former Minister of Law and Constitutional Affairs, 
Mophato Monyake, stated that the government budgets around four million Maloti 
(M4,000 000.00) per annum for compensation of victims of torture.115 This amount 
constitutes about ten percent of the Ministry’s budget.116 It therefore shows that a lot 
of money is spent on the compensation of victims of torture yet there are no 
mechanisms put in place for its prevention or punishment of its perpetrators. Hence, 
when addressing whether payment of damages to victims of police brutality has a 
deterrent or preventive effect, the South African Constitutional Court in the case of 
                                                          
111 In the case of Evloev v Kazakhstan Communication 441/2010 (Committee against Torture), 5 
November 2010, UN Doc CAT/C/51/D/441/2010 para 4, the Committee against Torture held that the 
investigation of the allegations of torture by the same institution where the alleged torture is committed 
does not lead to impartial investigation; Robben Island Guideline 40. 
112 See note 14 above. 
113 Committee against Torture GC 3 para 2; Bendib v Algeria Communication 376/2009 (Committee 
against Torture), 8 November 2013, UN Doc CAT/C/51/D/376/2009 para 6.7. 
114 For instance, in all the cases before the courts of Lesotho referred to in chapter 4 of this thesis, 
only monetary compensation was awarded to victims of torture and no other means of redress, 
including rehabilitation and reform of the national legal system to include criminalisation of torture were 
ordered by the Courts. 
115 About 300,000 USD 
116 As reflected in the budget speech for 2014/2015 delivered on 20 February 2014. 
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Fose v Minister of Safety and Security, held that ‘it would seem that funds of this 
nature could be better employed in structural and systemic ways to eliminate or 
substantially reduce the causes of infringement’,117 instead of budgeting for the 
infringement. 
 
1.3.4 Failure to submit state reports on measures taken against torture 
 
As far as torture is concerned, the importance of the state reporting process is that it 
enables states to review their laws on torture and to be aware of areas, which need 
reform, to compile statistics so as to track the crime of torture and lastly, to benefit 
from the treaty bodies’ concluding observations as to what measures may be put in 
place to effectively implement obligations against torture.118 However, despite having 
ratified a number of international human rights instruments, which contain obligations 
against torture, Lesotho has failed to submit state party reports to relevant oversight 
bodies, such as the HRC, Committee against Torture, CEDAW Committee and 
African Commission to mention but a few.119 
 
The human rights treaty bodies which review state party reports have emphasised 
that the reports must contain, amongst others, statistics on reported cases of torture, 
investigations conducted, prosecutions done, punishments imposed as well as 
remedies awarded.120 Statistics play an important role in assessing the human rights 
situation in any given country.121 If Lesotho complied with its reporting obligations by 
compiling and supplying statistics on torture, this would highlight the seriousness of 
torture in Lesotho and also help those in charge to design the type of interventions, 
needed to deal with the problem. Due to a lack of statistical data on many human 
rights violations, the few state party reports which Lesotho has submitted to human 
                                                          
117 Fose v Min of Safety and Security (1997) 3 SA 786 (CC) para 72. 
118 HRC, General Comment 30 ‘Reporting obligations of states parties under article 40 of the 
Covenant’ 18 September 2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.2/Add.12; ICESCR Committee General 
Comment 1 ‘Reporting by state parties’ 27 July 1981, UN Doc E/1989/22. 
119 Note 101 above. 
120 CRC Committee, Concluding observations on the second to fourth periodic report of Brazil 30 
October 2015 UN Doc CRC/C/BRA/CO/2-4 para 38; HRC Concluding observations on the second 
periodic report of Thailand 25 April 2017 UN Doc CCPR/THA/CO/2 para 47; CMW Committee, 
Concluding observations on Jamaica in the absence of a report 23 May 2017 UN Doc 
CMW/C/JAM/CO/1 para 35. 
121 TB Jabine & RP Claude ‘Exploring human rights issues with statistics’ in TB Jabine & RP Claude 
(eds.) Human rights and statistics: getting the record straight (1992) 5. 
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rights treaty bodies have been criticised as inconclusive.122 Due to lack of statistics, 
Lesotho has not been able to reflect on the status of torture in Lesotho and to assess 
factors, which impede the effective implementation of international human rights 
standards against torture.  
 
1.4 Central assumption 
 
In the light of the background and the problem discussed above, the thesis of this 
research is that failure to implement international human rights standards against 
torture is responsible for Lesotho’s weak legal and institutional frameworks against 
torture. The weak legal and institutional frameworks have resulted in a high rate of 
torture, impunity for perpetrators of torture (most of who are members of the security 
institutions) and a lack of redress for victims of torture. 
 
The legal framework is weakened by the fact that while the right to freedom from 
torture is guaranteed as a fundamental human right in the Constitution, there is no 
legislation, which criminalises torture and as a result acts, which amount to torture 
are prosecuted as common law crimes, such as murder and assault. This approach 
is inconsistent with Lesotho’s international human rights obligations as it fails to 
highlight the gravity and heinous nature of the offence of torture in Lesotho. The 
Penal Code Act123 lists torture as an element of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.124 Thus, it prohibits torture as an international crime and does not cover 
the human rights obligation to criminalise torture as a distinct crime.125 
 
Lesotho’s institutional framework is also weakened by the absence of an anti-torture 
law. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Police Complaints Authority do not have 
a clear mandate to receive, investigate and prosecute cases of torture. Furthermore, 
as far as torture is concerned, the functions of these two institutions overlap and both 
have limited financial and human resources. Absence of a functioning Human Rights 
                                                          
122 For instance, CEDAW Committee, The combined initial to fourth report of the Kingdom of Lesotho, 
11 October 2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/LSO/1-4. 
123 Penal Code Act 2010. 
124 Penal Code Act sections 94 & 95. 
125 CAT article 4.  
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Commission also weakens the institutional framework.126 Issues relating to torture, 
which can be best dealt with by the Human Rights Commission remain in the hands 
of the existing institutions and bodies, whose effectiveness is questioned in chapter 
3. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
 
The main question, which this research seeks to investigate, is the extent to which 
Lesotho has complied with obligations against torture as contained in customary 
international law, as well as international human rights instruments to which it is a 
party. This question is divided into the following sub-questions: 
 
1. What standards and obligations does international human rights law impose 
on states as far as torture is concerned? 
2. What are the legal and institutional frameworks against torture in Lesotho and 
do these frameworks adhere to the standards and obligations created by 
international human rights law?  
3. What are the challenges or problems, which inhibit the effective 
implementation of international human rights standards against torture in 
Lesotho? 
4. What is the effect of the failure to implement international human rights 
standards at the domestic level? 
5. What means can be put in place in Lesotho towards the effective 
implementation of the international human rights standards against torture? 
 
1.6 Research objectives 
 
The general objective of this research is to evaluate the extent to which Lesotho has 
implemented international human rights standards, which oblige states to prevent 
and prohibit torture, to punish its perpetrators and to provide redress to its victims. 
 
                                                          
126 Sixth Amendment to the Constitution Act 2011 and Human Rights Commission Act 2016, provided 
for establishment of the Human Rights Commission. However, at the time of submission of this thesis 
the Human Rights Commission had not been established. 
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The specific objectives are: 
 
1. to highlight through the analysis of international human rights instruments, 
human rights standards against torture and states’ obligations in relation 
thereto;  
2. to illustrate the place of international law in the legal system of Lesotho and to 
recommend the ways in which international standards against torture can be 
incorporated into the legal system of Lesotho; 
3. to examine the laws and institutions in Lesotho so as to evaluate the extent to 
which they implement the international human rights obligations against 
torture and to identify the challenges, which inhibit the effective 
implementation of the said standards; 
4. to analyse the practice of torture in Lesotho so as to highlight its extent 
occasioned by political instability and the failure to domesticate international 
human rights standards against torture; and 
5. to draw conclusions from the research done and to make recommendations as 
to the means, which Lesotho may employ towards the effective domestic 
implementation of international human rights standards against torture. 
 
1.7 Scope and limitations   
 
In examining the legal and institutional frameworks in Lesotho and benchmarking 
same against the international standards against torture, this research adopts a 
human rights approach. It is well appreciated that torture is not solely a human rights 
issue, but that it also has political, cultural and moral dimensions. From a political 
perspective, torture may sometimes be resorted to as a means to a political end. In 
some cases, due to political reasons, governments are reluctant to investigate 
allegations of torture and to prosecute its perpetrators.127 The cultural dimension of 
torture can be inferred from the fact that in the Sesotho culture, there are sayings or 
idioms, which condone torture, especially of criminals and of children.128  In its 
concluding observations on Lesotho’s state party report submitted in 2001, prior to 
                                                          
127 See analysis of the practice of torture in Lesotho in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
128 For instance, a Sesotho saying that ‘Lesholu ke ntja le lefa ka hlooho ea lona’ meaning assaulting a 
thief is justified as he has to pay for the wrong he has done. 
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the enactment of the Children’s Protection and Welfare Act, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, which is a body established to oversee implementation of CRC, 
raised a concern that: 
 
 … the practice [corporal punishment] continues to be widespread in schools and in the 
family, in the care and juvenile justice system and generally in society. The Committee is 
concerned in particular that corporal punishment of children is accepted among the public at 
large.129 … [and that] incidents of violence, including beatings, committed against children by 
law enforcement officials and the lack of investigation or criminal justice response to such 
incidents.130 
 
The anecdotal statistics on incidents of torture make it clear that torture has become 
an imbedded culture in the law enforcement agencies in Lesotho. From a moral 
perspective, several arguments are advanced that it would be justifiable to subject a 
suspect to torture in order to get information, which is necessary to avert danger to 
more people.131  
 
While these political, cultural and moral arguments cannot be ignored, this research 
is limited to discussions of freedom from torture as an absolute human right and will 
therefore not consider arguments regarding whether there are exceptional 
circumstances in which torture may be justified. This study is limited to the 
assessment of the implementation of existing standards dictated by customary 
international law and treaty law, which emphasise total prohibition of torture. 
  
Both international human rights law and IHL proscribe torture and provide standards 
and obligations for its prohibition. However, as indicated in the definition of torture 
earlier in this chapter, there are fundamental distinctions between these two systems 
of law in that human rights law invokes state responsibility while humanitarian law, 
which is enforced through international criminal law, invokes individual criminal 
responsibility. This research is limited to the implementation of standards prescribed 
under international human rights law under the auspices of the UN and AU. The sub-
                                                          
129 CRC Committee, Concluding Observations on the initial report of Lesotho 18 July 2001, UN Doc 
CRC/C/15/Add.147 para 31. 
130 As above para 33. 
131 D Luban ‘Liberalism, torture and the time bomb’ in SP Lee (ed) Intervention, terrorism and torture: 
Contemporary challenges to just war theory (2007) 249. 
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regional level, represented by the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), is excluded because SADC instruments do not contain specific standards 
on torture except in relation to extradition, which is considered in chapter 3 of this 
thesis. Despite its main focus being international human rights standards, the 
research refers to international humanitarian law and jurisprudence of international 
criminal tribunals in areas where the two systems take inspiration from each other 
with regard to the definition of torture, the scope of application of its prohibition and 
states’ obligations in relation thereto. 
  
Almost all international human rights instruments, which prohibit torture, also contain 
provisions regarding CIDT. However, this research is limited to the discussion of 
standards against torture as defined in article 1(1) of CAT and does not cover acts, 
which fall short of the elements stipulated therein. While discussion on the definition 
of torture has revealed that torture can take place in different settings, this research 
is limited to the discussion of torture as it takes place within the law enforcement 
institutions, such as police stations, correctional institutions and military detention 
centres in Lesotho. 
 
1.8  Methodology 
 
The research was conducted through a desktop study, which employed descriptive, 
normative and comparative analytic techniques. This approach was adopted in light 
of the practical nature of the research and the importance of addressing the findings 
of the study. The recommendations made at the end of the study are based on this 
analysis. The analytical approach was adopted in order to determine the relationship 
between international law and the legal system of Lesotho. The descriptive analysis 
enabled the identification of obligations against torture as contained in international 
human rights instruments. It also enabled the review of Lesotho’s domestic laws 
relating to prevention, prohibition and punishment of torture.  
 
The domestic legal and institutional frameworks were benchmarked against the 
international human rights standards through a normative approach. The national 
laws, policies, guidelines and training manuals for law enforcement officials on 
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interrogation techniques and the arrest of suspects were also analysed using a 
normative approach from a human rights perspective.  
 
Examples were drawn from other jurisdictions, where relevant, in the analysis of 
Lesotho’s legal and institutional frameworks, thus engaging a comparative approach 
in relation to this aspect of the study. A pragmatic stance was adopted in the use of 
jurisprudence of national and international courts, as well as international human 
rights treaty bodies for formulating conceptual and theoretical frameworks on torture 
in Lesotho. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, a prescriptive approach is 
adopted through which specific recommendations on how Lesotho should implement 
the international standards against torture are made. 
  
1.9 Literature review  
 
This study is situated within the broader area of international human rights law. Its 
specific focus is on international human rights standards against torture and the 
domestic implementation of such in Lesotho; that is, the study takes inspiration from 
research in three areas of law: international law, human rights law and domestic laws 
of Lesotho. The research seeks to extrapolate the major debates surrounding the 
implementation of international law at the domestic level, including the debate on 
whether individuals are subjects and/or beneficiaries of international law, as well as 
the monist/dualist theories on incorporation of international law into domestic legal 
systems. The research also extrapolates the debate regarding states’ obligations 
against torture, including the enactment of anti-torture legislation, non-refoulement 
and reparation for victims of torture. 
 
In order to address the debates stipulated above and in the quest to address the 
problem of torture in Lesotho, the study draws from works of eminent international 
law and human rights scholars and practitioners that the author of this thesis is 
aware of, such as Manfred Nowak, John Dugard, Frans Viljoen and Malcom Shaw 
who have done extensive research and have published on international law, human 
rights and states’ obligations to protect human rights in general and obligations 
against torture in particular. Jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, as 
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well as jurisprudence, general comments and concluding observations of human 
rights treaty bodies are also resorted to in order to interpret the scope and content of 
states’ obligations against torture.  
 
Little research has been done on torture in Lesotho and the domestic implementation 
of international human rights standards against torture in particular. This study 
therefore seeks to fill the gap between Lesotho’s failure to implement international 
human rights standards against torture and political instability as factors responsible 
for the high incidence of torture in Lesotho. Because of the link between torture and 
the political history of Lesotho, the discussion draws inspiration from literature in the 
field of political science. 
  
The literature review is divided into three thematic areas: the first theme is 
international standards against torture and their importance or relevance at the 
domestic level, the second theme covers literature, which addresses the problem of 
torture in Lesotho and the third theme deals with literature, which discusses the 
political history of Lesotho, which the study links to the occurrences of torture in 
Lesotho. 
  
1.9.1 International human rights standards against torture and their 
relevance to the domestic legal systems 
 
Dugard defines general international law principles and sources of international law. 
He identifies prohibition of torture as a peremptory norm from which no derogation is 
permitted.132 Similarly, Shaw discusses basic international law principles such as 
states’ obligations to protect human rights and states’ responsibility regarding the 
violation of human rights.133 He describes human rights treaties, including those 
against torture, as well as mechanisms in the form of treaty bodies, which are put in 
place to oversee such treaties. He also alludes to non-treaty mechanisms against 
torture, such as special rapporteurs. A similar approach is adopted by Starmer and 
Christou. Amongst others, they discuss the prohibition of torture in international law, 
the relevant international human rights instruments, monitoring bodies, relevant 
                                                          
132 J Dugard International law: A South African perspective (2011) 46. 
133 NM Shaw International Law (2014) 194. 
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principles as well as relevant case law.134 The basic principles of international law 
discussed in these books provide a conceptual framework for this research. 
 
Ingles discusses how CAT and the Committee against Torture came into being, the 
role of the Committee in the development of CAT, as well as various aspects of the 
tension between state sovereignty and the implementation of international law.135 
Joseph, Mitchel and Gyorki give an overview of the HRC and the Committee against 
Torture.136 They discuss the prohibition of torture through ICCPR, functions of the 
HRC, including receipt of state reports, interstate complaints and the HRC’s general 
comments. They also discuss the substantive provisions of CAT, the functions of the 
Committee against Torture, as well as its procedures. The history discussed by 
Ingles, as well as the overview provided by Joseph, Mitchel and Gyorki, provide this 
research with the ideology for the adoption of CAT and how the Committee against 
Torture operates. These in turn provide the research with a theory base for arguing 
that Lesotho should implement standards contained in the international instruments it 
has ratified. 
  
Viljoen and Odinkalu discuss substantive norms on torture in the African regional 
human rights system.137 They discuss, amongst others, the norms stipulated in the 
African Charter, the African Women’s Protocol, the African Children’s Charter, as 
well as the procedures available in the African Commission and the African Court for 
both individuals and states. With Lesotho being a member of the AU and a party to 
these instruments, this work provides a background for the discussion of Lesotho’s 
obligations against torture as contained in AU instruments. 
  
Onkemetse discusses the philosophical framework of the relationship between 
international law and municipal law.138 This work briefly makes an observatory 
remark on the two ‘rival theories’ of monism and dualism. While discussing the 
                                                          
134 See generally QC Starmer & TA Christou Human rights manual and sourcebook for Africa (2005).  
135 C Ingelse United Nations Committee against Torture: An assessment (2001) 2. 
136 S Joseph et al Seeking Remedies for torture victims: A handbook on the individual complaints 
procedures of the UN treaty bodies (2006). 
137 F Viljoen & A Odinkalu The prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in the African human rights 
system: A handbook for victims and their advocates (2006). 
138 BT Onkemetse ‘Giving effect to treaties in the domestic law of Botswana: modern judicial practice’ 
(1997) 10 (2) Lesotho Law Journal 205. 
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Botswana dualist approach to international law, it concludes that in the absence of 
legislation, the practice of domestic courts applying international law to domestic 
disputes amounts to a ‘closed-up’ approach. Although the arguments made by 
Onkemetse are focused on Botswana and not Lesotho, because of similarities in the 
two legal systems,139 his findings about the legal system of Botswana inform this 
research as far as the application of international law in Lesotho is concerned. 
 
Wolfendale argues that the occurrence of torture in the military is linked to military 
training methods, which cultivate the psychological dispositions connected to crimes 
of obedience.140 These arguments are used to determine the factors, which 
contribute to military torture in Lesotho. 
 
The jurisprudence, general comments and concluding observations of treaty bodies, 
such as the Committee against Torture, HRC, African Commission and others also 
provide this research with insight regarding the definition of torture, states’ general 
and specific obligations against torture as contained in specific international human 
rights instruments, as well as various means of implementing the provisions of those 
international instruments at the domestic level. 
 
1.9.2 Torture in Lesotho 
 
So far, there have only been five unpublished academic writings on torture in 
Lesotho. This is in the form of academic dissertations by Lenka, Sechele, Makututsa, 
Tsoeunyane and Mothobi. However, unlike the current research, these dissertations 
are limited in focus. For instance, Lenka’s PhD dissertation focuses on the LMPS’ 
observance of general human rights during criminal investigations. He interrogates 
from a historical perspective, the extent to which the Lesotho Police observed human 
rights including freedom from torture and other CIDT. However, he does not focus on 
states’ obligations against torture, which this present research does. Secondly, 
unlike the current research, Lenka limited his work to criminal investigations by the 
                                                          
139 The legal systems of Lesotho and Botswana are similar in the sense that both countries share a 
common heritage of Roman Dutch Law, which they inherited from Britain during colonisation and have 
similar constitutional dispensations.  
140 J Wolfendale Torture and the military profession (2007).  
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Police Service while the current research examines the three law enforcement 
institutions, being the police, the military and correctional service.  
 
Similarly, Sechele’s LLM dissertation focuses on the implementation of standards 
against torture in the LDF exclusively.141 Mothobi’s work focuses on the 
effectiveness of the PCA in dealing with acts of torture committed by members of the 
Lesotho police services.142 In a manner similar to Lenka and Sechele above, 
Makututsa143 and Ts’oeunyane144 limited their focus to investigation techniques. 
Makututsa discusses how torture may be a futile exercise due to the exclusionary 
rule in terms of which evidence obtained through torture must not be admissible in a 
criminal trial. Ts’oeunyane interrogates the admissibility of evidence obtained 
through torture. While these dissertations are limited in focus, they each become 
relevant for different aspects of this research.  
 
Over and above the relevance of the above literature to this research, this research 
builds on the work they have already laid down by expanding the enquiry to include 
all other law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in Lesotho, as well as other human rights 
oversight bodies and by also analysing the substantive and procedural aspects of 
torture in Lesotho in line with the international human rights standards. 
 
1.9.3 Lesotho’s political history and its connection to the occurrence of torture 
 
From the Social Sciences, this study has reviewed the writings of Likoti,145 Matlosa 
and Pule.146 These are political scientists who have undertaken extensive research 
on the politics of Lesotho including political history, relations between the police and 
                                                          
141 BA Sechele ‘An analysis of the compliance by the Lesotho Defence Force with the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ unpublished LLM 
dissertation University of Cape Town, 2008. 
142 M Mothobi ‘Are suspects and detainees protected by law against torture by the police? Effects of 
Police Complaints Authority – A plea for reform’ unpublished LLB dissertation National University of 
Lesotho, 2007. 
143 B Makututsa ‘The impact of torture in crime investigation: case of Lesotho’ unpublished LLB 
dissertation National University of Lesotho, 2006. 
144 M Tšoeunyane ‘The fundamental human rights against torture and confessions in the Lesotho 
Legal system’ unpublished LLB dissertation National University of Lesotho, 2006. 
145 FJ Likoti ‘The implications of executive influence on the police service: a study of the Lesotho 
Mounted Police since independence’ (1999) 2 (2) Lesotho Law Journal 201. 
146 K Matlosa & NW Pule ‘The Military in Lesotho’ (2001) 1 (2) African Security Review 62. 
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the executive as well as the civil-military relations. Although this literature focuses on 
the area of political science, it provides this research with the political context within 
which torture in Lesotho is committed. The current research contributes to the 
already existing body of literature by connecting the political instability to Lesotho’s 
inability to implement international human rights standards against torture. 
 
1.10 Chapter overview 
 
The research is divided into five chapters. In chapter 1 the research is introduced, 
and a definition of torture, which is used throughout the thesis, is provided. The 
research questions to which the research seeks to respond and the methodology 
adopted to respond to those questions is stated. The scope and limitations of the 
research are highlighted and a review of the literature, which is relevant to the 
implementation of international human rights standards against torture in Lesotho, is 
provided. Lastly, an outline of how the research is structured is given. 
 
In chapter 2, the international standards against torture as dictated by customary 
international law, as well as standards contained in human rights instruments in the 
form of binding treaties adopted under the auspices of the UN and AU are 
introduced. The  discussion also extends to non-binding standards and principles 
adopted under these two systems because of their importance in providing 
interpretation, scope, content and practical measures for the implementation of the 
standards contained in the binding instruments. 
 
In chapter 3, the legal and institutional frameworks against torture in Lesotho are 
discussed. The laws related to torture, as well as the institutions responsible for its 
prevention and punishment, are reviewed. The legal and institutional frameworks are 
then benchmarked against the international standards discussed in chapter 2. 
 
In chapter 4, torture in practice is discussed. The discussion provides the context 
within which torture in Lesotho is committed. It links the occurrences of torture and 
Lesotho’s failure to implement international standards to the country’s political 
history. Cases, human rights reports and Lesotho’s state party reports to various 
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treaty bodies in the light of Lesotho’s obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, to 
punish its perpetrators and to provide redress to its victims are also reviewed. 
 
In chapter 5, the research is concluded. Conclusions are drawn from the preceding 
chapters as to where Lesotho stands as far as the implementation of the 
international standards against torture are concerned. Based on the conclusions 
drawn, recommendations are then made as to the legal, methodological and 
practical means that Lesotho may adopt towards the effective implementation of 
international human rights standards against torture. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND STATES’ OBLIGATIONS 
IN RELATION TO TORTURE 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Brierly, Simpson and Dugard define international law as a body of rules and 
principles, which are binding upon states in their relations with one another.147 These 
rules are divided into general rules and particular rules.148 General rules are those 
that are binding on all states (such as customary international law), while particular 
rules are contained in treaty law in terms of which two or more states through a 
written instrument, agree on specific rules, which establish a relationship between 
them.149 It must be noted, however, that some scholars, such as Olufemi argue that 
there are certain rules of customary law, which may be categorised as particular,150 
and D’Amato argues that treaties may also be sources of general international 
law.151 For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to note that human rights standards 
against torture are contained in both customary international law and treaty law. 
There are also non-binding resolutions, principles and other instruments also 
referred to as soft law, which have been adopted under the auspices of the UN and 
different regional and sub-regional organisations, such as the AU at the regional 
level and SADC at the sub-regional level, which contain states’ obligations against 
torture. The non-binding soft law is discussed because of its persuasive nature, as 
well as its considerable moral and political authority.152 Furthermore, some pieces of 
soft law provide guidelines for the implementation of the legally binding 
                                                          
147JL Brierly The Law of Nations: An introduction to the international law of peace (1967)1; G Simpson 
The nature of international law (2001)1; Dugard (note 132 above) 4. 
148 As above. 
149 As above.  
150 E Olufemi ‘The nature of subjective element in customary international law’ (1995) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 502; RB Baker ‘Customary international law: A reconceptualisation’ 
(2016) Brooklyn Journal of International law 439. 
151 A D’Amato ‘Treaties as a source of general rules of international law’ (1962) 3 Harvard 
International Law Journal 7. 
152 Burgers & Danelius (note 71 above) 7. 
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instruments.153  At the centre of all the rules is an agreement that torture cannot be 
justified under any circumstances.154 Despite this apparent consensus amongst 
states that torture must be prevented and prohibited and also that its perpetrators 
must be punished, statistics reported by various human rights organisations show 
that torture takes place in about 141 countries of the world,155 states that commit it 
do not publicly admit nor report it and where they do, they under-report it or qualify it 
as something else other than torture.156  
 
In this chapter, a detailed analysis of the international human rights standards 
against torture as contained in both customary international law and international 
human rights instruments to which Lesotho is a party is provided.157 It is divided into 
five sections. In the first section, the historical evolution of international prohibition of 
torture is given. In the second section, the prohibition of torture under customary 
international law is set out. In the third section, UN standards against torture are 
discussed. In the fourth section, African human rights standards against torture are 
analysed. Standards adopted in the European and Inter-American systems are 
briefly referred to for comparative purposes only because the geographical situation 
of Lesotho  and it being a party to instruments adopted by the UN, AU and SADC  
makes standards adopted by these organisations most relevant and create 
obligations, which directly bind Lesotho. This chapter is confined to standards 
adopted at the UN and AU levels only while SADC standards on extradition are 
considered in the next chapter.  In the fifth section, a conclusion is given based on 
the analysis of standards carried out in the four sections. These standards and 
obligations form the benchmark against which Lesotho’s laws and practices are 
assessed in the next chapters.  
                                                          
153 For instance, the Robben Island Guidelines consist of concrete guidance for African states on how 
to implement the provisions of the African Charter on prohibition and prevention of torture, as well as 
providing redress for victims. 
154 Nowak & McArthur (note 63 above); A Harel & A Sharon ‘What is really wrong with torture?’ (2008) 
6 (2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 246. 
155 Amnesty International ‘Torture in 2014: 30 years of broken promises’ 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ACT40/004/2014/en/ [accessed 1 March 2016]. 
156 L Hajar ‘Does torture work? A socio-legal assessment of the practice in historical and global 
perspective’ (2009) Annual Review of Law and Social Science 3; Human Rights Council 
‘Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual 
orientation and gender identity’ (2011) Annual Report of the UNHCHR, UN Doc A/HCR/19/41 para 23. 
157 Because of the relationship between IHRL and IHL, states’ obligations under IHL are also briefly 
discussed. 
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The discussion of the human rights standards in the third and fourth sections of this 
chapter (i.e. sections 2.4 and 2.5) are consolidated and summarised with reference 
to the four-tier obligations, namely the obligation to prevent and prohibit torture, to 
punish its perpetrators, to provide redress to its victims and to report on measures 
taken by states. However, different approaches are adopted in discussing the 
standards contained in different treaties because some have implicit (some 
confirmed through subsequent interpretation) while others contain explicit (and, in 
some cases, more detailed) obligations relating to torture. Hence, in the discussion 
of UN and African regional treaties in sections 2.4 and 2.5 below, the obligations to 
prevent, prohibit, punish and provide redress are, for some treaties (such as those 
with implicit and less detailed torture-related obligations), grouped as appropriate 
based on the treaty provisions under consideration, and, for other treaties (such as 
those with explicit and more detailed torture-related obligations), they are discussed 
separately. Also, the discussion under sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.1 goes beyond the 
four-tier obligations typology for some treaties, incorporating additional specific 
torture obligations set out in the treaties. 
 
2.2 History of the prohibition of torture under international law 
 
Both the UN and AU (including its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU)) have adopted a number of instruments, which contain standards against 
torture.158 In this section, the history, which led to the adoption of these standards, is 
canvassed as it provides a framework for understanding the international human 
rights standards against torture. Historically, torture was accepted in criminal law as 
an indispensable tool through which the truth could be extracted from suspects, as a 
form of punishment to cleanse offenders and also as a deterrent to would-be 
offenders.159 The early development of international law did not contain standards 
                                                          
158 OAU: Fourth extraordinary session of the assembly of heads of state and government (8 - 9 
September 1999) Sirte, Libya; AM Adejo ‘From OAU to AU: New wine in old bottles?’ (2001) 4 (1 - 2) 
African Journal of International Affairs 119. 
159 WP Nagan & L Atkins ‘The international law of torture: From universal proscription to effective 
application and enforcement’ (2001) 14 Harvard Human Rights Journal 92. 
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against torture.160 The definition of international law itself placed emphasis on states 
as both participants and beneficiaries of international law to the exclusion of 
individuals.161 As a result of the earlier acceptance of torture, human rights standards 
against it have a long and sordid history. When it became clear that torture was 
counterproductive, domestic laws were passed to limit its use. As far back as the 18th 
century, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man prohibited torture.162 Although 
this Declaration did not use the term torture, article 9 thereof provided that ‘if arrest 
shall be indispensable, all harshness not essential to the securing of the prisoner’s 
person shall be severely repressed by law’.163  
 
Although efforts had been made to limit the use of torture at the domestic level in 
some countries such as France, at the international level, where an individual’s rights 
were violated, only his or her state would have a right to lodge a complaint before an 
international tribunal.164 Individuals’ rights were occasionally considered for 
humanitarian purposes where a tyrannical state grossly ill-treated its national or 
religious minorities.165 Even then, humanitarian intervention met fierce criticism on 
the grounds that intervening states did so for purposes of establishing spheres of 
influence or for economic or commercial advantage rather than the desire to alleviate 
human suffering.166 The principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in 
internal affairs of states were often invoked to exclude international protection of 
human rights.167 
                                                          
160 T Buergenthal ‘The normative and institutional evolution of international human rights’ (1997) 19 
(4) Human Rights Quarterly 703. 
161 Brierly (note 147 above); Simpson (note 147 above). 
162 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1789, 
www.historyguide.org/intellect/declaration.html [accessed 11 February 2015].  
163 As above. 
164Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Precautionary claims of Danzig Railway officials who have 
passed into the Polish service against the Polish railway administration) (1928) PCIJ Rep Ser. B 
No.15, 17-18; K Parlett  The individual in the international legal system (2011) 67 who reviews the 
international claims tribunals operating in the 18th and 19th century and concludes that although the 
practice was haphazard, its weight supports characterisation of claims as inter-state rather than 
individuals against a foreign state; LB Sohn ‘The new international law: Protection of the rights of 
individuals rather than states’ (1982-1983) 32 (1) American University Law Review 4.  
165 For instance, Treaty of Berlin 1890. See also Sohn (note 164 above) 5. 
166 D Shelton & PG Carozza Regional protection of human rights (2013) 3; E Schmidt Foreign 
Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (2013) 3; LA Horvitz & C Catherwood 
Encyclopaedia of war crimes and genocide (2009) 211. 
167 AL Clunan ‘Redefining sovereignty: Humanitarianism’s challenge to sovereign immunity’ in N 
Shawki & M Cox (eds) Negotiating sovereignty and human rights: Actors and issues in contemporary 
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The legacies of the two World Wars precipitated the establishment of international 
human rights standards, including standards against torture. The steps began inter 
alia with the establishment of a protection system of inhabitant national, ethnic, 
religious and linguistic minorities within the framework of the League of Nations.168 
However, due to policies of the countries involved, which failed to render 
constructive cooperation, this minorities protection system turned out to be 
unsuccessful. Consequently, deeply distressful various minority groups, in particular 
Jews, homosexuals and persons with disabilities were tortured and massacred by 
the Nazis during World War II.169 Rising from the ashes of World War II, the 
international community established the United Nations with the mandate to address 
issues of aggression, peace and security, as well as the protection of human 
rights.170 The protection of individuals’ rights to life, dignity and freedom from torture 
became the principal aims of the UN.171 According to Burgers and Danelius, the idea 
of human rights protection was based on the ‘recognition that a human being does 
not exist for the benefit of the state, but that the state exists for the benefit of the 
human being’.172  
 
Soon after its establishment, the UN adopted the Universal Declaration in 1948, the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949173 and their Additional Protocols of 1977.174 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
human rights politics (2009) 7; Riesman WM ‘Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary 
international law’(1990) American Journal of International law  868. 
168 P Hilport ‘The League of Nations and the protection of minorities: Re-discovering a great 
experiment’ (1990) 84 (4) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 87 who states that the League 
of Nations was given mandate to protect minorities who had been occasioned by border changes in 
Europe after World War I. 
169 See Buergenthal (note 160 above) 703.  
170 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, (UN Charter) preamble para 1; H 
Kelson The law of the United Nations: A critical analysis of its fundamental problems (1950) 13. 
171 UN Charter preamble reaffirms the UN’s faith in fundamental human rights and freedoms; UN 
Charter articles 1(2), 1(3) 13(b), and 62(2); Dugard (note 132 above) 308. 
172 Burgers & Danelius (note 71 above) 1; GA O’Donnell ‘Why the rule of law matters’ (2004) 15 (4) 
Journal of Democracy 32. 
173 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces 
in the field 12 August 1949 (1st Geneva Convention); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded and sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea 12 August 1949 
(2nd Geneva Convention); Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war 12 August 
1949 (3rd Geneva Convention); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War 12 August 1949 (4th Geneva Convention). Lesotho ratified all four Geneva Conventions 
on 20 May 1968. 
174 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 and Protocol Additional to the 
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ICCPR and International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) were adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1979. The ICCPR, 
ICESCR and Universal Declaration are together referred to as the International Bill of 
Rights.175  
 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. However, it 
neither defines torture nor gives examples of acts, which constitute torture. The 
prohibition of torture was later expanded by article 7 of the ICCPR, albeit still without 
a definition, as the definition of torture was only articulated by CAT in 1984. The 
standards contained in these instruments are discussed later on in this chapter. The 
Universal Declaration has laid a foundation for the prohibition of torture in 
international law and influenced other international instruments and national 
constitutions.176 This great influence has elevated some of provisions of the 
Universal Declaration, especially civil and political rights such as freedom from 
torture, to the status of customary international law by satisfying two conditions, 
which are discussed in detail in the next section.177  
 
2.3  Prohibition of torture under customary international law 
 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lists custom as one 
of the sources of international law.178 It defines custom as ‘a general practice 
accepted as law’.179  Customary international law has two elements of usus (state 
practice) and opinio juris (the belief that such practice is required as a matter of 
law).180 The prohibition of torture has been established to satisfy these two elements 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
175 As noted by Walts, ‘there is no single, straight forward story about the origins, shape and content 
of the International Bill of Rights’. See SE Walts ‘Universalising human rights: The role of small states 
in the construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2001) 23 (1) Human Rights 
Quarterly 44. 
176 For instance, the European Convention on Human Rights, ICCPR and CAT specifically state that 
they were adopted in accordance with the Universal Declaration.  
177 H Hannum ‘The status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in national and international 
law’ (1995-1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 317. 
178 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice 1946 (ICJ Statute). 
179 ICJ Statute article 38(1) (b). 
180 These two elements are well established as they have been confirmed and elaborated on in SS 
Lotus (France v Turkey) 7 September 1927 PCIJ Ser.A No.10 (Lotus case); The Asylum case 
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and is therefore part of customary international law.181 It is also regarded as part of 
customary international law because it is contained in article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration, which has itself achieved the status of customary international law. 182  
 
Prohibition of torture is not only a principle of customary international law but has 
risen to the status of a peremptory norm in both human rights law and international 
humanitarian law.183 A peremptory norm is defined by article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969 as: 
 
a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character. 
 
There is widespread support for the view that prohibition against slavery, genocide, 
racial discrimination, torture and denial of self-determination qualify as peremptory 
norms.184 Prohibition of torture ‘has the highest standing in customary [international] 
law and is so fundamental as to supersede all other treaties and customary laws 
(except laws that are also jus cogens)’.185 The jus cogens status of the prohibition of 
torture under international criminal law has been confirmed by the ICTY in the 
Furundzija case as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Columbia v Peru) 1950 ICJ Reports 395; Rights of passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) 
1960 ICJ Reports 6 (Rights of Passage case); North Sea Continental Shelf cases 1969 ICJ 3 para41; 
Dugard (note 132 above) 29; A Aust Handbook of international law (2005) 6; J Browlie Principles of 
international law (2003) 6. 
181 R Sifris Reproductive freedom, torture and international human rights: Challenging the 
masculinisation of torture 37; Burgers & Danelius (note 71 above) 100. See also NS Rodley & M 
Pollard ‘Criminalisation of torture: States’ obligations under the United Nations Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (2006) 2 European Human 
Rights Law Review 115.  
182 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America 
v Iran) 1980 ICJ Reports 1 in which the ICJ invoked the Universal Declaration and referred to the 
principles contained therein as fundamental principles legally binding on Iran with regard to 
deprivation of liberty and the imposition of physical constraints and conditions of hardship.  
183 Dugard (note 132 above) 43. L Juma ‘The role of human rights in post-conflict situations in Africa’ 
(2008) 2 (2) Malawi Law Journal 279. C Fournet ‘The universality of the prohibition of the crime of 
genocide: 1948-2008’ (2009) 19 (2) International Criminal Justice Review 132. 
184 E de Wet ‘The prohibition of torture as an international norm of jus cogens and its implications for 
national and customary law’ (2004) 15 (1) European Journal of International Law, 97; A Bianchi 
‘Human rights and the magic of jus cogens’ (2008) 19(3) European Journal of International Law 498. 
185 Human Rights Watch The legal prohibition against torture 1 June 2004 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/03/11/legal-prohibition-against-torture [accessed 12 June 2016]; 
Commentary on article 26 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(note 5 above) para 5. 
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…the fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has effects at 
the inter-state and individual levels. At the inter-state level, it serves to internationally 
delegitimize any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorising torture…at the individual 
level, that is, that of criminal liability, it would seem that one of the consequences of the jus 
cogens character bestowed by the international community upon prohibition of torture is that 
every state is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of 
torture who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction.186  
 
From this reasoning, the following state’s obligations are identified: the obligation not 
to enact any laws, nor take any administrative measures or judicial decisions, which 
authorise torture; the obligation to investigate allegations of torture, to prosecute 
suspects of torture, to punish those convicted of torture and also to extradite 
suspects of torture whom the state does not prosecute.187  In the South African case 
of National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African 
Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another, the South African Constitutional Court 
held that international law prohibition against torture has the status of a peremptory 
norm and is thus law in South Africa, which binds the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) to investigate allegations of torture committed by Zimbabwean authorities 
against Zimbabwean nationals in Zimbabwe.188 Similarly, article 139 of the 1999 
Constitution of Switzerland provides that ‘no Peoples’ Initiative aimed at 
constitutional amendment may be in conflict with the norms of jus cogens’.189 
 
                                                          
186 Furundzija (note 4 above) paras 155 - 156. 
187 Furundzija (note 4 above) para 157. Failure to comply with these obligations amounts to violation 
of international law. See Questions relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v 
Senegal) 2012 ICJ Reports para 113. 
188 National Commissioner of The South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre and Another (2015) 1 SA 315 (CC) 81 (SAPS v SALC); Prosecutor-General of the 
Supreme Court v Desire Bouterse LJN: AB1471 (Supreme Court of the Netherlands), 18 September 
2001, www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/case/1082 [accessed 4 January 2016]. In this case the 
Dutch court was confronted with the prosecution of the former military leader of Suriname Desire 
Bonterse for ordering extra-judicial killings of 15 people in Suriname in December 1982 in which one 
of the issues before court was whether prohibition of torture had attained the status of jus cogens 
189 See De Wet (note 184 above) 101 who illustrates that section 139 of the Constitution of 
Switzerland was the government’s reaction to the people’s proposal for constitutional amendment to 
include summary deportation of illegal asylum seekers. This proposal was rejected on the basis that 
deportation of people to countries in which they would be tortured violates a peremptory norm of non-
refoulement. 
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Although both South Africa and Switzerland have Constitutions, which reaffirm the 
status of jus cogens norms, absence of such constitutional stipulations does not 
absolve states such as Lesotho which, as will be illustrated in the next chapter, do 
not make reference to the status of international law in their legal systems from being 
bound by rules of customary international law. It being a jus cogens norm, prohibition 
of torture gives rise to erga omnes obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, to 
punish its perpetrators and to provide redress to its victims even in the absence of 
treaty ratification. Obligations erga omnes are defined as obligations, which a state 
owes to the entire international community. 
The principle of obligations erga omnes in international law was first raised in the 
dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case.190 With regard to the prohibition of 
torture, the principle was recognised by the ICTY in the Furundzija case in which it 
was stated that: 
 
… the prohibition of torture imposes upon States obligations erga omnes, that is, obligations 
owed towards all the other members of the international community, each of which then has a 
correlative right. In addition, the violation of such an obligation simultaneously constitutes a 
breach of the correlative right of all members of the international community and gives rise to 
a claim for compliance accruing to each and every member, which then has the right to insist 
on fulfilment of the obligation or in any case to call for the breach to be discontinued.191 
 
2.4 UN standards against torture 
 
As stated in the history of prohibition of torture, the UN was established in reaction to 
various atrocities, including torture, committed during World War II. The 
establishment of the UN also influenced change in international law as Dugard says 
that ‘[t]he experience compelled the state men to accept the need for a new world 
order in which the state was no longer free to treat its own nationals as it pleased’.192 
The UN Charter heralds this new world order in which the dignity and worth of the 
human person became paramount in international law and respect for treaty 
obligations became a way of ensuring this dignity, as well as other freedoms.193 It 
                                                          
190 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) 1970 ICJ Reports 32. 
191 Furudnzija (note 4 above) para 151. 
192 Dugard (note 132 above). 
193 UN Charter preamble para 1. 
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contains several articles, which establish its commitment to respect and protection of 
human rights and the need for states’ cooperation to achieve such.194 The Universal 
Declaration that was subsequently adopted accentuates this commitment. As far as 
prohibition of torture is concerned, as stated in section 2.2 above, the Universal 
Declaration prohibits torture in article 5. This prohibition has been further enshrined 
in other treaties and soft law, which contain general and specific standards against 
torture as discussed in detail below.  
2.4.1 UN treaties 
 
Amongst the legally binding instruments adopted under the auspices of the UN to 
which Lesotho is a party (thus, other UN treaties relevant to the question of torture 
that Lesotho is not a party to are not considered), the following contain direct and 
indirect standards against torture: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) of 1948,195 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) of 1951 and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees of 1967,196 International Convention on Eradication of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) of 1965,197 ICCPR, ICESCR Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 1979, CAT, Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 1989,198 Convention on the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (CMW) of 1990199 and Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) of 2006.200 The human rights standards, 
as well as states’ obligations contained in these treaties are discussed below in the 
order in which they were adopted by the UN.  
 
                                                          
194 UN Charter articles 1(3), 13(1) (b), 55(c) & 56. 
195 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by UN GA Res 
260 on 9 December 1948. Lesotho acceded to it on 29 November 1974. 
196 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Refugee Convention) was adopted by the 
United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 28 July 1951. Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees was adopted by the UN GA Res. 2198 (XXXI) on 31 January 1967. Lesotho acceded to 
both the Convention and Protocol on 14 May 1981. 
197 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was adopted by UN 
GA Res. 2106 (XX) on 21 December 1965. Lesotho acceded to it on 4 November 1971. 
198 Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by UN GA Res. 44/25 on 20 November 1989. 
Lesotho ratified it on 10 March 1992.  
199 Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW) was 
adopted by UN GA Res. 45/158 of 18 December 1990. Lesotho ratified it on 16 September 2005.  
200 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was adopted by UN GA Res. 61/106 
on13 December 2006. Lesotho acceded to it on 2 December 2008.  
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2.4.1.1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention) 1948  
 
The Genocide Convention was adopted in reaction to the atrocities which had taken 
place during the World War II. Its preamble stipulates that it was adopted by state 
parties ‘[r]ecognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses 
on humanity, and [b]eing convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an 
odious scourge, international co-operation is required’.201  
 
(1) The link between genocide and torture 
 
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as killing, causing serious bodily or 
mental harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical 
destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent births and forcibly transferring 
children, committed against particular groups being national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group with the intent to destroy such a group in whole or in part.202 This 
definition  links  torture and genocide in that there are circumstances under which 
torture may amount to or result in genocide,203 and also that in cases of genocide 
and mass atrocities, different forms of torture, as defined in article 1 of CAT, typically 
precede the killing of the targeted groups. For instance, the 1915 Armenian genocide 
was executed by armed roundups of political leaders, educators, writers and 
religious leaders who were taken from their homes, tortured, then executed by being 
hung or shot.204 The 1933 Holocaust also involved different forms of psychological 
and physical torture against the Jews and other prisoners who were taken to 
different concentration camps before they were killed.205 Genocide, which took place 
in Cambodia during the Pol Pot regime involved different forms of torture.206 In the 
                                                          
201 Genocide Convention preamble paras 2 & 3. 
202 Genocide Convention article II. 
203 Prosecutor v Kaing Guek alias Duch Case No.001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC (Extraordinary 
Chambers Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)), 26 July 2010, para 28. In this case the accused was found 
guilty of the crime against humanity of torture (including one instance of rape) and other inhuman 
acts. He had authorised the torture of detainees at S21 detention facility during the Cambodian 
genocide. 
204 United to end genocide ‘The Armenian Genocide’ http://endgenocide.org/learn/past-genocides/the-
armenian-genocide/ [accessed 6 September 2016]. 
205 A Jones Genocide, War Crimes and the West: History and Complicity (2004) 14. 
206 People who opposed the regime were detained and tortured to death, subjected to excessive 
beatings, their tongues cut out and livers plucked out with pliers. See J Barber ‘Less than human: 
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1994 Rwandan Genocide, the ICTR in Prosecutor v Akayesu held that rape, which 
had been committed as part of genocide, amounted to torture.207 In 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH),208 the German High Court held that because of the close 
connection between torture and genocide, the Court did not only have jurisdiction 
over genocide committed in Bosnia but also other violent crimes, such as torture, 
which took place as part of the genocide.209 The close link between torture and 
genocide thus justifies an argument that the obligations, which the Genocide 
Convention confers on state parties, also include obligations against torture, which is 
committed with the intention to destroy in whole or in part, a group protected by the 
Genocide Convention.  
 
(2) The obligations to prevent torture that amounts to genocide and to punish its 
perpetrators 
 
The obligation to prevent and punish acts of genocide (including torture, which 
amounts to genocide) is contained in article I of the Genocide Convention, which 
confirms that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a 
crime under international law, which state parties must prevent and punish. It is 
reinforced by article III, which criminalises conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide and complicity in genocide. Article IV removes 
the defence of official capacity. States therefore have an obligation to prevent and 
punish all modes of participation in torture, which amounts to genocide. Article V 
requires state parties to enact laws in order to give effect to the obligations contained 
in the Convention. Articles VI and VII mandate state parties to prosecute persons 
charged with genocide, including torture, in competent national tribunals or by any 
competent international tribunals, which have jurisdiction over such persons,210 to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Torture in Cambodia’ A Licadho project against torture report (2000) www.licadho-cambodia.org 
[accessed 11 June 2016]; B. Keirnan Te Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia 
under the Khemer Rogue, 1975-79 (1996) 354; LD Wheeler ‘Documenting genocide in Cambodia: 
one face after another’ (28 February 1999) 45 Chronicle of Higher Education 38. 
207 Prosecutor v Akayesu (note 37 above) para 597. 
208 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) is Germany’s Highest Court of civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
209 WA Schabas ‘National courts finally begin to prosecute genocide, the ‘crime of crimes’ (2003) 1(1) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 46. 
210 Genocide Convention article VI. 
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cooperate with extradition requests and not to consider genocide and related 
offences as political crimes for purposes of extradition.211 
 
State parties’ obligations to prevent and punish genocide were extrapolated by the 
ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention in which the 
ICJ emphasised that article I contains two independent obligations, which although 
clearly linked, are also distinct from each other: the obligation to prevent genocide 
and the obligation to punish genocide.212 In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Serbia and Montenegro, in its decision of 26 February 2007, the ICJ held that Serbia 
had violated its obligation to prevent genocide as mandated by the Genocide 
Convention.213 The ICJ further held that since the Genocide Convention is almost 
silent as to what the states have to do in order to fulfil their prevention obligation, 
such initiative may include educating communities about genocide and disseminating 
the Genocide Convention; drawing and publishing reports on any evidence or risk of 
genocide, including torture, in other countries, as well as enacting laws, which 
impose economic, diplomatic, military, travel or other sanctions on states, which are 
planning or attempting to commit genocide.214  
 
With regard to the obligation to punish torture which amounts to genocide, article VI 
creates a two-pronged obligation to establish competent national courts or tribunals 
for the prosecution of perpetrators of genocide and to establish international tribunals 
in which perpetrators may be prosecuted. Ntouband argues that at first glance, the 
first leg of the obligation, which is the establishment of competent national tribunals, 
may seem to be limited to prosecution of genocide, which has been committed in the 
territory of the state concerned.215 He argues that the principle of universal 
jurisdiction makes it possible for states to establish universal jurisdiction216 to 
                                                          
211 Genocide Convention article VII. 
212 Advisory Opinion Concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 ICJ Reports 15. 
213 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro 2007 ICJ Reports 43. 
214 As above. 
215 FZ Ntouband ‘When to act: A state’s obligations and responsibilities regarding genocide’ 14 June 
2013 Sentinel Project https://www.thesentinelproject.org/2013/06/14/when-to-act-a-states-obligations-
and-responsibilities-regarding-genocide/ [accessed 25 August 2015]. 
216 The principle of universal jurisdiction allows national courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
foreign nationals alleged to have committed genocide against foreign nationals in foreign territories. 
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prosecute heinous crimes, such as genocide, even in the absence of a territorial or 
nationality link to them.217  
 
The second leg of the obligation under article VI is the establishment of an 
international penal tribunal with jurisdiction over genocide and state parties’ 
obligation to cooperate with such a tribunal. In Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro, the ICJ specified that the nature and content of the obligation to 
cooperate with an international tribunal includes the requirement to: 
 
…arrest persons accused of genocide who are in their territory, even if the crime of which 
they are accused was committed outside it and, failing the prosecution of them in the parties’ 
own courts, that they will hand them over for trial by competent international tribunal.218 
 
From the content of article VI, as well as the ICJ’s statement above, it is clear that 
the obligation to prosecute perpetrators of torture amounting to genocide is first and 
foremost placed on states. Prosecution by international courts or tribunals exists as 
an alternative to complement the national efforts. The complementarity role that an 
international tribunal plays in the prosecution of genocide is best illustrated by cases, 
which followed the Rwandan genocide. The majority of the perpetrators were 
prosecuted by national courts in Rwanda, while only a few key role players were 
brought to the ICTR. 219 As illustrated in the ICJ decision in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v Serbia and Montenegro, the complementarity role of international criminal courts 
and tribunals carries with it the obligation for states to cooperate with such 
international criminal tribunals.220  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
MT Kamminga ‘Lessons learned from the exercise of universal jurisdiction in respect of gross human 
rights offences’ (2001) 23 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 940. 
217 Ntouband (note 215 above).  
218 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (note 213 above) para 443; P Gaeta The UN 
Genocide Convention: A Commentary (2008) 478. RH Steinberg Contemporary issues facing the 
International Criminal Court (2016) 79. 
219 For instance, following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, about 120 000 people were arrested and 
charged with the participating in the acts of genocide including torture. About seventy five of them 
were tried by the ICTR (those bearing greatest responsibility), about ten thousand were tried before 
national courts (those accused of planning the genocide or who had committed serious atrocities) and 
about twelve thousand community-based Gacaca courts tried about 1.2 million cases. See also Rome 
Statute article 17. 
220 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (note 213 above). See also MM El Zeidy The 
principle of complementarity in international criminal law: origin, development and practice (2008) 
51 
 
 
While the normative standards, which create the obligation to cooperate with 
international tribunals, seem clear in theory, the practical implementation of such 
standards has faced challenges. For instance, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi, Chad, 
Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa221 refused to comply 
with the ICC’s arrest warrants against the Sudanese President, Omar Al Bashir,222 
who is charged with five counts of crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, 
forcible transfer, torture and rape; two counts of war crimes and three counts of 
genocide by killing, causing serious physical or mental harm and by deliberately 
inflicting on each targeted group conditions of life calculated to bring about the 
group’s physical destruction;223 acts of torture, which amounted to genocide in Darfur 
and other places in Sudan from 2003.224  
 
(3) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture that amounts to 
genocide  
 
Unlike other UN human rights treaties, the Genocide Convention does not establish 
a monitoring body and also does not contain a provision on periodic reporting on 
measures taken for its implementation. 
 
2.4.1.2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Refugee Convention) 
1951 
 
The UN Refugee Convention was adopted by the UN shortly after the end of World 
War II. According to its preamble, it was adopted for purposes of aiding repatriation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
303. See also A Falzon ‘The principle of complementarity under international criminal law’ 
unpublished masters thesis, University of Malta (2012). 
221 South Africa’s failure to arrest Bashir was challenged nationally in the case of Southern African 
Litigation Centre (SALC) v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others (2016) 2 All 
SA 365 (SCA) 15 March 2016. See also D Tladi ‘Interpretation and international law in South Africa: 
The Supreme Court of Appeal and the Al Bashir saga’ (2016) 16 African Human Rights Law Journal 
321. 
222 O Bekou & D Birkett Cooperation and the international criminal court: Theory and practice (2016) 
156.  
223 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ICC-02/05/05-01/09. 
224 On 4 March 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Al-Bashir 
for crimes against humanity: ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009. On 12 July 2010 a second warrant of 
arrest for the crime of genocide was issued: ICC-02/-5-01/10. See T Dagne The crisis in Darfur and 
the status of the north peace agreement (2010) 7. 
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and resettlement of people who had been displaced by the war.225 It defines a 
refugee as a person who due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or owing to such  fear 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.226 This definition was 
initially restricted to persons who had been displaced due to events, which took 
place during the war prior to 1951.227 However, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol) removed this restriction as the problem of 
displacement for various reasons spread around the world.228 
 
(1) Non-refoulement  
 
The UN Refugee Convention contains a number of obligations for state parties to 
protect refugees,229 as well as the refugees’ obligations towards host countries.230 
Particularly relevant to torture is the obligation not to return a refugee or an asylum 
seeker to territories where there is a risk that his or her life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion.231 This obligation is embodied in the principle of non-
refoulement. 
  
In its Advisory Opinion,232 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR),233 characterised non-refoulement as a ‘corner-stone of 
                                                          
225 UN Refugee Convention Preamble para 3; Global Detention Project ‘Migration related detention 
and international law’ http://globaldetentionproject.org/law/legal-framework/international/treaties-and-
protocols [accessed 17 June 2015].  
226 UN Refugee Convention article 1 (1). 
227 UN Refugee Convention article A (2); UNHCR ‘Convention and Protocol relating to the status of 
refugees’ December 2010 http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf [accessed 5 
November 2015]. 
228 As above. 
229 UN Refugee Convention articles 3-34 contain different obligations including non-discrimination, 
non-refoulement and others. 
230 UN Refugee Convention article 2, which provides generally that every refugee has duties to the 
country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and 
regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order. 
231 UN Refugee Convention article 33. 
232 UNHCR Advisory Opinion on the extraterritorial application of Non-Refoulement obligations under 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 26 January 2007, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f17a1a4.html [accessed 7 November 2016]. 
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international protection of refugees’.234 It entails the duty not to expel, extradite or 
informally transfer a person to a state where there is a likelihood of persecution, 
including torture, or to deny such a person admission into their borders.235 This 
obligation has been translated into the domestic laws of several countries, including 
Lesotho and used as a standard to determine deportation, expulsion or 
extradition.236 
 
(2) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture of refugees 
 
Article 35 of the UN Refugee Convention mandates state parties to provide the 
UNHCR or other UN bodies with information regarding conditions of refugees, 
implementation of the Convention and domestic laws governing refugees in each 
state party. Unlike other human rights treaties, article 35 does not require periodic 
reports on the basis of which the UNHCR would adopt concluding observations. In 
pursuit of its supervisory mandate under article 35, the UNHCR has adopted 
advisory opinions on several issues which affect refugees’ right to freedom from 
torture. However, it has not issued any advisory opinions regarding states’ 
obligations to fulfil the reporting obligations under article 35(2). 
 
2.4.1.3 International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) 1965 
 
The CERD mandates state parties to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in all 
its forms. It defines racial discrimination as:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
233Established by the UN General Assembly in 1950, that is, before the UN Refugee Convention. In 
terms of article 35 of the UN Refugee Convention and article II of the 1967 Protocol, it has a mandate 
to interpret states’ obligations in relation to refugees.  
234 UNHCR Advisory Opinion (note 232 above) para 5. 
235 As above para 7. 
236 See chapter 3 of this thesis; Immigration and Naturalisation Services v Cardoza Fon-Seca Case 
No. 85-782 (Supreme Court of United States) 9 March 1987 paras 424 & 429 in which the Supreme 
Court said that after ratification of the UN Refugee Convention, the United State became bound by 
mandatory provisions of article 33 (1) not to return an alien to a country where his life or freedom 
would be threatened; South African Refugees Act 1998 section 2, which incorporates the non-
refoulement obligation; Ibrahim Ali Abubaker Tantoush v The Refugee Appeals Board and others 
Case No.13182/06 (High Court of South Africa-TPD) 11 September 2007 para 74. 
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…any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or 
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.237 
 
(1) The link between racial discrimination and torture 
 
As illustrated in chapter 1, one of the elements of torture is that severe pain or 
suffering must be inflicted for a prohibited purpose such as discrimination.238 While 
CERD does not specifically mention torture in its text, it prohibits all acts of 
discrimination including violence,239 and mandates states parties to guarantee ‘the 
right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily 
harm, whether inflicted by the government officials, or by any individual group or 
institution’.240 Infliction of severe pain for purposes of racial discrimination as defined 
by CERD therefore, amounts to racist torture. Furthermore, ‘discrimination of any 
kind can create a climate in which torture and ill-treatment of groups subjected to 
intolerance and discriminatory treatment can more easily be accepted’.241 Because 
of this link, states’ obligations under CERD are also relevant to prevent and prohibit 
racist torture, to punish its perpetrators and to provide redress to victims of racist 
torture. 
 
(2) The obligations to prevent and prohibit racist torture 
 
Article 4 of CERD contains various means through which racist torture may be 
prevented. These include condemnation and criminalisation of dissemination of 
information or ideas which portray one race as superior to others as well as acts of 
                                                          
237 CERD article 1; CERD Committee has recommended for states parties to adopt this definition in 
their domestic legislations. See CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the nineteenth to 
twenty-second reports of Germany,15 May 2015, UN Doc CERD/C/DEU/CO/19-22 para 7: CERD 
Committee, Concluding observations to the combined initial, second to fifth reports of Honduras,13 
March 2014, UN Doc CERD/C/HND/CO/1-6 para 9.  
238 CAT article 1(1). 
239 CERD article 4. 
240 CERD article 5(b). 
241 World Organisation Against Torture  Press Release: ‘The World Organisation Against Torture 
Welcomes both the Inclusion of the Issue of Torture in the WCAR Declaration and Programme of 
Action and the adoption of a follow up mechanism to the WCAR but deplores the watered-down 
language on racism’ October 2001 http://www.omct.org/monitoring-protection-mechanisms/urgent-
interventions/2001/10/d15465/ [accessed 15 June 2017]. 
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violence, financing or incitement to commit such acts against any race or group of 
persons by individuals or public authorities or institutions. States’ obligations under 
article 4 were elaborated on by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD Committee)242 in General Recommendation 32 and later 
reaffirmed in General Recommendation 35 to comprise of ‘legislative, executive, 
administrative, budgetary and regulatory instruments…as well as plans, policies, 
programmes and…regimes’.243 Similar obligations were identified with regard to 
article 5 which mandates state parties to prohibit and eliminate all forms of racial 
discrimination and also to guarantee ‘the right to security of person and protection by 
the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or 
by any individual group or institution’.  
 
(3) Non-refoulement 
 
In General Recommendation 30, the CERD Committee recommended that state 
parties should ‘[e]nsure that non-citizens are not returned or removed to a country or 
territory where they are at risk of being subject to serious human rights abuses, 
including torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.244 
 
(4) The obligation to report on measures taken against racist torture 
 
Article 9 of CERD mandates state parties to submit reports on measures that they 
have taken to implement the provisions of CERD. Relevant to states’ obligations to 
report on measures taken against racist torture, the Committee has continuously 
recommended states to include in the reports, ‘recent, reliable and comprehensive 
statistical data’ on the population of each state party as well as ‘economic and social 
indicators disaggregated by ethnicity’ to enable the Committee to assess enjoyment 
                                                          
242 Established in terms of CERD article 8 to oversee its implementation. 
243 CERD Committee General Recommendation 32 ‘The meaning and scope of special measures in 
the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’ 24 September 2009 UN Doc 
CERD/C/GC/32 para 13; CERD Committee General Recommendation 35 Combating racist hate 
speech 26 September 2013 UN Doc CERD/C/GC/35 para 10. 
244 CERD Committee General Recommendation 30 ‘Discrimination against non-citizens’ 4 May 2005, 
UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Add.1 (CERD Committee, GR 30) para 27. 
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of human rights, (including the right to freedom from racist torture).245 It has also 
recommended that the report must contain specific measures which states have 
taken to implement the Durban Declaration against racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance246 and measures taken on discrimination against 
people of African descent.247 States also have an obligation to ensure that the report 
as well as the Committee’s concluding observations are readily and publicly 
available and accessible.248 
 
2.4.1.4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 
 
The ICCPR was adopted by the UN General Assembly with the aim of protecting the 
inherent dignity of the human person.249 State parties thereto recognise that in 
accordance with the principles declared in the Universal Declaration, human beings 
can only enjoy civil and political freedom, as well as freedom from fear and want if all 
human rights are protected.250 It is based on the principles of equality and non-
discrimination251 and creates an obligation on states parties not to derogate from the 
prohibition of torture under any circumstances.252  
                                                          
245 CERD Committee Concluding observations on the nineteenth to twentieth reports of Canada 4 April 
2012, UN Doc CERD/C/CAN/CO/19-20 paras 7 & 11 in which it specifically requested statistical data 
on the treatment of African Canadians in the criminal justice system. See also CERD Committee 
Concluding observations on the sixteenth and seventeenth reports of El Salvador 25 September 2014, 
UN Doc CERD/C/SLV/CO/16-17  para 9. 
246 CERD Committee Concluding observations on the twentieth and twenty-first reports of Demark 15 
May 2015, UN Doc CERD/C/DNK/CO/20-21  para 24. See also CERD Committee Concluding 
observations on the sixteenth and seventeenth reports of El Salvador (note 245 above)  para 26, 
Committee, Concluding observations on the nineteenth to twenty-second reports of Germany (note 
237 above) para 20; CERD Committee, Concluding observations to the combined initial, second to 
fifth reports of Honduras  (note 237 above) para 24. 
247CERD Committee Concluding observations on the twentieth and twenty-first reports of Demark 
(note 246 above) para 25;, Committee Concluding observations on the sixteenth and seventeenth 
reports of El Salvador (note 245 above) para 27. 
248 Committee Concluding observations on the sixteenth and seventeenth reports of El Salvador (note 
245 above) para 27; CERD Committee, Concluding observations to the combined initial, second to 
fifth reports of Honduras para 25. 
249 ICCPR preamble para 2. 
250 As above para 4. 
251 HRC, GC 31 para 10 in which the HRC emphasised that the rights applies to all individuals 
including asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons who may find themselves in 
the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of a particular state party. 
252 ICCPR article 4; HRC General Comment 5 ‘Article 4 Derogations’ 31 July 1981, UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (HRC, GC 5) which has been replaced by HRC, GC 29; see also HRC, General 
Comment 20, ‘Article 7 Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ 10 March 1992, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (HRC, GC 20). para 3; see also Grille Mota v 
Uruguay Communication 11/1977 (HRC) 29 July 1980, UN Doc CCPR/C/10/11/1977 para 14 in which 
the HRC held that Uruguay could not rely on national law to subject the author to torture; in Frank 
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Article 7 of the ICCPR specifically provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall 
be subjected without his free consent, to medical or scientific experimentation.’ It 
differs from article 5 of the Universal Declaration in that it expands the prohibition of 
torture to medical and scientific experimentation without one’s consent.253 It must be 
noted however that unlike CAT, the ICCPR does not confine the commission of 
torture to people who do so in official capacity.254  States’ obligations in relation to 
article 7 were interpreted by the HRC first in General Comment 7 in 1984, which was 
later replaced by General Comment 20 in 1992, and in General Comment 31 in 
2004.255  
 
(1) The obligation to prevent torture 
 
The ICCPR contains several measures which speak to prevention of torture. For 
instance, article 7 has been interpreted to impose the obligation to exclude evidence 
obtained through torture from criminal proceedings. Furthermore, article 10 
mandates state parties to treat detained persons humanely, thus preventing torture 
of such persons. Specific measures which states have to take to implement this 
obligation are outlined below.  
 
(a) Exclusion of evidence obtained through torture from criminal proceedings 
 
Torture is often used to extract information from suspects in order to use such 
information in criminal proceedings. Therefore, exclusion of evidence obtained 
through torture eliminates the incentive for investigating officers to use torture as an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Kitenge Baruani v Congo Communication 1890/2009 (HRC), 27 March 2014 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/110/D/1890/2009 para 6.4 The HRC held that since article 7 allows no limitation even in 
situations of emergency, the ill-treatment meted on the author could not be justified as it violates both 
articles 4 &7 of the ICCPR. 
253 HRC, GC 20 in which the HRC stated that the prohibition is mostly important to people who are not 
capable of giving valid consent or those who are in detention or any form of imprisonment. 
254Eduardo Bleier v Uruguay, Communication 030/1978 (HRC), 29 March 1982, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/15/D/30/1978 para 15 in which the HRC reiterated that the state had an obligation to 
investigate Bleier’s whereabouts as well as the obligation to bring to justice any person found to be 
responsible for his death or disappearance and to pay compensation to him or his family for the injury, 
which he has suffered and lastly to ensure that similar acts do not take place in the future.  
255 HRC, GC 31 (note 6 above). 
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interrogation technique.256 In Sahadeo v Guyana, the HRC held that ‘it is important 
for the prevention of violations under article 7 that the law must exclude admissibility 
in judicial proceedings of statements or confessions obtained through torture or other 
prohibited treatment’.257 Similarly, in Zhakhangir Bazarov v Kyrgyzstan, the HRC 
held that the use of evidence obtained through torturing the author in a criminal trial 
against him violates article 7.258  
 
(b) Protection of detained persons from CIDT 
 
In General Comment 20, the HRC emphasised that article 7 cannot be interpreted on 
its own but in conjunction with article 10 which complements it.259 Similarly, when 
interpreting article 10 in General Comment 21, the HRC reiterated that article 10 
imposes positive obligations towards people who are particularly vulnerable because 
of being deprived of their liberty and complements for them the ban on torture and 
other CIDT in article 7.260 In Kouider Kerrouche v Algeria, the HRC held that having 
found that the conditions in Mascara and Ghriss prisons violate article 7 in that they 
were overcrowded, lacked hygiene, lighting, ventilation and that inmates were not 
given adequate food and physical exercise, it also finds a violation of article 10.261 
 
Measures, which state parties must take to protect detained persons from torture 
entail legislative,262 administrative, judicial and other measures against torture and 
other CIDT,263  dissemination of information, giving appropriate education and 
training to law enforcement officers, medical personnel and all persons who are 
involved in the custody or treatment of individuals who are arrested, imprisoned or 
                                                          
256 T Thienel ‘The admissibility of evidence obtained by torture under international law’ (2006) 17 (2) 
European Journal of International Law 356. 
257 Sahadeo v Guyana Communication 728/1996 (HRC) 1 November 2001 UN Doc   
CCPR/C/73/D/728/1996 para 9.3. 
258 Zhakhangir Bazarov v Kyrgyzstan Communication 2187/2012 (HRC) 21 October 2016 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/118/D/2187/2012 para 6.4. 
259 HRC, GC 20 para 14; Mulezi v Democratic Republic of Congo 2004) AHRLR 3 (HRC 2004) para 
5.3 in which the Committee held that the detailed account of treatment to which the author of the 
communication was subjected during detention shows that he was subjected to torture or ill-treatment 
and denied medical attention despite his loss of mobility in violation of both articles 7 & 10 of ICCPR.  
260 HRC, GC 21 para 3. 
261 Kouider Kerrouche v Algeria Communication 2128/2012 (HRC) 3 November 2016, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/118/D/2128/2012 para 8. 
262 HRC, GC 20 para 13. See also HRC, GC 31 para 13.  
263 HRC, GC 20 para 8. 
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detained.264 To prevent torture of detained persons, state parties also have an 
obligation to ensure that detention facilities are officially recognised and that the 
names of all detainees and of personnel responsible for their detention are kept in 
registers, which are easily available and accessible to those concerned, including 
relatives of the detainees.265 State parties are also mandated not to limit or restrict 
the rights contained in the Covenant. Where they decide to do so, they have an 
obligation to ensure that the laws, which restrict or limit any of the rights contained in 
the Covenant, are permissible under the Covenant.266  
 
(2) The obligation to prohibit torture  
 
The positive aspect of the obligations under article 2 is for state parties to take steps 
to ensure the realisation of the rights contained in the Covenant.267 These steps 
include the enactment of national laws, as well as the establishment of competent 
judicial, administrative, legislative or other authorities, capable of determining the 
rights in the Covenant,268 as well as enforcing the remedies when they are 
granted.269 Article 2(2) mandates state parties ‘to take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with [their] constitutional processes and with the provisions of the 
[ICCPR], to adopt laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognised in the Covenant’.270 Enactment of laws in the context of torture 
therefore implies that over and above the legal recognition or affirmation of the right 
to freedom from torture in the constitutions, states have a further obligation to 
proscribe through criminal law, acts of torture, whether committed by private persons 
or entities or by persons who do so in an official capacity.271 Closely linked to the 
                                                          
264 HRC, GC 20 para 10. 
265 HRC, GC 20 para 3. 
266 HRC, GC 31 para 18. 
267 MM Sepulveda Carmona The nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003) 130. 
268 ICCPR article 2(3) (b). 
269 ICCPR article 2(3) (c). 
270 ICCPR article 2(2). See also GC 31 para 13; Kouider Kerrouche v Algeria (note 261 above); 
Manojkumar Samathanam v Sri Lanka Communication 2412/2014 (HRC) 28 October 2016 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/118/D/2412/2014;. See also HRC, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of 
Italy 1 May 2017 UN Doc CCPR/C/ITA/CO/6 para 19 in which the HRC recommended that Italy must 
incorporate the crime of torture into its domestic legal system. 
271 HRC, GC 31 para 8. 
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enactment of anti-torture laws, are the duties to investigate and prosecute 
allegations of torture.272   
 
After consideration of communications brought before it, the practice of the HRC has 
gone beyond the award of a victim-specific remedy to include the general obligation 
for states to change their national laws to include prohibition of torture.273  In Kouider 
Kerrouche v Algeria, the HRC reiterated that the state had to fulfil its obligation to 
bring its national laws into conformity with the Covenant.274 Similarly, in Roy 
Manojkumar Samathanam v Sri Lanka, the HRC held that the harmonisation of the 
national legal system with the provisions of the ICCPR is a torture-prohibition 
measure, which Sri Lanka has to take in order to ensure that the acts of torture do 
not recur.275   
 
(3) The obligation to punish perpetrators of torture 
 
Over and above the prevention of torture and its prohibition through criminal laws, 
where the right to freedom from torture has been violated, states have an obligation 
to bring perpetrators of such acts to justice. That is, where complaints are lodged, 
they must be promptly and impartially investigated by competent authorities and 
appropriate redress must be awarded to the victims of such acts.276 The 
establishment of competent courts and tribunals is essential because in its General 
                                                          
272 As above; Zhakhangir Barazov v Kyrgyzstan Communication 2187/2012 (HRC) 21 October 2012, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/117/D/2187/2012 in which the HRC held that failure of the state party to investigate 
the author’s allegation that he was subjected to torture while in police custody violates article 2(3); 
Urmatbek Akunov v Kyrgyzstan Communication 2127/2011 (HRC) 21 October 2016, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/111/D/2127/2011 para 10 in which failure to investigate was also held to be inconsistent with 
states’ general obligations under article 2(3). A similar holding was made in Manojkumar 
Samathanam v Sri Lanka (note 270 above) para 10. 
273 HRC, GC 31 para 17. 
274 Kouider Kerrouche v Algeria (note 261 above) para 10. See also HRC, GC 31 paras 2 & 3 in which 
this obligation was linked with customary international law and other international instruments as 
obligations erga omnes which have to be performed in good faith in accordance with article 26 of the 
VCLT.274 For further reading on the principle of good faith see S Rheinhold ‘Good faith under 
international law’ 2013 (2) University College London Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 40 who 
argues that the principle of good faith is a necessary limitation of state sovereignty; See also II 
Lukashuk ‘New thinking by Soviet scholars: the principle pacta sunt servanda and the nature of the 
obligation under international law’ 1989 (83) American Journal of International Law 513 who argues 
that good faith enhances state sovereignty because it does not only confer duties, but also rights vis-
a-vis other states. 
275 Roy Manojkumar Samathanam v Sri Lanka (note 270 above) para 8.  
276 ICCPR article 2(3) (b); HRC, GC 20 paras 14 & 15. 
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Comment 31, the HRC reiterated that obligations contained in article 2 are binding 
on the state party as a whole and not just the executive or legislative branch of the 
state.277 It stated that all branches of the government, being the executive, 
legislature, judiciary and other public and governmental authorities are in a position 
to engage the responsibility of the state party.278  
 
(4) The obligation to provide redress to victims of torture 
 
The obligation to establish competent authorities to investigate and determine 
allegations of torture is also tied to a further obligation to ensure that, where 
remedies are awarded, there are competent authorities to enforce the said 
remedies.279 The obligation to provide a remedy for human rights violations is a 
peremptory norm of customary international law reinstated in article 2(3) of the 
ICCPR.280 In Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, the HRC found that treatment of the 
complainant’s husband, which resulted in a broken jaw during his arrest, amounted 
to torture in violation of article 7 of the ICCPR.281 On this ground, the Committee held 
that Uruguay was under an obligation, pursuant to article 2(3) of the ICCPR, to 
provide effective remedies to the victim including immediate release, permission to 
leave Uruguay, compensation for the violation which he had suffered and to take 
steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future.282  
 
When deciding on what an effective remedy or full reparation entails, the HRC has 
taken the circumstances of each case into consideration. For instance, in Roy 
Manojkumar Samathanam v Sri Lanka, it held that in terms of article 2(3), full 
                                                          
277 HRC, GC 31 para 4. 
278 As above. 
279 ICCPR article 2(3) (c). 
280 HRC, GC 29 para 11. 
281 Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, Communication 052/1979 (HRC), 29 July 181, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 para 13. 
282 Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago Communication 845/1998 (HRC) 26 March 2002 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998 para 9. In this communication the state party was ordered to compensate the 
author, to consider his early release and to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future; 
Kouider Kerrouche v Algeria (note 261 above) para 10 in which the HRC held that the state party has 
an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy in the form of full and effective 
investigation, as well as prosecution and punishment of his torturers; Evans v Trinidad and Tobago  
Communication 908/2000 (HRC) 21 March 2003 UN Doc CCPR/C/77/D/908/2000; Teesdale v 
Trinidad and Tobago (note 45 above) para 11, Boodoo v Trinidad and Tobago Communication 
721/1996 (HRC) 2 April 2002 UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/721/1996 para 8. 
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reparation would include the investigation into the allegations of torture, adequate 
compensation and ensuring that the legal framework complies with the ICCPR as a 
guarantee that such acts would not happen again.283 In Urmatbek Akunov v 
Kyrgyzstan, it held that full reparation would entail the investigation of the allegations 
of torture, prosecution of those responsible, as well as provision of adequate 
compensation.284 In Zhakhangir Bazarov v Kyrgyzst, it stated that full reparation 
would include quashing the author’s conviction and if necessary holding a new trial 
as well as reimbursement for all court fines and legal costs, which he had 
incurred.285 These cases show that the HRC has not fixed a single remedy for 
victims of torture. Rather,it focuses on the circumstances of each author and also on 
the legal framework of the state involved, in order for a remedy to be compatible with 
such circumstances. 
 
(5) Non-refoulement 
 
This obligation has been interpreted by the HRC through general comments and 
jurisprudence. In General Comment 31, the HRC stated that article 2 of the ICCPR 
imposes negative and positive obligations on state parties.286 Relevant to the 
prevention of torture is the negative obligation to refrain from doing acts, which 
interfere with the enjoyment of the rights contained in the Covenant.287 This includes 
an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from the 
state’s territory where there are substantial grounds to believe that there is a real risk 
of irreparable harm, including torture in the country to which such a person is being 
transferred.288  
 
The HRC has also invoked this obligation in a number of communications brought 
before it under both articles 2(3), which contains general states’ obligations and 
article 7, which prohibits torture and CIDT. In J.D. v Denmark it stated that before 
returning a person to another country, a state party must take into account all 
                                                          
283  Roy Manojkumar Samathanam v Sri Lanka (note 270 above) para 8. 
284 Urmatbek Akunov v Kyrgyzstan (note 272 above) para 10. 
285 Zhakhangir Bazarov v Kyrgyzstan (note 258 above) para 6.3. 
286 HRC, GC 31 para 6. 
287 As above. 
288 As above para 12. 
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relevant facts and circumstances, including whether the human rights situation in the 
country to which such a person is being returned would expose him/her to torture.289 
In C. v Australia, it held that the author’s return to Iran would violate article 7 of the 
ICCPR because of the possibility of him being persecuted upon his return and 
because he would not be availed necessary psychiatric care in Iran, which he needs 
due to the torture and ill-treatment he suffered while detained in Australia.290  
 
It must be noted, however, that the HRC has continuously stated that in order for 
states’ obligations against expulsion under article 2(3) to be invoked, the risk of 
torture or CIDT must not only be assessed on the basis of the general human rights 
situation in a particular country, but must be real and likely to affect the intended 
returnee personally.291 
 
(6) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture 
 
Article 40 of the ICCPR mandates state parties to submit to the HRC, within one year 
of the Covenant’s entry into force in respect of each state and thereafter when the 
Committee so requests, reports on measures they have taken to implement the 
Covenant.292 With regard to reporting on measures against torture, the HRC has 
                                                          
289J.D. v Denmark Communication 2204/2012 (HRC), 26 October 2016, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/118/D/2204/2016 para 11.3 
290C. v Australia Communication 900/1999 (HRC), 28 October 2002 UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 
para 8.5.  
291 Ernest Sigman Pillai v Canada Communication 1763/2008 (HRC), 25 March 2011 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008 para 11.4. In this communication, the HRC stated that in order to 
determine whether there was a real risk of the author being subjected to torture in Sri Lanka, the 
Canadian authorities ought to have investigated his allegations that he had been tortured before and 
that in the absence of such investigations, his removal from Canada would violate Canada’s general 
obligation to respect the rights contained in the ICCPR. See also A & B v Denmark Communication 
2291/2013 (HRC) 13 July 2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/117/D/2291/2013 para 8.6 in which the HRC held 
that despite the human rights situation in Pakistan, the facts placed before the HRC by the authors 
were not sufficient to conclude that the authors faced a ‘personal and real risk’ of ill-treatment if 
removed from Denmark to Pakistan. See also Ali & Mohamed v Denmark Communication 2409/2014 
(HRC) 29 March 2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/116/D/2409/2015; Y. v Canada Communication 2314/2013 
(HRC) 22 March 2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/116/D/2314/2013 paras 7.2 and 7.6 in which the HRC held 
that although the author has submitted that he is a Tamil from Northern Sri Lanka and a failed asylum 
seeker and there are reports of both Tamils and failed asylum seekers being subjected to torture in 
Sri Lanka, the author has failed to submit reliable information that upon his return to Sri Lanka, he 
personally, stands the real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to articles 6(1) and 7 of the 
ICCPR. Therefore, his return was considered not to be a violation of articles 2(3) and 7. 
292 HRC, GC 1, replaced by HRC, GC 30. See also HRC, GC 2 paras 1- 3. With regard to torture the 
periodic report must contain the legislative, practical and judicial measures which the state adopted 
against torture, the progress made with regard to implementation of the specific obligations contained 
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requested state parties to provide in their reports, ‘specific up to date information’ 
including statistics of investigations done, convictions secured and the penalties 
which have been imposed on perpetrators of torture, 293 as well as other measures 
adopted to implement the obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, to punish its 
perpetrators and to provide redress to its victims.294  
2.4.1.5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
1966 
 
The ICESCR contains economic, social and cultural rights, most of which are also 
contained in the Universal Declaration. As stated previously in this thesis, the 
ICESCR is one of the pillars of the international Bill of Rights. It does not have a 
specific provision on torture although states’ obligations against torture have been 
implied under the right to health which is contained in article 12 of the ICESCR. 
 
(1) The link between ICESCR right to health and torture 
 
The right to health under article 12 was interpreted by the Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR Committee),295 to be closely related to and to 
include freedom from torture and other CIDT.296 This relationship was reaffirmed by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture in his report on torture in health settings 
wherein he stated that certain practices which take place in healthcare settings, such 
as compulsory detention for medical conditions, violation of reproductive rights, 
denial of pain treatment and ill-treatment of persons with psychosocial disabilities 
and those belonging to marginalised groups amount to torture as defined in article 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the ICCPR to prevent torture, to prohibit it, to punish and its perpetrators and to provide redress to 
its victims. Lastly, it must also contain the challenges and factors which affect effective implementation 
of these obligations. 
293 HRC, Concluding observations on the initial report of Bangladesh 27 April 2017 UN Doc 
CCPR/BGD/CO/1 para 20. 
294 As above para 22 read with para 35. See also HRC, Concluding observations on the second 
periodic report of Thailand (note 120 above). 
295 Established by ECOSOC Res.1985/17 of 28 May 1985 with the mandate to monitor the 
implementation of ICESCR. 
296 ICESCR Committee, General Comment 14 ‘The right to highest attainable standards of health 
(art.12)’ 11 September 2000, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (ICESCR Committee, GC 14); L Beletsky et al 
‘Advancing human rights in patient care: The law in seven transitional countries’. Open Society 
Foundations (2013). See also Open Society Institute ‘Health and Human Rights: a resource guide’ 
(2013); WHO Fact Sheet ‘Health and Human Rights. www.who.int.../Economic_social_cultural_rights 
[accessed 22 February 2016]. 
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1(1) of CAT.297 Therefore, states’ obligations towards the ICESCR right to health 
also apply to torture. 
 
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture in realisation of the right to 
health, punish its perpetrators, and provide redress to its victims 
 
Article 2 of the ICESCR mandates state parties to take steps, to the maximum of 
available resources and without discrimination, to achieve progressively, the full 
realisation of the right to health, by all appropriate means, including the adoption of 
legislative measures.298  When addressing  what ‘appropriate measures’ under article 
2 are, the ICESCR Committee stated that they include legislation,299 judicial 
remedies,300 administrative, financial, education and social measures.301 In the 
context of torture, therefore, article 2 requires states to take immediate steps to 
prevent and prohibit torture, punish its perpetrators and provide redress to its victims 
in a non-discriminatory fashion. The scope of article 2 was further elaborated upon in 
General Comment 9, which addressed the domestic application of the ICESCR.302 In 
the context of torture, states’ obligations under article 2 as elaborated upon in 
General Comment 9 include modification of laws to give effect to states’ treaty 
obligations to prevent and prohibit torture in the healthcare system303 and for the 
Covenant to be applied by domestic courts.304  
 
Article 4 also contains a torture prevention obligation in that it mandates state parties 
to refrain from unnecessarily limiting the rights – which includes the right to health − 
contained in the Covenant and other human rights instruments. Where such 
                                                          
297 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. 1 February 2013. UN Doc A/HRC/22/53 submitted at the twenty-second session of the 
Human Rights Council.  
298 ICESCR Committee, GC 20 para 2 in which the Committee reaffirmed the fundamentality of 
equality and non-discrimination; In ICESCR Committee, GC 3 paras 1-4 it was stated that the 
undertaking to take steps without discrimination are of immediate effect and not subject to progressive 
realisation.  
299 ICESCR Committee, GG 3 paras 1-4. 
300 As above para 4. 
301As above para 7. 
302 ICESCR Committee, General Comment 9 ‘The domestic application of the Covenant’8 December 
1998, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/28 (ICESCR Committee GC 9). 
303 As above para 3 
304 As above paras 4 & 14. 
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limitation is indispensable, states have an obligation to ensure that the limitation is 
compatible with the Covenant and done for purposes of promoting the general 
welfare of society in a democratic society.305 In relation to freedom from torture, as a 
component of the right to health, the ICESCR Committee has stated that limitation 
clauses used to restrict movement or to detain persons with transmissible diseases, 
such as HIV/AIDS or to refuse medical treatment to persons opposed to government, 
amount to torture.306 The Committee has also stated that where restrictions are 
indispensable, they must be proportional, for a limited duration and subject to 
review.307 
 
(2) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture  
 
Article 16 of the ICESCR mandates state parties to submit to the ICESCR 
Committee, reports, which outline measures adopted and the progress made in 
achieving observance of the rights contained in the Covenant. 308 States are 
expected to provide in such reports, measures they have adopted towards full 
realisation of the right to health including legislative, judicial, administrative and other 
measures taken to prevent and prohibit acts of violence. The reports have to contain 
inter alia, statistic on domestic violence,309 and the steps which the state has taken 
to implement the Committee’s recommendations made in previous reports.310  
 
2.4.1.6 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) 1979 
 
The CEDAW was adopted as a step towards the recognition of women’s rights as 
human rights. Its adoption was based on the concern that despite an earlier 
                                                          
305 ICESCR article 4. 
306 ICESCR Committee, GC 14 para 28. 
307 As above. 
308 ICESCR Committee, GC 1 paras 1-9 outlines the objectives of reporting under the ICESCR. In the 
context of torture, the objectives are to ensure that a state party undertakes a comprehensive review 
of national legislation, administrative rules and procedures as well as practice to prevent and prohibit 
torture in the healthcare systems, enable monitoring of progress and to identify areas in which the 
state needs assistance. 
309 ICESCR Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth report of Cyprus 28 October 2016 UN 
Doc E/C.12/CYP/CO/6 paras 32 & 49. 
310 As above para 49. See also ICESCR Committee, Concluding observations on the combined fifth to 
sixth reports of Philippines 23 October 2016 UN Doc E/C.12/PHL/CO/5-6 para 63. 
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international human rights framework, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
sex, women continued to suffer specific discrimination and disadvantages, which 
affected their access to food, health education and opportunities for employment.311 
Several studies had concluded that the human rights framework, which existed prior 
to the CEDAW, reflected a male perspective and consequently the violation of 
women’s dignity remained invisible,312 unrecognised, and when recognised, 
perpetrators often went unpunished and victims without redress.313 It contains a 
number of general and specific obligations for the protection of women from 
violence, including torture within both the public and private spheres.  
 
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit gender-based torture, punish its 
perpetrators and provide redress to its victims 
 
Although the CEDAW does not contain explicit obligations against torture, the 
Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee),314 
has defined violence directed against women simply because they are women or 
that which affects women disproportionately, namely gender-based violence (GBV) 
as ‘… a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights 
and freedoms on a basis of equality with men’,315  therefore falling within the purview 
of the CEDAW. Infliction of severe pain or suffering on a woman simply because she 
is a woman and for purposes listed in article 1 of CAT would therefore amount to 
gender-based torture (GBT).316 Although GBT committed by individuals is not 
covered under CAT, it is covered by article 7 of the ICCPR, which does not limit the 
                                                          
311 CEDAW preamble para 9. 
312 KD Askin & DM Koenig Women and international human rights law (2001) 3. 
313 R Cook ‘State Responsibility under CEDAW’ in R Cook (ed) Human rights of women: national and 
international perspective (1994) 228. 
314 Established in terms of article 17 of CEDAW to oversee its implementation. 
315 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 19 ‘Violence against women’ 1992, UN Doc 
A//47/38 (CEDAW Committee, GR 19) para 1. See also A.S v Hungary Communication 2/2004 
(CEDAW Committee) 29 August 2006, UN doc CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2006 para 11.4 in which the 
CEDAW Committee held that compulsory sterilisation without the patient’s full and informed consent 
amounts to violence against women and violates article 16(1)(e) of CEDAW.   
316 CEDAW Committee, GR 19 para 7(b); LA Nessel ‘Wilful blindness to gender-based violence 
abroad: United States’ implementation of article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture’ 
(2004-2005) 89 (71) Minnesota Law Review 95; J Green, R Copelon, P Cotter & B Stephens ‘Affecting 
the rules of prosecution of rape and other gender-based violence before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: A feminist proposal and critique’ (1994) 5 (2)  Hasting’s Women’s 
law Journal172. See also Prosecutor v Akayesu (note 37 above).  
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commission of torture to state actors and by article 1 of the CEDAW as a form of 
discrimination. Furthermore, acts of GBT committed by individuals may be 
attributable to the state where it has failed to prevent them.317 Because of this link 
therefore, states’ general obligations contained in the CEDAW also apply to GBT. 
 
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit GBT 
 
State’ overall obligation under the CEDAW is the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women so as to achieve substantive equality in the enjoyment 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.318 Hence, states have the obligations 
to prevent and prohibit torture as it is a form of discrimination. With regard to GBT, 
article 2 generally mandates state parties to harmonise their national legal systems 
with the CEDAW. States’ specific obligations under article 2 in the context of 
violence against women, were elaborated on by the CEDAW Committee in General 
Recommendation 19 in which it recommended that states must enact laws against 
family violence, abuse and rape, sexual assault and other gender-based violence. 
They must also compile statistics on the extent, causes and effects of violence, 
prevent and criminalise trafficking and sexual exploitation, and provide remedies to 
victims of all forms of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and sexual 
assault and harassment in the workplace.319  
 
Articles 5, 11 and 12 of the CEDAW also mandate state parties to protect women 
against violence of any kind, whether it happens within the family, at the workplace 
                                                          
317 CEDAW Committee, GR 19 para 11 makes examples of acts of violence against women such as 
family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks, female circumcision, sexual 
harassment, compulsory sterilization or abortion, denial of reproductive health services, battering, rape 
and other forms of sexual abuse as forms of gender-based violence. Failure of states to prevent these 
acts or to punish their perpetrators may amount to such acts as being attributed to the state; BSN 
Khutsoane ‘Gender-based violence and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women’ in E Delport (ed.) Gender-based violence in Africa: Perspectives from 
the continent (2009) 5. 
318 CEDAW article 2. 
319CEDAW Committee GR 19, para 24. See also X and Y v Georgia Communication 24/2009 
(CEDAW Committee) 25 August 2015, UN Doc CEDAW/C/61/24/2009 paras 9.3 and 10 in which the 
Committee held X’s husband’s acts of rape and other forms of sexual and physical abuse against X 
and their daughter Y were attributable to the state because it failed to exercise due diligence to 
prevent such acts, to investigate the allegations and to punish the perpetrator.  Similar holding was 
made in M.W v Denmark Communication 46/2012 (CEDAW Committee) 21 March 2016, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/63/D/46 para 5.8. 
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or in any other area of social life. Measures to be taken by states in this regard 
include the adoption of legislation on sexual violence, abuses in the family and 
sexual harassment at the workplace, as well as the provision of support services to 
victims of gender-based violence.320  
  
(2) The obligation to report on measures taken against GBT 
 
Article 18 mandates state parties to submit periodic reports on measures they have 
adopted to implement the CEDAW at the domestic level.321 With regard to reporting 
on GBT and other forms of violence against women, states are required to include in 
their reports, statistics on violence against women,322 preventive and protective 
measures adopted against such violence and their effectiveness323 as well as 
whether there exists at the domestic level, support services for women who are 
victims of violence.324  
 
2.4.1.7 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 1984 
 
CAT is the first legally binding instrument, which focuses entirely on torture. Its 
adoption was a reaction to the ongoing torture around the world, as well as the lack 
of a binding instrument with explicit provisions on torture at that time.325 It is aimed at 
                                                          
320 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 12 ‘Violence against women’ 1989 preamble para 
1. 
321 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 1 ‘Reporting by states parties’ Fifth Session 1986 
and CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 2 ‘Reporting by states parties’ Sixth Session 1987 
address reporting in general while CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 12 ‘Violence 
against women’ Eighth Session 1989 para 1-4 and CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 19 
‘Violence against women’ Eleventh Session 1992 para 24 indicate that with respect to violence against 
women, the periodic report must contain the legislative and other measures, statistical data as well as 
support services which states have put in place to address violence against women, including TBV. 
322 CEDAW Committee GR 12, such statistics should cover all forms of violence including sexual 
violence, abuses in the family and sexual harassment in the workplace. 
323 CEDAW Committee, GR 12; CEDAW Committee GR 19 para 24(v). 
324 CEDAW Committee GR 12. 
325 M Lippman ‘The development and drafting of the United Nations Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (1994)17(2) Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 275. Lippman demonstrates that from time immemorial, 
including after its ban by the United Nations through the Universal Declaration, torture continued to be 
used as a device to detect and deter political opposition, to stem the rising of colonial unrest and to 
extract confessions from suspected terrorists. See also the European Commission’s case of Ireland v 
United Kingdom (note 25 above); Human rights advocacy and the history of international human 
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strengthening the existing prohibition of torture and related offences by a number of 
supportive measures.326 Unlike other international human rights instruments, which 
contain the right to freedom from torture in one or two articles, CAT focuses on 
torture and CIDT in all its articles. States’ obligations are contained in the substantive 
articles 1 to16 as well as article 19, which mandates state parties to submit reports to 
the Committee against Torture.327  
 
Articles 1 to 16 contain specific measures, which state parties must take in order to 
comply with the obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, to punish its perpetrators 
and to provide redress to its victims. The core provisions in these sections focus on 
prohibition and punishment through criminal enforcement.328 The scope and content 
of states’ obligations under CAT as interpreted by the Committee against Torture,329 
as well as scholars and commentators of international and national law are traversed 
below taking into account their indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness.330 
  
(1) Obligation to incorporate definition of torture into national legal systems  
 
The definition of torture under CAT has been discussed thoroughly in chapter 1 of 
this thesis. From this definition, three main elements of torture were identified as the 
infliction of severe pain or suffering, for a prohibited purpose, such as extracting 
information or discrimination and thirdly, by a person who does so in an official 
capacity. The Committee against Torture through its General Comment 1, as well as 
concluding observations, has called upon states to incorporate this definition into 
their national legal systems.331  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rights standards http://humanrightshistory.umich.edu/problems/torture [accessed 16 September 
2014]. See also Amnesty International ‘Conference for the abolition of torture: Final Report’ (1973). 
326 CAT preamble para 5; Burgers & Danelius (note 71 above) 1. 
327 Established in terms of CAT article 17 to oversee its implementation. 
328 CAT articles 4 - 9. See also LA Wendland Handbook on state obligations under the UN Convention 
against Torture Association for Prevention of Torture (2002)15. See also Nowak & McArthur (note 63 
above) 1. 
329 Established by CAT article 17 to oversee the implementation of CAT. 
330 Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 3. 
331 Committee against Torture, GC 2; Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the 
initial report of Qatar, 25 January 2013 UN Doc CAT/C/QAT/CO/2 paras 8 & 9 in which the Committee 
recognised ‘Qatar’s incorporation of the definition of torture as laid out in the Convention into domestic 
law’; Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Japan 28 
June 2013 UN Doc CAT/C/JPN/CO/2 para 7. The Committee raised its concern that Japan has not 
yet adopted a definition of torture which covers the elements of torture in article 1(1). See also 
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Although article 1 stipulates that the definition contained therein is without prejudice 
to any international or national law which may contain a definition with wider 
application,332 the Committee against Torture has warned that ‘serious 
discrepancies’ between the CAT definition of torture and a domestic definition create 
actual or potential loopholes for impunity.333 Hence, it encourages states to adopt a 
uniform definition in order to ensure the legitimacy of domestic norms.334 The 
Committee has also observed that in some cases, although similar language as the 
one in CAT may be used, its meaning may be qualified by domestic law or by judicial 
interpretation.335 It has highlighted that the benefits of implementing the definition of 
torture as it is in article 1 are that it directly advances the over-arching aim of 
preventing torture336 and also to define its elements and penalties for its 
commission.337 The definition also enables officials to track the offence of torture and 
the public to monitor states’ implementation of its obligations against torture.338 
 
(2) Obligation to take legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to 
prevent and absolutely prohibit torture 
 
Article 2(1) of CAT mandates state parties to take effective legislative, administrative 
and judicial measures to prevent torture. Article 2(2) provides for absolute prohibition 
of torture in that it restrains states from relying on any exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever to justify torture. It provides that not even a state of war or threat of war, 
internal political instability or any public emergency may be invoked to justify torture. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic report of 
Poland 23 December 2013, UN Doc CAT/C/POL/CO/5-6 para 7. The Committee raised its concern 
that despite its earlier recommendation, Poland has still not incorporated the provisions of CAT into its 
domestic law, including the definition of torture; Committee against Torture Concluding Observations 
on the fourth periodic report of Italy 16 July 2007, UN Doc CAT/C/ITA/CO/4 para 5 in which the 
Committee reiterated its earlier recommendation that Italy must incorporate the crime of torture into 
domestic law and adopt a definition, which covers all the elements contained in article 1 of CAT. 
332 CAT article 1(2). 
333 Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 9. 
334 As above. 
335 As above. 
336 As above para 11. 
337 As above. 
338 As above. 
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It also removes the defence of superior orders.339 The three parts of states’ 
obligations under article 2 were interpreted by the Committee against Torture in 
General Comment 2 in which it emphasised the wide-ranging nature of states’ 
obligations under this article.340 The interpretation has also been applied in the 
jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture as follows:  
 
(a) The obligation to prevent torture 
 
In General Comment 2, the Committee stated that first of all, article 2 contains the 
obligation to prevent torture, which entails several duties, including the duty to 
eliminate any legal or other impediments to the eradication of torture and CIDT, as 
well as the review of national laws and their alignment with the provisions of CAT.341 
The obligation to harmonise national legal frameworks with the provisions of CAT as 
a torture prevention mechanism has also been emphasised by the CAT Committee 
in its concluding observations.342  
 
Other torture prevention measures identified by the Committee against Torture in 
General Comment 2 include alignment of state practice to conform to the provisions 
of CAT. Such alignment includes registration of detainees, informing detainees about 
their rights, affording detainees independent legal and medical assistance, enabling 
detainees to have contact with relatives, establishment of independent bodies to visit 
places of detention and availing victims of torture avenues for them to lodge their 
complaints about torture, ensuring that platforms, such as courts, which are 
established to examine and determine such complaints do so promptly and are 
impartial.343 
                                                          
339 The defence of superior orders is a defence mostly used by members of disciplined forces that a 
criminal conduct was ordered by a higher ranking officer or a person in authority. P Gaeta ‘The 
defence of superior orders: statute of the international criminal court versus customary international 
law’ (1999) European Journal of International Law 173. See also WA Schabas An introduction to the 
International Criminal Court (2011) 243. 
340 Committee against Torture, GC 2 paras 3 & 10 in which the Committee stated that states’ 
obligations under article 2 extend to privately owned detention centres. 
341 As above para 4. 
342 Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined third and fourth periodic 
report of Sri Lanka 8 December 2011 UN Doc CAT/C/LKA/CO/3-4 para 4 in which the Committee 
commended enactment of laws which comply with CAT and para 10 in which it recommended that Sri 
Lanka must align its anti-terrorism laws with CAT;  
343 As above para 13. 
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The Committee has further stated that while the provisions of CAT bind states and 
not individuals, the state shall be liable for acts of individuals wherein it has failed to 
investigate, prosecute and punish private actors.344 Such acts include GBV, such as 
rape, domestic violence, FGM and human trafficking.345 States’ officials shall be 
regarded as the authors of such acts by way of complicity, consent or 
acquiescence.346  
 
The Committee has also interpreted states’ obligation to prevent torture under article 
2 to include non-discrimination in that it requires special protection of people 
belonging to minority and marginalised groups who are at risk of being subjected to 
torture by reason of belonging to such groups.347 Examples of factors, which would 
place people at the risk of torture, are race, colour, sex, ethnicity, age, religion, 
sexual orientation, transgender identity, disability, health and other status.348 
 
(b) Absolute prohibition of torture 
 
With regard to the second and third states’ obligations to prohibit torture in absolute 
terms, the Committee against Torture has stated that the circumstances listed in 
article 2(2), which cannot be invoked to justify torture are not exhaustive.349 It 
emphasised that the term ‘any exceptional circumstances whatsoever’ includes 
threats of terrorist acts, violent crimes, international or national armed conflict, 
protection of public safety or national emergencies of whatever nature.350 The 
Committee thus dispelled arguments that torture could be justified in certain 
exceptional circumstances. The Committee stated that article 2 also prohibits the 
                                                          
344 As above para 18. 
345 As above. 
346 As above. 
347 As above para 21. 
348 Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 21; R.O. v Sweden (note 64 above) in which the Committee 
against Torture considered that the author had failed to place facts to prove that she and her minor 
daughters should not be deported to Nigeria because there is a real and personal risk of their 
daughters being subjected to FGM because of their age and ethnicity. Although the author in this 
case had failed to satisfy the Committee in this regard, the Committee did, however, indicate that 
facts on age and ethnicity would be considered as factors, which would make the girls vulnerable to 
torture in the form of FGM if properly proven.   
349 Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 5. 
350 As above. 
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granting of amnesties and other procedures, which ‘preclude or indicate 
unwillingness’ to promptly and fairly prosecute and punish perpetrators of torture or 
CIDT.351 
 
(3) Non-refoulement  
 
Article 3 of CAT prohibits state parties from expelling, returning or extraditing a 
person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be subjected to torture.352 States’ obligations under article 3 have been 
interpreted by the Committee against Torture in General Comment 1 and through 
jurisprudence.353 In General Comment 1, the Committee stated that the non-
refoulement obligation in article 3(1) must be read together with article 3(2), which 
states that the substantial grounds envisaged in  article 3(1) must be determined on 
the basis of all relevant factors, including ‘a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or 
mass violation of human rights.354 Unlike non-refoulement obligations under article 7 
of the ICCPR, which also include the obligation not to expose a returnee to CIDT, the 
Committee against Torture has emphasised that article 3(1) prohibits exposure of a 
                                                          
351 As above. 
352 CAT article 3(1). 
353Committee against Torture, General Comment 1 ‘Implementation of article 3 of the Convention in 
the context of article 22 (Non-refoulement and communications)’ 21 November 1997, UN Doc 
A/53/44, annex IX. 
354 CAT article 3(2); Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 1; K.N. v Australia Communication 
649/2015 (Committee against Torture), 23 November 2016, UN Doc CAT/C/59/D/649/2015 para 7.3, 
E.S. v Australia Communication 652/2015 (Committee against Torture), 6 December 2016, UN Doc 
CAT/C/59/D/652/2015 para 9.4, R.K. v Sweden Communication 609/2014 (Committee against 
Torture), 11 August 2016, UN Doc CAT/C/58/D/609/2014 para 8.7. In all these communications, 
although it reached different conclusions, the Committee raised its concern about the consistent 
allegations of widespread use of torture and CIDT by both the military and the police in many parts of 
Sri Lanka since the end to the conflict in May 2009. See also Tala v Sweden Communication 43/1995 
(Committee against Torture) 15 November 1996 UN Doc CAT/C/17/D/43/1996 paras. 10.1 - 10.5 in 
which the Committee held that the concerns raised in the report by the Human Rights Commission on 
the human rights situation in Iran, including executions, torture and CIDT were substantial ground for 
believing that the author would be subjected to torture if returned to Iran; X.Y.Z. v Switzerland 
Communication 697/2015 (Committee against Torture) 25 November 2016 UN Doc 
CAT/C/59/D/697/2015 paras 6.3-6.7. The author challenged Switzerland’s decision to deport him and 
his family to Belgium on the grounds that Belgium is likely to extradite him to Rwanda where they are 
likely to be subjected to torture because of his fallout with the President of Rwanda. The Committee 
held that he had failed to provide substantial grounds for believing that there are human rights 
violations in Belgium, which substantiate his belief that Belgium would not act in accordance with 
article 3 of CAT when considering his extradition to Rwanda.   
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returnee to torture as defined in article 1 of CAT.355 In the case of G. R. B. v Sweden 
in which the author alleged that she had been subjected to torture, including rape by 
members of Sendero Luminoso, a rebel group in Peru and was likely to be subjected 
to torture again if returned to Peru, the Committee held that states’ obligations under 
article 3 are limited to acts, which are likely to be committed by state officials as only 
those qualify as torture under article 1.356 
 
The Committee has, however, warned that the enquiry under article 3(2) should not 
be stopped at substantial grounds for believing that torture is likely, but the author or 
the person whose return is being considered, should go further and prove that the 
risk of torture is real and he is personally likely to suffer that risk. In the words of the 
Committee, the risk of torture must be real, personal,357 and present.358 
 
The requirement that the risk of torture must be personal has been dealt with in a 
number of communications in which the Committee against Torture has held that the 
existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights 
in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a 
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that 
country; additional grounds must exist, which indicate that the individual concerned 
would be personally at risk.  
 
In R.O. v Sweden the Committee held that although the author challenged her return 
to Nigeria due to fear of FGM on her daughters, she failed to prove that such risk 
                                                          
355 Committee against Torture, GC 1 para 1; Y.S. v Australia communication 633/2014 (Committee 
against Torture) 15 November 2016, UN Doc CAT/C/59/D/633/2014 para 4.4 in which the Committee 
stated that states’ restrictions against refoulement in article 3 are confined to torture as defined in 
article 1 and do not include CIDT. In V. X. N. & H. N. v Sweden Communications 130 and 131/1999 
(Committee against Torture) 15 May 2000 UN Doc CAT/C/24/D130&131/1999, para 13.8 the 
Committee held that for purposes of article 3, the torture which an author is likely to be exposed to 
must be likely to be perpetrated by a person acting in an official capacity and not by private 
individuals; in P.Q.L. v Canada Communication 57/1996 (Committee against Torture) 17 November 
1997, UN Doc CAT/C/19/D/57/1996, para 10.6 the Committee held that the obligations under article 3 
are limited to an enquiry whether the author would be subjected to torture at the country of return and 
cannot be used for other determinations, such as whether the author is entitled to a residence permit 
under a country’s domestic legislation. 
356 G. R. B. v Sweden Communication 83/1997 (Committee against Torture), 15 May 1998, UN Doc 
CAT/C/20/D/83/97.   
357 Committee against Torture, GC 1 para 7.   
358 As above. 
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was real, present and facing her daughters personally as she failed to prove that 
FGM is widely practised in her ex-husband’s tribe and on children the same age as 
her daughters.359 In K.N. v Australia the Committee held that despite the human 
rights situation in Sri Lanka, the author had failed to provide information, which 
shows that he personally stands the risk of torture if returned to Sri Lanka.360  
 
In Paez v Sweden, the Committee held that although Sweden sought to deport the 
author because of his involvement in non-political criminal activities, it had failed to 
consider that prior to seeking asylum in Sweden, he was involved in political activity 
and also came from a family of political activists, which placed him at a personal risk 
of torture if returned to Peru.361 In A. S. v Sweden the Committee took into account 
the author’s conviction for adultery in Iran, and the fact that adultery is punishable by 
death in Iran and held that the conviction was to be considered as a ground, which 
exposed her personally to the risk of being stoned to death if she was returned to 
Iran.362  In Alan v Switzerland, the Committee took into account that there was a 
substantial risk of the author being subjected to torture in Turkey because of his 
ethnic background, his alleged political affiliation, his history of previous detention 
and torture, and the fact that there is evidence that the police in Turkey are on the 
look-out for him.363 In Chipana v Venezuela, the Committee held that the nature of 
offences cited by Peru in its request for extradition of the author to Peru, placed the 
author at risk of being subjected to torture since the Committee had received reliable 
information concerning torture of suspects of terrorism and treason and held that his 
                                                          
359 R.O. v Sweden (note 64 above) paras 8.8 & 8.10. 
360 K.N. v Australia (note 354 above) para 7.7. 
361Paez v Sweden Communication 39/1996 (Committee against Torture), 28 April 1997, UN Doc 
CAT/C/18/D39/1996 paras. 2.1, 2.3, 14.2 - 14.6 and 15. 
362 A. S. v Sweden communication 149/1999 (Committee against Torture), 24 November 2000, UN 
Doc CAT/C/25/D/149/1999 paras 8.7 & 9. 
363 Alan v Switzerland (note 58 above) paras 11.3, 11.4 & 12; Kisoki v Sweden, Communication 
41/1996 (Committee against Torture) 8 May 1996, UN Doc CAT/C/16/D41/1996 paras. 9.1-9.7 in 
which the Committee said Sweden must refrain from returning the author to Zaire as there is a risk of 
being subjected to torture due to her political affiliation and activities, history of detention in the past 
and information from UNHCR that upon arrival at Kinshasa airport, deportees who are discovered to 
have sought asylum abroad undergo interrogation, detention and possibly ill-treatment; Elmi v 
Australia Communication 120/1998 (Committee against Torture), 14 May 1999, UN Doc 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 paras 6.6 to 6.9 in which the Committee considered the fact that previous 
detention and torture, execution of his family and his ethnicity exposed the author to torture if returned 
to Mugadishu. 
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return to Peru would violate article 3.364 In X v Switzerland, the Committee held that 
despite the serious human rights violations in Sudan, the return of the author to 
Sudan would not be inconsistent with article 3 because he had failed to provide 
substantial grounds to prove that he would be personally at risk of being  tortured if 
returned to Sudan.365 
 
With regard to the requirement that the risk of torture must be present, in X.,Y. & Z. v 
Sweden, the Committee held that while the previous history of the authors being 
tortured is taken into account, it is used to determine whether there is a risk of torture 
at the time of the determination. In the present case, although Y had been subjected 
to torture before, the regime in the DRC had changed and there were no substantial 
grounds to prove that she and the other authors were at the risk of torture under the 
regime that was in power at the time of their return.366 In S. V. et al. v Canada the 
Committee held that the author’s frequent visits to Sri Lanka post his refuge in 
Canada was a clear indication that at the time of his return, he no longer faced any 
risk of being persecuted upon his return to Sri Lanka despite the human rights 
situation in Sri Lanka.367 Similarly, in A. L. N. v Switzerland, the Committee held that 
the author had not established that he was at risk of torture in Angola since the 
political situation had improved since he left and there were peace negotiations 
going on at the time that the communication was brought before the Committee.368 
                                                          
364 Chipana v Venezuela Communication 110/1998 (Committee against Torture), 10 November 1998, 
UN Doc CAT/C/21/D/110/1998 para 6.4; A. v The Netherlands Communication 91/1997 (Committee 
against Torture), 13 November 1998, UN Doc CAT/C/21/D/91/1997 in which the Committee relied on 
information documented over the years that persons accused of opposition political activity are 
tortured and ill-treated in Tunisia and held that the author’s return to Tunisia would be inconsistent 
with article 3; Haydin v Sweden Communication 101/1997 (Committee against Torture), 20 November 
1998, UN Doc CAT/C/21/D/101/1997 para 6.4. 
365 X. v Switzerland Communication 38/1995 (Committee against Torture), 9 May 1997, UN Doc 
CAT/C/18/D/38/1995 para 10.6. 
366 X ., Y. and Z. v Sweden Communication 61/1996 (Committee against Torture), 6 May 1998, UN 
Doc CAT/C/20/D/61/1996 paras11.1 to 11.5 
367 S. V. et al. v Canada Communication 49/1996 (Committee against Torture), 15 May 2001, UN Doc 
CAT/C/26/D/49/1996, para 9.6. 
368 A. L. N. v Switzerland Communication 90/1997 (Committee against Torture), 19 May 1998, UN 
Doc CAT/C/20/D/90/1997, paras 8.6 & 8.7; K. N. v Switzerland Communication 94/1997 (Committee 
against Torture), 19 May 1998, UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/94/1997, paras. 10.3 & 10.4; J. U. A. v 
Switzerland Communication 100/1997 (Committee against Torture), 10 November 1998, UN Doc 
CAT/21/D/100/1997, paras. 6.3-6.6; H. D. v Switzerland Communication 112/1998 (Committee 
against Torture), 30 April 1999, UN Doc CAT/C/22/D/112/1998, paras 6.3-6.7 in which the Committee 
held that the reasons, which had driven the author out of Turkey had since vanished and therefore his 
return was not a violation of article 3; A. D. v The Netherlands Communication 96/1997 (Committee 
against Torture) 12 November 1999, UN Doc CAT/C/23/D/96/1997, para 7.4 in which the Committee 
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The Committee has held further that the requirement of ‘substantial grounds’ in 
article 3 must not be interpreted to mean ‘serious…in the sense of being highly likely 
to occur’.369 It held that while there must be more than a mere possibility of torture, it 
does not need to be highly likely to occur to satisfy conditions of article 3. In E. A. v 
Switzerland, the Committee held that while there were serious human rights 
violations in Turkey, a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to 
torture must exist for the state to refrain from returning the author to Turkey, which in 
the present case had not been substantiated.370  
 
An exception to the non-refoulement obligation is where the person granted asylum 
or refugee status is regarded as a danger to public interest.371 The Committee has, 
however, warned that before applying this exception, the host country must carefully 
scrutinize the claim ‘without regard to what the person may have done to warrant 
expulsion or to any perceived threat to the national security of the expelling State’.372 
 
(4) The obligation to criminalise torture and related offences 
 
Article 4 mandates state parties to ensure that acts of torture are offences under 
criminal law of each state party. It creates a three-pronged obligation to criminalise 
torture, to prosecute alleged offenders and lastly, to impose appropriate penalties on 
those convicted of torture. The obligation to criminalise torture has been interpreted 
differently by different scholars. For instance, Burgers and Danelius with whom 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
held that while it is aware of the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, it considers that, given the shift in 
political authority and the present circumstances, the author has not substantiated his claim that he 
will personally be at risk of being subjected to torture if returned to Sri Lanka at present. 
369 E. A. v Switzerland Communication 28/1995 (Committee against Torture) 10 November 1997, UN 
Doc CAT/C/19/D/28/1995, para 11.3. 
370 E. A. v Switzerland (note 393 above) para 11.5; S. M. R. and M. M. R. v Sweden Communication 
103/1998 (Committee against Torture), 5 May 1999, UN Doc CAT/C/22/D/103/1998, para 9.7 in which 
the Committee held that although there were reports of mass violation of human rights in Iran, the 
authors had failed to establish that they face a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being tortured in 
Iran. 
371 In Z. Z. v Canada Communication 123/1998 (Committee against Torture), 15 May 2001, UN Doc 
CAT/C/26/D/123/1998, the Committee held that Canada had not violated article 3 and was justified in 
returning the author to Afghanistan upon his release from prison as he had been convicted for 
importing narcotics into Canada. 
372 T. P. S. v Canada Communication 99/1997 (Committee against Torture), 16 May 2000, UN Doc 
CAT/C/24/D/99/97, para 15.3. 
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Messineo agree, argue that article 4 does not mean that there must be a specific, 
separate offence corresponding to torture under article 1 of the Convention.373 This 
argument fails to take into account the other provisions of CAT, as well as the 
concluding observations of the Committee against Torture. First of all, article 1 
imposes an obligation on state parties to incorporate the definition of torture in their 
national legal systems. Secondly, in its concluding observations to Italy, Japan, and 
Poland, the Committee emphatically stated that article 4 requires states to 
incorporate the crime of torture into domestic laws and to adopt a definition of 
torture, which covers all elements contained in article 1 of the Convention.374 The 
Committee repeated this stance in its dialogue with Ukraine.375 Furthermore, article 4 
of CAT mandates state parties to prosecute perpetrators of torture. Over and above 
the obligation to prosecute the offence, which takes place on the soil of state parties, 
article 5 of CAT goes a step further by providing for universal jurisdiction.376 
Therefore it would be impossible to implement article 4 in isolation without having a 
specific offence of torture. 
 
(5) The obligation to train law enforcement officers and review rules of interrogation 
 
Article 11 of CAT mandates state parties to keep their interrogation rules, 
instructions, methods, practice, as well as arrangements of custody and treatment of 
detained persons under systematic review with the aim of preventing torture. In 
Elaiba v Tunisia, the Committee stated that taking general measures to prevent 
torture does not comply with the obligations under article 11 in as much as article 11 
requires the state to have measures in place that are specifically targeted at police 
officers with the aim of preventing them from committing acts of violence against 
individuals who have been arrested, detained or imprisoned.377 
                                                          
373 Burgers & Danelius (note 71 above); F Messineo ‘Extraordinary renditions and state obligation to 
criminalise torture and prosecute torture in the light to the Abu Omar case in Italy’ (2009) 7 (5) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 1023. 
374 Committee against Torture Concluding observation on the fourth periodic report of Italy, second 
periodic report of Japan and combined fifth to sixth periodic report of Poland (note 341 above); Report 
of the Committee against Torture UN Doc A/62/44,2007. 
375 Committee against torture dialogue with Ukraine UN Doc CAT/C/SR.762, 2007 para 8. 
376 CAT article 5(3); SAPS v SALC (note 188 above). See also Nowak & McArthur (note 63 above). 
377 Elaiba v Tunisia Communication 551/2013 (Committee against Torture) 6 May 2016 UN Doc 
CAT/C/57/D/551/2013, para 7.4; Hernandez Colmenarez and Guerrero Sanchez v Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela Communication 456/2011 (Committee against Torture), 15 May 2015 para 6.7. 
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(6) The obligation to investigate allegations of torture promptly and impartially  
 
Article 12 of CAT provides that where there is reasonable ground to believe that an 
act of torture has been committed, states are mandated to institute prompt and 
impartial investigation of such allegations.378Article 12 has three aspects: firstly, 
states must establish investigating authorities, secondly, such investigating 
authorities must be independent and impartial and thirdly, the investigations 
conducted must be carried out promptly. These three aspects were interpreted by 
the Committee against Torture through jurisprudence. With regard to the 
establishment of competent, independent and impartial investigating authorities, in 
Abad v Spain, the Committee held that the court’s failure to identify and question any 
Guardia civil officers who might have taken part in torturing the author was an 
inexcusable incompetence since a criminal investigation must seek to determine 
both the nature and circumstances of the alleged acts and to establish the identity of 
the person who might have been involved in the said acts.379 Similarly in Elaiba v 
Tunisia the Committee stipulated that ‘…a criminal investigation must seek both to 
determine the nature and circumstances of the alleged acts and to establish the 
identity of any person who has been involved in them’.380 In Ristic v Yugoslavia, the 
Committee held that by using a doctor who is not a forensic expert in investigating 
the death of a person alleged to have been subjected to torture, the state had 
violated its obligation under articles 12 and 13.381 In Alexander Gerasimov v 
Kazakhstan the Committee noted that a preliminary examination of the author’s 
complaints of torture was undertaken by the Department of Internal Security, which 
                                                          
378 In Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi Communication 549/2013 (Committee against Torture), 11 
November 2016, UN Doc CAT/C/59/549/2013paras 3.4 & 7.4 the Committee held that Burundi had 
violated article 12 because although the author had complained to the authorities about his torture in 
June 2007 and again in November 2012, they failed to investigate them.  
379 Abad v Spain Communication 59/1996 (Committee against Torture), 14 May 1998, UN Doc 
CAT/C/20/D/59/1996 para 8.8. 
380 Elaiba v Tunisia (note 377 above) para 7.6. Similar holdings were made in F.K. v Denmark 
Communication 580/2014 (Committee against Torture) 23 November 2016 UN Doc 
CAT/C/56/D/580/2014 para 7.7 and Dzemajl v Yugoslavia Communication 161/2000 (Committee 
against Torture) 21 November 2002 UN Doc CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 para 9.4. 
381 Ristic v Yugoslavia Communication 113/1998 (Committee against Torture), 11 May 2001, paras 
9.5 to 9.8.  
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is under the same chain of command as the regular police force and held that this 
could not lead to an impartial examination of such complaints.382 
 
With regard to prompt investigations, in Halimi-Nedzibi v Austria, the Committee 
considered the delay of fifteen months before the investigation of allegations of 
torture as unreasonably long and in violation of article 12.383 Similarly, in M’Barek v 
Tunisia, the Committee held that the state party had violated article 12 in that despite 
it being brought to its attention by several national and international organisations 
that the author’s son had died as a result of torture; it was only after ten months that 
investigations were initiated.384 The Committee held further that the magistrate who 
carried out the enquiry was not impartial and therefore articles 12 and 13 violated.385  
 
In its General Recommendation 3 on the implementation of article 14, which 
mandates states to provide redress to victims of torture, the Committee against 
Torture stated that the investigation of allegations of torture is also a remedy to 
which victims are entitled.386 It stated further that if those acting in official capacity 
knew or ought to have known about acts of torture, but fail to exercise due diligence 
to investigate them, the state bears responsibility to redress the victims of such 
acts.387 
 
(7) The obligation to enable victims to complain about torture 
 
In terms of article 13, states are mandated to ensure that there exists, at the national 
level, authorities with competence to examine complaints about torture promptly and 
impartially. This obligation is closely linked to the obligation to investigate under 
article 12. Therefore, states’ obligation to ensure that authorities who examine 
                                                          
382 Alexander Gerasimov v Kazakhstan Communication 433/2010 (Committee against Torture), 24 
May 2012, UN Doc CAT/C/48/D/433/2010, para 12.4. See also Keremedchiev v Bulgaria 
Communication 257/2004 (Committee against Torture), 11 November 2008, UN Doc 
CAT/C/4/D/257/2004.  
383 Halimi-Nedzibi v Austria Communication 8/1991 (Committee against Torture), 18 November 1993, 
para 13.5. 
384 Khaled M’Barek v Tunisia Communication 60/1996 (Committee against Torture), 10 November 
1999, UN Doc CAT/C/23/D/60/1996, paras 11.5 to 11.7. 
385 As above para 11.10. 
386 Committee against Torture, GC 3 para 16. 
387 As above para 7. 
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complaints of torture are impartial is similar to ensuring the impartiality of 
investigations in that the authority must not be under the same chain of command as 
the office, which is complained about.388  
 
The second leg of states’ obligations under article 13 is to ensure prompt 
examination of the complaint. In Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi the Committee held 
that the state party had violated article 7 in that although the complaints about torture 
were brought to the attention of the judicial authorities on 27 June 2007, at the time 
of considering the communication in 2013, the judicial authorities had still not 
examined the complaint in violation of both articles 12 and 13 of CAT.389  
 
The third leg of the obligation is that the victims, witnesses and members of their 
families must be protected against further ill-treatment or intimidation, which they 
may face because of having lodged the complaint. In Gerasimov v Kazakhstan, the 
Committee held that the state party’s failure to protect the author against torture and 
ill-treatment including forced psychiatric evaluation following his complaint was a 
violation of article 13. Similarly, the state party was found to have violated article 13 
in Abdulrahm Kabura v Burundi because following his release from prison, the author 
and members of his family received threats and were intimidated, which he reported, 
yet the state failed to do anything to protect them from such.390 
 
(8) The obligation to provide redress to victims of torture  
 
Article 14 mandates state parties to provide redress for victims of torture and to the 
victim’s dependents where the victim has died as a result of torture. In General 
Comment 3,391 the Committee considered that the term ‘redress’ in article 14 
encompasses the concepts of ‘effective remedy’ and ‘reparation’.392 It emphasised 
further that the comprehensive reparative concept entails restitution, compensation, 
                                                          
388 See Alexander Gerasimov v Kazakhstan (note 382 above). 
389 Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above), para 7.5. The link between articles 12 and 13 
was also made in Dmytro Slyusar v Ukraine (note 59 above) para 9.3. 
390 Abdulrahm Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above) para 7.5.  
391 Committee against Torture, GC 3 (note 9 above). 
392 Committee against Torture, GC 3, para 2; Bendib v Algeria (note 113 above), Evloev v Kazakhstan 
(note 111 above) and Gerasimov v Kazakhstan (note 382 above). 
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rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.393 In Gerasimov v 
Kazakhstan the Committee held that this remedy does not and should not under 
domestic law, be dependent upon a conviction in criminal proceedings.394 
  
According to the Committee against Torture, the obligation to provide redress under 
article 14 is two-fold: procedural and substantive. The procedural obligation is to 
enact legislation and establish complaints mechanisms, investigation bodies and 
institutions capable of determining the right to and to award redress for a victim of 
torture and other CIDT. The state also has to ensure that such mechanisms and 
bodies are effective and accessible to all victims.395 In Abdulrahman Kabura v 
Burundi the Committee recalled its concluding observations to the state party in 
which it was urged to take legislative, administrative and judicial measures to 
prevention torture.396 It held that in order to ensure that these acts do not recur, 
investigation and action must be brought against those responsible.397 
 
The substantive obligation enjoins state parties to ensure that victims of torture or ill-
treatment obtain full and effective redress and reparation, including compensation 
and the means for as full rehabilitation as possible.398 This aspect of states’ 
obligations under article 14 was applied in Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi.399 In this 
case the author submitted that since he reported his torture to the authorities, he has 
not received any compensation or rehabilitation. The Committee recalled that article 
14 does not only recognise the right to fair and adequate compensation, but also 
requires state parties to ensure that a victim of torture obtains redress, which should 
encompass a number of measures, such as restitution, compensation and 
guarantees of non-repetition.400 It held that in the particular case the author ought to 
have received treatment and rehabilitation for the trauma and physical effects of the 
                                                          
393 Committee against Torture GC 3, para 2. 
394Gerasimov v Kazakhstan (note 382 above) para 12.8. 
395 Committee against Torture, GC 3 para 5. 
396 Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above) para 7.3. 
397 As above para 7.6; Salem v Tunisia Communication 269/2005 (Committee against Torture) 7 
November 2007 UN Doc CAT/C/23/D/269/2005 para 16.8. 
398 As above. 
399 Abudulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above) para 7.6. 
400 As above; Gerasimov v Kazakhstan (note 382 above) para 12.8 in which the Committee held that 
redress should cover all harm suffered, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation of the victim 
and measures to guarantee that those acts do not recur. 
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torture.401 The Committee emphasised that measures for appropriate redress must 
be based on the circumstances of each case.402  In General Comment 3, the 
Committee also emphasises the importance of victim participation in the redress 
process, and that restoration of the dignity of the victim is the ultimate objective in 
the provision of redress.403  
 
(9) The obligation to prohibit use of torture-induced evidence in official proceedings  
 
Article 15 of CAT mandates state parties to ‘ensure that any statement, which is 
established to have been made as a result of torture, shall not be invoked as 
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as 
evidence that the statement was made’. Torture is mostly used as an interrogation 
technique to extract confessions and evidence of commission of a criminal offence. 
These materials are used by police officers to secure convictions. Therefore, 
rejection of such evidence negates the entire investigation process and would 
therefore discourage the police from resorting to torture during their investigation.404 
This obligation is an important step towards the prevention of torture, as the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture has stated that effective prevention of torture and ill-treatment 
requires that any incentive to use such abuse to assist investigations be 
eliminated.405  
 
In Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi, the author submitted that he was subjected to 
torture as a result of which he made incriminating statements against himself. These 
statements were used to keep him in detention for a period of two months and 
twenty days and to open a case of attempted murder against him.406 The Committee 
held that by using those statements in the judicial proceedings in the course of which 
                                                          
401 Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above) para 7.6. 
402 As above. 
403 Committee against Torture, GC 3 para 4. 
404 JD Mujuzi ‘The admissibility in Namibia of evidence obtained through human rights violations’ 
(2016) 16 African Human Rights Law Journal 412. 
405 Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, JE Mendez’ 10 April 2014 UN Doc A/HRC/25/60 paras 21 & 63. 
406 Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above) para 3.7. 
85 
 
the author was released on bail, the state party had violated its obligations under 
article 15.407 
 
(10) The obligation to prevent other acts of CIDT 
 
In terms of article 16, state parties are mandated to prevent acts of cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in 
article 1(1), when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. In Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi the Committee held that the conditions 
in which the author was detained violated the state party’s obligation under article 
16. These conditions were detention in a 12-square metre cell with no windows and 
light, deprivation of food and water and sleeping on the floor in a cell in appalling 
sanitary conditions.408 
 
(11) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture  
 
Article 19 of CAT mandates state parties to submit within one year of the CAT’s entry 
into force for a particular state, and every four years thereafter, ‘reports on measures 
they have taken to give effect to their undertakings under [CAT]…’409  The report 
must contain legal and institutional frameworks as well as case law which affect 
implementation of CAT, statistics on ‘complaints, inquiries, indictments, proceedings, 
sentences’ and factors which inhibit full implementation of states’ obligations under 
CAT.410 
 
2.4.1.8  Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989 
                                                          
407 As above para 7.7. 
408 As above para 7.8; Kirsanov v Russian Federation (note 66 above) para 12 in which the conditions 
of the temporary confinement ward, which had no bedding and toiletry items, no toilet and sink, cold 
shower and denial to walk outside were held to be a violation of article 16 of CAT as the acts did not 
fit the definition of torture under article 1. 
409 The form and content of the periodic reports are outlined in the ‘General guidelines regarding the 
form and contents of periodic reports to be submitted by state parties’ 2 June 1998, UN Doc 
CAT/C/14/Rev.1. 
410 As above para 3; see also CAT Committee Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan 
1 June 2017, UN Doc CAT/C/PAK/CO/1 para 6 in which the Committee raised concern that the report 
does not contain information with regard to criminal proceedings against police officers alleged to have 
committee torture. 
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The CRC was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989 as an instrument 
specifically dedicated to the protection of children’s rights. Article 19 provides for the 
protection of all children from ‘all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or 
abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual 
abuse while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has 
the care of the child’. Specifically referring to torture, article 37 provides that ‘no child 
shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.411 The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee),412 has 
emphasised the complementary nature of articles 9 and 37.413  
 
In General Comment 13, the CRC Committee defined violence as ‘all forms of 
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment or 
exploitation including sexual abuse’.414 It interpreted physical violence to include 
corporal punishment and all forms of torture and CIDT.415 In the context of the CRC, 
torture refers to violence against children, which is inflicted for purposes of extracting 
a confession, punishing children for unwanted behaviour, or to force children to 
engage in activities against their will.416 The Committee stated further that typically 
this type of violence is inflicted by the police and law enforcement officers, as well as 
other non-state actors who have power over the children.417 In General Comment 8, 
it noted that corporal punishment and other CIDT are widely accepted and mostly 
practised in schools, care centres, residential homes, police custody and justice 
institutions.418 The CRC contains states’ obligations against torture. 
 
                                                          
411 CRC article 37 (1). 
412 Established by CRC article 43 as a body responsible to oversee its implementation. 
413 CRC, General Comment 18, CEDAW General Recommendation 31 ‘Harmful practices’ 14 
November 2014 (CRC, GC 18); CRC, GC 18; UNICEF 2014 ‘Fulfilling obligations under the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols’  
https://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30208.html [accessed 8 January 2016]. 
414 CRC, General Comment 13 ‘The right of the child to have his or her best interest taken as a 
primary consideration (art. 3, para 1)’ 29 May 2013, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14 (CRC, GC 13) para 4. 
415 CRC, GC 13 para 22 (a). 
416 As above para 25. 
417 As above para 26. 
418 CRC, General Comment 8 ‘The right of the child to protection from corporal punishment and other 
cruel or degrading forms of punishment (arts. 19, 28 para 2; and 31 inter alia)’ 2 June 2006, UN Doc 
CRC/C/GC/8 para 1 & CRC, GC 13 para 3(i). 
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(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture of children 
 
With regard to states’ obligations to protect children from torture by preventing and 
prohibiting it, the CRC mandates states to adopt legislative and administrative 
measures.419 While the national laws may provide general protection of rights for all 
citizens, including children, the Committee has emphasised the need for the 
adoption of children-specific laws, which must reflect the principles of non-
discrimination,420 best interest of the child,421  the child’s inherent right to life and the 
child’s right to express opinion in matters affecting him/her.422  
 
The protection of children from discrimination is particularly relevant to the 
prevention of torture because certain children may be more vulnerable to torture on 
the grounds of discrimination.423 The Committee has emphasised that the obligation 
to eliminate violent and humiliating punishment of children is an immediate and 
unqualified state obligation, which is linked to states’ obligations under other human 
rights treaties, such as ICCPR, CAT and the African Charter.424  
 
With regard to the adoption of legislative measures aimed at the prevention and 
prohibition of torture, the Committee re-emphasised the need for state parties to 
review their existing laws and harmonise them with the standards contained in the 
CRC.425 It stated that: 
 
The Committee urges States parties, as a matter of urgency, to enact or repeal their 
legislation as necessary in order to prohibit all forms of violence, however slight, within 
the family and in schools, including as a form of discipline, as required by the provisions 
of the Convention and in particular articles 19, 28 and 37 (a) and taking into account 
                                                          
419 CRC article 4. See also CRC, GC 8 paras 30 to 37 and CRC, GC 18 para 55. 
420 CRC, General Comment 5 ‘General Measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44 para 6)’ 2003 (CRC, GC 5) para 12. 
421CRC, GC 8 paras 38 to 43 and CRC, GC 13 para 13. 
422 CRC, GC 5 para 22. 
423 CRC, GC 13 para 26 states that children in conflict of the law, children in street situations, 
minorities and indigenous and unaccompanied children, who are marginalised, disadvantaged and 
discriminated against are often victims of different forms of torture and CIDT.  
424 As above paras 22 & 25. 
425 CRC Committee, Report of the twenty-eighth session, Geneva 28 September to 12 October 2001, 
UN Doc CRC/C/111 (CRC Committee Report of 28th Session) para 713. 
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articles 2, 3, 6 and 12, as well as articles 4, 5, 9, 18, 24, 27, 29 and 39.426 
 
The CRC Committee has stated further that it is essential for domestic laws to be 
harmonised with the CRC, that the CRC be directly applied and enforceable in 
domestic courts and to prevail over national laws.427  
 
Administrative measures for prevention and prohibition of torture have been 
interpreted to include awareness-raising, guidance and training in accordance with 
the principle of the best interest of the child,428 education of children and adults alike 
on the laws, which prohibit corporal punishment,429 monitoring and evaluation,430 
submission of state party reports as required under the CRC,431 ratification of the 
Optional Protocols to CRC, CRPD and CAT,432 providing an adequate budget for 
legislation and all other measures adopted to end violence against children,433  
enforcing law and judicial procedures in a child-friendly way, and empowering 
women and girls.434  
  
Apart from the general comments adopted by the CRC Committee, the scope and 
content of states’ obligations against torture has been elaborated upon in the 
Optional Protocols to the CRC. These Protocols provide guidelines on the prevention 
and prohibition of violence and torture against children. The Optional Protocol on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict mandates state parties to take measures, 
which ensure that individuals under the age of 18 do not take a direct part in armed 
conflicts.435 Exclusion of children from direct participation in armed conflicts reduces 
their risk of being tortured either by the commanders of the armed group in which 
                                                          
426 CRC Committee, Report of the twenty-eighth session para 701. See also CRC, GC 8 para 7 and 
CRC, GC 13 para 41 (d). 
427 CRC, GC 5 paras 2, 19 & 20. 
428 CRC, GC 8 paras 38 - 43. 
429 As above paras 44 - 49. 
430 As above paras 50 - 52. 
431 As above para 53. 
432 CRC, GC 13 para 41 (a). 
433 As above para 41 (e). 
434 CRC, GC 18 paras 61 - 69. 
435 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict, adopted by UN GA Res. A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, article 1. 
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they would be recruited or by the opposition armed group.436  The Optional Protocol 
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography requires states to 
provide legal and other support services to child victims and specifically calls for 
international cooperation to prevent and punish these abuses.437 It therefore 
reinforces states’ obligations to prohibit torture and also to punish those who 
perpetrate it against children. 
(2) The obligations to punish perpetrators and provide redress to victims of torture  
  
The CRC mandates state parties to provide redress where the rights of the child 
have been violated. The CRC Committee has interpreted this obligation to entail the 
establishment of effective, child-sensitive procedures of complaints, which are 
accessible to the children and their representatives.438 These complaints procedures 
must be independent and have the power to order appropriate reparation, including 
compensation, as well as physical and psychological recovery, rehabilitation and 
integration as mandated by article 39 of CRC.439 The Committee also reminded state 
parties of the need to punish perpetrators of torture and to provide appropriate 
redress, which is suitable to the circumstances of the children who are victims of 
such violence.440 
 
(3) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture 
 
Article 44 mandates state parties to report on the measures they have adopted to 
implement the CRC and to make their reports widely available to the public in their 
own countries. The state also has the duty to ensure that the report is accessible in 
that it is translated into languages understood by the public, and is in forms 
accessible to children and persons with disabilities.441  As far as reporting on torture 
is concerned, the CRC Committee requests states to provide detailed statistics on 
                                                          
436 UN GA Secretary General ‘Promotion and protection of the rights of children: impact of armed 
conflict on children’ 26 August 1996, UN Doc A/51/150 paras 11, 67, 91, 94, 212 and 213. 
437 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography, adopted by UN GA Res. A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000 article 
3(3). 
438 As above para 24. 
439 As above. 
440 CRC Committee, Report of the twenty-eighth session (note 425 above) para 716. 
441 As above. 
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reported cases of torture of children, the number of prosecutions as well as 
punishments which have been imposed on perpetrators of such acts.442 
 
2.4.1.9 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW) 1990 
 
The CMW was adopted with the aim of protecting migrant workers and members of 
their families from exploitation and human rights violation.443 It defines a migrant 
worker as ‘a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a 
remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national’.444 Article 10 of 
the CMW provides that no migrant worker or member of his or her family shall be 
subjected to torture or CIDT.  
 
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, punish its perpetrators, and 
provide redress to its victims 
 
States’ obligations with regard to the implementation of the CMW have been 
interpreted and elaborated on by the Committee on Protection of Migrant Workers 
(CMW Committee),445 in General Comment 1 in which it stated that there is a need 
for legal protection of migrant workers from exploitation, which they face particularly 
because of being foreigners.446 Particularly related to torture, the Committee noted 
with concern that women migrant workers are more vulnerable to abuse, including 
gender-based violence.447 Based on the vulnerabilities it identified, the Committee 
recommended that state parties should take appropriate measures to prevent torture 
by disseminating information on the rights of migrant workers, pre-departure training 
                                                          
442 CRC Committee, Concluding observations on the second to fourth periodic report of Brazil (note 
120 above).  
443 CMW preamble. 
444 CMW article 2(1). 
445 Established in terms of article 72(1)(a) of CMW as its supervisory body. 
446 Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 
General Comment 1 ‘Migrant domestic workers’, 23 February 2011, UN Doc CMW/C/GC/1  (CMW, 
GC 1).1 para 7. 
447 As above. 
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of the workers, as well as co-operation between the worker’s state of origin, state of 
transit (if any) and state of employment. 448  
 
In General Comment 2, which deals with the rights of migrant workers in an irregular 
situation and members of their families,449 the Committee noted that an estimated 
10-15% of the world’s international migrants are in an irregular situation, which 
makes them vulnerable to abuse and torture because many states increasingly 
resort to repressive measures, such as criminalisation of irregular migration, as well 
as administrative detention and expulsion as a way of deterring migrant workers and 
members of their families from entering or staying on their territory without 
authorisation.450 The Committee noted that the criminalisation of irregular migration 
fosters and promotes public perceptions that migrant workers and members of their 
families are illegal, second class individuals and unfair competitors for jobs and 
social benefits, thus fuelling anti-immigration public discourses, discrimination and 
xenophobia.451  
 
It listed a number of obligations which state parties have under the CMW and other 
international human rights instruments. Although these obligations do not explicitly 
refer to torture, if complied with, torture would be prevented. These are the 
obligations  to (1)  eliminate discrimination which is contained in the laws, as well as 
that which, although not formally or legally recognised, exists or has an impact on 
migrant workers,452 (2) protect migrant workers and members of their families 
against violence, physical injury, threats and intimidation by public officials, private 
individuals, groups or institutions,453 (3) protect migrant workers against arbitrary 
arrest and detention and where detention is indispensable, to prescribe by law 
circumstances under which, as well as the period for which, a migrant worker in an 
                                                          
448 As above paras 28 & 29 & 33 - 44. 
449 Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 
General Comment 2 ‘Rights of migrant workers in an irregular situation and members of their families’, 
28 August 2013 UN Doc CMW/C/GC/2  (CMW, GC 2) para 3; the CMW article defines a migrant 
worker in an irregular situation as one who has not been authorised to enter, to stay and to engage in 
a remunerated activity in the state of employment pursuant to the laws of that state and to 
international agreements to which that state is a party. 
450 CMW, GC 2 paras 1 & 2. 
451 CMW, GC 2 para 2. 
452 CMW article 7; CMW, GC 2 paras 18 & 19. 
453 As above para 21. 
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irregular situation may be arrested,454 (4) protect migrant workers from inhuman 
treatment by  providing them with adequate sanitary, bathing and shower facilitates, 
adequate food, drinking water, communication with relatives and access to qualified 
medical personnel,455 and (5) protect all migrants against refoulement and collective 
expulsions as such may expose them to torture in the country of return.456 
 
The CMW Committee stipulated the following as specific means to address states’ 
obligations to prevent and prohibit torture of migrant workers, to punish its 
perpetrators and also to provide redress to its victims: 
 
(a) adoption and implementation of legislation prohibiting acts of violence;  
(b)  effectively investigating cases of abuse and violence; 
(c) prosecution and punishment of those responsible with appropriate 
punishments; 
(d) adequate reparation to victims and members of their families; 
(e) human rights training for public officials; 
(f) effective monitoring of the conduct of state agents; and  
(g) regulation of the conduct of private persons and entities with the view to 
prevent acts of violence.  
 
In exceptional circumstances in which a migrant worker has been detained, state 
parties have an obligation to: 
 
a) inform authorities of his or her country of origin without delay of the arrest or 
detention of the migrant worker concerned, if he or she so requests;  
(b) facilitate any communication between the person concerned and the said 
authorities;  
(c) inform the person concerned without delay of this right, as well as of rights under 
other applicable treaties;  
                                                          
454 CMW article 16; CMW, GC 2 paras 23 - 35. 
455 CMW, article 17; CMW, GC 2 para 36. 
456 CMW article 22; CMW, GC 2 paras 11 & 50. 
93 
 
(d) correspond and meet with representatives of the said authorities and make 
arrangements with them for his or her legal representation;457 
(e) promptly bring the detained person before court;458 
(f) give the detained person access to an interpreter (if necessary) and ensure that 
he or she gets information about his or her rights in the language that he or she 
understands;459 and 
(g) ensure availability of enforceable right to compensation and the right not to be 
expelled while compensation is being considered.460 
 
(2) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture 
 
Article 73 of the CMW mandates state parties to submit reports for consideration by 
the CMW Committee on the legislative, judicial, administrative and other measures 
they have taken to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention. The initial 
report has to be submitted within one year of the Convention’s entry into force and 
the periodic reports have to be submitted every five years thereafter and when the 
CMW Committee so requests. With regard to reporting on torture and other CIDT, 
the Committee recommends that the state party report must contain information on 
the situation of migrant workers in the state party as well as disaggregated data on 
‘incidents of xenophobia, ill-treatment and violence directed at migrant workers and 
members of their families’.461 The report must also contain ‘the number of migrant 
workers who have been arrested, detained and expelled for immigration-related 
infractions, the reasons for their detention and expulsion, the length of their detention 
as well as detention conditions’.462 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
457 CMW article 16 (7); Committee GC 2 para 30. 
458 CMW, GC 2 para 33. 
459 As above para 34. 
460 As above para 35. 
461 CMW Committee, Concluding observations on Jamaica in the absence of a report (note 120 
above). 
462 As above para 36. 
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2.4.1.10 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 2006 
 
The CRPD is aimed at promoting, protecting and ensuring the full and equal 
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with 
disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.463 It is based on the 
principles of respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy, non-discrimination, full 
and effective participation and inclusion in society, respect for difference and 
acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity, 
equality of opportunity, accessibility, equality between men and women, respect for 
the evolving capacities of children with disabilities and respect for the right of 
children with disabilities to preserve their identities.464 
 
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture 
 
Article 15 of the CRPD provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or other 
CIDT, including medical or scientific experimentation. It places a duty on state 
parties to take effective legislative, administrative and judicial measures to prevent 
and prohibit torture and other CIDT of persons with disabilities on equal basis with 
others. This entails an obligation to effectively and promptly investigate allegations of 
torture and other CIDT and to ensure that persons who are at the risk of torture have 
access to independent complaint mechanisms and ‘legally entitled to remedies’ 
including compensation.465 The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability 
(CRPD Committee),466 in its concluding observations has stated that states’ 
obligations under article 15 include refraining from ‘protective custody’ which has the 
effect of violating freedom of movement.467 Article 4 of the CRPD requires that the 
measures adopted must be based on the principle of non-discrimination. In the 
context of torture, states are obliged to modify or abolish discriminatory laws, policies 
                                                          
463 CRPD Article 1. 
464 CRPD article 3. 
465 CRPD Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of Jordan 15 May 2017 UN Doc 
CRPD/C/JOR/CO/1 para 32. 
466 Established in terms of CRPD article 34 to monitor implementation of CRPD. 
467 CRPD Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of Moldova 15 May 2017, UN Doc 
CRPD/C/MDA/CO/1 paras 31 & 32. 
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or practices,468 and also to train professionals and staff working with people with 
disabilities on the prohibition of torture.469 
 
(2) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture 
 
In terms of article 35 of the CRPD, state parties are required to submit to the CRPD 
Committee, within two years after the CRPD’s entry into force with respect to each 
state and thereafter every four years, a comprehensive report on measures taken to 
implement the CRPD. It mandates the state to indicate in the initial report, all 
legislative, administrative and judicial measures, as well as factors and challenges 
which inhibit full implementation of the CRPD.470 With regard to subsequent reporting 
on torture, the CRPD Committee has stated in its concluding observations that the 
report must contain information on how the state has implemented the 
recommendations in previous reports including the recommendation to prevent 
torture by developing effective investigation and monitoring systems,471 investigating 
of allegations of torture as well as establishment of independent complaint 
mechanisms with mandate to adjudicate on cases and to award remedies to persons 
with disabilities who are victims of torture and other CIDT.472 
 
2.4.2 UN soft law  
 
Apart from the legally binding treaties discussed above, the UN has also set 
standards against torture in other non-binding instruments, which are also referred to 
as soft law or consensus documents.473  Although non-binding in nature, soft law is 
                                                          
468 CRPD article 4(1) (b). 
469 CRPD article 4(1) (i). 
470 CRPD article 35(5). 
471 CRPD Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of Moldova para 31 read with para 
64; CRPD Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of Jordan para 32 read with para 
69 
472 As above. 
473 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1975); Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners (1957 as amended in 1977); Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979); 
Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the 
Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1982); Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power (1985); Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985); Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) (1987); Body of 
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persuasive, provides guidelines for the implementation of the legally binding 
instruments and also provides evidence of the existence of customary international 
law.  The focus of this section is on the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from Being Subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (Declaration against Torture) 1975 because it is specific on torture 
and also defines it.474  The Declaration also confirmed the absolute nature of the 
obligation against torture and provides for redress to victims of torture.  Lippman 
however, argues that in 1975, its drafters had not appreciated that by the time of its 
adoption, torture ‘had become a central mechanism of political control’, which would 
make it unrealistic to rely on domestic legal systems to prevent and prohibit it.475 
According to Ingles, when torture continued to take place despite states’ commitment 
in the Declaration, the government of Sweden took a step further and sponsored a 
binding treaty, hence, the Declaration became a basis from which CAT would be 
adopted later in 1984. 
 
2.5 Prohibition of torture in the African human rights system 
 
The African human rights system first functioned under the auspices of the OAU and 
currently functions under the AU.476 Both the OAU and AU have respect and 
protection of human rights as their core objectives and principles.477 The instruments 
adopted under their auspices, which contain obligations against torture are: OAU 
Convention governing specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa (OAU Refugee 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (1988); 
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1990); Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 
(1990); Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (1990); Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived 
of their Liberty (1990); Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary 
and Summary Executions (1990); Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials (1990); Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care (1991); Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (1992); Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Istanbul Protocol) 
(1999) and Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparations for victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (UN Impunity Principles) (2005). 
474 The UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from being subjected to Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN GA Resolution 34/52 UN Doc A/10408 
(Declaration against Torture) 9 December 1975. 
475 Lippman (note 325 above) 303. 
476 The OAU was established in 1963 in Addis Ababa and was replaced by the AU in 2002 
477 OA Charter article II and Constitutive Act of the AU articles 3 & 4. 
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Convention),478 African Charter,479 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (African Children’s Charter),480 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol),481 
African Youth Charter,482 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance483 and AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa (AU IDP Convention).484 The discussion also considers 
the AU Guidelines on Measures for Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Robben Island Guidelines/RIGs) 
which is soft law.485 
 
2.5.1 African regional treaties 
 
2.5.1.1 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(OAU Refugee Convention) 1969  
 
One of the main reasons, which precipitated the establishment of the OAU, was the 
problem of refugees occasioned by civil wars and liberation struggles in Africa in the 
1960s.486 The OAU Refugee Convention was adopted in 1969 to alleviate the 
suffering of refugees and also to address the friction between African states, which 
had been caused by the increasing number of refugees, as well as individuals and 
groups who would seek refuge only to carry out subversive acts against their own 
states while in the country of refuge.487  It defines a refugee in similar terms as the 
UN Refugee Convention.488 Because many refugees in Africa were also driven out of 
                                                          
478 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted by Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government on 10 September 1969. Lesotho acceded to it on 18 November 
1988. 
479 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted by the OAU Assembly on 27 June 1981. 
Lesotho acceded to it on 10 February 1992. 
480 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adopted on 1 July 1990, Lesotho ratified in 
on 27 September 1999. 
481 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
adopted on 7 November 2003. Lesotho ratified it on 26 October 2004. 
482 African Youth Charter adopted on 2 July 2006, Lesotho ratified it on 31 May 2010. 
483 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted on 30 January 2007, Lesotho 
ratified it on 25 June 2010. 
484 AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, adopted 
on 23 October Lesotho ratified it on 19 January 2012. 
485 Robben Island Guidelines (note 103 above). 
486 OAU Refugee Convention preamble. 
487 OAU Refugee Convention preamble. 
488 OAU Refugee convention article I (1). 
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their countries during the fight against colonisation, the OAU Refugee Convention 
added another group of refugees to this definition, being: 
 
…every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality. 
 
(1) Non-refoulement 
 
Article II (3) of the OAU Refugee Convention contains the non-refoulement obligation 
in that it mandates state parties not to reject from their frontiers, return or expel a 
person from their territory as a result of which such a person shall be compelled to 
return to or remain in a territory in which his life, integrity of person or liberty would 
be threatened on grounds set out in article I. Some scholars have suggested that the 
OAU Refugee Convention expands states’ non-refoulement obligations beyond the 
UN Refugee Convention in that it does not contain the security exception in article 
33(2) of the former and also that the latter applies at the states’ frontiers while the 
former does not explicitly provide so.489 These arguments have, however, been 
countered by Sharpe who illustrates that  the exceptions in article 1(4)(f) & (g) of the 
OAU Refugee Convention in terms of which protection from refoulement ceases 
when one commits a non-political offence is similar to the security exception in article 
33(2) of the UN Refugee Convention.490 She argues further that with regard to 
application at the frontiers, state practice, as well as recorded views support an 
argument that asylum applies immediately when one presents himself or herslef at 
the borders of a particular state. Therefore that particular state’s non-refoulement 
obligation under the UN Refugee Convention is triggered at that very moment.491 
 
 
 
                                                          
489 R Murray ‘Refugees and the internally displaced persons and human rights: The African system’ 
(2005) 24 (2) Refugee Survey Quarterly 57; G Abi-Saab ‘The admission and expulsion of refugees 
with special reference to Africa’ (2008) 8 African Yearbook of International Law 90.  
490 M Sharpe ‘The 1969 Refugee Convention: Innovations, misconceptions and omissions’ (2012) 58 
(1) McGill Law Journal 106. 
491 As above 107. 
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(2) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture 
 
States’ reporting obligations under the OAU Refugee Convention are similar to those 
outlined under the UN Refugee Convention in that states are not required to submit 
periodic reports but to furnish the secretariat of the OAU with ‘information and 
statistical data on the condition of refugees, implementation of the Convention’ as well 
as laws relevant to refugees in that particular country.492 This obligation has not been 
elaborated upon. 
   
2.5.1.2 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) 1981 
 
The African Charter is the main human rights instrument on the African continent. 
When celebrating the 30th anniversary of the African Charter, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission),493 stated that the 
African Charter helped to steer Africa from the age of human wrongs into a new age 
of human rights.494 Article 5 contains the right to dignity as well as freedom from 
torture and other CIDT.495 With regard to the definition of torture under article 5, the 
African Commission has adopted the CAT definition of torture.496 On this basis it has 
held that acts such as ‘whipping and beating with sticks’ do not amount to torture, but 
to other CIDT.497  It has further stated that all the rights contained in the African 
Charter generate ‘at least four levels of duties for a state…namely, the duty to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights’.498 In the context of torture, these 
obligations have been interpreted as follows: 
                                                          
492 OAU Refugee Convention article VII 
493 Established in terms of African Charter article 30. 
494African Commission ‘The Charter is 30 years old’ www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/30th-
anniversary [accessed 22 November 2016]. 
495 The practical implementation article 5 is set out in detail in the Robben Island Guidelines (note 103 
above).  
496 Abdel Hadi & Others v Republic Sudan Communication 368/09 (ACHPR) 22 October – 5 
November 2013 paras 70-73 in which the Commission held that acts, such as rabbit jump, heavy 
beatings with water hoses, inflicted by police officers with the purposes of extracting confessions from 
the victims, as well as punishment for deaths of the policemen who were killed when a scuffle ensued 
at an IDP camp, were of such a threshold of severity as to amount to torture; Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights v Egypt Communication 334/06 (ACHPR) 2011 para 162; Zimbabwe Human Rights 
NGO Forum v Zimbabwe Communication 245/2002, (2006) AHRLR 128 (ACHPR 2006) para 180. 
497 Interights, ASADHO & Others v DRC Communication 274/03 & 282/03 (ACHPR) May 2014 para 
61. 
498 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001) 
para 44. 
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(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture 
 
With regard to states’ obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, the obligation to 
respect requires state officials to refrain from inflicting torture and other CIDT. 499  In 
Malawi African Association & Others v Mauritania, the African Commission found a 
violation of article 5 in that during their time in custody, a number of detainees were 
beaten, forced to make statements, deprived of the opportunity to sleep, some were 
held in solitary confinement, denied food, kept in chains, locked in overpopulated 
cells lacking in hygiene and denied access to medical care.500  Some were burnt 
using different objects, while others were buried in sand and left to die a slow 
death.501 Electric shocks were administered to their genital organs and they had 
weights tied on them.502 Other detainees’ heads were plunged into water until they 
almost suffocated and their eyes were smeared with pepper.503 They were also 
subjected to a so-called ‘jaguar’ position, which was carried out by tying the victim’s 
wrists to his feet and then suspending him from a bar facing upside down.504 Women 
were raped.505 The state party did not deny any of the alleged acts. The African 
Commission held that taken together or in isolation, these acts are proof of 
widespread use of torture and CIDT in violation of article 5 of the African Charter.506 
That is, by inflicting pain on the victims, the state had violated its general obligation 
to refrain from interfering with their right to freedom from torture. 
 
When interpreting the obligation to protect human rights in the SERAC case, the 
African Commission stated that, ‘the state is obliged to protect rights-holders against 
other subjects by legislation and provision of effective remedy’.507 The obligation to 
adopt legislative measures to give effect to the rights contained in the Charter is 
                                                          
499 In International Pen and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria, 2001 AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 
1994) para 79, the Commission emphasised that article 5 does not only prohibit torture, but also cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment. 
500 Malawi African Association & Others v Mauritania (2000) AHLR 149 (ACHPR 2000) para 12. 
501 As above para 10. 
502 As above para 22. 
503 As above para 23. 
504 As above para 20. 
505 As above. 
506 As above paras 84 - 102. 
507 SERAC v Nigeria (note 498 above) para 46. 
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expressed in article 1 of the African Charter, which provides that ‘[t]he member states 
of the Organization of African Unity, parties to the present Charter shall recognise the 
rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to them’. The obligation to prohibit torture 
is therefore two-pronged: firstly, to recognise the right to freedom from torture, for 
instance in the Constitution and secondly, to adopt laws, which criminalise torture. 
This has been confirmed in the Commission Nationale des Droits des Lˊhome et des 
Libertés v Chad  in which the African Commission held that the obligation under 
article 1 to recognise rights contained in the Charter also includes states’ obligation 
to protect the rights against violation by third parties.508 It held that by failing to 
ensure security in Chad, which failure resulted in a civil war, characterised by 
massive killings and torture, the government of Chad violated articles 1 and 5 of the 
African Charter.509 
  
The torture prevention obligation in the African Charter is reinforced by article 27, 
which prohibits states from derogating from any of the rights contained in the Charter 
including article 5. Article 27(2) provides that ‘[the] rights and freedoms of each 
individual shall be exercised with due regard to rights of others, collective security, 
morality and common interest’. This means that the right to freedom from torture 
cannot be derogated from, in as much as its exercise neither violates the rights of 
others nor collective security, morality and common interest. Rather, it is the violation 
of this freedom, which would have a negative impact on the rights of its victims, 
collective security, morality and common interest.  
 
Non-derogability of rights contained in the African Charter was illustrated in the case 
of Gunme and others v Cameroon. In this case, the complainants were 14 
individuals who had brought the communication on their behalf and on behalf of the 
people of Southern Cameroon against the Republic of Cameroon.510 The 
communication alleged violations of several provisions of the African Charter, 
                                                          
508 Commission Nationale des Droits de Lˊhome et des Libertés v Chad (2000) AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 
1995) para 20. 
509 As above paras 21 - 28. 
510 Gunme and others v Cameroon Communication 266/2003(African Commission) 26th Activity 
Report para 1. 
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including freedom from torture in article 5.511 It contained details of victims who were 
subjected to torture, amputations and denial of medical treatment by law 
enforcement officers of the Republic of Cameroon. The state’s response to this 
communication was that members of rebel groups were involved in acts of terrorism, 
killing law enforcement officers, vandalising state properties and also stealing 
weapons and ammunition.512 The African Commission held that ‘even if the state 
was fighting the alleged terrorist activities, it was not justified to subject the suspects 
to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and found the state to have 
violated article 5 of the African Charter.513 The Commission’s view was based on the 
fact that the African Charter does not allow derogation from any of the rights 
contained therein. A similar stance was taken in Commission Nationale des Droits de 
L’home et des Liberts v Chad referred to above.514 In Media Rights Agenda v 
Nigeria, the Commission held that: 
 
…the African charter does not contain a derogation clause. Therefore the limitations on the 
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies and special 
circumstances. The only legitimate reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms of the 
Charter are found in article 27(2). 
 
(2) The obligation to provide redress to victims of torture 
  
States’ obligation to provide redress to victims of torture has been interpreted by 
both the African Commission (in the context of article 5 of the African Charter) and 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court).515 The African 
Commission stipulated that in the context of torture, redress entails ‘adequate, 
                                                          
511 As above para 18. The complainants alleged systematic violation of the rights of the people of 
Southern Cameroon, including arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, punishment, maiming and killings 
of persons who were advocating for self-determination of Southern Cameroon. 
512 As above para 113. 
513 As above para 114. 
514 Commission Nationale des Droits de L’home et des Liberts v Chad (note 508 above) para 21. 
515 African Commission General Comment 4 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
The Right to Redress of Victims of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or 
Treatment (Article 5), Adopted at the 21st Extra-Ordinary Session of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, held from 23 February to 4 March 2017 in Banjul, The Gambia, 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/general-comment-right-to-
redress/achpr_general_comment_no._4_english.pdf [accessed 4 December 2016]; See also 
Consolidated application of Tanganyika Law Society and another v The United Republic of Tanzania 
Application 009/2011) and Reverend CR Mtikila v The United Republic of Tanzania Application 
011/2011 (African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights) 14 June 2013. 
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effective and comprehensive’ remedy which has the effect of changing social and 
political factors which enable the practice of torture such as ‘restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction - including the right to the truth, and 
guarantees of non-repetition’.516  
 
(3) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture 
 
Article 62 mandates state parties to submit a report to the African Commission every 
two years after entry into force of the Charter with respect to a particular state.517 As 
far as states’ obligations against torture are concerned, the initial report must contain 
all legislative or other measures, which states have adopted with the aim of 
implementing the Charter obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, to prosecute 
and punish its perpetrators and to provide redress to victims of torture.518 The 
subsequent reports must also contain information on how the Commission’s 
recommendations in relation to torture have been implemented.519 
 
2.5.1.3  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s 
Charter) 1990 
 
The African Children’s Charter520 is the first comprehensive regional instrument 
specifically dedicated to the protection of the rights of an African child.521 It was 
adopted by members of the OAU having noted with concern ‘that the situation of 
most African children, remains critical due to the unique factors of their socio-
economic, cultural, traditional and developmental circumstances, natural disasters, 
                                                          
516 African Commission GC 4, paras 8 - 10; See also Mtikila & Others v Tanzania (note 515 above) para 124. 
See also O Windridge ‘A watershed moment for African human rights: Mtikila & Others v Tanzania at 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ African Human Rights Law Journal (2015) 15, 323. 
517 The African Commission has formulated guidelines as to the form and content of both initial and 
subsequent periodic reports submitted under article 62 of the African Charter – African Commission 
Guidelines for national periodic reports 1989. 
518 African Commission Concluding observations on the cumulative periodic reports (2nd, 3rd, 4th and 
5th) of the Republic of Angola 30 July – 4 August 2012 para 38 in which the Commission raised a 
concern that the report did not contain information on the legislative or institutional measures to 
criminalise torture and to prosecute and punish its perpetrators.  
519 African Commission Concluding observations on the 3rd periodic of the Republic of Cameroon 7-14 
March 2014 recommendation xxxviii 12. 
520 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990. 
521 BD Mezmur ‘The African Committee of experts on the rights and welfare of the child: an update’ 
(2006) 6 (2) African Human Rights Law Journal 549. 
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armed conflicts, exploitation and hunger’.522 State parties also noted that because of 
these factors and the physical and mental immaturity of children, they need special 
safeguards and care.523 Amongst arguments advanced for the adoption of this 
Charter was that the CRC did not cater for the specific needs of African children, as 
Africa was not well represented during its drafting.524 While some scholars have 
criticised the reasons advanced for the justification of adopting a separate African 
children’s instrument from the CRC,525 Mezmur argues that the two instruments 
complement each other and that the African Children’s Charter gives the CRC 
specific application within the African context.526 It contains guidelines, such as best 
interest of the child principle, which are meant to guide, protect and promote the 
rights and welfare of children.527  
 
Article 16 of the African Children’s Charter provides for protection against child 
abuse and torture. It has been interpreted by the African Committee of Experts on 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC)528 in two communications.529 In Michelo 
Hansungule and Others (on behalf of the children of Northern Uganda v The 
Government of Uganda,530 the government of Uganda was alleged to have violated a 
number of provisions of the African Children’s Charter on the right to life, right to 
education, right to health and right to freedom from violence, including sexual abuse 
                                                          
522 African Children’s Charter preamble para 4. 
523 As above. 
524 During drafting of the CRC, only Egypt, Morocco and Senegal were represented and it was argued 
that the CRC did not address issues, which affected African children, such as apartheid in South 
Africa then, internal displacement and harmful traditional practices, such as FGM; Mezmur, (note 521 
above) 549.   
525 D Olowu ‘Protecting children’s rights in Africa: A critique of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 International Journal of Children’s Rights 127; D Chirwa ‘The merits 
and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 157; A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child and the African Committee of Experts: Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 179. 
526 Mezmur (note 521 above) 550. 
527 African Children’s Charter article 4. 
528 ACERWC is established in terms of article 32 of the African Children’s Charter as a body 
responsible to oversee its implementation. For a detailed discussion on the mandate of ACERWC, see 
Mezmur (note 521 above). See also BD Mezmur ‘Still an infant or a toddler? The work of the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the child and its 8th ordinary session’ African 
Human Rights Law Journal (2006) 6 (2) 258. 
529 At the time of this research, the ACERWC had finalised only four communications, three of which 
had been decided upon while in Institute for Human Right and Development in Africa v The 
Government of Malawi Communication 001/2014 the parties reached an amicable settlement. 
530 Michelo Hansungule and Others (on behalf of the children on northern Uganda v The government 
of Uganda Communication 1/2005 (ACERWC) 15-19 April 2013. 
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of the children of Northern Uganda who were recruited into the Ugandan Defence 
Force (UDF) and into the rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The ACERW 
found that there had been a violation of article 22 of the African Children’s Charter, 
as there was evidence that upon rescuing children from the LRA, some of them were 
recruited into the UDF.531 However, with regard to the violation of article 16, the 
ACERWC found that the evidence before it did not disclose violation of article 16, as 
the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of the children by members of the 
UDF could not be substantiated.532  
 
In Centre for Human Rights (University of Pretoria) and La Recontre Africaine pour la 
defense des droits de l’homme (Senegal) v Government of Senegal,533 the 
ACERWC held that the Republic of Senegal had violated several provisions of 
African Children’s Charter including article 16. The communication concerned about 
100 000 children (commonly known as talibes) aged between 4 and 12 years who 
were forced to beg in the streets. These children were sent by their parents to live in 
Quaranic schools in the urban cities of Senegal to receive religious education 
because of the difficulty of getting access to government schools in Senegal. The 
complainants alleged that in these schools, children were subjected to various forms 
of torture and CIDT. They slept in overcrowded rooms or outside, did not have 
adequate food and had no access to clean water and sanitation.534 They were also 
forced by their instructors to work as beggars in the streets and were required to 
bring back a daily quota in the form of sugar, rice or money.535 Failure to meet the 
daily quota or an attempt to flee from the training centre resulted in physical assault 
and harsh punishment of the children by their instructors. The complainants 
submitted further that despite the existence of laws in Senegal which prohibited 
these acts, only ten cases had been brought before the domestic courts and very 
lenient punishments were imposed on convicted instructors.536  
 
                                                          
531 As above para 66. 
532 As above para 78. 
533 Centre for human rights (University of Pretoria) and La Recontre Africaine pour la defense des 
droits de l’homme (Senegal) v Government of Senegal Decision 003/Com/001/2012 (ACERWC) 15 
April 2014. 
534 As above para 8. 
535 As above para 3. 
536 As above para 4. 
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The ACERWC held that this treatment amounts to the violation of article 16. It relied 
on jurisprudence of the African Commission, as well as the CAT definition of torture. 
For instance, in Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan, the African Commission held that 
‘there is no right for individuals, and particularly the government to apply physical 
violence on individuals for offences. That would be tantamount to sanctioning state-
sponsored torture…’537 It also referred to International Pen and Others v Nigeria,538 
in which it was held that inhuman and degrading treatment include actions which 
humiliate the individual or force him to act against his will or conscience. The 
ACERWC considered that treatment, such as taking the children into a room in 
which they were stripped of their shirts, and beaten with electric cables or clubs 
could rise to the level of torture as defined under article (1) of CAT and therefore 
violates article 16.539  
  
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture 
 
With regard to states’ obligations to protect children from torture, article 16 provides 
that state parties shall ‘[t]ake specific legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of torture… while in the care 
of a parent, legal guardian or school authority or any other person who has the care 
of the child’.540 The obligation to take legislative measures to give effect to provisions 
of the African Children’s Charter is also contained in article 1. Article 16(2) contains 
the ‘protective measures’, which must be taken to prevent and prohibit torture of 
children to include:  
  
establishment of special monitoring units to provide necessary support for the child and for 
those who have the care of the child, as well as other forms of prevention and for 
identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment, and follow-up of instances of child 
abuse and neglect. 
 
This obligation was re-emphasised in Centre for Human Rights (University of 
Pretoria) and La Recontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme 
                                                          
537 Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan, (2003) AHRLR (ACHPR 2003) para 42. 
538 International Pen and Others v Nigeria (note 499 above). 
539 Centre for Human Rights and another v Senegal (note 533 above) paras 65 & 68. 
540 African Children’s Charter art.16 (1). 
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(Senegal) v Government of Senegal, wherein the ACERWC held that the African 
Children’s Charter mandates state parties to protect children from abuse and torture 
and requires states to adopt legislative, administrative, social and educational 
measures, including the establishment of special monitoring units to provide the 
children and those in whose care the children are, with necessary support.541 States 
are also obliged to undertake other forms of investigation, treatment and follow up of 
instances of child abuse and neglect.542 The ACERWC has also referred to these 
and other obligations in its concluding observations on Lesotho’s initial report.543 It 
has emphasised that state parties have an obligation to ensure full domestication of 
CAT and to harmonise domestic laws with provisions of the African Children’s 
Charter.544 
 
Other torture prevention measures include wide publication of the laws, which 
protect women and children against sexual abuse and FGM,545  training of judicial 
police officers and magistrates on appropriate sanctions to be imposed on 
perpetrators of child abuse,546 encouraging and establishing denunciation 
mechanisms,547 investigating and prosecuting of allegations of torture548 as well as 
providing free access to legal assistance, psychological and medical therapy, and 
treatment of children who are victims of torture and CIDT.549 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
541 Centre for Human Rights and another v Senegal (note 533 above) para 63. 
542 As above para 68. 
543 ACERWC, Concluding observations to the government of Lesotho on its initial report on the 
implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 26th Ordinary Session, 16 
- 19 November 2015 para 5. 
544 ACERWC, Concluding Recommendations on the Republic of South Africa initial Report on the 
status of implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child para 36. 
545 ACERWC, Recommendations and Observations to the Government of Kenya by the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child concerning the Initial Report on the 
Implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 16th Session, 16-19 
November 2009, para on article 21. 
546 As above para on article 24. 
547 As above para on article 16. 
548 ACERWC, Concluding Observations on South Africa’s initial report para 54. 
549 ACERWC, Recommendations and Observations to the Government of Liberia by the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child concerning the Initial Report on the 
Implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 23rd Session, para E. 
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(2) The obligations to punish perpetrators of torture and provide redress to 
victims of torture 
 
States’ obligation to punish perpetrators of torture and to provide victims with redress 
were invoked in Centre for human rights (University of Pretoria) and La Recontre 
Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme (Senegal) v Government of 
Senegal. The ACERWC held that despite the fact that these acts were allegedly 
committed by the instructors acting in their private capacity, they are, however, 
attributable to the state because although there are legislative and social initiatives to 
protect the rights of children in Senegal in general, the government failed to take 
specific administrative and judicial measures to protect the talibes against their 
instructors.550 In this regard, the ACERWC relied on General Comment 2 of the 
Committee against Torture, which states that: 
 
Where states authorities or others acting in an official capacity or under the colour of law, 
know or have reasonable grounds to believe that acts of torture or ill-treatment are being 
committed by non-state actors and they fail to excise due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, prosecute or punish such non-state officials, or private actors consistently 
with the Convention, the state bears responsibility and its officials should be considered 
as authors, complicit or otherwise reasonable under the Convention for consenting to or 
acquiescing in such impermissible act.551 
 
(3) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture 
  
State parties are expected to submit reports on their implementation of the Charter to 
the ACERWC in terms of article 43 of the African Children’s Charter.552 These reports 
are to be submitted two years after the Charter enters into force with respect to each 
state party and thereafter every three years.553 With regard to the protection of 
children from torture and abuse, the ACERWC has stipulated in its concluding 
                                                          
550 As above. 
551 As above para 66. 
552 The ACERWC has adopted State parties reporting guidelines of 2015 which outline the form and 
content of both the initial and periodic reports submitted in terms of article 43 of the African Children’s 
Charter. 
553 African Children’s Charter article 43. 
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observations on state reports that the report must contain statistical data on child 
abuse and rape.554 
 
2.5.1.4 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol) 2003 
 
According to its preamble, the Protocol was adopted because of the concern that 
despite ratification of the African Charter, and other international human rights 
instruments by majority of African states and their solemn commitment to eliminate 
all forms of discrimination and harmful practices against women, women in Africa still 
continued to be victims of discrimination and harmful practices.555 It was therefore 
adopted to complement the African Charter and to reinforce states’ obligations for 
protection of women’s rights.556 Prior to the adoption of the Protocol, the African 
Charter had been criticised as ineffective, inadequate557 and also reinforcing 
stereotypes about the African women’s place being confined within the family.558 The 
Protocol protects women against violence559 and explicitly calls upon states to 
prohibit harmful traditional practices, such as FGM,560 which had for a long time been 
justified by those who practise it as part of African culture or tradition.561 It thus 
                                                          
554 ACERWC, Recommendations and observations sent to the Government of the Republic of Uganda 
by the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child on the Initial 
Implementation Report of the African Charter of the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 15th Session, 16 -
19 March 2010.  See also ACERWC, Recommendations and observations to the Government of 
Guinea by the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child concerning the 
Initial Report on the Implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1st 
Extraordinary Session, para 8. 
555 African Women’s Protocol preamble para 12. 
556 MS Nsibirwa ‘A brief analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women’ (2001) 1(1) African Human Rights Law Journal  41; DM Chirwa 
‘Reclaiming (wo)manity: the merits and demerits of the African Protocol on women’s rights’ (2006) 
Netherlands International Law Review  95. 
557 Centre for Reproductive Rights ‘The protocol on the rights of women in Africa: An instrument for 
advancing reproductive and sexual rights’ (February 2006) www.reproductiverights.org [accessed 4 
December 2016]. 
558 African Charter article 18(3); Chirwa (note 558 above) and C Heyns ‘The African human rights 
system: The African Charter’ (2004) 108 Pennsylvania State Law Review 679. 
559 African Women’s Protocol articles 1(j), 3(4) and 4. 
560 In R.O. v Sweden (note 64 above), the Committee against Torture held that FGM amounts to 
torture. 
561 African Women’s Protocol article 5; Centre for Reproductive Rights 2006 (note 557 above). 
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provides protection to women in Africa beyond CEDAW.562 It also protects women 
against sexual violence, which takes place in private.563  
 
Although the Protocol does not make explicit reference to protection against torture, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has stated that acts of violence and CIDT can 
escalate to torture if committed for purposes prohibited under article 1(1) of CAT and 
with participation of persons who do so in an official capacity.564 Therefore, 
protection from violence and ensuring that women are treated with dignity, translates 
to prevention of torture. The correlation between respect for women’s dignity under 
article 3 of the Protocol, their protection from violence and torture was also made in 
the case of S.A. (represented by Redress and another) v Democratic Republic of 
Congo.565 The Commission held that the rape of S.A. by a member of the 
Respondent state’s army amounted to torture in violation of article 5 of the African 
Charter,566 violated her integrity protected by article 4 of the Protocol,567 violated the 
state’s obligation under article 11 to protect her against gender-based violence568 
and was a form of discrimination.569  
 
The other link between sexual violence against women and torture is that there are 
circumstances in which sexual violence amounts to torture.570 Research reflects that 
globally, especially in situations of armed conflict, rape and other forms of sexual 
abuse are resorted to by both the state actors (members of security forces) and non-
state actors (members of rebel groups).571 Although in most armed conflicts sexual 
                                                          
562 A Iyanuolu ‘The challenge of culture for the rights of women in Africa: A critical analysis of the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa’ 
unpublished LLM thesis University of Cape Town 2008. 
563 F Viljoen ‘Introduction to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa’ (2009) 16 (11) WAS & LE JCR & SOC JUST 21. 
564 Committee against Torture, GC 2 outlines circumstances in which acts of private individuals may 
be attributed to the state. 
565 S.A. (represented by Redress and another) v Democratic Republic of Congo communication 
502/14 (African Commission), 18 November 2016.  
566 As above para 35. 
567 As above para 53. 
568 As above para 54. 
569 As above paras 59 and 64.  
570 See African Commission Resolution 284 ‘Suppression of sexual violence against women in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’ adopted at the 55th Ordinary Session 28 April to 12 May 2014. 
571 SP Tunamsifu ‘The right to justice: A challenge for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in 
the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal, 476; 
Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence S/2016/361 to 
111 
 
violence is perpetrated against men and women, as well as boys and girls, often 
women and girls suffer this abuse far more than men and boys.572 For instance, 
Kitharidis argues that women in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ‘have 
been the victims of a ‘war within a war’ as the number of rapes and other forms of 
sexual violence soar in the region’.573 OHCHR reports that from January 2010 to 
December 2013, more than 3 635 cases of sexual assault were reported in the DRC, 
with the majority of these cases being victims of the Forces Armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and over 1 200 rapes committed in 
the context of military operations against armed rebels in North and South Kivu.574 In 
Nigeria, Boko Haram575 has used sexual violence, including rape, forced marriages 
and forced pregnancies as some of its tactics in the terror campaign against the 
Nigerian state.576 This has resulted in the majority of women rescued from the 
terrorist group’s camps testing HIV positive, some pregnant and others already 
having born children resulting from rape, sexual violence and forced marriages to 
members of Boko Haram.577 In the case of Prosecutor v Akayesu, Trial Chamber 1 of 
the ICTR held that where rape is committed for purposes of intimidation, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the United Nations Security Council on 20 April 2016, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_361.pdf [accessed 21 October 2016]. 
572 DA Lewis ‘Unrecognised victims: sexual violence against men in conflict settings under 
international law’ (2009) 27 Wisconsin International law Journal 1. E Rehn & EJ Sirleaf Women, war 
and peace: The independent experts’ assessment on the impact of armed conflict on women and 
women’s role in peace-building (2002) 10. 
573 S Kitharidis ‘Rape as a weapon of war: Combating sexual violence and impunity in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and the way forward’ (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal 450; 
Human Rights Watch The war within the war: Sexual violence against women and girls in Eastern 
Congo (2002); S Meger ‘Rape of the Congo: Understanding sexual violence in the conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2010) 28 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 119. 
574 OHCHR Report of the mapping exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 (2010). OHCHR Progress and obstacles in the fight 
against impunity for sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (April 2014) 9; 
Tunamsifu (note 571 above) 476; T Elbert et al Sexual and gender-based violence in the Kivu 
provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from former combatants (2013) 37. 
575 The Nigerian terror group Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati WatJihad – people committed to the 
propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad; CE Attah ‘Boko Haram and sexual terrorism: The 
conspiracy of silence of the Nigerian antiterrorism laws’ (2016) 16 African Human Rights Law Journal 
388. 
576 Attah (note 575 above) 10. 
577 Human Rights Watch ‘Those terrible weeks in their camps: Boko Haram violence against women 
and girls in North-East Nigeria’ 2 http://www.hrw.org   [accessed 5 February 2017]; O Akukwe ‘Chibok 
girls, Boko Haram and Jihad of the penis’ http://www.nigerianbulletin.com/ [Accessed 5 February 
2017]; ‘Boko Haram’s rescued sex slaves tell their horror stories’ 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/06/boko-haram-horror-stories-told-by-rescued-girls-in-
nigeria.html [accessed 5 February 2017]. 
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degradation, humiliation, punishment, control or destruction and is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of, or, with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity, then such rape constitutes torture.578 The 
African Women’s Protocol contains states’ obligations to prevent and prohibit these 
acts, to punish those who commit them, to provide redress to the victims and to 
report measures, which they have taken to implement these obligations to the 
African Commission.  
 
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture  
 
State parties to the African Women’s Protocol undertake to combat all forms of 
discrimination against women through appropriate legislative, institutional and other 
measures.579 Because violence against women, including that which amounts to 
torture, has been categorised as a form of discrimination, measures to prevent 
discrimination also apply to the prevention and prohibition of torture against women. 
The Protocol mandates state parties to implement this general obligation through 
various means, such as: 
 
 Inclusion and effective enforcement of the principle of equality between men and women 
in their national constitution and other legislation; 
  Enactment and effective implementation of legislative/regulatory measures that curb all 
forms of discrimination, particularly harmful practices that endanger the health and well-
being of women; 
 Integration of a gender perspective in policy decisions, legislation, development 
programmes and all other spheres of life; 
 Corrective and positive action in areas where discrimination continues to exist; and 
 Modification of social and cultural practices with a view to eliminating discriminatory and 
harmful traditional practices and support for initiatives directed at eradicating all forms of 
discrimination against women.580 
 
States’ obligations under article 2 of the Protocol in the context of torture have been 
interpreted by the African Commission in the case of S.A. v Democratic Republic of 
                                                          
578 Prosecutor v Akayesu (note 37 above) para 597. 
579 African Women’s Protocol article 2. 
580 Equality Now A guide to using the African Women’s Protocol for legal action (2011) 9. 
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Congo581 in which it held that states have an obligation to refrain from any acts of 
violence, which impair women’s equality,582 to respond to discriminatory practices 
such as gender-based violence and to reform laws and institutions to ensure that 
such acts do not recur.583  
 
Article 5 mandates state parties to raise public awareness regarding harmful 
practices and ‘to adopt legislative measures backed by sanctions’, against all forms 
of FGM, its sacrification, medicalisation and para-medicalisation as well as other 
practices in order to eliminate them.584 It also contains an obligation to protect 
women who are at risk of being subjected to harmful practices, or all other forms of 
violence, abuse and intolerance.585 
 
(2)  The obligation to punish perpetrators of torture 
 
Articles 4 and 5 mandate state parties to punish perpetrators of violence against 
women, including those who perform FGM.586 States are also mandated to establish 
mechanisms and accessible services for effective information.587 In the case of the 
DRC, Kitharidis observes that although Congolese criminal law contains sanctions 
for such acts, there is no practical implementation of the laws because of a weak 
justice and penal systems, as a result of which rape and sexual violence against 
women is widespread in the region.588 In Nigeria, Attah has criticised the Nigerian 
anti-terrorism law for failing to address sexual terrorism; that is, to punish sexual 
violence as a form of terrorism.589 The failure to punish perpetrators of sexual 
violence also leads to breach of the obligations to provide redress to victims of such 
violence by the state party.590  
 
                                                          
581 S.A. (represented by Redress and another) v Democratic Republic of Congo (note 565 above). 
582 As above para 62; Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights & INTERIGHTS v Egypt Communication 
323/2006 (ACHPR) 3 March 2011, para 165.  
583 As above paras 65 & 107. 
584 African Women’s Protocol article 5 (a) and (b). 
585 African Women’s Protocol article 5(d). 
586 African Women’s Protocol article 4(e) and article 5(b).  
587 African Women’s Protocol article 4(f) 
588 Kitharidis (note 573 above) 456. 
589 Attah (note 575 above) 385. 
590 Tunamsifu (note 571 above). 
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(3) The obligation to provide redress to victims of torture 
 
Article 25 mandates state parties to ensure the provision of an appropriate remedy to 
women whose rights under the Protocol are violated. Appropriate remedy in this 
regard can be inferred from article 4, which mandates state parties to establish 
mechanisms for ‘effective information, rehabilitation and reparation for victims of 
violence against women.’591 Article 5 also mandates state parties to ‘provide 
necessary support to victims of harmful practices through basic services, such as 
health services, legal and judicial support, emotional and psychological counselling, 
as well as vocational training to make them self-supporting’.  
 
The obligation to provide remedies to victims of violence, including torture, is coupled 
with the obligation to ensure that such remedies are determined by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or any other competent authority 
provided for by law.592 In S.A. (represented by Redress) and another v Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the Commission held that the DRC had an obligation under 
article 25 to provide the victim with an effective remedy as ordered by the domestic 
courts.593 
 
(4) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture 
 
Article 26 enjoins state parties to ensure the implementation of the Protocol at the 
national level and to reflect such in their periodic reports submitted to the African 
Commission in terms of article 62 of the African Charter. Measures adopted to 
implement the Women’s Protocol are covered under part B of the report submitted in 
terms of article 62. The form and content of part B of the report are guided by the 
reporting guidelines adopted by the African Commission specifically for reporting 
under the African Women’s Protocol.594 With regard to reporting on torture and 
violence against women, the report has to contain disaggregated data on the number 
                                                          
591 African Women’s Protocol article 4(f). 
592 African Women’s Protocol article 25(3). 
593 S.A. (represented by Redress and another v Democratic Republic of Congo (note 565 above) 
paras 75 & 107. 
594 African Commission Guidelines for state reporting under the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, May 2010. 
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of victims of torture as well as legislative and administrative measures, institutions, 
policies and programmes, public education and other measures which the state has 
adopted to implement its obligations under the Women’s Protocol to protect women 
against violence including sexual violence, human trafficking, domestic violence and 
others.595 
 
2.5.1.5 African Youth Charter 2006 
 
According to its preamble, the African Youth Charter is guided by visions of the AU 
on Africa’s integration, inherent dignity and inalienable rights afforded to all members 
of the human family as set out in various international human rights instruments, as 
well the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).596 It focuses on the youth, whom it 
defines ‘as every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years’.597  Article 18(2) of 
the African Youth Charter mandates state parties to ensure that youth who are in 
detention, imprisonment or rehabilitation are not subjected to torture or other CIDT. 
 
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture  
 
In terms of article 1 of the Africa Youth Charter, state parties have an obligation to 
adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to the provisions of the Charter, 
including preventing and prohibiting torture of the youth in any form of detention. 
Article 28 of the African Charter tasks the African Union Commission to oversee 
interpretation and implementation of the Charter. However, so far the Africa Union 
Commission has not issued any guides on interpretation or implementation of article 
18.   
 
(2) The obligation to report on measures taken against torture 
 
The African Youth Charter does not contain reporting obligations. It tasks the African 
Union Commission to collaborate with states and NGOs to develop best practices for 
                                                          
595 As above; see also African Commission, Concluding observations and recommendations on the 
eighth to eleventh periodic report of the Republic of Kenya 16-25 February 2016 paras 34 & 64. 
596 African Youth Charter preamble paras 2 to 9.  
597 African Youth Charter preamble last para. 
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youth policy formulation and implementation,598 but does not require state parties to 
submit periodic reports on their implementation of the provisions of the Charter.  
 
2.5.1.6 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 2007 
 
ACDEG was adopted by the AU in 2007 and entered into force in February 2012. It 
highlights the significance and interrelatedness of good governance, popular 
participation, rule of law, human rights and also confirms that insecurity, instability 
and violent conflicts in Africa are caused by unconstitutional changes of 
governments.599 It links democracy and respect for human rights across its 
provisions.600 The ACDEG also mandates the state parties to implement its 
provisions in accordance with a number of principles, including ‘respect for human 
rights and democratic principles’.601 Although the ACDEG does not have a specific 
provision on torture, it mandates generally that state parties shall commit themselves 
to promotion of democracy, rule of law and human rights;602 and ensure that citizens 
enjoy fundamental freedoms and human rights, taking into account their universality, 
interdependence and indivisibility.603 This thus imposes obligations against torture as 
illustrated in the next section.   
 
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, punish its perpetrators, and 
provide redress to its victims 
 
The specific obligations imposed on state parties are: to take all necessary 
measures to strengthen organs of the AU, to promote and protect human rights and 
to fight impunity and endow the said AU organs with the necessary resources.604  
 
State parties are also enjoined to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on 
political opinion, gender, ethnic, religious and racial grounds, as well as any other 
                                                          
598 African Youth Charter article 28. 
599 ACDEG preamble paras 1 and 9, which also make reference to articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive 
Act of the AU.  
600 ACDEG article 2(1). 
601 ACDEG article 3(1). 
602 ACDEG article 4. 
603 ACDEG article 6. 
604 ACDEG article 7. 
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forms of intolerance.605 As illustrated under the UN Genocide Convention, CERD 
and CEDAW, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race and even gender has in 
some instances amounted to acts of violence, which fit under article 1(1) of CAT. 
Therefore, by mandating state parties to root out all forms of discrimination, the 
ACDEG partly provides standards with which states must comply in order to protect 
individuals against torture. 
 
Article 14 of the ACDEG mandates state parties to strengthen and institutionalise 
constitutional civilian control over the armed and security forces to ensure 
consolidation of democracy and constitutional order. Although this article does not 
specifically refer to torture, it will be illustrated in the next chapter of this thesis that 
failure by the civilian authority to exercise control over the armed forces has led to 
the incidences of torture in Lesotho. Therefore, by mandating state parties to ensure 
civilian control over armed forces, the ACDEG sets the standards to prevent torture. 
 
Means of implementation of the obligations contained in the ACDEG are contained in 
article 44, which provides that state parties shall take appropriate measures, 
including legislative, executive and administrative actions to harmonise their national 
laws and regulations with the ACDEG. The legal framework must include laws, which 
prohibit violence, which give civilian authority power to control the armed forces and 
also prescribe punishment for violation of such laws. Implementation of these laws 
would therefore be a torture prevention measure. 
 
(2) The obligation to report on measures against torture 
 
The ACDEG vests the mandate to coordinate and evaluate its implementation in the 
African Union Commission. However, such evaluation does not involve periodic 
reporting by state parties. Rather, the African Union collaborates with other 
institutions of the AU such as the African Commission, Pan-African Parliament, 
Peace and Security Council and others, to deal with allegations of torture during 
unconstitutional changes of governments.606  
                                                          
605 ACDEG article 8. 
606 ACDEG article 45. 
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2.5.1.7 AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa (IDP Convention) 2009 
 
The IDP Convention is the first international instrument to focus on internally 
displaced persons. It was adopted in order to address the situation of internally 
displaced persons whose numbers and vulnerability are increasing in Africa.607 It 
defines IDPs as:  
 
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes 
or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of 
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights or natural or 
human-made disaster, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state 
border.608 
 
 
It mandates state parties to refrain from and to prevent the displacement of persons 
within their territories and also to protect IDPs whose displacement could not be 
prevented.609 Article 9 mandates state parties to protect the rights of IDPs, regardless 
of the cause of displacement by refraining from, and preventing arbitrary killing, 
summary execution, arbitrary detention, abduction, enforced disappearance or 
torture and other CIDT,610 sexual and gender-based violence in all its forms,611 and 
starvation.612  
 
(1) The obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, punish its perpetrators, and 
provide redress to its victims 
 
States’ obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, as well as the obligation to punish 
its perpetrators can be inferred from the general obligation for state parties to 
incorporate standards contained in the Convention into their domestic laws by 
enacting or amending relevant legislation on the protection and assistance of IDPs in 
accordance with international law.613 In particular, state parties are mandated to 
                                                          
607 IDP Convention preamble paras 1 & 2. 
608 IDP Convention article 1(k).  
609 IDP Convention article 3. 
610 IDP Convention article 9(1) (c). 
611 IDP Convention article 9(1) (d). 
612 IDP Convention article 9(1) (e). 
613 IDP Convention article 3(2). 
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criminalise and punish acts of displacement, which amount to genocide, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity,614 and to hold members of armed groups criminally 
responsible for their acts.615 States are also obliged to take primary duty and 
responsibility for providing protection of and humanitarian assistance to IDPs within 
their territory or jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind.616  
 
In the event that the state has failed to prevent torture of IDPs, article 12 of the 
Convention enjoins such a state to provide persons affected by displacement with 
effective remedies through the establishment of an effective legal framework to 
provide just and fair compensation and other forms of reparation. Although the article 
makes reference to compensation for damages, which have been incurred as a 
result of displacement, it can be argued that it also includes compensation for 
torture, which resulted in displacement or took place during the displacement, 
whether caused by the government officials or by third parties. 
 
(2) The obligation to report on measures against torture 
 
Article 14 of the IPD Convention establishes a Conference of state parties as a body 
to oversee implementation of its provisions. With regard to reporting on torture, it 
provides that states should include in their reports submitted in terms of article 62 of 
the African Charter, legislative and other measures they have taken to implement the 
IDP Convention, thus including article 9 which mandates states to protect IDPs from 
torture.617 The report therefore has to follow the form and content discussed under 
the African Charter above. 
 
2.5.2 African regional soft law  
 
The focus of this thesis in relation to African regional soft law is on the AU Guidelines 
and measures for the prohibition and prevention of torture, cruel and inhuman or 
                                                          
614 IDP Convention article 4(6). 
615 IDP Convention article 7(4). 
616 IDP Convention article 5(1). 
617 See Press release by the Special Rapporteur on refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced 
persons and migrants in Africa on the occasion of the IDP Convention’s entry into force, 6 December 
2012 http://www.achpr.org/press/2012/12/d137/ [accessed 26 May 2017]. 
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degrading treatment or punishment (Robben Island Guidelines or RIGs), adopted by 
the African Commission in 2002 in the Gambia and came into force in 2008.618 
Another relevant soft law which has been stated in section 2.5.1.2(2) above and 
hence not discussed under this section is African Commission General Comment 4 
that deals with the obligation to provide redress. 
 
The aim of the Robben Island Guidelines is to operationalise article 5 of the African 
Charter.619 The Guidelines were adopted as a result of a suggestion by the 
Association for Prevention of Torture (APT) in October 2000 that there should be a 
workshop aimed at drawing concrete measures for the implementation of article 5.620 
The Guidelines do not create new obligations, but provide practical means through 
which obligations against torture contained in the African Charter and other 
international human rights instruments must be implemented.  
 
The Robben Island Guidelines address the implementation of states’ obligations, 
which are divided into three main categories of obligations: (1) to prohibit torture; (2) 
to prevent torture and (3) to provide redress to victims of torture.  
 
(1) The obligation to prohibit torture  
 
In terms of the Robben Island Guidelines, states’ obligation to prohibit torture entails 
the duty to ratify regional and international human rights instruments on torture and 
to ensure that they are implemented at the domestic level through both legal and 
institutional mechanisms;621 to promote and support cooperation with international 
mechanisms;622 to criminalise all acts, which fit the CAT definition of torture in 
national laws, and to pay particular attention to gender- and age-based forms of 
                                                          
618 Robben Island Guidelines (note 103 above). 
619 Robben Island Guidelines preamble para 7. 
620 African Commission ‘special mechanisms’ http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/cpta/about/ 
[accessed 5 December 2016]. 
621 Robben Island Guideline 1 encourages ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on the 
establishment of the African Court, CAT, ICCPR, ICESCR and the Rome Statute. 
622 Robben Island Guideline 2 encourages promotion and support of the African Commission, Special 
Rapporteur on arbitrary, summary and extrajudicial executions in Africa and Special Rapporteur on 
the rights of women in Africa. 
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torture and ill-treatment;623 to confer jurisdiction on national courts to try the crime of 
torture624 and to impose appropriate penalties on those convicted of torture;625 to 
recognise torture as an extraditable offence and to ensure expeditious extraditions in 
accordance with international standards;626 to recognise non-derogability of 
torture,627  and non-refoulement.628  
 
In order to implement the obligation to prohibit torture in accordance with article 1, 
read with article 5 of the African Charter, the Robben Island Guidelines enjoin state 
parties to combat immunity and to ensure that those responsible for acts of torture 
and CIDT are subject to legal processes.629 They thus have to restrict immunity laws, 
consider extradition requests expeditiously, accommodate the difficulties of proving 
ill-treatment suffered while in custody into the laws of evidence;630 and establish 
readily accessible and fully independent complaints and investigations procedures 
for allegations of torture, which must be investigated promptly, impartially, effectively 
and in accordance with international standards.631  
 
(2) The obligation to prevent torture 
 
The Robben Island Guidelines set several procedural and substantive safeguards, 
which states must put in place in order to prevent torture. These include 
guaranteeing a detainee the right to have his or relative notified of the detention, the 
right to independent medical examination, access to an independent lawyer and the 
right to be informed of all these rights in a language understood by the detainee.632 
In order to prevent torture during the investigation of crimes, the Robben Island 
                                                          
623 Robben Island Guidelines 4 & 5. 
624 Robben Island Guideline 6. 
625Robben Island Guideline 12. 
626 Robben Island Guidelines 7 & 8. 
627 Robben Island Guideline 9 states that circumstances, such as war, threat of war or internal political 
instability or any other public emergency must not be invoked to justify torture or CIDT; Robben Island 
Guideline 10 rules out notions, such as necessity, national emergency, public order and ordre public 
from being invoked as justifications; Robben Island Guideline 11 nullifies the defence of superior 
orders from being a justifiable defence for commission of torture. 
628 In terms of Robben Island Guideline 15, states are reminded of the duty not to expel or extradite a 
person to a country where he or she faces the risk of being subjected to torture. 
629 Robben Island Guideline 16(a). 
630 Robben Island Guideline 16(a). 
631 Robben Island Guidelines 17, 18 &19. 
632 Robben Island Guidelines 20 & 31. 
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Guidelines enjoin states to establish regulations by which investigating officers are 
expected to abide.633 States are also expected to ensure that criminal investigations 
are conducted by people who are subject to codes of criminal procedure;634 that the 
detained people are immediately informed of the reasons for their detention and 
charges against them635 and are promptly brought before courts and given a chance 
to be represented by lawyers of their own choice.636 The right to challenge the 
lawfulness of the detention must also be guaranteed.637 As a means of discouraging 
investigators from committing torture, the Robben Island Guidelines encourage 
proper keeping of interrogation records, including the names and identity of people 
present during interrogation,638 and exclusion of evidence, obtained through torture, 
from being admissible in judicial proceedings.639 
 
The Robben Island Guidelines also take cognisance of the fact that there is a high 
risk of torture in detention facilities. Therefore, in order to prevent torture in detention 
facilities, they provide that states should take steps to ensure that detained people 
are treated in accordance with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners.640 These standards include reducing overcrowding and holding pre-trial 
detainees separately from convicted detainees and also holding women, children 
and other detainees in separate appropriate facilities.641  
 
In order to ensure that these international standards are observed at all times, states 
are also encouraged to establish oversight mechanisms, which are independent from 
the detention and law enforcement authorities and give them mandate to receive, 
investigate and take appropriate action on allegations of torture;642 supporting the 
independence of the judiciary and encouraging medical and legal professions to be 
                                                          
633 Robben Island Guideline 21 provides that such guidelines must be guided by the UN Body of 
Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by 
UN GA Res.43/173 of 1988 
634 Robben Island Guideline 22. 
635 Robben Island Guidelines 25 & 26. 
636 Robben Island Guideline 27. 
637 Robben Island Guideline 32. 
638 Robben Island Guideline 28 also encourages the use of video or audio to tape interrogations. 
639 Robben Island Guideline 29 
640 Robben Island Guideline 37; UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners UN 
ECOSOC Res. 2076 (LXII) of 1977. 
641 Robben Island Guidelines 35-37. 
642 Robben Island Guideline 40. 
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concerned with matters relating to torture prevention and prohibition,643 to establish, 
strengthen and support national human rights institutions, such as the Human Rights 
Commissions and Ombudsman and to give them a mandate to visit places of 
detention and to address general issues of torture and CIDT.644 The Robben Island 
Guidelines also list training of law enforcement and health personnel, as well as the 
public at large about the absolute prohibition of torture as a mechanism for its 
prevention.645  
 
(3) The obligation to provide redress to victims of torture 
 
The Robben Island Guidelines set out different forms of redress to victims of torture 
including protection of victims and witnesses of torture from intimidation or reprisal 
arising from the reporting or investigation,646 monetary compensation, appropriate 
medical care and rehabilitation, as well as social rehabilitation and support.647 Such 
reparation should also take into account the community perspective in terms of 
which, the families and communities whose member has been subjected to torture 
must be regarded as victims and therefore also entitled to rehabilitation.648  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, specific international human rights standards against torture have 
been set out. Through the discussion of the history of the international prohibition of 
torture, it has been illustrated that torture was not always proscribed at the 
international level, but that horrendous atrocities, which led to World Wars I and II 
pushed statesmen to realise that the protection of human rights is key to 
international peace and security and also that such protection should not be left in 
the hands of individual states, but that there should be international cooperation.  
 
                                                          
643 Robben Island Guidelines 38 and 39. 
644 Robben Island Guideline 41. 
645 Robben Island Guidelines 45 and 47. In this regard states also have an obligation to support the 
NGO and media efforts on awareness raising about torture and CIDT. 
646 Robben Island Guideline 48. 
647 Robben Island Guideline 49 provides that victims of torture are entitled to the remedies regardless 
of whether there has been or could be a successful criminal prosecution. 
648 Robben Island Guideline 50. 
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The international cooperation for the protection of human rights was embraced in the 
form of multilateral treaties adopted under the auspices of the UN and at regional 
levels, including in the African region under the auspices of the OAU, which was later 
replaced by the AU. The massive ratification of international human rights 
instruments has been described by Conforti as transfer of protection of human rights 
from the national to the international sphere.649 Gross violations of human rights are 
now considered to be matters of international, rather than exclusive domestic 
concern.650 Inclusion of individuals in the international law arena therefore 
symbolises a change in the strategy of international law in terms of forums and 
institutions. 
 
Customary international law, as well as treaty law in both the UN and AU human 
rights instruments set out general and specific obligations with which state parties 
must comply. These include the adoption of legislative, administrative, judicial and 
other measures for the prevention and prohibition of torture, the investigation of its 
allegations and punishment of its perpetrators, as well as provision of redress to its 
victims. Therefore, in order to achieve the ultimate aim of eradication of torture and 
other human rights violations, there is a need for harmonisation of the national legal 
frameworks with the international human rights standards against torture. On this 
basis, Lesotho’s legal and institutional frameworks are evaluated against the 
international normative framework in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
649 B Conforti International law and the role of domestic legal system (1993) 3. 
650 Sohn (note 164 above) 7. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AGAINST TORTURE IN 
LESOTHO 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
 … it is essential, if a man is not to be compelled to have recourse… to rebellion against 
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.651 
(Emphasis added) 
 
The above quotation, from the preamble of the Universal Declaration, illustrates the 
important role played by the rule of law in the protection of human rights, including 
the right to freedom from torture. Rule of law contemplates the existence of an 
effective legal system, which entails laws and mechanisms or institutions entrusted 
with the implementation of such laws.652 In the previous chapter of this thesis, 
relevant binding and non-binding human rights standards against torture, as well as 
how such have been interpreted and applied in case law, general comments and 
recommendations of various human rights bodies have been set out. The thesis of 
this research is that the prohibition of torture cannot be achieved by the adoption of 
international standards alone, but also requires effective national legal frameworks, 
which incorporate the said international standards against torture.653 Based on this 
thesis, the task at hand is to analyse Lesotho’s national legal and institutional 
frameworks against torture from a human rights perspective. 
  
This analysis is divided into four sections. In the first section, a general overview of 
the place of international law in the legal system of Lesotho is given. A historical 
approach, which illustrates how international law has been incorporated into the 
national legal system through succession, accession and ratification of various 
international instruments during different political phases, is adopted. It is also 
                                                          
651 Universal Declaration preamble para 3. 
652 C Saunders & K Le Roy ‘Perspectives on the rule of law’ in C Saunders & K Le Roy (eds) The rule 
of law (2003) 5. The authors discuss the three core principles on which the rule of law is based, 
namely governance of the polity by general rules laid down in advance, application and enforcement 
of these rules and lastly effective and fair resolution of disputes. 
653 HRC, GC 20 para 14. 
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illustrated how the courts of law have approached both customary international law 
and international treaties. In the second section, the national legal framework of 
Lesotho, namely the Constitution and other subsidiary laws are critiqued against the 
international standards against torture. In the third section, an assessment of the 
extent to which several institutions, which are tasked with the protection of human 
rights in Lesotho, comply with international human rights standards against torture is 
made. Institutions assessed in this regard include the LMPS, Police Complaints 
Authority, Office of the Ombudsman and Director of Public Prosecutions. In the last 
section of the chapter, a conclusion is drawn as to where in theory, Lesotho stands 
with regard to the implementation of its international human rights obligations against 
torture.  
 
3.2  General overview of the place of international law in the legal system of 
Lesotho 
 
Lesotho is party to several international human rights instruments, which clearly 
prohibit torture and create obligations for state parties in relation thereto. However, 
enjoyment of all human rights, including the right to freedom from torture does not 
rely solely on the existence of these provisions in international human rights 
instruments, but also on national legal mechanisms, which are put in place to ensure 
the implementation of such instruments. It is at the national level that individuals can 
easily access and enforce against their own governments, the rights and obligations 
contained in the ratified international human rights instruments.654 This is in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity in terms of which individuals are 
required to exhaust local remedies before approaching an international or regional 
body to vindicate their human rights.655  
                                                          
654 Viljoen (note 20 above) 10. 
655 CAT article 22(4) (b) requires exhaustion of local remedies. The following cases were declared 
inadmissible for failure to adhere to this requirement: X. v Switzerland (note 365 above) paras 8.1 to 
8.7; H. v Sweden Communication 627/2014 (Committee against Torture), 5 August 2016, UN Doc 
CAT/C/58/D/627/2014 para 7.5 in which local remedies were not exhausted and the admissibility and 
merits of the communication had been dealt with by the European Court; E.E. v The Russian 
Federation Communication 479/2011 (Committee against Torture), 26 August 2012, UN Doc 
CAT/C/50/D/479/2011 para 8.4; B.R. v Italy Communication 598/2014 (Committee against Torture) 12 
June 2016, UN Doc CAT/C/57/D/598/2014 para 6. Exceptions to the exhaustion rule were considered 
in the case of Gerasimov v Kazakhstan (note 382 above) para 11.5 in which the author’s lawyer was 
given the decision of the lower court after the date of appeal and the Committee held that it was 
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In the context of the African human rights system, the principle of subsidiarity is 
contained in article 56(5) of the African Charter.656 Sibanda argues that a close 
examination of article 1 of the African Charter in terms of which state parties 
undertake to ‘recognise’ the rights and freedoms contained in the Charter, article 
56(5) on exhaustion of local remedies, and article 62 on state reporting, demonstrate 
that even in the African context, state parties are primary players in the protection 
and promotion of African Charter rights and freedoms, while the role of the African 
Commission is a subsidiary one.657 It is therefore imperative for states to have 
national legal and institutional frameworks, which adequately protect human rights. 
The need for human rights-compliant legal and institutional frameworks is framed as 
a general state party obligation in several international human rights treaties, which 
mandate state parties to adopt legislative measures to implement their provisions.658 
Therefore, in order for the citizens of Lesotho to fully enjoy the right to freedom from 
torture as contained in the international human rights instruments discussed in the 
previous chapter, it is important for the national legal and institutional frameworks to 
be aligned with such instruments. Harmonisation of Lesotho’s legal system with the 
international legal system on torture depends on how in theory and in practice 
international law is related to the municipal law of Lesotho.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
impossible for him to have appealed before approaching the Committee; Dmytro Slyusar v Ukraine 
(note 59 above) para 8.2; Hanafi v Algeria Communication 341/2008 (Committee against Torture) 3 
June 2011, UN Doc CAT/C/46/D/341/2008 para 8.5 the Committee held that the local remedies had 
been unduly prolonged and therefore the authors were exempted from the requirement to exhaust 
local remedies before approaching the Committee. 
656 Article 56(5) provides that ‘communications relating to human and peoples’ rights referred to in 
article 55, received by the Commission, shall be considered if they, ‘…are sent after exhausting local 
remedies, if any…’ Exceptions to the exhaustion of local remedies rule include unavailability or when 
they are unduly prolonged; The Nubian Community in Kenya v Kenya Communication 317/2006 
(African Commission) 19-28 February 2015 para 52. The Commission held that this case falls within 
the exceptions as complainants were unable to utilise local remedies because of many procedural 
and administrative bottlenecks put in their path. See also Open Society Justice Initiative v Côte 
d’Ivoire Communication 318/2006 (African Commission) 18 - 19 February 2015, paras 40 - 50 in 
which the Commission held that the insecurities in Côte d’Ivoire rendered the local remedies 
unavailable as the authorities, which the victims had to approach for redress were the ones involved 
in the alleged violations. In Atangana Mebara v Cameroon Communication 416/2012 (African 
Commission) 18 May 2016 paras 63 & 69 the Commission held that local remedies had been unduly 
prolonged since the magistrate had not responded despite statutory timeframes for such response 
having expired. 
657 S Sibanda ‘Beneath it all lies the principle of subsidiarity: The principle of subsidiarity in the African 
and European regional human rights systems’ (2007)40(3) Comparative and International Law Journal 
of Southern Africa 425. 
658 CAT article 2; ICCPR article 2(2); CEDAW article 2; African Charter article 1; African Women’s 
Protocol article 2(1). 
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The two main theories, which are often employed to determine the place of 
international law in a particular state, are monism and dualism.659 On the one hand, 
monism views international law and municipal law as a single entity composed of 
binding legal rules.660 Its proponents posit that there is a single universal system of 
law and that international law and municipal law are aspects of such system.661 
Monists insist that the two legal systems are interrelated parts of one legal 
structure.662 According to the theory of monism, municipal courts are obliged to 
directly apply rules of international law at the same level as municipal laws.663 Where 
the two legal systems clash, monism gives preference to rules of international law.664 
In its purest form, monism dictates that international law prevails over national laws 
and that a national law, which contradicts an international instrument is null and void, 
even if that national law is a constitution, whether passed prior to or post the state’s 
ratification of or accession to an international instrument in question.665 Supremacy 
of international law over municipal law in both international and national decisions 
thus underlies the theory of monism.  
 
Dualism, on the other hand, treats international law and municipal law as two entirely 
distinct and separate legal systems.666 Unlike in monism, where the underlying 
principle is that international law has primacy over municipal law in both international 
and national decisions,667 dualist theory asserts that international law has primacy 
over municipal law in international decisions and municipal law has primacy over 
international law in municipal decisions.668  In relation to dualists, Dugard states that 
                                                          
659 G Ferreira & A Ferreira-Snyman ‘The incorporation of public international law into municipal law 
and regional law against the background of the dichotomy between monism and dualism’ (2014)17 
(14) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1472.  
660 JG Starke ‘Monism and dualism in the theory of international law’ in SL Paulson (ed) Normativity 
and norms: Critical perspectives on Kelsenian themes (1999) 537.  
661 As above. 
662 Starke (note 660 above) 539. 
663 DP O’Connell ‘The relationship between international law and municipal law’ (1960) 48 (3) 
Georgetown Law Journal 432. 
664 JF Coyle ‘Incorporative statutes and the borrowed treaty rule’ 50 (2010) 3 Virginia Journal of 
International law 656. 
665 M Killander & H Adjolohoun ‘International law and domestic human rights litigation in Africa: An 
introduction’ in Killander (ed) International law and domestic human rights litigation in Africa (2010) 5. 
666 As above. 
667 O’Connell (note 663 above) 432. 
668 As above. 
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domestic courts can only apply international law if (a) it is adopted by the courts or 
(b) it is transformed into domestic law by national legislation.669 In dualist 
jurisdictions, international law is regarded as having been incorporated into the 
domestic legal order only when expressly stated by a legislative enactment or when 
its articles are included, although not expressly, into a domestic law.670 If 
international law is not transformed into national law through legislation, national 
courts cannot apply it.671 Hence, dualism is also known as the transformation or 
adoption theory.672  
 
The two theories of monism and dualism have been used to analyse the 
incorporation of international law into domestic legal systems of many countries and 
in almost all of them, the reality reflected through jurisprudence is different from the 
tenants of these two theories.673 In the next sections of the chapter, an attempt will 
be made to illustrate that in the same manner, the legal system of Lesotho fails to fit 
squarely in either of these theories although it is often said to be dualist.674 According 
to state party reports submitted to different treaty bodies,  
 
[i]n Lesotho, treaties are not invoked directly in domestic courts, that is, they are not self-
executing. They have to be domesticated into national laws and administrative regulations in 
order to be enforced…675  
                                                          
669 Coyle (note 664 above). 
670 Killander & Adjolohoun (note 665 above) 9. See also Basotho National Party and Another v 
Government of Lesotho and Others Constitutional Case No. 5/2000 [2003] LSHC 6, 22. 
671 As above. 
672 Killander & Adjolohoun (note 665 above) 9. 
673 J Sloth-Nielsen & K Hove ‘Mudzuru and another v The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs and 2 Others: A review’ (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal 554. The authors 
highlight the use of international law and foreign case law by Zimbabwean Courts and how such has 
been bolstered by constitutional provisions in the new Constitution of Zimbabwe, which requires courts 
to consider international law in the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution; D Tladi 
‘Interpretation and international law in South African Courts: The Supreme Court of Appeal and the Al 
Bashir saga’ (2016) 16 African Human Rights Law Journal  3 in which the author illustrates the 
practical challenges to interpretation of international law in a supposedly international law-friendly 
South African constitutional framework. Some of the challenges identified include a clash between 
international and domestic rules of interpretation; D Tladi ‘Interpretation of treaties in an international 
law-friendly framework: The case of South Africa’ in HP Aust & G Nolte (eds) The interpretation of 
international law by domestic courts: uniformity, diversity, convergence (2016). See also N Botha 
‘Justice Sachs and interpretation of international law by the Constitutional Court: Equity or 
expediency?’ (2010) 25 South African Public Law 253. 
674 For instance, BNP v Government of Lesotho and others (note 670 above) and other cases 
considered in section 3.2.6.1 of this thesis, the Courts have referred to the legal system of Lesotho as 
being dualist.  
675 CMW Committee, The initial state party report for Lesotho para 1. 
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Categorisation of Lesotho as dualist is based on Lesotho’s history, which includes 
the heritage of Roman Dutch Common Law, as well as a constitutional supremacy 
clause in section 2 of the Constitution.676 As will be illustrated below, jurisprudence of 
the courts of Lesotho does not explicitly reflect dualism as it is defined in theory, but 
rather reflects a mixture of both dualism and monism.  There is neither consistency 
nor predictability as to how a particular judge will approach a question of application 
of international law against torture in domestic courts if such arises in a case 
because categorisation of Lesotho as dualist is theoretically supported by the 
Constitution and other pieces of legislation while jurisprudence paints a totally 
different picture.  
 
The disparity between theory and practice as far as the application of international 
law in Lesotho is concerned is highlighted in the next sections through an analysis of 
the legal system of Lesotho from a historical perspective, including ratification of 
international instruments, enactment of corresponding domestic laws, submission of 
reports to relevant treaty bodies and the courts’ reasoning for accepting or rejecting 
reliance on international law in domestic courts. In order to make a clear illustration, 
this section is not limited to the application of international instruments against 
torture, but extrapolates Lesotho’s conduct in relation to international law in general 
as the courts’ attitude to general international law gives a picture of how the courts 
would approach the application of international human rights standards against 
torture. 
 
3.2.1 International law in the legal system of Lesotho prior to independence 
(pre-1966) 
 
Lesotho was formerly known as Basutoland, named after a nation called the Basotho 
who occupied the territory during the 1800s.677 The Basotho as a nation was formed 
by the unification of a number of clans and displaced refugees who had come to 
Moshoeshoe for protection against Shaka Zulu and the Boers who invaded their 
                                                          
676 GJ Van Niekerk ‘Constitutional protection of common law: The endurance of civilian tradition in 
Southern Africa’ (2012) 18 (1) Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History 115. 
677 S Rosenberg & RF Weisfelder The historical dictionary of Lesotho (2013) 472. 
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homelands in the 1800s.678 These conflicts drove most Africans out of their 
homelands and forced them to seek refuge in Thaba-Bosiu where Moshoeshoe had 
established a fortress.679 Moshoeshoe subsequently gathered all those who had 
come to him for protection and founded the Basotho nation for whom he became 
King.680 His Kingdom became known as Basutoland (later named Lesotho).681  
 
During the Great Trek, white settlers (also known as the Boers) arrived in the Cape 
Colony.682 In the mid-1820s, they crossed the Orange River into Moshoeshoe’s 
territory and allegedly requested him to settle there.683 Moshoeshoe’s view was that 
he had lent them the territory, but the Boers later claimed to have rights over it.684 
These divergent views about ownership of land led to conflicts between the Basotho 
who occupied Basutoland and the Boers who occupied the current South Africa.685 
The conflicts gave rise to a number of bilateral treaties between the two territories 
thus bringing international law into play.  
 
The first territorial treaty was signed between Moshoeshoe and Napier who 
represented Great Britain in 1843.686 According to this treaty, the British recognised 
Basotho sovereignty over the land between the Orange and Caledon rivers.687 The 
Boers, who had settled in some areas included in the 1843 treaty did not recognise 
this territory and continued their invasion and attempts to conquer more of 
Moshoeshoe’s land.688 In 1845, the territorial treaty was altered by Governor 
Maitland to legally recognise the Boers’ settlement.689 This alteration of the 1843 
Treaty fuelled more conflicts between the Basotho and the Boers. The British ended 
up drawing new boundaries, which separated the territories and this time leaving 
                                                          
678 S Poulter Legal Dualism in Lesotho (1981) 1.  
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681 As above. 
682 South African History Online ‘Basotho wars: 1858-1868’ http://www.sahistory.org.za/south-africa-
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lesser land for Moshoeshoe. These boundaries became known as the Warden Line 
(named after the British Resident in Bloemfontein, Henry Warden).690 The Warden 
Line was not welcomed by Moshoeshoe and his people and a fierce conflict between 
the British and the Basotho ensued, resulting in the Battle of Viervoet in 1851 and 
another in 1852 in the Berea Plateau.691 The British were defeated in both battles. 
They then realised that the cost of maintaining sovereignty became too high and 
they handed over the territory to the Boers through the signing of the Sand River 
Convention.692  
 
Upon their takeover, the Boers demanded land beyond the Caledon River, and 
named the new territory the Republic of the Orange Free State (Free State).693 The 
demand for more land ignited new feuds between the Basotho and the Boers. 
President of the Free State, JN Boshof declared war against the Basotho, resulting 
in the War of Senegal in March 1858 in which Moshoeshoe was almost defeated.694 
After this war, an uneasy peace between the two territories followed and in 1861, 
Moshoeshoe requested protection from Britain.695 Moshoeshoe’s request for Britain’s 
involvement in the conflict between Moshoeshoe and the Boers also manifests a 
principle of international law, namely the concept of humanitarian intervention in 
modern international law.696  
 
In 1865, the Free State launched heavy attacks against Moshoeshoe and his people. 
This conflict became known as Seqiti War.697 By the late 1860s, Moshoeshoe and 
the Basotho people were exhausted and at the edge of famine as a result of these 
struggles.698  Their total defeat by the Boers was also looming.699 Moshoeshoe then 
renewed his entreaty for British Protection and in March 1868, the British Parliament 
declared the Basotho Kingdom a British Protectorate.700 The Boers discontinued the 
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war and in February 1869, boundaries were agreed upon between Basutoland and 
the Republic of the Free State presently, known as Lesotho and South Africa 
respectively. These boundaries were drawn in the Convention of Aliwal North.701  
 
The history above reflects that from its foundation as a sovereign state and even 
when it had become a British protectorate, Lesotho’s affairs were governed by 
international law. The conflicts, which Lesotho had with the British, as well as the 
Boers, resulted in the conclusion of several peace and boundary treaties. 
Moshoeshoe viewed the said international law as binding on him and his people.702 
To date, the boundaries between Lesotho and South Africa remain as stipulated in 
the Aliwal North Convention. However, there is no literature, which suggests that 
international law was applied to solve domestic disputes during Moshoeshoe’s reign. 
This could be influenced by several factors, such as the fact that during that time, 
Moshoeshoe and his Chiefs who also acted as legislatures focused more on 
stabilising their territories and solving territorial disputes than on internal disputes 
amongst the subjects.703 The other factor could be the effect of General 
Proclamation 2B of 1884, which dictated that domestic disputes were to be resolved 
by domestic laws as illustrated below. 
 
As referred to earlier, when the British became frustrated and realised the high cost 
of the peaceful administration of Basutoland, they quickly handed the territory over to 
the Cape for it to administer.704 As far as the legal system was concerned, the High 
Commissioner issued General Law Proclamation 2B of 1884 (the Proclamation), 
which made law that was applicable in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope at the 
time to be equally applicable in Lesotho. The Proclamation reads as follows: 
 
In all suits, actions or proceedings, civil or criminal, the law to be administered shall, as nearly 
as the circumstances of the country will permit, be the same as the law for the time being in 
force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope: Provided, however, that in any suits, actions, 
                                                          
701 As above. 
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or proceedings in any Court, to which all parties are Africans, and in all suits, outcomes or 
proceedings whatsoever before any Basotho Courts, African law may be administered.705 
 
This Proclamation imported Roman Dutch Law and its legal traditions into Lesotho 
although it still left room for the application of African law (later known as Sesotho 
customary law), thus creating a dualist system, which still applies today.706 In terms 
of this legal dualism, Sesotho customary law operates side by side with the ‘received 
law’.707  It is perhaps at this stage that Roman Dutch Law traditions, including a 
dualist approach with regard to the relationship between international law and 
municipal law, were imported into the legal system of Lesotho. During the time when 
Lesotho was its protectorate, the United Kingdom concluded international treaties 
and extended their application to Lesotho while at the same time the Cape passed 
Proclamations, which were meant to run the country. Proclamation 2B did not make 
any reference to international law nor to its status vis-à-vis other Proclamations, 
which were passed. However, an inference, which can be drawn from its wording, is 
that the status of international law in Lesotho during its protectorate days would be 
that which obtained in the Cape Colony of Good Hope, which was dualism as 
influenced by the English legal system.708  
 
Although it is argued in this research that Lesotho’s dualist approach to international 
law was mainly influenced by the British legal system, Killander and Adjolohoun warn 
that the description of the English legal system as the epitome of dualism is arguably 
exaggerated for a number of reasons: firstly, customary international law formed and 
continues to form part of the law of the land in England, as well as many common 
law countries.709  Secondly, unincorporated treaties still play an increasingly 
important role in the English legal system, though the courts may not directly apply 
them.710 This objection notwithstanding, it suffices to conclude that the dualist 
approach to international law in Lesotho became more evident when Lesotho 
became a British protectorate. Therefore, the Roman Dutch and English systems as 
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introduced by Proclamation 2B acts as a cradle for continued dualism in Lesotho. 
However, as will be illustrated in the next political phases, the Courts of Lesotho did 
not stick to tenets of dualism as described in theory, but ventured to approach 
international law through a mixture of both dualism and monism. It would therefore 
be misleading to categorise Lesotho in terms of the dualist/monist dichotomy as 
court practice does not fit squarely into either theory. 
 
3.2.2 The legal system post-independence and prior to the state of 
emergency (1966 - 1970) 
 
Lesotho continued to be a British Protectorate until 1966 when it had its first 
democratic elections. These elections were governed by the first Constitution, which 
was approved by the British Royal Decree in January 1965.711 The elections were 
held in preparation for independence from Britain, which took place on 4 October 
1966. Following the 1965 elections and attainment of independence, the parliament 
of Lesotho passed an Independence Order of 1966 on the basis of which a new 
Constitution was adopted by Lesotho, now as an independent state.712  The 1966 
Constitution was based on the British model although it had a Bill of Rights, which 
was influenced by constitutional practice of the United States of America.713 The 
1966 Constitution did not make any provision for international law, but had a 
constitutional supremacy clause.714 That is, the international instruments to which 
Lesotho was a party would only be applicable to the extent that they did not 
contradict provisions of the Constitution. Thus, in cases of conflict between 
international law and the constitution, the national constitution is elevated above 
international instruments.  
 
As far as other laws which had been passed by the Colony of the Cape of Good 
Hope were concerned, the 1966 Constitution did not do away with them. They 
continued to operate. Some were slowly phased out and some are still part of the 
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laws of Lesotho to date. This status is highlighted by Palmer and Poulter in the 
following words: 
 
The newly independent state of Lesotho took over the existing laws that had previously been 
in force in Basutoland, though in future they were to be construed with any modifications, 
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions required to bring them into conformity with the 
independence legislation, namely the Constitution…715 
 
As an acknowledgment of the relevance of international law to Lesotho as a new 
independent state, in the same month that it gained independence, Lesotho ratified 
three conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).716 These 
Conventions were later domesticated through the Labour Code Order 1992, which 
provides that ‘no provision of the Code or of rules and regulations made thereunder 
shall be interpreted or applied in such a way as to derogate from the provisions of 
any International Labour Convention which has entered into force for the Kingdom of 
Lesotho’. 717 
 
Lesotho also took cognisance of the fact that there were international treaties, which 
the government of the United Kingdom had concluded on its behalf during the time 
when Lesotho was under British protection. However, Lesotho neither hastened to 
be immediately bound by those treaties, nor to discharge itself from their obligations 
altogether. It proposed a twenty-four month period running from the date of 
independence to review its position as regards such treaties. What was to happen to 
Lesotho’s treaty obligations in the interim during this review period was contained in 
a letter of 22 March 1967 written by the Prime Minister of Lesotho to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations. The letter reads as follows: 
  
 
 
                                                          
715 V Palmer & S Poulter The legal system of Lesotho (1972) 41; TLC Lenka ‘A historical and 
comparative study of human rights violations in criminal investigations in Lesotho’ unpublished LLD 
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Your Excellency, 
The government of the Kingdom of Lesotho is mindful of the desirability of maintenance, 
to the fullest extent compatible with the emergence into full independence of the Kingdom of 
Lesotho, (of) legal continuity between Lesotho and the several states with which, through the 
actions of the government of the United Kingdom, the country formerly known as Basutoland 
enjoyed treaty relations. Accordingly, the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho takes the 
present opportunity of making the following declarations: 
 
1. As regards bilateral treaties validly concluded by the government of the United Kingdom, 
on behalf of the country formerly known as Basutoland, or validly applied or extended by 
the said country to the country formerly known as Basutoland, the government of the 
Kingdom of Lesotho is willing to continue to apply within its territory on the basis of 
reciprocity, the terms of all such treaties for a period of twenty-four months from the date 
of independence (i.e. until October 4, 1968) unless abrogated by mutual consent. At the 
expiry of that period, the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho will regard such of these 
treaties which could not by application of customary international law be regarded as 
otherwise surviving, as having terminated. 
2. … 
3. The government of the Kingdom of Lesotho is conscious that the above declaration 
applicable to bilateral treaties cannot with equal facility be applied to multilateral treaties. 
As regards these, therefore, the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho proposes to 
review each of them individually and to indicate to the depository in each case what steps 
it wishes to take in relation to each such instrument, whether by way of confirmation of 
termination or confirmation of succession or accession. During such interim period of 
review, any state party to a multilateral treaty which has, prior to independence been 
applied or extended to the country formally known as Basutoland, may, on the basis of 
reciprocity, rely as against Lesotho on the term of such treaty. 
4. It would be appreciated if your Excellency would arrange for the text of this declaration to 
be circulated amongst all members of the United Nations. 
 
Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration. 
 
Signed LEABUA JONATHAN (Prime Minister).718 
 
The implications of this letter to Lesotho’s international human rights obligations are 
discussed in more detail in the case of Joe Molefi, which is considered later on in this 
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chapter. What is important to highlight at this juncture is the fact that from the time of 
independence, Lesotho was aware that being a party to international treaties, 
whether bilateral or multilateral, carries with it certain obligations with which state 
parties are expected to comply; hence immediately upon entry into power, the 
government took a stance as regards such obligations. The letter does not reflect a 
dualist approach to international law in which case the government would claim that 
in the absence of any domesticating laws, any international instrument to which the 
British government was a party or made Basutoland a party would not be binding on 
the government of Lesotho. 
 
After the twenty-four months review period, Lesotho continued to ratify international 
treaties, such as the four Geneva Conventions 1949,719 and the Convention of the 
Privileges and Immunities of the UN 1946.720 Some aspects of the Geneva 
Conventions have been domesticated in that the Penal Code Act criminalises grave 
breaches of international humanitarian law including torture, which is committed as 
part of war crimes and crimes against humanity.721 The Penal Code Act specifically 
makes reference to the Geneva Conventions.722  
 
 
3.2.3 The legal system during the state of emergency (1970 - 1986) 
 
The 1966 Constitution was suspended in 1970 following Lesotho’s second 
democratic elections. The then ruling party, Basotho National Party (BNP), which 
had won the elections in 1965, lost to the opposition Basotho Congress Party (BCP). 
As the results were being announced over the national radio station, the Prime 
Minister, Leabua Jonathan, declared a state of emergency and suspended the 
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Constitution ‘pending the drafting of a new one’.723 He justified this suspension on 
the basis that the election had been marred by acts of violence against BNP 
supporters and was, therefore, unfair.724 However, he did not mention that there 
were any flaws in the Constitution, which warranted such a suspension nor the need 
for its re-drafting precipitated.725  
 
After suspending the Constitution, the Prime Minister then established a Council of 
Ministers (the Council) composed of members of the former cabinet. The Council 
performed legislative functions and in 1973, it passed the Lesotho Order of 1973, 
which constituted an Interim National Assembly (INA). The INA passed several laws 
from 1973 to 1986 when the military toppled the government through a coup d’état. 
Amongst laws passed by the INA was the Parliament Act of 1983, which would act in 
the place of a Constitution.726 According to a number of authors who wrote on 
Lesotho’s constitutional changes, suspension of the Constitution was followed by 
massive human rights violations and disregard for international law.727 It is argued 
that some of the human rights violations were sanctioned by laws passed by the 
Council of Ministers and the INA.728 Lesotho adopted a strict dualist approach to 
international law in terms of which the Prime Minister ignored all voices of the 
international community and stood firm that whatever was happening in Lesotho was 
Lesotho’s problem, to be solved according to the laws of Lesotho and that 
international law had no place in the national legal system.729 A dualist approach to 
international law in Lesotho during this period can be inferred from the fact that there 
were laws promulgated during the period, which stipulated expressly that their 
enactment was meant to give effect to certain principles contained in international 
human rights instruments which Lesotho is a party. For example, section 13 of the 
1983 Refugee Act of Lesotho made specific reference to the UN Refugee 
Convention of 1951. The impression given by express mention of section, a specific 
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international instrument, is that any other convention, which is not expressly 
mentioned in an Act of parliament, is not considered law in Lesotho. 
 
Legitimacy of Orders passed by the Council of Ministers and the INA was dealt with 
in the case of Moerane and nineteen others v R730 and later in Khaketla v The Prime 
Minister and others.731 In the Moerane case, the appellants had been charged with 
treason. They in turn argued that the government did not have majestas (Latin term 
meaning dignity) and therefore laws passed by the INA and the Council, which were 
established by a questionable government, ought to be declared invalid. They urged 
the Court to recognise the 1966 Constitution and to find that the government had 
violated human rights contained in the 1966 Constitution. The Court relied on the 
doctrine of efficacy732 and recognised the declaration of the state of emergency as a 
revolution, which gave majestas to the government of the day. Consequently, it held 
that all laws passed by the government were lawful as was the suspension of the 
1966 Constitution.733 
 
Having been declared lawful, the BNP government continued its international 
relations and ratified a number of international treaties, including CERD in 1971, the 
Genocide Convention in 1974, as well as the UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol in 1981.734 However, during this period, no domestic laws were enacted to 
implement the provisions of CERD and the Genocide Convention despite that article 
2(1) of CERD and article 5 of Genocide Convention mandate state parties to adopt 
legislative measures to implement their provisions. These conventions were also not 
applied by the Courts. The only laws which implemented aspects of Lesotho’s 
obligations against torture contained in the UN and OAU Refugee Conventions are 
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the Aliens Control Act of 1966 and the Refugee Act of 1983, which are discussed in 
the next section.  
 
In terms of article 9 of CERD, Lesotho’s initial report to the CERD Committee was 
due in 1972, one year after its entry into force in Lesotho and subsequent reports in 
1974 and every two years thereafter. However, Lesotho’s initial report was submitted 
in 1998, more than twenty-five years after CERD’s entry into force in Lesotho, and to 
date, no subsequent reports have been submitted. The reporting obligations under 
the UN and OAU Refugee Conventions to provide the UNHCR or other UN bodies 
with information regarding conditions of refugees, implementation of the Convention 
and domestic laws governing refugees in a particular state party were fulfilled by 
chance because firstly, the Conventions do not stipulate the time within which to 
report.  Secondly, the era of the state of emergency in Lesotho coincided with the 
era of apartheid in South Africa.735 Because of an influx of refugees from South 
Africa into Lesotho, particularly after the 1976 Soweto uprising, the UNHCR 
established a Refugee office in Lesotho.736 Thus, information required under article 
35 of the UN Refugee Convention was within UNHCR’s reach. The BNP government 
was toppled by the military in 1986. Below is an analysis of how the military regime 
approached international law. 
 
3.2.4  The legal system during military rule (1986 - 1993) 
 
In 1986, the Royal Lesotho Defense Force (RLDF), under the leadership of Major 
General Metsing Lekhanya, launched a coup d’état against the BNP government.737 
The military regime repealed the 1983 Act and passed Lesotho Order No. 2 of 1986, 
which was to work as the country’s Constitution.738 The military government ruled for 
about five years and in 1991 it was toppled by another group of the army called the 
‘captains’ under the leadership of Colonel Elias Phitšoane Ramaema.739 The 
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Ramaema military regime set aside the 1986 Order and promulgated Lesotho Order 
No. 2 of 1990 as the basis of its power.740  
 
Legitimacy of the Orders passed by the military regime and the request for the 
recognition of the 1966 Constitution were raised before the High Court in Mokotso 
and others v King.741 The Court held that taking into account a ‘notorious’ fact that 
the Military government was in effective control throughout the country and had for 
two years been ruling the country using the three arms of government, it had 
inherited all obligations and responsibilities of the previous government and therefore 
had to be viewed as a legitimate power.742 Consequently, the 1986 Lesotho Order 
was regarded as the nation’s principal law in force during that time.  
 
Unlike the 1966 Constitution, which expressly provided for constitutional supremacy, 
the 1986 Order did not. Therefore, the place of international law vis-à-vis the laws of 
Lesotho during this time, is unknown. However, the military regime continued to 
ratify, as well as accede and succeed to a number of international human rights 
instruments, including the OAU Refugee Convention 1969, ICESCR 1966, ICCPR 
1966, African Charter 1981 and CRC 1989. It is interesting to note that despite this 
massive ratification, Lesotho did not comply with the obligations contained in these 
international instruments. It did not enact laws aimed at implementing these 
instruments at the domestic level as required;743 and did not submit any state party 
reports to indicate measures adopted to implement these instruments.744 The 
international instruments were also not applied in the courts. Neither were reports in 
respect of treaties, which had earlier been ratified, acceded or succeeded to by the 
BNP government submitted.  
 
The conclusion that the status of international law in the legal system of Lesotho 
during this period remained unknown is supported by the fact that there is no case 
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law, which reflects the use of international law in the domestic courts of Lesotho 
during this period. An argument based on dualism would be inconsistent with 
Lesotho’s international human rights obligation as the ICESCR Committee has 
stated that ‘in general, legally binding international human rights standards should 
operate directly and immediately within the domestic legal system of each State 
Party, thereby enabling individuals to seek enforcement of their rights before national 
courts and tribunals’.745 
 
3.2.5 The legal system during democratic rule (1993 - the Present) 
 
In 1991, when Ramaema and ‘the captains’ removed Lekhanya from power, they 
promised to restore civilian rule. Indeed, in the following year, 1992, preparations for 
elections and the adoption of a new Constitution were made. Having been under a 
military regime for almost a decade, Lesotho had democratic elections, which 
ushered in a new Constitution in 1993. Several ‘undemocratic decrees’, which were 
passed by the self-imposed BNP government and the military regime, were repealed 
in favour of laws that adhered to the Bill of Rights, which was contained in the 1993 
Constitution. In effect, the 1993 Constitution is a replica of the 1966 Constitution. It 
could be argued that the reason for this replication is that, in the first place, there 
was nothing wrong with the 1966 Constitution, which warranted its suspension. 
Unlike the Constitution of other countries, such as the 1996 Constitution of South 
Africa, the 1993 Constitution of Lesotho is silent on the place of international law in 
Lesotho.746  However, just like the 1966 Constitution, it has the supremacy clause 
which places all other laws subject to the Constitution.747  
 
Since democratic rule in 1993, Lesotho ratified and/or acceded to several 
international human rights instruments, such as CEDAW, the Equal Remuneration 
Convention 1951(No. 100),748 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention 1958,749 the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the 
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Optional Protocol to ICCPR 1966,750 the ILO Convention against Child Labour 
1999,751 the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957,752 CAT, Occupational 
Health and Safety Convention 1981,753 UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crimes 2000,754 Protocol Against Smuggling of Migrants 2000,755 
Optional Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict 2000,756 
Protocol to the African Charter on establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples Rights 1998,757 Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons 
1949,758 Optional Protocol to CEDAW 1999,759 Convention on Reduction of 
Statelessness 1961760 and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
 
During this period, the government of Lesotho ratified more instruments than it did in 
the past. This era also saw a change in the pattern of submission of state party 
reports to international treaty bodies. Lesotho started submitting reports on the 
implementation of several treaties, such as ICCPR, CRC, CERD, CEDAW and 
CMW.761 Its report to the CEDAW Committee, for instance, outlines legislative and 
policy measures, which have been put in place to combat gender-based violence, 
which is linked to torture.762  Its First Periodic Report to the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child refers to constitutional and legislative measures put in place to prohibit 
the torture of children.763 Although it is not in all reports that Lesotho’s obligations 
were mentioned, what is commendable, however, is that during this period, Lesotho 
                                                          
750Lesotho ratified on 6 Sept 2000. 
751Lesotho ratified on 14 June 2001. 
752Lesotho ratified on 14 June 2001. 
753Lesotho ratified on 1 Nov 2001. 
754Lesotho ratified on 24 Sept 2003. 
755Lesotho ratified on 24 Sept 2003. 
756Lesotho ratified on 24 Sept 2003. 
757Lesotho ratified on 28 October 2003. 
758Lesotho ratified on 24 Sept 2004. 
759Lesotho ratified on 24 Sept 2004. 
760Lesotho ratified on 24 Sept 2004. 
761 See Lesotho’s initial report to the HRC, 16 October 1998, UN Doc CCPR/C/81/Add.14; Lesotho’s 
initial report to the CERD Committee, 8 September 1998, UN Doc CERD/C/337/Add.1; Lesotho’s initial 
Report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 20 July 1998 UN Doc CRC/C/11/Add.20; 
Lesotho’s initial to fourth Periodic Reports to the CEDAW Committee 26 August 2010 UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/LSO/1-4; Lesotho’s initial Report to the Committee on Migrant Workers, 13 April 2016, UN 
Doc CMW/C/LSO/1. 
762 Lesotho’s initial to fourth periodic report to the CEDAW Committee (note 757 above) paras 24, 27, 
31, 46 & 57 in which it is acknowledged that gender roles and stereotypes perpetuate gender-based 
violence.  
763 Lesotho’s First Periodic Report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 16 November 2016, 
UN Doc CRC/C/LSO/2 paras 128 - 137. 
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seems to have appreciated that state reporting is an obligation, which has to be 
fulfilled; thus practical compliance with the reporting obligation, which had not been 
complied with by previous regimes. The change in trend towards international law 
did not only remain with ratification of treaties and filing of state party reports, but 
was also illustrated in the enactment of laws,764 and further influenced the application 
of both customary international law and international treaty law in the courts of 
Lesotho as discussed in detail below. Post 1993, the courts started applying 
international law and making pronouncements, albeit inconsistent, which shed some 
light on the applicability of international law in the legal system of Lesotho. 
 
3.2.6 Application of international law in the courts of Lesotho 
 
3.2.6.1 Courts’ application of customary international law  
 
Customary international law, unlike international treaty law (discussed in the next 
section) is seldom applied or even referred to in the courts of Lesotho. One of the 
few cases in which a principle of customary international law was implied is the case 
of Lekhoaba v Minister of Home Affairs.765 In this case, the court held that while dual 
citizenship is proscribed by the 1993 Constitution, section 42, however, provides that 
parliament may not under any circumstances make a provision whose effect would 
render any person stateless. This, the Court emphasised, ‘is an immutable principle 
of the law of nations, which declares that every human being cannot be stateless 
and has an inalienable right to be a national of his fatherland’.766 The court took 
cognisance of the principle of customary international law, which is emulated in 
section 42 of the Constitution. What remains uncertain is whether the court would 
adopt a similar approach in a case where constitutional provisions conflicted with the 
principles of customary international law. Considering that the prohibition of torture is 
a peremptory norm of customary international law, which binds all states even in the 
absence of treaty ratification, the High Court’s approach to customary international 
                                                          
764 For instance, Sexual Offences Act 2003, Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act 2006, which were 
aimed at gender mainstreaming in compliance with non-discrimination as contained in articles 1 of 
ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, African Charter article 2 and African Women’s Protocol article 2.  
765 Lekhoaba v Director of Immigration and Another Const./C/3/2007 [2007] LSHC 6. 
766 As above para 64 (emphasis added). 
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law in Lekhoaba case opens the door for the application of customary international 
law standards against torture in Lesotho. 
 
3.2.6.2 Courts’ application of international treaty law 
 
The earliest case after independence in which the question of the application of 
international treaties in the courts of Lesotho was discussed, is the case of Joe 
Molefi v Legal Advisor and others.767 In this case, the appellant sought to be 
declared a refugee as contemplated by the UN Refugee Convention. The 
Convention had been ratified by the United Kingdom during the time when Lesotho 
was its protectorate and its application was extended to Lesotho. One of the 
questions raised in this case was whether the applicant could be declared a refugee 
under Lesotho law based on the definition of refugee contained in the UN Refugee 
Convention. The court was confronted with the interpretation of section 38 of the 
Aliens Control Act 1966 on which the Petitioner relied. The Court held that the letter, 
which the Prime Minister of Lesotho had written to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, was a positive manifestation of Lesotho’s intention to be bound by 
international instruments, including the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.768 It held further that article 38 of the Aliens Control Act caused the 
Convention to be part of the domestic laws of Lesotho and that the Appellant was a 
refugee as defined by the UN Refugee Convention.769 However, the petitioner’s 
circumstances did not fall within those contemplated in article 38 and therefore he 
could not be declared a refugee in terms of the Aliens Control Act. The Court 
adopted a strict dualist approach to international law in that the Refugee Convention 
was regarded as binding on Lesotho only because it had been transformed into the 
laws of Lesotho by virtue of section 38 of the Aliens Control Act.   
 
The courts’ approach to international law as stated in the Joe Molefi case,770 started 
off as strictly dualist in that they rejected the use of undomesticated international 
instruments. In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Mohollo Tšoenyane & 
                                                          
767 Joe Molefi v Legal Advisor and others (note 719 above). 
768 As above (unnumbered paragraphs). 
769 As above (unnumbered paragraphs). 
770 Joe Molefi (note 719 above). 
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Others, the High Court of Lesotho held specifically that whether bilateral or 
multilateral, in order for international agreements to be relied upon in domestic 
courts, ‘they require adoption by domestic legislatures’. 771 In Basotho National Party 
and Another v Government of Lesotho and Others,772 the applicants, a political party 
which had just lost the 2002 general elections, sought orders, including that the court 
direct the Government of Lesotho to ‘take necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, to adopt such legislative and other measures necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognised in international conventions, such as the 
Universal Declaration 1948, African Charter and others’.773 The Court explicitly 
stated that ‘these Conventions cannot form part of our law until and unless they are 
incorporated into municipal law by legislative enactment’.774 It stressed that: 
 
The court cannot usurp the functions assigned the executive and the legislature under the 
Constitution and it cannot even indirectly require the executive to indirectly introduce a 
particular legislation or the legislature to pass it or assume itself a supervisory function over 
the law-making activities of the executive and the legislature.775 
 
The Tšoeunyane and BNP cases illustrate a strict dualist approach in that the courts 
rejected the application of international human rights instruments in the absence of 
an Act of Parliament, which incorporated them into the domestic legal system. The 
case of Senate Gabasheane Masupha v Senior Resident Magistrate for the District 
of Berea and others776 was also decided from a dualist perspective. In this case, a 
daughter of a late principal chief challenged the constitutionality of section 10 of the 
Chieftainship Act 1968, which limits the right to succession to office of chief to first-
born male children. Amongst instruments cited to advance the arguments that 
Lesotho had an obligation not to discriminate on the basis of sex were the ICCPR, 
CEDAW, African Charter and African Women’s Protocol. The Court held that: 
 
                                                          
771 Director of Public Prosecutions v Mohollo Tšoenyane & Others CR/299/99 (High Court of Lesotho) 
unreported 25 February 2000 para 6. 
772 BNP v Government of Lesotho and Others (note 670 above). 
773 As above para 2. 
774 As above para 22. 
775 BNP v Government of Lesotho and Others (note 670 above) 23. 
776 Senate Gabasheane Masupha v Senior Resident Magistrate for the district of Berea and others C 
of A (CIV) 29/2013 [2014] LSCA. 
148 
 
These instruments, it is clear, are aids to interpretation not the source of rights enforceable by 
Lesotho citizens. In the present matter, there’s no aspect of the process if interpreting section 
10 of the [Chieftainship] Act, which leaves its meaning exposed to any uncertainty, to the 
resolution of which the instruments in question could contribute further than the 
considerations, which have already been taken into account.777 
 
The Court did not rule out international instruments as completely irrelevant to the 
enquiry, but said they could only be helpful as interpretative guides if there was 
uncertainty in the interpretation of section 10 of the Chieftainship Act. Although in 
wording the ruling may sound international law friendly, in effect, it adopted a strictly 
dualist approach. By holding that international human rights instruments to which 
Lesotho is a party are ‘not the sources of rights enforceable by Lesotho citizens,’ the 
Court exonerated the state from its international human rights obligations in the 
absence of an Act of parliament. That is, despite being blatantly discriminatory, the 
Chieftainship Act was upheld and not tested against international human rights 
standards against discrimination. In the context of this research, it can be opined that 
the Court erred because it did not take into account the fact that non-discrimination 
on the basis of sex is an established principle of customary international law which 
binds all states even in the absence of ratification of an international human rights 
instrument, which outlaws discrimination.778 
  
Prior to the BNP and Masupha cases, the High Court of Lesotho, in the cases of 
Sello v Commissioner of Police and others,779 and Law Society of Lesotho v Right 
Honourable Prime Minister,780 had approached human rights cases in a more 
international law-friendly manner. The case of Sello v Commissioner of Police and 
others was an application of habeas corpus of a woman who was detained under the 
Internal Security Act (General) 1984 for over twenty days without access to any 
visitors. The Court held that while there is a law, the Internal Security Act, which 
authorised such an arrest, that law should be interpreted bearing in mind the rights of 
                                                          
777 Masupha (note 777 above) para 28. 
778 JP Humphrey ‘The implementation of international human rights law’ (1978-1979) 24 NY Law 
School Law Review 31.  
779 Sello v Commissioner of Police and others CIV/APN/10/1980 (High Court of Lesotho) unreported 
22 February 1980. 
780 Law Society of Lesotho v Right Honourable Prime Minister C of A (CIV) 5 /1985 (Lesotho Court of 
Appeal) unreported 3 September 1985. 
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the individuals and held further that ‘may it also be remembered that this Kingdom is 
a signatory to the Declaration of Human Rights Charter’ (sic).781 That is, the Court 
considered Lesotho’s international human rights obligations as a yardstick against 
which interpretation of the Internal Security Act had to be measured. 
 
The case of Law Society of Lesotho v Right Honourable Prime Minister involved the 
independence of the judiciary in which a former officer of the Attorney General and 
Director of Public Prosecutions had been appointed as an acting judge. 782 The Court 
was called in to interpret the Human Rights Act 1983. In so doing, it relied on the 
European Convention and Universal Declaration and the extent to which they had 
influenced the law in Britain, as well as its territories, including Lesotho.783 Although 
the Court did not rely on the international treaties to interpret provisions of the 
Human Rights Act, it, however, reiterated the role that international law played in 
shaping the national legal framework, including the Human Rights Act. The reminder 
that the Human Rights Act was anchored in international human rights thus reflects 
the Court’s willingness to align its interpretation with what obtains in the realm of 
international law. This approach thus best fits the theory of monism and not dualism. 
 
In the case of DPP v Sole and another,784 the Court had to determine whether the 
right to legal representation as contained in section 12 of the 1993 Constitution could 
be stretched to include the accused person’s right to be represented in a criminal 
trial by a former Director of Public Prosecution who had been involved in the 
investigations leading to the charge on behalf of the state. The Court referred to a 
number of cases from different jurisdiction in the commonwealth, South Africa, the 
European Court on Human Rights, as well as a number of international conventions 
such as the ICCPR, African Charter, European Convention and Inter-American 
Convention. The Court found the dicta of the European Court ‘instructive’.785 It 
considered all arguments and the relevant instruments and ultimately drew 
inspiration from a judgment made by the European Court. That is, although the Court 
                                                          
781 Sello (note 780 above) 17. 
782 Law Society of Lesotho (note 781 above) 2. 
783 Law Society of Lesotho (note 783 above) 19. 
784 DPP v Sole and another [2001] LSHC 63. 
785 Sole (note 785 above) 57. 
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did not hold that Lesotho has obligations under the European Convention, 
jurisprudence of the European Court, which is a part of international law, was applied 
in interpreting a domestic legislation.786 
 
In the case of Lesotho Revenue Authority v Master of the High Court and Others,787 
the Court held that in interpreting the national laws, as well as the Constitution, fair 
balance between the public interest and the rights of the individual has to be 
established.788 The Court borrowed the principle of fair balance from article 1 of the 
European Convention, which had been used by Ackerman JA in the South African 
case of First National Bank and Another v Commissioner of South African Revenue 
Services and others.789 The courts’ international law-friendly approach in this case is 
similar to the one, which was adopted in the case of DPP v Sole above. 
 
A similarly monist approach was adopted in a number of cases, which followed the 
Sole case. In Judicial Officers of Lesotho and another v the Right Honourable Prime 
Minster and another,790 magistrates sought an order declaring Rule 16 of the Judicial 
Commission Rules, as well as the government directive, which assigned magistrate 
courts to District Administrators as unlawful and contrary to the principle of 
separation of powers. The Court held that besides section 118 of the Constitution, 
‘Lesotho is also a party to ICCPR, African Charter and Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which all impose on state parties, the duty to guarantee 
independence of the courts’.791 Similarly, in Moosa and others v Magistrate 
Ntlhakana and others,792 the Court took cognisance of the fact that ‘Lesotho has 
signed the African Union Convention on the African Charter on human and peoples’ 
rights (sic) regarding the rights of citizens’.793 Makhasane v Commissioner of Police 
and others was a trial for damages arising out of unlawful arrest and detention, as 
                                                          
786Law Society of Lesotho (note 775 above) 19. 
787 Lesotho Revenue Authority v Master of the High Court and Others CIV/APN/67/2004, [2004] LSHC 
55. 
788 As above para 90. 
789 First National Bank and Another v Commissioner of South African Revenue Services and others 
2002 (4) SA 768 cited in LRA (note 788 above). 
790 Judicial Officers of Lesotho (JOALE) and another v The Right Honourable Prime Minster and 
another Constitutional Case No.3/2005, [2006] LSHC 150. 
791 As above 17. 
792 Moosa and others v Magistrate Ntlhakana and others CIV/APN/167/2007, [2007] LSHC 83. 
793 As above para 40. 
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well as verbal and physical abuse. 794 In determining the amount for damages, the 
Court took into account the fact that the ‘African Charter protects a number of civil 
and political rights, including the right to dignity’795 and held that such had been 
infringed by the police who unlawfully arrested and detained the complainant.796 
 
Particularly when making reference to the right to freedom from torture, the Court of 
Appeal of Lesotho in the case of Makotoko Lerotholi & Others v Director of Public 
Prosecutions held that: 
 
Even the police are mandated by the law as well the provisions of international laws and 
conventions regarding the rights of suspects to which this country is signatory, to treat 
suspects humanely and in accordance with the law…the suspects are equally entitled to a 
fair, human and just treatment in keeping with domestic and international law.797 
 
In a majority of cases in which the courts were persuaded by the international 
instruments, they were satisfied by the fact that Lesotho has ratified such 
instruments and is therefore bound to act as mandated thereby. They did not raise 
any issues about whether the said instruments had been domesticated or not. The 
courts even went further to rely on other regional instruments, such as the European 
and Inter-American Conventions to which Lesotho is not even a party, for instance 
the Sole and LRA cases.798 In Attorney General v ‘Mopa,799 the Court not only 
compared section 12 of the Constitution with the European Convention, but also 
used cases from the European Court to interpret section 12 of the Lesotho 
Constitution.800  
 
The most celebrated cases in which the courts’ pronouncements on international law 
were very clear are the cases of Molefi Tšepe v IEC and others801 and Fuma v 
                                                          
794 Makhasane v Commissioner of Police and others CIV/T/401/2006, [2011] LSHC 20. 
795 As above, (unnumbered paragraphs and pages). 
796 As above. 
797 Makotoko Lerotholi & Others v DPP CRI/A/23/2007 (Lesotho Court of Appeal) 7 July 2007 
(unreported). 
798 LRA (note 788 above) and Sole (note 785 above). 
799 Attorney General v ‘Mopa (2002) AHRLR 91 (LeCA 2002). 
800 As above para 25 in which the Court referred to Webber v United Kingdom.  
801 Molefi Tšepe v IEC CIV/APN/135/2005, [2005] LSHC 96 (hereinafter Ts’epe). 
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Commander LDF.802 These decisions are not celebrated only because of their 
contribution to the enforcement of the rights of women and people with disabilities 
respectively, but also because of the courts’ bold and extensive interpretation of 
Lesotho’s international obligations as contained in the international human rights 
instruments. In the Tšepe case, the Court was called on to declare the Local 
Government Elections Act 1998 (as amended by an Amendment Act of 2005), which 
reserved one third quota of all Local Government seats for women, discriminatory 
and unconstitutional. The Court held that there was no discrimination in the Act and 
relied on articles 3 and 26 of ICCPR,803 HRC General Comment 18,804 articles 3 and 
4 of the CEDAW,805 article 18(3) and (4) of the African Charter, as well as the SADC 
Declaration on Gender Equality.806 The Court stated that: 
 
If regard be had to Lesotho’s international law obligations, these, if anything, reinforce the 
interpretation of section 18(4) (e) of the Constitution and require equality, which is substantive 
and not merely formal and restitutionary in its reach.807  
 
The Fuma case was an application before the Constitutional Court in which Fuma, a 
soldier of the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF) was retired on medical grounds in terms 
of section 24 of the LDF Act by the medical board having reached a conclusion that 
he is legally blind because of inter alia HIV.808 Fuma contended that the board’s 
decision to retire him was discriminatory on the basis of his HIV status because there 
were still other officers in the army who were visually impaired, but instead of being 
retired, they were given other duties in the institution that befitted their condition. He 
stated that the only factor, which influenced the medical board’s decision to retire 
him, was his HIV status. The Court held that in deciding the case, ‘it primarily takes a 
view that the unreservedly ratified United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities stands not only as an aspirational instrument in the matter, 
but that by default, it technically assumes the effect of municipal law in the 
                                                          
802 Fuma v Commander LDF CONS. Case no. 08/2011 [2013] LSHC 68. 
803 Tšepe (note 802 above) para 17. 
804 As above para 18. 
805 As above para 17. 
806 As above para 21. 
807 As above para 22 
808 Fuma (note 803 above) summary. 
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country’.809 Having considered the relevant provisions of the ICCPR, the Court went 
further to hold that ‘[t]he ICCPR is in this respect, not only inspirational, but it is also 
domestically applicable…’810  
 
Most Anglophone African countries, which had inherited Roman Dutch Law during 
colonisation, have since adopted new constitutions, which reflect the change in 
jurisprudence, which had shifted more and more towards the application of 
international law in domestic courts, so long as such instruments have been ratified.  
For instance, the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court in the case of Mudzuru & 
Another v The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & 2 Others, held 
that by ratifying the CRC and the African Children’s Charter, ‘Zimbabwe expressed 
its commitment to take all appropriate measures, including legislative, to protect and 
enforce the rights of the child as enshrined in the relevant conventions to ensure that 
they are enjoyed in practice’.811 Although Makara J’s approach in the Fuma case 
seems similar to the approach adopted by the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court, the 
difference between these two approaches is that Makara J went on to state that 
ICCPR is applicable ‘to the extent of its consistency with the Constitution and other 
laws of Lesotho’812 (emphasis added). This could be attributed to the fact that the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe contains a provision, which mandates Courts to take 
international law into account, while the Constitution of Lesotho is silent as to the 
place of international law and contains the supremacy clause. 
 
Although the courts’ trend in the above cited case seems to be tilted more towards 
monism than dualism, in cases which followed, the courts adopted an approach that 
combines both approaches. While the courts do not reject reference to international 
human rights instruments, they often couple such instruments with corresponding 
domestic laws. This approach thus illustrates the courts’ reluctance to solely rely on 
international law where there is no corresponding domestic legislation. For instance, 
in cases involving the rights of children, the courts have not flinched from considering 
                                                          
809 As above para 22. 
810 As above para 56. 
811 Mudzuru & Another v The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & 2 Others CCZ 
12/2015 (Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe) 14 January 2015 & 20 January 2016,  27 
812 Fuma (note 803 above) para 56. 
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the CRC and African Children’s Charter where the best interest of the child principle 
is employed. The court’s justification in such instances could be that the Children’s 
Protection and Welfare Act (CPWA) 2011 incorporates the said conventions in the 
following words: 
 
The objects of this Act are to extend, promote and protect the rights of children as defined in 
the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1990 African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other international instruments, protocols, standards 
and rules on the protection and welfare of children to which Lesotho is a signatory.813 
 
In the case of Rex v Malefetsane Mohlomi & Others, the Court, confronted with a 
review of a criminal trial of two accused persons aged sixteen and seventeen year 
old, held that since the accused were children as defined in the CPWA, the trial court 
ought not to have tried them together with the two adults with whom they were 
charged with contravention of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 814 The Court found that 
their rights, as stipulated in the CRC and the African Children’s Charter had been 
violated and ordered that they be tried afresh by a different magistrate who must, in 
the conduct of trial, put in mind the best interest of the child principle as expounded 
in the CRC and the African Children’s Charter.815 
 
A similar approach regarding the applicability of the African Charter and CRC was 
adopted in the cases of Mapetla v Leboela816 and L. v M.,817 which dealt with the 
custody of minor children. In the former case, the Court held specifically that the 
international law principle of best interest of the child is particularly relevant in the 
courts of Lesotho because of section 4 of the Children's Protection and Welfare Act 
2011, which reiterates the said principle. In the latter case, the Court of Appeal held 
that the High Court had erred by ignoring arguments based on the CRC and African 
                                                          
813 Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2011 section 2.  
814 Rex v Malefetsane Mohlomi & Others 14 March 2013 [2013] LSHC 27 paras 1 - 3. 
815 As above para 105. For a discussion of children’s rights under CRC and African Children’s Charter 
see A Skelton ‘The development of a fledgling child rights jurisprudence in Eastern and Southern 
Africa based on international and regional instruments’ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal, 
482. 
816 Leboela v Mapetla C of A (CIV) No. 44/2011 [2012] LSCA 2. 
817 L. v M. 21 C of A (CIV) No.29/2011 [2011] LSCA 29. 
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Children’s Charter as these international instruments are ‘authoritative since Lesotho 
had ratified them in March 1992 and November 1992 respectively’.818  
 
In like manner, Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) are 
applied with ease by both the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court, because 
of section 2 of the Labour Code Order 1992, which provides that: 
 
In cases of ambiguity, provisions of the Code shall be interpreted in such a way as more 
closely conforms with the provisions of conventions adopted by the conference of the ILO and 
of recommendations adopted by it. 
 
3.2.7  Concluding remarks on the place of international law in the legal 
system of Lesotho 
 
Although not conclusive, the foregoing discussion has highlighted the place, which 
international law occupied in the legal system of Lesotho from the time the Basotho 
nation was founded to date. The discussion has highlighted that from its foundation, 
Lesotho relied on international law to solve territorial disputes, which approach best 
fits the theory of monism. However, when Lesotho became a British Protectorate, it 
inherited the British dualist approach to international law by stating in the 
Constitution that the Constitution is the supreme law of Lesotho on the basis of 
which courts of law initially rejected the application of undomesticated international 
law in domestic cases. It can therefore be argued that the current Constitution is one 
of the colonial legacies, which reinforces dualism in Lesotho. However, in other 
cases, especially those adjudicated upon after 1993, the Courts of law became 
friendlier to international law, in particular as regards protection of human rights. In 
these cases, the courts have taken cognisance of the important role, which 
international law plays in domestic law, as well as the role that domestic law plays in 
the implementation of international human rights law. This mutual relationship 
between the two legal systems, therefore, counters observations by authors, such as 
                                                          
818 As above para 5. 
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Torrijo who argue that international law and domestic law ‘are definitely an odd 
couple’.819 
  
Despite some level of ambivalence with regard to the place of international law in the 
legal system of Lesotho, it is prudent to mention that as illustrated in the previous 
chapter, prohibition of torture has attained the status of a peremptory norm of 
international law.820 That is, the international human rights instruments to which 
Lesotho is a party merely codify a principle, which is already accepted in 
international law. In addressing the principles of customary international law and 
their status in a municipal legal system prior to the 1996 Constitution, the South 
African Appellate Division Court in the case of Minister of Interior v Bechler; Beier v 
Minister of the Interior held that where an unincorporated treaty provides evidence of 
a rule of customary international law, it may be applied as a customary rule, but not 
as a treaty.821 That is, Lesotho has international human rights obligations against 
torture, which cannot be discarded merely because the treaties in which they are 
contained have not been domesticated in accordance with the theory of dualism. It is 
on this basis, as well as the principle of performance of treaty obligations in good 
faith as enunciated in the VCLT that Lesotho’s legal and institutional frameworks will 
be benchmarked in the next section, against human rights standards discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
 
3.3  Legal framework against torture in Lesotho  
 
In each of the international human rights instruments discussed in the previous 
chapter, state parties undertake to adopt specific measures aimed at preventing and 
prohibiting torture, prosecuting and punishing its perpetrators and providing effective 
remedies for its victims. Central to states’ obligations in relation to torture is the 
enactment of laws aimed at harmonising domestic laws with states’ international 
human rights standards against torture. The centrality of this measure is illustrated 
by the fact that in almost all the international human rights instruments discussed in 
                                                          
819 XF Torrijo ‘International law and domestic law: Definitely an odd couple’ Revista Jurudica 
Universidad de Puerto Rico (2008) 77, 485. 
820 Dugard (note 132 above); Brierly (note 147 above); Simpson (note 147 above). 
821 Minister of Interior v Bechler; Beier v Minister of the Interior (1948) 3 SA 449. 
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the previous chapter of this thesis, the enactment of laws is stated as the basic 
standard with which states must begin in order for them to fulfil all general and 
specific obligations contained in each instrument. For instance, state parties to the 
African Charter undertake to ‘adopt legislative or other measures’ to give effect to the 
rights, duties and freedoms contained in the Charter’.822 In a similar way, CAT 
mandates state parties to ‘take effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other 
measures to prevent acts of torture’.823  
 
There are different ways through which states implement the obligation to harmonise 
domestic legal frameworks with the international legal frameworks. One such way is 
the analysis of the existing national laws and determining whether they meet the 
state’s international human rights obligations.824 If the result of the analysis is that 
the national legal framework fails to meet certain or all obligations, then the state is 
required to amend or repeal those laws in favour of new laws, which comply with the 
international human rights standards.825 When interpreting what ‘effective legislative 
measures’ in the context of torture entails, the Committee against Torture in its 
General Comment 2 stated that an effective law in this regard is one which takes into 
account the definition of torture in article 1(1) of CAT, which recognises the absolute 
nature of the right to freedom from torture as contained in article 2(2), which 
excludes the defense of superior orders as per article 2(3), which criminalises torture 
as a distinct crime as mandated in article 4(1) and provides appropriate punishment 
in terms of article 4(2) of CAT.826 In concurrence with these standards, the APT has 
published a comprehensive guide, which assists law makers to assess national legal 
frameworks’ compliance with the above criteria.827 In terms of this guide, an anti-
torture legislation complies with the provisions of CAT if it contains the following 
elements or covers the following themes: 
 
 
                                                          
822 African Charter article 1. 
823 CAT article 2(1). 
824 JAE Faria ‘Future directions of legal harmonisation and law reform: Stormy seas or prosperous 
voyage?’ (2009) Uniform Law Review 27.  
825 As above. 
826 Committee against Torture, GC 2 paras 5, 9, 11 & 26. 
827 Association for Prevention of Torture ‘Guide on anti-torture legislation’ March 2014 (APT 
Guidelines). www.apt.ch/content/files_res/anti-torture-guide-en.pdf [accessed 5 April 2017]. 
158 
 
a) Definition of torture; 
b) Modes of liability; 
c) The exclusionary rule; 
d) Jurisdiction; 
e) Complaints, investigations, prosecutions and extraditions; 
f) Amnesties, immunity, statute of limitation; 
g) Non- refoulement; and 
h) Redress.828 
 
Because this guide clearly dissects the elements, which are given in detail in 
General Comment 2, it is used below to analyse Lesotho’s legal framework.  It is 
imperative to note at the outset that there is no law in Lesotho, which focuses 
exclusively on torture, nor is torture proscribed as a criminal offence in the Penal 
Code Act, which is considered later on in this section. Therefore, the legal 
frameworks being analysed in this section consist of the Constitution and other 
subsidiary pieces of legislation, which have some provisions relating to torture. 
  
3.3.1 Constitution of Lesotho 1993 
 
The Constitution is the supreme law in Lesotho.829 It contains a bill of rights in 
chapter two. Section 8(1) thereof provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment’. Subsection (2), however, 
contains the following proviso: 
 
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question authorises the 
infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful in Lesotho before the coming into 
operation of this Constitution. 
 
The Constitution, therefore, guarantees the right to freedom from torture, but 
excludes lawful punishment from being regarded as torture, which exception is also 
contained in article 1(1) of CAT. The Constitution also protects other rights, which 
                                                          
828 As above. 
829 Constitution section 2. 
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are relevant to the prevention of torture. These include the right to life,830 right to 
personal liberty,831 freedom from slavery and forced labour,832 freedom from arbitrary 
search or entry,833 right to fair trial,834 freedom from discrimination,835 right to equality 
before the law and equal protection of the law836 and the right to a remedy when the 
rights contained in the Constitution have been infringed.837 
 
Having listed a number of human rights, from section 4 to section 20, section 21 of 
the Constitution contains circumstances under which human rights and fundamental 
freedoms may be derogated from. It provides that during any time when Lesotho is 
at war or when a state of emergency has been declared in accordance with section 
23, section 6, which provides for the right to personal liberty, section 18 on freedom 
from discrimination and section 19 on the right to equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law may be derogated from. Section 8, which provides for the right 
to freedom from torture, is not listed amongst the rights which may, during a state of 
emergency, be derogated from. The Constitution thus protects freedom from torture 
as a non-derogable right. This is in accordance with article 2(2) of CAT and article 4 
of ICCPR in compliance with states’ obligations under customary international law, 
as well as ICCPR, CAT and the African Charter.838 Therefore, the Constitution 
complies with the international human rights obligation to recognise freedom from 
torture as a non-derogable right. 
 
                                                          
830 Constitution section 5(1) protects the right to life. However, section 5(2) retains the death penalty 
as a lawful punishment in Lesotho. 
831 Constitution section 6. 
832 Constitution section 9. 
833 Constitution section 10.  
834 Constitution section 12. 
835 Constitution section 18; In Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 20 & HRC, GC 31 para 8, the 
Committee against torture and the HRC respectively stated that states’ general obligation to prevent 
torture also includes the duty to protect people who belong to minority and marginalised groups 
because they are vulnerable to being subjected to torture because of their status, such as sex, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, age, ethnicity, etc. Therefore, the non-discrimination provisions in section 
18 of the Constitution comply with this obligation.  
836 Constitution section 19 guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the 
law in compliance with states’ obligations under CAT article 13, which mandates state parties to 
ensure that there are competent authorities to which victims of torture can complain and be impartially 
heard. 
837 Constitution section 22. 
838 ICCPR article 4; CAT article 2(2) & (3); African Charter article 27, all which do not permit 
derogation from the prohibition of torture. 
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Another provision in the Constitution which illustrates that the right to freedom from 
torture is non-derogable is the interpretation and savings clause of the Constitution, 
which provides that: 
 
In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force raised under a law of 
Lesotho, nothing contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force 
shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of this chapter other 
than section 5, 8 and 9.839 
 
The effect of this section is that in as much as the laws governing disciplined forces 
may limit some rights contained in the Constitution, the right to life, freedom from 
torture and freedom from slavery may not be limited or be deviated from. This 
interpretation was confirmed by the High Court in the case of Jobo and others v 
Lesotho Defense Force in which the Court held that regardless of the offences with 
which one is charged, he has a right not to be subjected to torture.840  
 
Equally relevant to states’ obligation against torture is the obligation to provide 
redress to victims of human rights violations.841 In this regard, section 22 of the 
Constitution provides that: 
 
(1) If any person alleges that any of the provisions of sections 4 to 21 (inclusive) of this 
Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him (or, in the 
case of a person who is detained, if any other person alleges such a contravention in 
relation to the person), then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the 
same matter, which is lawfully available, that persons (or that other person) may apply to 
the High Court for redress. 
 
Section 22 therefore complies with article 14 of CAT and article 2(3) of ICCPR, which 
mandate that where there has been a human rights violation, the victim must be 
availed avenues to complain and such a claim must be adjudicated upon by a 
                                                          
839 Constitution section 24(3). 
840 Jobo and others v Lesotho Defence Force CIV/APNS/189/194/198/199/203/2015, 17 June 2015 
[2015] LSHC 25 para 27. 
841 ICCPR article 2(3); HRC, GC 31 para 8 interpreted states’ obligations under ICCR article 7 to 
include obligation to provide effective remedy; Kouider Kerrouche v Algeria (note 261 above) para 10, 
Zhakhangir Barazov v Kyrgyzstan (note 272 above), Urmatbek Akunov v Kyrgyzstan (note 272 above) 
para 10; Manojkumar Samathanam v Sri Lanka (note 270 above) para 10; CAT article 14; Committee 
against Torture, GC 3 para 2.  
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competent and impartial court or tribunal. However, competence and impartiality of 
the judiciary to handle cases of torture is limited to hearing of civil claims for 
damages because of the absence of an anti-torture law in Lesotho. 
 
Although the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom from torture as a non-
derogable right and also sets up a mechanism for the vindication of this right where it 
has been violated in compliance with Lesotho’s international human rights 
obligations, two big challenges remain: firstly, the Constitution does not define 
torture, 842 and secondly, it does not criminalise torture as a distinct crime nor contain 
any provisions from which it may be inferred that torture is a crime. Victims of torture 
may therefore approach the High Court for a civil remedy, but will not be availed the 
opportunity of the perpetrators being charged with the criminal offence of torture as 
the Constitution does not contain such a criminal offence.. In other jurisdictions, this 
hurdle is tackled by backing up constitutional provisions with laws, which criminalise 
violation of the rights contained in the Constitution.843 However, as will be illustrated 
below, the Penal Code of Lesotho also fails to criminalise torture and therefore 
leaves a lacuna as far as the obligation to criminalise torture is concerned. The HRC 
has emphasised that over and above the affirmation of the right to freedom from 
torture as the Constitution does, the state has a further obligation to proscribe acts of 
torture through criminal law.844 This lacuna therefore indicates Lesotho’s failure to 
comply with one of the key international human rights obligations to prohibit torture 
through criminal law. In its General Comment on the implementation of article 2 by 
state parties, the Committee against Torture has stated that: 
 
By defining torture as distinct from assault or other common law crimes, states parties will 
promote CAT by highlighting the gravity of the offence, (b) strengthen the deterrent effect of the 
prohibition, (c) enhance tracking of the specific crime of torture and thereby assist state parties 
to bring national law into full conformity with CAT. 
 
                                                          
842 Constitution section 8 guarantees the right to freedom from torture, but does not define it. 
843 For instance, section 12 of the Constitution of South Africa protects the right to freedom from 
torture. The constitutional provision is backed up by the Prevention and Combating of Torture of 
Persons Act 2013 which criminalises torture as a discrete crime. See JD Mujuzi ‘Prosecuting and 
punishing torture in South Africa as a discrete crime and as a crime against humanity’ (2015) 23 (2) 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 339.  
844 HRC, GC 31 para 8. 
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By failing to define and criminalise torture, the legal framework of Lesotho fails to 
comply with key obligations to prevent and prohibit torture and thereby fails to 
promote CAT and other international human rights instruments which contain 
standards against torture. In the next section, it will be considered whether the other 
laws subsidiary to the Constitution have similar challenges or limitations as the 
Constitution. 
 
3.3.2 Subsidiary legislation on torture 
 
As alluded to earlier, there is no specific anti-torture law in Lesotho. The absence of 
anti-torture legislation at the domestic level is catastrophic in that it creates space for 
impunity and where perpetrators are brought before courts of law, they are 
prosecuted for lesser offences, such as assault and the sentences imposed do not 
highlight the gravity of the offence of torture.845 In its General Comment on the 
implementation of article 2 by state parties, the Committee against Torture has 
stated that the absence of a definition of torture, which is absent in the legal system 
of Lesotho, creates actual or potential loopholes for impunity.846 Because of the 
absence of an anti-torture law in Lesotho, the fragmented pieces of legislation, which 
have provisions with a bearing on Lesotho’s obligations against torture, will be 
analysed in the next section. These laws include the Aliens Control Act, Refugee 
Act, Fugitive Offenders Act, Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 1981, Penal Code 
Act 2010, Education Act 2010 and Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2011.  
Relevant provisions of these laws are discussed in detail below. 
 
3.3.2.1 Aliens Control Act 1966 
 
As indicated above, one of the characteristics of an effective anti-torture legal 
framework is that there must be a provision on non-refoulement.847 Non- refoulement 
is an obligation in terms of which state parties are prohibited from expelling, returning 
                                                          
845 Committee against Torture, GG 2 paras 10 & 11. 
846 Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 10. 
847 Committee against Torture, GC 1; APT Guidelines (note 828 above) 47; J Niyizurugero & P 
Lessene Robben Island Guidelines of the prohibition and prevention of torture in Africa: Practical 
guide for implementation (2008) 31, who argue that states also have an obligation to ensure that 
extradition treaties with other countries must also comply with international obligations including non-
refoulement. 
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or extraditing a person to another country in which there are substantial grounds to 
believe that such a person’s life is at risk or he would be subjected to torture.848  
 
Expulsion of foreign nationals from Lesotho is regulated by the Aliens Control Act 
1966,849 which deals with entry, registration and departure of aliens who seek 
temporary and permanent sojourn in Lesotho. It also regulates the expulsion of 
aliens who unlawfully enter the territory of Lesotho.850 In terms of the Aliens Control 
Act, an alien is ‘a person who is not a citizen of Lesotho’.851  An alien may be 
expelled if he or she has been lawfully refused to enter or land in Lesotho.852 Such 
expulsion is effected through an order by the Minister.853 This Act fails to comply with 
Lesotho’s non-refoulement obligations with regard to two aspects: one, vesting the 
prerogative of expulsion solely in the Minister is subject to abuse and is not 
compliant with the states’ obligations under ICCPR and CAT;854 two, in terms of 
section 28, the process of expulsion may involve arrest and detention in police 
custody or in prison.855 That is, the alien subject to return is detained with people 
suspected of committing criminal offences. This contravenes Lesotho’s obligations 
under the CMW as the Committee on Migrant Workers has stated that illegal 
migration is an administrative offence and not a criminal offence and therefore 
detention must be a measure of last resort and must not be unlimited or of excessive 
length.856 Because this provision does not express conditions under which an alien 
may be placed under police custody while his return is being considered, it may also 
be abused for reasons based on discrimination. The detention itself may amount to 
torture where it results in severe physical or psychological pain and suffering on the 
part of the detainee and is done on grounds of discrimination by police and 
                                                          
848 UN Refugee Convention article 32; CAT article 3; UNHRC, Advisory opinion (note 230 above). 
849 Aliens Control Act No.16 of 1966. See also Joe Molefi v Legal Advisor & Others (note 719 above). 
850 Aliens Control Act section 25.  
851 Aliens Control Act section 2(1). 
852 Aliens Control Act section 4. 
853 Aliens Control Act section 25.  
854 The Alien’s Control Act does not provide for the right to challenge the decision to expel an alien 
while ICCPR article 13 and UN Refugee Convention article 33 (2) provide that protection from 
refoulement will cease only where there are compelling reasons of national security; OHCHR 
‘Expulsion of aliens in international human rights law’ OHCHR Discussion Paper, Geneva (September 
2006) 10. 
855 Aliens Control Act sections 25(1) & 28(1). 
856 CMW, GC 2 paras 27 & 38; CRC article 37(b) which provides against detention of children; 
OHCHR ‘Administrative detention of migrants’ OHCHR Discussion Paper 5 
http://www2.ohchr.org/English/issues/migration/taskforce/disc-paper.html [accessed 6 April 2017]. 
164 
 
immigration officials. The Committee on Protection of Migrant Workers has raised its 
concern about the detention of migrant workers in its concluding observations when 
considering Lesotho’s initial state party report.857  
  
The only safeguard against torture during arrest and period of detention, which can 
be inferred from the Aliens Control Act, is contained in section 28(2), which provides 
that ‘an alien detained in accordance with the provisions of this section must be in 
lawful custody’. It is presumed that by lawful custody, the section refers to custody in 
which all laws, including protection of human rights are adhered to. However, when 
dealing with the expulsion of migrant workers in an irregular situation, the Committee 
on Migrant Workers in its General Comment stated that states must refrain from 
administrative detention and where it is indispensable, it must   be a last resort.858 
Therefore, by authorising the arrest and detention of aliens, the Act increases the 
risk of such aliens being subjected to torture. The other shortfall is that the Act does 
not provide measures to safeguard the detainees against torture while in detention. 
The Committee against Torture has laid down some measures, which states may put 
in place to prevent torture. These include the maintenance of official registers, 
informing detainees of their rights such as the rights to legal representation and 
affording them independent medical assistance.859 The Aliens Control Act does not 
contain any of these guarantees and is, therefore, inconsistent with international 
human rights standards against torture. The inadequacy of the Aliens Control Act 
was conceded in the Lesotho’s initial report to the CMW Committee in which it is 
stated that ‘[t] he Aliens Control Act, 1966 is outdated and does not take into 
consideration the new developments in international law’.860 
 
Another shortfall of the Aliens Control Act is that it is silent on Lesotho’s obligations 
in cases where expulsion of an alien is likely to expose the expelled person to torture 
in the country to which he is returned. This is thus inconsistent with Lesotho’s non-
refoulement obligations under article 7 of ICCPR and article 3(1) of CAT. In contrast 
                                                          
857 CMW, Concluding observations on the initial report of Lesotho 23 May 2016 UN Doc 
CMW/C/LSO/CO/1 paras 29 & 30. 
858 CMW, GC 2 para 26. 
859 Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 13. 
860 Lesotho’s initial report to CMW para 37. 
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with the Aliens Control Act, the South African Prevention and Combating of Torture 
of Persons Act, expressly prohibits the extradition, expulsion or return of a person to 
a country ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture’.861 This shortfall could thus be rectified by 
enactment of an anti-torture law and inclusion of non-refoulement provisions as 
recommended in the APT Guideline.862 
 
The Aliens Control Act, however, does not apply to refugees. Persons who qualify as 
refugees in terms of any international treaty or convention to which Lesotho is a 
party shall not be refused entry into or sojourn in Lesotho, and shall not be expelled 
from Lesotho.863 Such persons are dealt with under the Refugee Act, which is 
considered in detail below.  
 
3.3.2.2  Refugee Act 1983 
 
As illustrated above, refugees are exempted from the application of the Aliens 
Control Act. Their registration, rights and expulsion are governed by the Refugee Act 
of 1983. This Act defines a refugee in the following terms: 
 
(1) subject to subsection (2), a refugee is any person who, 
(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
(i) is outside the country of his nationality is unable or owing to such fear is unwilling to avail 
himself protection of that country or 
(ii) not having a nationality, and being outside the country of his former residence, is unable or 
owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it, or 
(b) … 
(c) belongs to a class of persons declared by the Minister to be refugees for purposes set out in 
paragraphs (a) or (b). 
 
                                                          
861 Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act 2013 section 8(1). For a full discussion of the 
South African Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act, see Mujuzi (note 844 above) 339.  
862 APT Guidelines (note 828 above) 47. 
863 Aliens Control Act section 38 (1). 
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Section 11 of the Refugee Act contains Lesotho’s non-refoulement obligations. It 
provides that a person shall not be rejected at any Lesotho frontier or be expelled or 
otherwise compelled to return to or remain in a country: 
 
(a) where he seeks to leave or has left or outside of which he finds himself, for any of the 
reasons mentioned in section 3(1)(a) or (b) or 
(b) where he may be tried or punished for offences of a political nature. 
 
The effect of this section is that Lesotho undertakes to protect from expulsion any 
person who faces the risk of persecution in his or her country of nationality or 
residence on the grounds of discrimination based on religion, political opinion, social 
class or others. However, the Act does not list the risk of torture as a ground on the 
basis of which the non-refoulement obligation may be invoked. This is inconsistent 
with Lesotho’s obligation under customary international law and treaty law,864 in that 
a person subject to being returned cannot invoke the Refugee Act on the grounds 
that he or she faces real, personal and present risk of being subjected to torture in 
the country to which he or she is being returned because it is not contained in the 
Refugee Act.  
 
3.3.2.3 Extradition laws 
 
As far as extradition is concerned, it is important to indicate at the outset that there is 
no law in Lesotho, which focuses exclusively on extradition. However, Lesotho has 
entered into several bilateral extradition treaties with other countries, such as South 
Africa and China. It is also a state party to the SADC Protocol on Extradition865 and 
SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.866 The bilateral 
treaties, as well as the SADC Protocol are used for purposes of requesting and 
determining other countries’ requests for extradition. These treaties contain offences 
for which the parties shall be requested to extradite the suspects or convicted 
offenders, as well as the procedures for both the request and extradition. With regard 
                                                          
864 Non-refoulement is a norm of customary international law, derogation from which is not permitted. It 
is also a binding obligation under the UN Refugee Convention article 33, OAU Refugee Convention 
article 2(3), ICCPR article 7 & CAT article 3; UNHCR Advisory opinion (note 232 above); HRC, GC 31; 
Committee against Torture, GC 1. 
865 SADC Protocol on Extradition 2002. 
866 SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 2002. 
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to extraditable offences, the SADC Protocol provides that ‘…extraditable offences 
are offences that are punishable under the laws of both States Parties by 
imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for a period of at least one year’.867  
 
The challenge with the implementation of this provision against suspects of torture in 
Lesotho is that the law does not criminalise torture as a distinct crime and therefore 
does not prescribe penalties for its commission. Therefore, such suspects may only 
be extradited if charged with other offences, such as assault or assault GBH, a state 
highly discouraged by the Committee against Torture as it does not illuminate the 
gravity of the offence of torture.868 Extradition for torture may also not be possible if 
another country, such as South Africa requests extradition of a suspect of torture 
because although torture is an offence under South African law, it is not a distinct 
offence in Lesotho and the Protocol requires an extraditable offence to be an offence 
in both jurisdictions. Therefore, Lesotho’s failure to criminalise torture as a distinct 
crime is also failure to implement the obligation to recognise torture as an 
extraditable offence.869 The Protocol on Extradition allows for the refusal of 
extradition if ‘the person whose extradition is requested has been, or would be 
subjected to torture in the requesting state’.870  
 
3.3.2.4 Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 
 
Where no extradition treaty exists, extradition is dealt with under the Fugitive 
Offenders Act of 1967. The Act provides that:  
 
a person found in Lesotho who is accused of a relevant offence in any other country to which 
this section applies, or who is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction of such an 
                                                          
867 SADC Protocol on Extradition article 3. 
868 See Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 11 in which the Committee stated that naming and 
defining the crime of torture will ‘enhance the ability of responsible officers to track the specific crime of 
torture’. 
869 Belgium v Senegal (note 187 above) paras 120 & 121 in which the ICJ held that by failing to 
comply with its obligations under articles 6 and 7 of CAT, Senegal had engaged its international 
responsibility. It was then ordered to prosecute the Chadian President Hessen Hibre, failing which to 
extradite him. 
870 SADC Protocol on Extradition article 4(f). 
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offence in such a country, may be arrested and returned to that country as provided by this 
Act.871  
 
Restrictions on the return of a person under the Fugitive Offenders Act are contained 
in section 6. Amongst other restrictions, the Act provides that a person shall not be 
returned to the requesting country if it appears to the Minister or to the Court that:  
 
(b) the request for his return (though purporting to be made on account of a relevant offence) 
is in fact made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, 
religion, nationality or political opinion;  
(c) that he might, if returned, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his 
personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.872  
 
The Act does not expressly list exposure to torture as one of the restrictions to the 
return of an alleged offender to the other country. However, such can be inferred 
from the above section, which provides that Lesotho shall be restrained if there is a 
possibility that the returned person shall be subjected to prosecution, punishment or 
detention based purely on prohibited grounds of discrimination. As discussed in 
chapter one, the CAT definition of torture categorises infliction of severe harm or 
suffering on the basis of discrimination as torture.873 Therefore, section 6 of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, to a large degree, complies with Lesotho’s non–refoulement 
obligations where a returnee is likely to suffer torture in the form of persecution 
based on discrimination. This is in conformity with article 31 of UN Refugee 
Convention, article 2(3) of OAU Refugee Convention and article 3 of CAT. The Act 
also gives the Minister the discretion not to make an order for the return of a person 
to the requesting country if such person is accused or convicted of a relevant offence 
not punishable with death in Lesotho if that person could be or has been sentenced 
to death for that offence in the country requesting his return. 
 
A shortcoming in the Act is that it does not lay down procedures for the 
determination of whether the return would expose a returnee to torture. In General 
Comment 3, the Committee against Torture laid down some criteria which may be 
                                                          
871 Fugitive Offenders Act No. 38 of 1967, section 3(1). 
872 Fugitive Offenders Act section 6(1). 
873 CAT article 1(1). 
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used to determine whether the return of a person to another country would expose 
him to torture or not.874 The criteria includes, but is not limited to the examination of 
the human rights situation in the country, which requests the return, whether the 
returnee has been subjected to torture before and whether he has participated in 
political activities, which expose him to the risk of prosecution or punishment based 
on discrimination on the grounds of political opinion.875 The Fugitive Offenders Act, 
on the other hand, leaves the decision of whether or not to return, in the hands of the 
Minister, without guarantees to ensure that the Minister applies the discretion within 
the scope of Lesotho’s standards against torture. 
 
3.3.2.5 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 1981   
 
The APT Guidelines on an anti-torture law state that a human rights compliant anti-
torture law must have a provision, which contains an exclusionary rule. This element 
is by itself a torture prevention mechanism contained in article 15 of CAT.876 The 
HRC has also interpreted states’ obligations under article 7 of ICPR to include the 
obligation to exclude evidence, which has been obtained through torture from 
criminal proceedings.877 In the African context, Robben Island Guideline 29 lists the 
exclusion of evidence obtained through torture as one of torture prevention 
measures compliant with articles 1 and 5 of the African Charter. 
 
Although there is no law, which criminalises torture in Lesotho, the legal system 
complies with this aspect of the obligation to prevent torture in that section 228 of the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (CP&E) 1981 rejects the use of evidence that 
was obtained through the use of torture in judicial proceedings. It provides that: 
 
                                                          
874 Committee against Torture, GC 3 para 8. 
875As above; see also; Paez v Sweden (note 361 above) in which the Committee against Torture held 
that although Sweden attempted to deport the author due to his involvement in criminal activities, 
Swedish authorities had failed to consider that prior to seeking asylum in Sweden, Paez was involved 
in political activity and also came from a family of political activists, which exposed him to risk of torture 
if returned to Peru. 
876 CAT article 15 provides that ‘each state party shall ensure that any statement, which is established 
to have been made as a result of torture, shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except 
against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made’. 
877 Sahadeo v Guyana (note 257 above) para 9.3 and Zhakhangir Bazarov v Kyrgyzstan (note 258 
above) para 6.4. 
170 
 
(1) Any confession of the commission of any offence shall, if such confession is proved by 
competent evidence to have been made by any person accused of such offence (whether 
before or after his apprehension and whether on a judicial examination or after commitment 
and whether reduced into writing or not), be admissible in evidence against such person 
provided the confession is proved to have been freely and voluntarily made by such person in 
his sound and sober senses and without having been unduly influenced thereto. 
 
(2) If a confession is shown to have been made to a policeman, it shall not be admissible in 
evidence under this section unless it is confirmed and reduced to writing in the presence of a 
magistrate. 
 
This section was interpreted by the Lesotho Court of Appeal in the case of Mabope 
and Others v Rex.878 In this case, the Court held that a pointing out, done 
consequent to torture of the person who makes it, is not free and voluntary and 
therefore inadmissible as evidence to prove commission of a criminal offence.879 
Section 228 thus fully complies with Lesotho’s obligations under CAT,880 ICCPR and 
African Charter.881 However, when discussing section 218 of the Namibian Criminal 
Procedure Act, which is similar to Lesotho’s section 228, Mujuzi argues that it is not 
enough for this exclusion to be contained in a subsidiary legislation and not in the Bill 
of Rights as a protected right from which there cannot be a derogation.882 Mujuzi’s 
concern was raised by the court’s view in the case of S v Minnies and another, in 
which the Court held that it had discretion whether or not to admit such evidence.883 
While section 228 complies with Lesotho’s human rights obligation, its inclusion in 
the Constitution as part of the right to a fair trial in section 12 of the Constitution or as 
a stand-alone right, would provide a stronger guarantee for prevention of torture. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
878 Malefetsane Phala Mabope and Others v Rex 1993/1994 Lesotho Law Reports 154. 
879 As above. 
880 CAT article 15; Robben Island Guideline 29; Mujuzi (note 404 above). 
881 The obligation to exclude torture-induced evidence in criminal proceedings was elaborated upon in 
the Robben Island Guidelines as one of states’ obligations under article 5 of CAT. 
882 Mujuzi (note 404 above) 412. 
883 S v Minnies and another 1990 NR 177 (HC). 
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3.3.2.6 Education Act 2010 
 
Section 4 of the Education Act provides that ‘a learner shall not be subjected to 
cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment’.884 Although section 4 does not mention 
torture, inclusion of torture in the prohibition may be inferred from the statement to 
the reasons and objects of the Education Act, which states that: 
 
The Bill abolishes corporal punishment at schools in accordance with section 8 of the 
Constitution which provides that a person shall not be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading punishment.885 
 
By abolishing corporal punishment, the Education Act implements Lesotho’s 
international obligations against torture of children in accordance with section 8 of 
the Constitution, as well as Lesotho’s human rights obligations under article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration, article 7 of ICCPR, Article 2 of CAT and article 19 of CRC, all 
of which mandate state parties to adopt legislative measures to prevent torture.886 It 
also responds to the concern of the Committee on the Rights of the Child which it 
had raised with regard to the practice of corporal punishment in Lesotho.887 
However, the Act has shortcomings similar to those in the Constitution in that it 
neither defines corporal punishment nor makes a list of acts, which constitute 
corporal punishment.888 A definition of corporal punishment would enable analysis as 
to whether the Education Act covers acts of torture or CIDT. The second shortfall is 
that it does not criminalise corporal punishment and is silent as to the remedies, 
which a learner who has been subjected to corporal punishment, can pursue. The 
importance of the provision of reparation to victims of torture as an essential 
component of the obligation to prohibit torture has been emphasised by all the 
                                                          
884 Education Act 2010 Section 4(4). 
885 Government Notice No. 18 of 2010 The Parliament of Lesotho Statement of Objects and Reasons 
of the Education Act, 2010 section 5. 
886 CRC, GC 8 para 18; HRC, GC 20 para 5; Report of the Committee against Torture, (1995), UN Doc 
A/50/44 para 169. 
887 CRC Committe, Concluding observations on the initial report of Lesotho 21 February 2001 UN Doc 
CRC/C/15/Add.147 para 31. 
888GW Holden ‘Perspectives on the effects of corporal punishment: Comment on Gershoff (2002)’ 
(2002) 128 (4) Psychological Bulletin 590. 
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international human rights instruments discussed in chapter 2.889 Failure to 
criminalise corporal punishment and to provide remedies available is thus 
inconsistent with Lesotho’s obligations under CAT and CRC.890 These shortfalls 
could be rectified by the enactment of an anti-torture law, which defines torture and 
CIDT and also prescribes punishments against perpetrators and remedies for 
victims. 
 
3.3.2.7  Penal Code Act 2010 
 
The Penal Code does not prohibit torture as a distinct crime.891 As a result of this 
omission, acts, which amount to torture, are absorbed into other criminal offences, 
such as assault,892 aggravated assault,893 murder,894 culpable homicide,895 indecent 
assault,896 and unlawful sexual acts.897 This is inconsistent with Lesotho’s obligations 
under articles 1, 2 and 4 of CAT. When interpreting states’ obligations under these 
articles, the Committee against Torture has raised its concern that failure to 
criminalise torture as a distinct crime from assault creates loopholes for impunity.898 
It has also criticised the approach of charging perpetrators of torture with other 
offences other than torture as being inconsistent with the obligation to take legislative 
measures against torture.899 It stated that this approach fails to highlight the gravity 
of the offence of torture and consequently perpetrators do not get the appropriate 
punishment and the victims are not availed the redress, which they deserve.900 
                                                          
889 Lopez Burgoz v Uruguay (note 281 above), Kennedy v Trinidad & Tobago (note 282 above), Evans 
v Trinidad & Tobago (note 282 above), Roy Manojkumar Samathanam v Sri Lanka (note 270 above); 
CAT article 14; Committee against Torture, GC 3 para 2; Addulrahman v Burundi (note 378 above); 
CRC, GC 5 para 24; CWM, GC 2 para 21; Mtikila & Others v Tanzania (note 515 above). 
890 CRC GC 8 paras 31 & 31. 
891 Penal Code Act section 94 lists torture as one of the offences, which constitutes crimes against 
humanity, and section 95 lists torture as a war crime. 
892 Penal Code Act section 30. 
893 Penal Code Act section 31. 
894 Penal Code Act, sections 40 - 42. 
895 Penal Code Act, section 38. 
896 Penal Code Act, section 51. 
897 Penal Code Act, section 52; Sexual Offences Act section 3, which criminalises all sexual acts that 
take place under coercive circumstances. 
898 Committee against Torture, GC 2 paras 10 & 11. 
899 As above. 
900 As above.  
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Furthermore, this approach makes it difficult for the state to track, report upon and 
respond effectively to the incidences of torture.901  
 
Lesotho ratified CAT, but so far has not submitted a state party report outlining 
measure it has taken to implement its obligations under CAT. The failure to submit 
state party reports may be attributed to the fact that torture is not proscribed as a 
distinct crime, therefore tracking its prevalence is difficult because the criminal 
statistical data shows other offences and not torture. As a result of the failure to 
submit the initial state party report on the implementation of CAT, Lesotho has not 
reviewed its laws, including the Penal Code. The state reporting process as well as 
the concluding observations could have been beneficial and could have created 
room for the review of the existing legal framework, its harmonisation with standards 
contained in CAT and thereby responding to the challenge of torture in Lesotho. 
 
According to General Comment 2 of the Committee against Torture, criminalisation 
of torture is central to fulfilling the obligation to prohibit it.902 Hence, after CAT 
entered into force and following lobbying of anti-torture organisations, such as the 
APT, a number of countries altered their national legal frameworks to include 
criminalisation of torture as a distinct crime. These countries include Uganda and 
South Africa.903 Some countries, such as the Maldives and Philippines, have even 
gone as far as specifically stating in their laws that ‘torture shall be considered a 
separate criminal offence,’904 and that ‘torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not 
be absorbed by any other crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a 
means in the conduct or commission thereof’.905  
 
                                                          
901 Redress ‘Legal frameworks to prevent torture in Africa: Best practices, shortcomings and options 
for going forward’ (March 2016) 10 www.redress.org/downloads/publications/1603anti-torture-
legislative-frameworks-in-africa.pdf [Accessed 18 February 2017]. 
902 CAT Committee, GC 2 para 8. 
903 Ugandan Prevention and prohibiting of torture Act, 2012 and South African Prevention of 
combating and torture of persons Act, 2013. 
904 Maldives, Act on the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture 2013, Law 13/2013 (23 December 
2013), Law 13/2013, article 11 http://mvlaw.gov.mv/pdf/ganoon/chapterVIII/13-2013.pdf [accessed 3 
May 2016]. 
905 Philippines’ Anti-Torture Act of 2009, Republic Act N°9745 (10 November 2009), section 15 
http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_14/RA09745.pdf [accessed 3 May  2016]. 
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While anti-torture legislation is not in itself the sole barometer used to measure 
states’ compliance with the obligation to prevent torture, the absence of such 
prohibits a state from implementing other substantive and procedural aspects of the 
obligations to prevent and prohibit torture, to punish its perpetrators and to provide 
redress to its victims. In the context of Lesotho, the Constitution, Children’s 
Protection and Welfare Act, and Education Act reiterate the inherent right of all 
people to freedom from torture, but do not make the commission of torture a criminal 
offence. These pieces of legislation are also silent as to what constitutes torture. 
Therefore, non-incorporation of the definition of torture in any of these pieces of 
legislation weakens the state’s ability to prevent it. 
 
Over and above the requirement for the criminalisation of the direct commission or 
perpetration of torture, articles 1 and 4 of CAT also require state parties to 
criminalise and hold people who get involved in torture through other means 
accountable. Article 1 makes it an offence for a person acting in an official capacity 
to instigate or incite torture, as well as to consent to or be acquiescence to its 
commission. Article 4 further requires anti-torture legislation to impose criminal 
liability on those who attempt to commit torture or participate through complicity or 
any other form. The requirement for anti-torture legislation to cover modes of liability 
beyond the direct commission of torture has been confirmed by the Committee 
against Torture in its General Comment 2 in which it stated that: 
 
States are obliged to prevent public authorities and other persons acting in an official capacity 
from directly committing, instigating, inciting, encouraging, acquiescing in or otherwise 
participating or being complicit in act of torture as defined in the Convention.906  
 
The need for these modes of liability to be reflected in the national anti-torture 
legislation was emphasised by the Committee against Torture in its Concluding 
Observations on Gabon and Morocco.907 In these concluding observations, the 
Committee stated that state parties have an obligation to make necessary 
                                                          
906 Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 17. 
907Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on Morocco’s initial report 21 December 2011, 
UN Doc CAT/C/MAR/CO/4; Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on Gabon 17 
January 2013 UN Doc CAT/C/GAB/CO/1. 
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modifications to explicitly criminalise attempts to commit torture and acts constituting 
complicity or participation in torture and to define them as torture.908 The sad 
consequence of Lesotho’s failure to criminalise torture and all its modes of liability is 
that even the obligation to prescribe ‘appropriate penalties’ on those convicted of 
torture is also compromised as the Penal Code Act does not contain any 
punishments for the crime of torture. 
 
It is important to note that the failure of the Penal Code Act to proscribe torture has 
also left sexual violence, which meets the requirements of CAT (sexual torture) in the 
purview of the Sexual Offences Act. The Sexual Offences Act prohibits sexual 
offences generally and does not specifically focus on sexual offences in which those 
in an official capacity take advantage of their position and commit sexual offences 
against victims subject to their control or under their detention for purposes 
prohibited under article 1.909 Criminalising sexual torture in the same manner as 
other sexual offences fails to take into account the gravity of sexual torture and also 
fails to prescribe penalties that are appropriate for the offence of torture. Attah raised 
similar concerns when analysing the omission of rape and sexual offences in the 
Nigerian’s anti-terrorism law, arguing that rape and sexual violence by Boko Haram 
in northern Nigeria amounts to torture and terrorism.910 
 
3.3.2.8 Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2011  
 
The Children’s Protection and Welfare Act (CPWA) protects the right of children not 
to be subjected to torture. It provides that: 
 
(a) A child has a right to be protected from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, including any cultural practice, which degrades or is injurious 
to the physical, psychological, emotional and mental well-being of the child. 
                                                          
908 Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on Morocco’s initial report (note 908 above) 
para 5. See also Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on Gabon (note 908 above) 
para 8. 
909 Sexual Offences Act section 3. 
910 Attah (note 575 above). 
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(b) A child shall be chastised in accordance with his age, physical, psychological, emotional 
and mental condition and no discipline is justifiable if by reason of tender age or 
otherwise the child is incapable of understanding the purpose of the discipline.911  
 
Similar to the Constitution and Education Act, the CPWA protects children’s right to 
freedom from torture, but does not define torture nor distinguish it from other CIDT. It 
also does not criminalise torture or contain any provisions with regard to the redress 
of children who are victims of torture. It does not contain any specific measures, 
which the government would put in place in order to prevent torture of children. The 
African Commission in the case of Equality Now and Ethiopian Women Lawyers 
Association v Ethiopia held that in addition to prosecution, the state had an obligation 
to adopt preventive measures.912 In its General Comment on states’ obligations 
under article 2 of CAT, which mandates state parties to adopt legislative measures to 
prevent torture, the Committee against Torture has emphasised that the obligations 
under article 2 include protection of groups of people who are marginalised or 
discriminated against on various grounds, including age. Therefore, in the absence 
of anti-torture legislation in Lesotho, the protection of children under the CPWA could 
have been broader and encompassed standards against the torture of children as 
contained in ICCPR, CAT, African Charter, CRC and African Children’s Charter.  
  
3.3.2.9 Anti-trafficking in Persons Act 2011 
 
The Anti-trafficking in Persons Act (Anti-trafficking Act) was enacted with the 
objective of curbing the high rate of women, girls and sometimes men who are 
trafficked into South Africa under the pretence of employment in the domestic, 
farming and mining industries, only to be forced into servitude, sexual exploitation, 
drug smuggling and prostitution.913 The Act is relevant for purposes of implementing 
Lesotho’s obligations against torture because trafficking, which meets the 
                                                          
911 Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2011 section 16. 
912 Equality Now and Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association v Ethiopia Communication 341/2007 
African Commission), November 2015. In this communication the Commission held that rape is a 
serious violation of the victim’s human rights and the state’s failure to protect her through legislative 
measures amounts to violation of articles 1 and 5 of the African Charter. 
913 United States Department of State, Trafficking in persons report (2011) 
http://refworld.org/docid/4e12ee6837.html [accessed 7 April 2017]. 
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requirements of article 1 of CAT, amounts to torture, while some forms of trafficking 
may amount to CIDT.914  
 
The Anti-trafficking Act contains provisions aimed at preventing and prohibiting 
torture by trafficking, punishing its perpetrators and providing redress and support to 
its victims. With regard to prevention, it provides for the launching of public 
awareness campaigns, which aim at educating people about human trafficking, 
about how traffickers operate and also that it is a criminal offence.915 The obligation 
to prohibit torture is implemented through criminalising the offence of trafficking,916 
acts, which promote or facilitate trafficking,917 smuggling of persons,918 as well as 
engaging in services of a victim of trafficking.919 Most importantly, section 7(d) of the 
Act provides that when these acts are committed by a public figure or officer, they do 
not only amount to the offence of trafficking but aggravated trafficking which attracts 
a heavier sentence upon conviction. The Act complies with article 68 of the CMW in 
that it provides for the prevention and elimination of trafficking in persons and 
smuggling of migrant workers for purposes of trafficking.920  
 
The Act also contains a number of provisions aimed at the practical implementation 
of the prohibition, ranging from port and border control,921 identification of victims,922 
arrest of suspected perpetrators both by police officers and private persons,923 
prosecution of such perpetrators and imposition of heavy penalties upon 
conviction.924 The Act pays special attention to victims of trafficking by detailing how 
                                                          
914 UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’ (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/3 para 56; Committee against Torture, 
Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Azerbaijan, 8 December 2009 UN Doc 
CAT/C/AZE/CO/3 para 20; Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the second 
periodic report of Belgium, 19 January 2009 UN Doc CAT/C/BEL/CO/2  para 25.  
915 Anti-trafficking Act section 43. 
916 As above section 5.  
917 As above section 6. 
918 As above section 12. 
919 As above section 8. 
920 Lesotho initial report to CMW para 41. 
921 Anti-trafficking Act section 14. 
922 As above sections 22 - 35. 
923 As above sections 20 & 21. 
924 Anti-trafficking Act section 5 provides for a penalty of a fine of 1 million Maloti (about 67 000 USD) 
or imprisonment for a period of 25 years. Where the victim is a child, the fine is doubled or liable to life 
imprisonment, which is similar to an offence of aggravated trafficking, which is where a child is 
adopted under the laws of Lesotho with the sole purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual 
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they shall be protected during investigation, criminal proceedings and post 
proceedings against the perpetrator. Some protection includes the prohibition of 
summary deportation of victims of trafficking,925 establishment of centres for victims 
and a fund aimed at assisting victims,926 rehabilitation of victims, including the 
provision of healthcare.927 The Anti-trafficking Act also provides for redress to victims 
of trafficking in accordance with the recommendations of the HRC, CAT, as well as 
the Robben Island Guidelines as discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
 
3.3.2.10 Amnesty Bill 2016 
  
The Amnesty Bill is still awaiting debate and approval by parliament. If approved in 
its current form, the primary object of the Amnesty Bill is:  
 
To make provision for the granting of amnesty to certain persons who may be liable for 
criminal prosecution or disciplinary proceedings or civil litigation for certain acts or omissions 
of offences done or purported to have been done during the period 1 January 2007 to 31 
December 2015 by such persons in the execution of their duties or in pursuit of any political 
objective.928  
 
The Bill provides specifically that when enacted, the Amnesty Act will exempt from 
prosecution, disciplinary action and even civil litigation, members of the LDF, LMPS, 
NSS and LCS who have committed offences, such as treason, sedition, subversion, 
murder, mutiny, other acts of violence against persons, malicious damage to 
property, kidnapping, desertion, incitement to commit a crime and contravention of 
the Internal Security Act during the mentioned period. It also provides that charges, 
which have already been instituted, shall be withdrawn and those officers imprisoned 
shall be released from detention and formally retired. Although not yet tabled for 
debate, the Bill has been criticised by political opposition parties as a smokescreen 
to exonerate officers of the LDF who have been implicated in the death of the former 
military commander in June 2015 and the torture of soldiers who were detained for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
exploitation, labour exploitation, slavery or debt bondage or the act is committed by a public officer. 
See Anti-trafficking Act section 7. 
925 Anti-trafficking Act sections 28 & 29. 
926 As above sections 44 to 49. 
927 As above sections 36 to 42. 
928 Amnesty Bill section 1. 
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almost two years on charges of mutiny.929 It is viewed as creating a breeding ground 
for impunity and further violation of human rights.  
 
As a way of addressing public concerns about the rights of those affected by the 
crimes committed during the period covered by the Bill, section 4 provides for their 
mandatory compensation by the government. It further provides that its provisions 
are without prejudice to the right of a person who is not satisfied with such 
compensation to access the courts of law for an appropriate relief.930 Although 
section 4 caters for the compensation for victims of human rights violations, including 
torture, the Bill is incompatible with Lesotho’s human rights obligations under 
customary international law as well as all the international human rights instruments 
discussed in chapter 2. In terms of customary international law, absolute prohibition 
of torture is a peremptory norm of international law derogation, which cannot be 
justified by a domestic legislation.931 The obligation to prohibit torture has been 
interpreted by the HRC in General Comments 20 and 29 to entail the duty to 
investigate all allegations of torture and also to prosecute and punish its 
perpetrators.932 Similarly and perhaps more explicitly, the Committee against Torture 
has interpreted the obligation to prosecute and punish to entail the duty to remove 
amnesties and other impediments, which ‘preclude or indicate unwillingness’ to 
prosecute and punish perpetrators of torture.933 The African Commission, in the case 
of Malawi African Association & Others v Mauritania, held that ‘…an amnesty law 
adopted with the aim of nullifying suits or other actions seeking redress that may be 
filed by victims or their beneficiaries…cannot shield that country from fulfilling its 
obligations under the Charter’.934 The Bill cannot therefore be justified on any 
                                                          
929 More details on these events are discussed in the next chapter under prevalence of torture within 
the LDF during the seven-party coalition government. 
930 Amnesty Bill section 4(2). 
931 Dugard (note 132 above) 43; Juma (note 183 above) 279; SAPS v SALC (note 188 above) 81. 
932 HRC, GC 20 para 1; HRC, GC 29 para 3.  
933 Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 5. 
934 Malawi African Association & Others v Mauritania (note 500 above). This communication involved 
challenges against an amnesty law, which granted amnesty to members of the security forces who 
had committed torture and other crimes in Mauritania between 1986 and 1992; Zimbabwe Human 
Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (note 496 above) para 201 in which the African Commission held that 
[t]here has been consistent international jurisprudence suggesting that the prohibition of amnesties 
leading to impunity for serious human rights violations has become a rule of customary international 
law’. 
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grounds as it is against Lesotho’s international human rights obligations against 
torture.935 
  
3.4  Institutional framework against torture in Lesotho  
 
As illustrated in section 3.3 above, the effectiveness of Lesotho’s legal framework to 
implement the international human rights standards against torture is challenged by 
the absence of specific anti-torture legislation, which would define torture, prohibit it 
as a distinct crime, and stipulate sentences for its commission and also means 
through which its victims would be redressed. The implementation of these 
obligations depends on the capacity of Lesotho’s institutional framework.  In this 
section, the existing institutions are analysed and it is concluded that the flaws in the 
legal framework also pose institutional challenges. The institutions are analysed in 
line with the standards and obligations relating to the investigation of allegations of 
torture, prosecutions and punishment of perpetrators of torture, granting of 
amnesties and immunities, as well as provision of adequate redress to its victims. 
Institutions, which are analysed, include the LMPS, which is tasked with the 
investigation of criminal offences and the apprehension of offenders, the PCA, which 
is a civilian body tasked with police oversight, the Office of the Ombudsman who has 
the mandate to receive complaints related to maladministration, injustice and human 
rights, as well as the DPP who is responsible for the prosecution of all criminal 
cases. The establishment, mandate and effectiveness of these institutions vis-à-vis 
Lesotho’s human rights obligations against torture are considered in the next section. 
  
3.4.1  Lesotho Mounted Police Service  
 
The LMPS is governed by the Police Service Act of 1998. It is an institution 
responsible for the investigation of torture and the training of law enforcement 
officials on human rights and rules of interrogation. Its mandate, includes: to uphold 
the law, to preserve the peace, to protect life and property, to detect and prevent 
crime, to arrest offenders and to bring them to court.936 According to the international 
                                                          
935 MP Sharf ‘Swapping amnesty for peace: Was there a duty to prosecute international crimes in Haiti’ 
(1996) 31Tex International Law Journal 38. 
936 Constitution section 147; Police Service Act section 4. 
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human rights standards discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis, the 
investigation of allegations of torture is at the centre of states’ obligation to prohibit 
torture as it leads to prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators, as well as the 
provision of redress to its victims.937 In its General Comment 2, the HRC stated that 
allegations of torture must be investigated by competent authorities.938 For Lesotho 
to fully comply with its obligation to investigate allegations of torture, the LMPS must 
therefore have competence to investigate. 
 
Apart from being contained in the international human rights instruments, the 
obligation to investigate allegations forms part of customary international law. In the 
case of National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern 
African Litigation Centre and Another,  the South African Constitutional Court held 
that the South African Police Service (SAPS) does not only have power, but a duty to 
investigate allegations of torture.939 In this case, the Court held that this duty is not 
only confined to the investigation of acts alleged to have been committed in South 
Africa or those concerning South Africans, but because of its customary international 
law nature, the obligation includes investigation of allegations of torture committed in 
Zimbabwe by Zimbabwean authorities against Zimbabwe nationals.940 
 
To illustrate the importance of investigation to states’ obligation to prohibit torture, 
failure to carry out investigation of acts committed by third parties amounts to such 
acts being attributed to the state.941 That is, state authorities are considered to be 
authors of such acts because of having failed to investigate them and to bring those 
responsible to justice.942  
 
                                                          
937 CAT articles 12 & 13; Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above) para 9.3; Dmytro Slyusar v 
Ukraine (note 59 above) para 9.3; Elaiba v Tunisia (note 377 above) para 7.6. 
938 HRC, GC 20 paras 14 & 15. 
939 SAPS v SALC (note 188 above) 81. 
940 As above. 
941 Committee against Torture, GC 3 para 7; See also McGregor (note 78 above) 211; Clapham (note 
78 above) 342. See also McCorquodale & La Forgia (note 78 above) 217. 
942 HRC, GC 31, HRC stated that states’ failure to investigate acts of third parties amounts to violation 
of article 2 of ICCPR which contains general obligations; Committee Against Torture GC 2,  Bleier v 
Uruguay and Centre for Human Rights (University of Pretoria) and another v Senegal (note 533 
above).  
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The preceding discussion on the legal frameworks against torture in Lesotho has 
clearly shown that the absence of an anti-torture law in Lesotho is inconsistent with 
Lesotho’s international human rights obligations against torture. This absence also 
has catastrophic effects on the ability of the LMPS to investigate allegations of 
torture in as much as the crime of torture is non-existent in the penal system of 
Lesotho. However, turning a blind eye and assuming that the Penal Code prohibition 
of other acts of violence, such as assault and murder could, while the Act is being 
awaited, be the basis for investigation, the question, which then arises, is whether 
the LMPS is competent to carry out investigations and take perpetrators to court. 
The answer to this question is no, as the discussion in the next chapter shows that in 
the majority of cases of torture, officers of the LMPS are the main perpetrators of 
torture. They use torture as an interrogation tool during investigations. When 
analysing human rights violations in criminal investigations in Lesotho, Lenka 
concludes that due to serving undemocratic governments over a long period, the 
LMPS has been involved in several human rights violations despite the change in the 
legal framework, which governs it.943 In the next chapter, it will be illustrated through 
cases that this remains to be the case to date. Great involvement of members of the 
LMPS in acts of torture thus limits its competence and impartiality to investigate 
allegations of torture in accordance with international standards. 
 
The competence of LMPS officers to investigate allegations of torture is also 
dependent upon the type of training, which they receive. Hence, the training of law 
enforcement officers on human rights is listed as one of states’ obligations against 
torture as illustrated in the previous chapter.944 The Constitution of Lesotho provides 
that Lesotho shall ensure that education is available to all in an endeavour to 
strengthen respect for human rights.945 The Police Training College (PTC) offers 
human rights training as part of syllabi for newly recruited, as well as serving officers. 
However, as reflected in the next chapter, incidents of torture occur nonetheless. 
This, therefore, questions the manner in which the training is offered and illustrates 
that the use of torture in interrogation is an imbedded culture in the LMPS, which 
needs more effort in order for it to be rooted out.  
                                                          
943 Lenka (note 716 above) 313. 
944 CAT article 10; Elaiba v Tunisia (note 377 above) para 7.4; HRC, GC 20 para 10. 
945 Constitution section 28 (a). 
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3.4.2 Police Complaints Authority 
 
The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) is a statutory body established in terms of 
section 22 of the Police Service Act.946 It is a civilian body with mandate to oversee 
policing. Its mandate include: 
 
… the responsibility for investigating and reporting to the Police Authority [who in terms of the 
Act is the Minister] on any complaint referred to it by the Police authority or the 
Commissioner, which is a complaint from the members of the public about the conduct of a 
member of the Police Service.947  
 
Because of its mandate to oversee police-public relations, the PCA can be 
categorised as a torture-prevention mechanism as it is an institution outside the 
police service and has the mandate to investigate allegations of torture made against 
members of the police service.948 However, the institutional independence of the 
PCA is compromised by the manner in which its members are appointed.949 In terms 
of the Police Service Act, members of the PCA shall be appointed by the Police 
Authority, the Minister.950  
 
Apart from political influence of the appointment of members of the PCA, other 
factors, which determine competence of the PCA are also compromised. These 
include inaccessibility and lack of any power beyond investigation.951 As far as 
accessibility is concerned, Murtaugh and Poe argue that one of the most important 
functions of a police oversight body is to provide information to the public about the 
police service in general, as well as about the complaints procedure where there are 
                                                          
946  Police Service Act No.7 of 1998, section 22.  
947 Police Service Act section 22 (3). 
948 Alexander Gerasimov v Kazakhstan (note 382 above) para 12.4 in which the Committee against 
Torture held that an investigating authority in the same chain of command as the regular police force 
is incapable of conducting impartial investigations. See also Evloev v Kazakhstan (note 111 above) 
para 4 in which the Committee against Torture held that there cannot be impartiality where 
investigations are conducted by the same institution alleged to have committed torture.  
949 HRC, Summary record of 1743rd Meeting 1 April 1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.1743 para 58 in which 
members of the HRC questioned the independence of the PCA under the authority of a Minister.  
950 Police Service Act 1998 section 22(3). 
951 R Crawshaw, S Cullen & T Williamson Human Rights and Policing (2007) 413. 
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human rights violations or other grievances.952 However, in its report on the human 
rights situation in Lesotho, the SADC Lawyers’ Association notes that Lesotho’s PCA 
is unknown amongst the populace.953 This, therefore, renders the PCA ineffective as 
the majority of the people of Lesotho do not know about it and therefore do not 
benefit from its establishment. 
  
As far as procedural accessibility is concerned, in terms of section 22 of the Police 
Service Act, members of the public do not have direct access to the PCA, but have 
to either go through the Commissioner of Police or the Police Authority who then 
forwards such complaints to the PCA.954 There is no written procedure for 
channelling complaints to the Police Authority. Therefore, although this is a route 
seldom used, probably because the public is not aware of it, or because of political 
reasons, it seems easier than the alternative of channelling through the 
Commissioner of Police, which entails cumbersome bureaucratic processes. With 
regard to complaints, which reach the PCA through the Commissioner of Police, 
such complaints must have gone through the following channels.955 The complaint is 
submitted to the Commissioner by the office of Inspectorate, Complaints and 
Discipline (IC&D) having followed the following processes: the complainant has to 
first go to the station commander (also referred to as officer commanding or OC) 
where the police officer who is facing the complaint is stationed and report the ill-
treatment, use of force or any unsatisfactory conduct, which is the basis of the 
complaint. The OC would then take up the matter with the officer concerned.  If the 
issue is not resolved, then the complainant or the OC would take the matter to the 
officer in charge of the district (Dispol) who is then mandated to investigate the 
matter and solve it, failing which the matter may be referred to the officer in charge of 
the region (Regipol) who would then take it to IC&D. The IC&D may investigate the 
matter or refer it to the PCA.  If upon investigation, the IC&D finds that the officer has 
used unlawful and impermissible force, the Commissioner directs Dispol to hold a 
                                                          
952 Murtaugh C & Poe M Establishing an independent Police Oversight Body INPROL Responses 
2010 available at www.inprol.org [accessed 13 June 2013]. 
953 SADC Lawyers Association Report on human rights situation in Lesotho (2013). 
954 Police Service Act section 22 provides that the PCA shall investigate complaints from members of 
the public, which are brought to its attention through the Commissioner of Police and Minister of 
Police.  
955 This procedure is not contained in the Police Service Act, but forms part of the standard procedure 
adopted by the LMPS throughout the country.  
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disciplinary hearing against the officer complained of in accordance with the Police 
Service Act.  
 
Because of the many channels through which complaints go before reaching the 
Commissioner of Police, very few of them are taken to the PCA; most of them are 
dealt with internally by the OC, Dispol, Regipol or IC&D while in some cases, the 
complainants become weary and abandon the complaints midstream. This also 
‘leads to lack of transparency, abuse of power and unnecessary delays’.956 As a 
result, many victims of police brutality have opted to bypass this procedure and 
lodge delictual claims against the Commissioner of Police directly in the courts of law 
as opposed to using the PCA as a police oversight body.957 
 
The second challenge is with regard to powers, which the PCA has over the cases, 
which have been submitted to it. According to section 22, the powers of the PCA do 
not go beyond investigating and reporting such complaints to the Minister. The PCA 
does not have the power to institute any legal or disciplinary proceedings against the 
officer complained of, but may in its report, make recommendations to the 
Commissioner or Police Authority. When such recommendations have been made, 
the disciplinary proceedings are not carried out by the PCA, but by the 
Commissioner of Police in accordance with the procedures contained in the Police 
Service Act. Because the PCA does not have the power to follow up on whether the 
recommendations have been implemented, the investigations carried out often end 
up with no action being taken against the concerned police officers. It must be noted 
that in 1999, when Lesotho’s initial report to the HRC was considered, the Lesotho 
delegation welcomed the Committee’s suggestion that the PCA should be 
empowered to give effect to its findings,958 yet two decades later the law governing 
the PCA remains the same. 
 
 
 
                                                          
956 Lesotho initial report to CMW para 38. 
957 The majority of these cases are discussed in the next chapter under prevalence of torture within the 
LMPS.  
958 HRC Summary Record 1744th Meeting 1 April 1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.1744 para 10. 
186 
 
3.4.3 Office of the Ombudsman 
 
The Office of the Ombudsman is established in terms of sections 134 and 135 of the 
Constitution. The nature, mandate and powers of the Ombudsman are described in 
the Ombudsman Act of 1996. The Ombudsman is appointed by the King, acting on 
the advice of the Prime Minister.959  The mandate of this office is to investigate and 
recommend preventative and remedial action on complaints related to 
maladministration, corruption, injustice, human rights, corruption and degradation of 
the environment.960 This office is therefore mandated to receive complaints on 
human rights violations, including torture. 
 
The main function of the Ombudsman is to receive and investigate complaints from 
aggrieved persons, against government agencies, including law enforcement 
institutions and to recommend remedial action where he finds the complaint 
justified.961  Complaints are received directly from members of the public, who may 
do so in person at the office of the ombudsman or through the post or by telephone. 
The investigators then embark on an investigation and determine whether the 
complaint is legitimate, within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and whether 
available remedies have been exhausted.  If the investigation done reveals that the 
complainant’s rights have been violated, the investigator then writes a report and 
recommends remedial action to the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman is satisfied with 
the report and recommendation, he then writes to the head of the concerned 
government agency and recommends an appropriate remedial action.  Unlike the 
PCA, if the Ombudsman’s recommendation is not implemented within a stipulated 
time, then the Ombudsman may make a special report to parliament.962  The 
possibility of the matter being reported to parliament increases the rate at which 
government agencies comply with recommendations by the Ombudsman in order to 
avoid naming and shaming. 
 
                                                          
959 Constitution section 135 (1). 
960 Ombudsman Act section 7. 
961 Ombudsman Act section 7(4). 
962 Ombudsman Act section 7(5). This a report, which may be filed at any time of the year apart from 
the annual reports, which the Ombudsman files to parliament in terms of section 135(3) of the 
Constitution and section 16(1) of the Ombudsman Act. 
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However, as far as torture is concerned, the Ombudsman usually refers complaints 
against members of the police service to the IC&D office for investigation. The 
Ombudsman then requests reports and makes follow-ups as to the extent to which 
the allegations of torture have been investigated.  The office does not embark on the 
actual investigations. As illustrated earlier, the competence and impartiality of the 
police to investigate allegations of torture are highly compromised. This practice 
therefore also negatively affects the work of the Ombudsman as far as allegations of 
torture by the police are concerned. 
 
The establishment of national preventive mechanisms (NPMs) whose powers 
include visits to places of detention and receipt of complaints regarding conditions of 
detention is an international human rights obligation, which states have to fulfil.963 As 
illustrated above, the Ombudsman also plays a role in torture prevention by visiting 
places of detention and receiving reports on general conditions of detention. The 
2016 report of the Ombudsman to parliament which covers the period between 
2012/2013 submitted in terms of section 16 of the Ombudsman Act shows that the 
Ombudsman has over the years, visited places of detention, focused on conditions 
of detention such as overcrowding but did not pay particular attention to torture and 
CIDT in the police and correctional detention facilities.964 It can therefore be 
concluded that the office of the ombudsman also fails to effectively implement 
Lesotho’s international human rights obligations against torture. 
 
3.4.4 Director of Public Prosecution 
  
The DPP is established in terms of section 141 of the Constitution. The mandate of 
the DPP is prescribed in section 5 of the CP&E as ‘institution and undertaking of 
criminal proceedings against any person before any court (other than court martial) 
in respect of any offence alleged to have been committed by that person’. While the 
primary mandate to prosecute is invested in the DPP, effective prosecution of 
                                                          
963 Robben Island Guidelines (note 103 above); Alexander Gerasimov v Kazakhstan (note 382 above) 
para 12.4. 
964 The challenge is, however, that the Ombudsman does not submit annual reports on time. The 
latest report covering 2012/2013 was submitted in 2016. This report does not cover torture or 
complaints against the police. It only reports on visit of 28 police stations and 6 correctional centres, 
which was done after six years. Recommendations made in the report addressed working conditions 
of the police and correctional officers and nothing on allegations of torture or conditions of detention. 
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suspects of torture is highly dependent on the ability of investigation officers to 
gather evidence on the basis of which the suspected perpetrators are prosecuted.965 
Lack of anti-torture legislation in Lesotho has proven to be a challenge to the 
capacity of institutions, such as the LMPS to investigate allegations of torture. This in 
itself presents challenges to the ability of the DPP to prosecute suspects and of the 
courts of law to impose appropriate sanctions.  
 
As will be illustrated in the next chapter, of the many cases of torture committed by 
members of the police, the army and the correctional service, very few are 
investigated and ultimately prosecuted. In the next chapter, it is illustrated that 
although there is an appalling number of civil claims against the police and the 
military for torture, there are spotted corresponding criminal cases against the 
officers implicated. Failure to prosecute perpetrators of torture therefore amounts to 
violation of the state’s international obligation to punish torture.966 
 
3.5  Universal Periodic Review and African Peer Review Mechanisms 
 
Apart from the state reporting obligations discussed in the previous chapter, both the 
United Nations and the African Union have established mechanisms through which 
states’ implementation of standards contained in the human rights instruments may 
be assessed. The Universal Peer Review (UPR) was established by the UN General 
Assembly in 2006 when the Human Rights Council was established.967 It is a 
mechanism for the Human Rights Council to monitor in a non-adversarial manner, 
states’ human rights implementation on the ground.968 At the regional level, the New 
Partnership for Africa (NEPAD) Heads of State and Government Implementation 
Committee established the African Union has established the African Peer Review 
Mechanisms (APRM) in 2003. The APRM is an instrument voluntarily acceded to by 
members of the AU to self- monitor their performance in governance by fostering the 
                                                          
965 CAT articles 12 & 13. 
966 CEDAW Committee, GR 19 para 11; Committee against Torture, GC 2; HRC, GC 31; Centre for 
Human Rights & Another v Senegal (note 533 above) para 68. See also See also McGregor (note 78 
above) 211. See also Clapham (note 78 above) 342. See also McCorquodale & La Forgia (note 78 
above) 217. 
967 General Assembly Resolution 60/251 3 April 2006, UN doc A/Res/60/251 article 5(e). 
968 As above. 
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adoption of policies, values, standards and practices of political and economic 
governance that lead to political stability amongst others.969 
 
Although both the UPR and APRM are not strictly legal and therefore non-binding, 
they however, provide an introspection for states parties and are also platforms in 
which states publicly declare their status as far as implementation of their 
international human rights obligations are concerned. Lesotho’s commitment towards 
its obligations against torture are reflected in the reports of both mechanisms as 
illustrated below. 
 
3.5.1 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
 
Lesotho participated in this review in June 2010. Following an interactive dialogue 
between Lesotho’s delegation and other states which took part in the review, 
Lesotho supported several recommendations which have a bearing on its obligations 
against torture. For instance, it supported: the recommendation by Chad to integrate 
ratified international human rights instruments relating to torture and the state of 
prisons into its domestic legislation;970 France’s recommendations to combat prison 
overcrowding and to establish ‘credible mechanisms’ for investigation of human 
rights violations committed by security forces, to compensate victims and to 
prosecute and punish perpetrators of such violations;971  Netherlands’ 
recommendation to ‘reinforce its legislative framework to protect children from all 
forms of sexual abuse and exploitation, including in the family’ and to investigate and 
prosecute cases of all forms of domestic violence and ensure that perpetrators are 
punished;972 and Brazil’s recommendation to abolish corporal punishment.973 
Recommendations made by Argentina, Germany and Sudan for Lesotho to adopt 
legislative measures and to eradicate the practice of FGM were however not 
                                                          
969 African Union ‘African Peer Review Mechanism’ available at https://au.int/en/organs/aprm 
[accessed 10 November 2017]. 
970 Human Rights Council Report of the working group on universal periodic review: Lesotho 16 June 
2010, UN doc A/HRC/15/7, para 97.3. 
971 As above paras 97.4 and 97.38. 
972 As above, paras 97.12 and 97.36. A similar recommendation against domestic violence was made 
by Germany at para 97.37.  
973 As above para 97.34. 
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supported by Lesotho.974 Lesotho also undertook to ratify international human rights 
instruments such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 2002 
(OPCAT) and the Optional Protocol to CRPD and the International Convention for 
the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances 2006 (ICPED).975  
 
3.5.2 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
Lesotho acceded to the APRM on 8 July 2004 and its first review was in June 2010. 
As far as Lesotho’s obligations towards torture are concerned, the APRM panel 
raised several concerns including non-domestication of CAT and Lesotho’s failure to 
establish a national human rights commission,976 as well as weak institutional 
frameworks. It recommended that Lesotho must strengthen its oversight agencies 
such as the Office of the Ombudsman and the PCA which are weakened by lack of 
transparency, exclusion of the public participation and inability to follow up on their 
recommendations.977 The report also indicated that due to backlog of cases in the 
courts of Lesotho, and the parliament’s failure to enact laws timeously which are 
matters of governance, torture, abuse, poor prison services and lengthy pretrial 
detentions are some of specific areas of concern in the realm of the judiciary in 
Lesotho.978 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The central theme in this research is that in order to eradicate torture at the national 
level, domestic laws must be harmonised with international standards against 
torture. Before delving into the extent to which Lesotho’s legal and institutional 
frameworks comply with the international human rights standards against torture, the 
two main theories of incorporation of international law into national legal systems: 
monism and dualism were investigated in this chapter. The conclusion was drawn 
                                                          
974 As above paras 99.1, 99.2 and 99.5. Lesotho’s position could have been influenced by the fact that 
it has not been established that FGM is practiced in Lesotho. 
975 Human Rights Council Human Rights Council Report of the working group on universal periodic 
review: views on conclusions and/ or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented 
by the state under review -Lesotho 15 September 2010, UN doc A/HRC/15/7/Add.1 paras 1 and 6. 
976 APRM Kingdom of Lesotho country review report no.12 June 2010 para 222. 
977As above paras 175, 223 and 229. 
978 As above para 220. 
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that although Lesotho is often categorised as dualist and therefore requiring an Act 
of Parliament before the courts of law could apply an international norm, 
jurisprudence of the courts of Lesotho reflects that, in Lesotho, there is no strict 
adherence to dualism as sometimes the courts of law apply international law in a 
manner best described by the theory of monism. A further conclusion is that this 
mixture of approaches confirms that reliance on the two theories of monism and 
dualism when assessing the implementation of international standards in a particular 
state, has become outdated and that in the human rights discourse, what must be 
focused on is the content of a pedigree and not its source. That is, as far as torture is 
concerned, the focus must shift from whether its prohibition is a rule of international 
law to the results, which its prevention, prohibition, punishment of perpetrators and 
provision of redress to its victims yield for the citizenry of that particular country.  
 
Discussions of the laws and institutions has highlighted that the legal and institutional 
frameworks in Lesotho are very weak as far as the implementation of the state’s 
international human rights obligations against torture are concerned. The legal 
system is weakened by the absence of a law, which prohibits torture as a distinct 
crime. This law would enable the implementation of other obligations such as the 
obligation to define torture in accordance with article 1(1) of CAT and the obligations, 
to investigate allegations of torture and prosecute its perpetrators. It would also 
prescribe the appropriate punishment which takes into account the heinous nature of 
the offence of torture. The absence of an anti-torture law has also affected the 
obligation to provide appropriate redress to victims of torture. Because of the weak 
legal framework, the institutions, which would be expected to implement Lesotho’s 
obligations against torture, are also weakened. For instance, the PCA’s investigation 
powers are very limited, it does not have the power to prosecute and therefore relies 
on the police to charge and take the police and army officers alleged to have 
committed torture to court. The end result of this vicious circle is impunity, which is 
illustrated more fully in the next chapter.     
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
PRACTICE OF TORTURE IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS IN 
LESOTHO 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Electric shocks, beatings, solitary confinement, deprivation of sleep and water 
boarding are some of the acts, which have been declared unlawful by national and 
international courts and tribunals.979 When expressing displeasure against practices 
of torture, the Namibian Supreme Court in the case of Namunjepo & Others v The 
Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison & Another held that: 
 
Whatever the circumstances, the practice to use chains and leg-irons on a human being is a 
humiliating experience, which reduces the person placed in irons to the level of a hobbled 
animal whose mobility is limited so that it cannot stray.980 
 
Despite the unanimous condemnation of torture by most countries of the world, 
‘every day across every region of the world, these unimaginable horrors are a reality 
for countless men, women and children’.981  In his statement on 26 June 2012, a day 
marked as the international day to support victims of torture, former UN Secretary 
General, Ban Ki-moon, described torture as a cruel and dehumanising practice often 
committed with the intention of destroying one’s sense of dignity and human 
worth.982 He stated further that in some cases, torture ‘is part of deliberate state 
policy of instilling fear and intimidating its population’.983 The former Secretary 
General also stated his concern that: 
  
                                                          
979 Angel Estrella v Uruguay (note 51 above) para 10; Alan v Switzerland (note 58 above) para 14. 
See also Malawi African Association & Others v Mauritania (note 500 above). See also Evloev v 
Kazakhstan (note 111 above); Dmytro Slyusar v Ukraine (note 59 above); Sathasivam & Saraswati v 
Sri Lanka (note 48 above); Grasimov v Kazakhstan (note 61 above). 
980 Namunjepo & Others v Commanding officer, Windhoek Prison & Another (2000) 6 BCLR 671 
(Namibian Supreme Court) 9 July 1999 para 23. 
981 Amnesty International Torture in 2014: Thirth years of broken promises (2014) 5. 
982 UN SG, Secretary-General’s message on the international day in support of victims of torture 26 
June 2012 www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=6158 [accessed 8 April 2016]. 
983 As above. 
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In too many countries, people’s legitimate demands for freedom and human rights are met 
with brutal repression. Even when regimes change, torture often persists and a culture of 
impunity remains.984  
 
Lesotho is no stranger to this reality. Although not often reported, torture has taken 
and continues to take place in Lesotho. In this chapter, the task will be to illustrate 
through the analysis of reports compiled by different human rights organisations, the 
media, as well as reported court cases that torture is practised in Lesotho.985 The 
argument advanced in this chapter is that, the failure to incorporate international 
human rights standards against torture into the national legal system, coupled with 
the political instability with which the country has been grappling since 
independence, contributes to the occurrence of torture in Lesotho. 
 
According to human rights reports compiled by international and national 
organisations, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of 
citizens by the police, as well as societal abuse of women and children are amongst 
the most pressing human rights issues in Lesotho.986 The link between torture and 
political instability is supported by the number of cases by Amnesty International and 
other human rights organisations compiled in the 1980s and those compiled recently 
which give details of cases in which various forms of torture were committed and 
continue to be committed against suspects of crime in Lesotho.987 In some cases, 
                                                          
984 As above. 
985 HRC Concluding observations on Lesotho’s initial report 8 April 1999 UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.106 
paras 14, 16 - 19 in which the Committee raised its concerns about numerous instances of torture of 
persons in custody, excessive use of force, prolonged detention as well as impunity for crimes and 
abuses committed by members of the military. CEDAW Committee, Concluding observations on the 
combined initial to fourth periodic reports of Lesotho 8 November 2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/LSO/CO/1 
- 4 para 20 in which the Committee raised concerns about stereotypes and harmful practices, which 
perpetuate violence against women, paras 22 & 23 in which the Committee raised concerns about the 
high prevalence of domestic and sexual violence against women, and paras 24 - 25 in which the 
Committee raised concerns about the high prevalence of trafficking of women and girls and the low 
rate at which it is being reported; CRC, Concluding Observations’ on Lesotho’s initial report (note 128 
above) para 31.  
986 United States Bureau of Democracy Human rights and Labour Country Reports for Human Rights 
Practices for 2011: Lesotho (2012); Freedom House Country ratings and status: Freedom in the World 
1973-2012 (2012); SADC Lawyers Association Report on the overview of human rights situation in 
Lesotho (2013). 
987 This chapter relies more on reports compiled by Amnesty International and the US Department of 
States due to the fact that such information is not easily accessible from the LMPS and other 
government sources. 
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the worst forms of torture have resulted in the death of its victims.988 According to 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2016 evaluation report, the 
collapse of the 2012 coalition government resulted in instability in the country, with 
several instances of brutality and torture, as well as political interference with the 
judiciary.989 Thus, the human rights situation in Lesotho is closely linked to the 
political landscape in the country. As a result, the incidences of torture have 
fluctuated depending on the level of political stability.  
 
Because torture mainly takes place in the shadows, an assessment of its scale in a 
comprehensive, categorical and statistical manner is impossible.990 However, despite 
the absence of statistical data, which illustrates the magnitude of torture in Lesotho, 
this research illustrates in the next sections that human rights reports and reported 
case law show that torture and related offences have been committed at differing 
degrees from the time Lesotho gained independence to date. The analysis also 
indicates that in the majority of the reported cases of torture, perpetrators are 
members of the security forces and that they commit such acts with impunity. They 
also indicate that the commission of torture is rifer during political instability.  
 
Torture as defined in article 1(1) of CAT is capable of being committed in various 
settings. However, the focus of this chapter is on the extent of torture within the law 
enforcement institutions in Lesotho. In this research, the law enforcement institutions 
are also referred to as security forces or agencies. The security forces in Lesotho are 
made up of the LDF, LMPS, NSS and LCS.991 The LDF is a military force tasked with 
the maintenance of all external security issues,992 although when the Commissioner 
of Police so requests, it may assist the LMPS, which is tasked with maintenance of 
                                                          
988 United States Bureau of Democracy (2012) (note 975 above) 1 which reports that in 2011, three 
people died in police custody and the United States Bureau of Democracy (2014) 3, which reports that 
in 2013 five prisoners died while one suspect died in police custody; M Mokotjo ‘Family wants answers 
after a man dies in custody’ Lesotho Times 8 January 2016; A Dissel & C Frank Policing and Human 
Rights: Assessing southern African countries’ compliance with the SARPCCO code of conduct for 
police officials  (2012) 48. 
989 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) Lesotho Country Report 2016 (2016) 6. It 
reports that the number of victims of police brutality has increased significantly since the last review in 
2015. 
990 Amnesty International (note 970 above) 10. 
991 Constitution of Lesotho section 146 - 149. 
992 Constitution section 146. 
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law and order as part of internal security.993 The NSS is an intelligence unit 
responsible for the provision of information that poses a threat to the country’s 
internal or external security.994 The LCS is an institution responsible for the 
administration of prisons,995 although the terms ‘prison’ has been replaced with 
‘correctional institution’.996 
  
The commission of torture in each of these law enforcement institutions can be 
attributed to different factors. The most apparent factor is political instability. 
Literature in the form of case law and human rights reports points to the fact that the 
type or form of torture as well the reasons for which it is committed differ from one 
institution to another. Cases in which the police have or are alleged to have tortured 
people, mostly involve the use of torture as an interrogation tool during criminal 
investigations.997 Conversely, torture in the LDF is resorted to as a training method 
against newly recruited members of the army,998 as a tool of discipline against 
serving members of the army,999 as well as a political tool used by those in 
government to suppress opposition.1000 Correctional officers are alleged to 
sometimes resort to torture as a means of disciplining inmates.1001 There is no case 
law or anecdotal report, which implicates members of the NSS in cases of torture. 
This may be attributed to the fact that officers of the NSS do not have physical 
contact with suspects of crime, but refer cases to the police for action. Therefore, the 
analysis will be limited to the three institutions being the LMPS, LDF and LCS.  
 
Because of the link between the occurrences of torture and political history in 
Lesotho, cases of torture involving the security forces considered in this chapter are 
                                                          
993 LDF Act section 190. 
994 Constitution section 148. 
995 Constitution section 149. 
996 Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, Act No. 8 of 2004 section 4. 
997 Lenka (note 716 above) 10.  
998 Sechele (note 141 above) 6. 
999 Mathabeng Lechalaba v Commander LDF and Others CIV/T/142/2001 (High Court of Lesotho) 
unreported. 
1000 Following the 2015 elections, members of the army who were thought to be supporters of the 
previous Prime Minister, Thomas Thabane, were arrested on allegations of having plotted mutiny 
against the command of the LDF.  
1001 Letlaka Banyane v Commissioner of Correctional Services & Another CIV/APN/80/2008 (High 
Court of Lesotho) [2010] LSHC 13 9 March 2010 in which the applicant, an officer of the LCS who had 
been found guilty of torture of inmates in disciplinary proceedings challenged the reduction of his 
salary, which was punishment for the offence. 
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analysed from a perspective of Lesotho’s political history. The involvement of each 
security institution in cases, which amount to or are related to torture, is analysed 
with reference to seven main political phases after Lesotho’s independence from 
Britain. For the purposes of this illustration, Matlosa and Pule’s categorisation of 
these periods into four, namely the era of embryonic democracy (from 1965 to 1970), 
the era of de facto one-party rule (from 1970 to 1986), the era of military 
authoritarianism (from 1986 to 1993) and the era of fragile democracy (1993 to 1998) 
is used. When discussing civil military relations during the era of fragile democracy, 
Matlosa and Pule refer to the period between 1993 and 1998.1002 Matlosa and Pule’s 
analysis was limited to 1998 because it was done in 1999. Post 1999, the political 
landscape in Lesotho changed several times, which changes also affected the legal 
and institutional frameworks, as well as the extent of torture. Hence, the analysis in 
this chapter extends the political phases discussed by Matlosa and Pule by 
expanding the embryonic democracy to 2012, and adding the era of coalition 
governments (between 2012 and 2016).  In their research, Matlosa and Pule argue 
that ‘for much of the post-colonial period, the military was used as a tool, politicised 
and partisan’.1003 In this instance, cases of torture are used to illustrate that while this 
observation was made in the 1990s, it remains true to date.  The incidences of 
torture committed by both the police and the military has been and continues to be 
influenced by the political landscape of the country.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections: in section one, the practice of torture within 
the LMPS during each political phase is discussed. The cases in this section are 
derived from human rights reports of Amnesty International and the United States 
department of state, Lesotho’s initial report to the HRC, media reports and the High 
Court of Lesotho. In section two, the occurrences of torture within the LDF are 
discussed. The discussion entails allegations of torture committed against newly 
recruited members during their training, cases of torture against serving members of 
the LDF and torture of civilians during the LDF’s operations related to the 
preservation of internal order. In section three, the focus is on the LCS. Because 
                                                          
1002 K Matlosa & NW Pule ‘Civil-military relations in Lesotho, 1966-1988: Problems and prospects’ in R 
Williams, G Cawthra & D Abrahams  (eds) Ourselves to know: Civil military relations and defence 
transformation in Southern African (2003) 39. 
1003 As above. 
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there are no cases, which link torture within the LCS to the political environment, this 
section is categorised into two broad sections: firstly, incidents in which inmates 
have been subjected to torture by officers of the correctional institutions, and 
secondly, the conditions of the detention facilities, which amount to torture. In section 
four, a conclusion is drawn that despite not being regularly reported, torture is high in 
Lesotho, perpetrators of torture go unpunished and its victims remain without 
redress. 
  
4.2 Torture within the Lesotho Mounted Police Service  
 
The role of a modern police service in society has been summarised by Dunham and 
Alpert as being to ‘represent and implement the government’s right to use coercion 
and force to guarantee certain behaviours from its citizens’.1004 Likoti enhances this 
definition by arguing further that in a liberal dispensation, the police service is 
perceived as a law enforcer and crime fighter whose main mandate is the detection 
of crime and ‘catching’ criminals.1005 Therefore, since torture is a crime, the general 
expectation is that members of the police service should not be engaged in the 
commission of torture. Rather, they should detect cases of torture, apprehend those 
suspected of its commission and take them before courts of law for prosecution. 
However, as pointed out in the previous chapter, in Lesotho, torture is not 
criminalised as a distinct crime. Therefore the police do not have a basis for charging 
a person with torture and taking him to court for prosecution for the crime of torture. 
Over and above this limitation, the human rights reports and jurisprudence of the 
courts of Lesotho discussed in this section show that members of the LMPS are 
often implicated in the commission of torture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1004 RG Dunham & GP Alpert ‘The foundation of the police role in society’ in RG Dunham & GP Alpert 
(eds) Critical issues in policing (2015) 3. 
1005 Likoti (note 145 above) 201. 
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4.2.1 Overview of the LMPS 
 
The LMPS was established on 26 October 1872 by the British administration prior to 
Lesotho’s independence from Britain.1006 It was then known as the Basutoland 
Mounted Police (BMP), which was mainly made up of chiefs’ sons and 
magistrates.1007 While the magistrates had judicial powers, the other officers’ main 
duties were to assist the magistrates as interpreters and to work as messengers in 
the Magistrate Courts.1008 Other functions of the police included the collection of 
revenue, customs and gaol duties.1009 Since the BMP was the only disciplined force 
in Lesotho, which was then called Basutoland, it carried out duties of both internal 
and external security.1010 In 1965, the Basutoland Police Proclamation of 1957 was 
amended to expand the functions of the police force to include the preservation of 
peace, the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders and the 
collection and communication of intelligence affecting public peace.1011 It also 
authorised the police officers to carry arms.1012   
 
Prior to this amendment, which expanded the scope of work for the police, a ‘special 
operations unit’, called the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), was established within the 
Basutoland Mounted Police in 1963.1013 The PMU was mainly tasked to control 
political conflict, which the colonial administration thought would ensue during the 
1965 elections, which was to usher in Lesotho’s independence from being a British 
Protectorate. The PMU was established mainly because the colonial administrators 
perceived one of the political parties that would contest the elections, the Basotho 
Congress Party (BCP), as a dangerously militant organisation, which needed to be 
suppressed.1014 Political analysts, Matlosa and Pule, argue that there was a general 
belief amongst the populace in Lesotho that from its inception, the PMU was meant 
to protect supporters of the Basotho National Party (BNP), another political party, 
                                                          
1006 PE Garner ‘Policing in Lesotho’ (1971) 44(1) The Police Journal: Theory Practice and Principles 
42; ‘Lesotho Mounted Police Service: About us’ www.lmps.org.ls [accessed 20 October 2015]. 
1007 Likoti (note 145 above) 203. 
1008 As above. 
1009 As above. 
1010 Dissel & Frank (note 977 above) 38. 
1011 BMP Proclamation No. 27 of 1957 section 6. 
1012 As above. 
1013 Rosenberg & Weisfelder (note 677 above) 472. 
1014 As above. 
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which was believed to be favoured by the colonialists, and to ensure that it won the 
elections against the BCP.1015 The general perception was that colonial 
administrators favoured the BNP because they perceived it as more conservative, 
non-violent and therefore posing a lesser threat to the colonial administrators than 
the BCP.1016 
 
The BNP won the 1965 election. On 4 October 1966, Lesotho officially gained 
independence from Britain1017 and the BNP government took over as the first 
democratically elected government. During this time, the police service changed its 
name to the Lesotho Mounted Police Force (LMPF).1018 In terms of section 8 of the 
Police Force Order, the Minister could deploy the police in times of war to defend the 
country. This task was entrusted to the PMU. The police force continued to carry out 
the dual functions of internal order and external security until 1980 when the PMU 
was abolished with the formal establishment of a national military force.1019  
 
As will be illustrated later on in this chapter, Lesotho had a bumpy political landscape 
with a number of political challenges, including the declaration of a state of 
emergency, the suspension of the Constitution in 1970, unconstitutional changes of 
government through coups: the 1970, 1986, 1990, 1998 and a controversial 
attempted coup in 2014. Most general elections have also been characterised by 
pre-, during and post-election violence. The changing political landscape posed 
several challenges to the Lesotho police. It came with change in command, and a 
change in policing strategies and policies, as well as change of the entire legal 
framework governing the police. These changes in turn impacted on the efficiency of 
the police as an institution, the laws governing the institution, the criminal laws 
passed, as well as the prevalence of human rights violations, including torture, 
during each political phase. Below is a trajectory of the incidents of police torture 
during each political phase and an analysis of how the political landscape influenced 
and continues to influence the prevalence of torture within the LMPS.  
                                                          
1015 Matlosa & Pule (note 146 above) 62. 
1016 As above. 
1017 Lesotho Independence Act of 1966. 
1018 Rosenberg & Weisfelder (note 677 above) 162. 
1019 Acts of torture, which are alleged to have been committed by the PMU during the time when the 
police and the army were one organisation are discussed in the next section under the LDF. 
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4.2.2 Torture during the period of embryonic democracy (1965 - 1970) 
 
As indicated above, at the time of the first election in Lesotho, security tasks were 
carried out by the BMP through its special operations unit, the PMU. In their analysis 
of the relationship between the military and the general public, Matlosa and Pule 
canvass different views that different people held towards the PMU. On the one side, 
Leeman’s opinion was that from its establishment in 1963, the PMU was forced to 
ensure that the BNP maintained its grip on power.1020 Conversely, for Sixishe, the 
PMU was a force necessary to maintain law and order in the country.1021 Leeman’s 
view finds support in the number of arrests, detentions and killings of supporters of 
the opposition BCP and other critics of the BNP government, which were allegedly 
committed by members of the PMU.1022 Similarly, Sixishe’s view is supported by 
arguments that such deaths occurred in the course of the maintenance of public 
order, which was disturbed by attacks launched by the military wing of the BCP, the 
Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), against civilians and government’s essential 
services.1023 In support of the necessity to use force, the PMU commander, Fred 
Roach, emphasised that public order had to be preserved at all cost, including the 
decisive use of force, against an alleged communist-backed opposition.1024 Although 
the two views expressed by Leeman and Sixishe are different, what they have in 
common is the acknowledgment that human rights violations, including excessive 
use of force, did take place within the police service during this period. The 
difference lies in whether such violations were proportionate to the harm that the 
country was facing at the time and therefore justified or not. 
 
Noted incidents in which the PMU used force against BCP supporters include the 
Thaba-Bosiu killings of December 1965 in which ten people died when opposition 
and monarchy supporters clashed with the state security forces when their meeting 
was intercepted pursuant to a law inherited from the colonial administration.1025 
                                                          
1020 Matlosa & Pule (note 146 above) 41; RS Weisfelder ‘Free elections and political instability in 
Lesotho’ (2015) 14 (2) Journal of African Elections 52, who argues that the BNP, which had lost to the 
BCP retained power with the help of Lesotho’s security forces. 
1021 As above. 
1022 As above. 
1023 Lenka (note 716 above) 55. 
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1025 Matlosa & Pule (note 146 above) 41. 
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Although the Thaba-Bosiu killings do not amount to torture, one could argue that the 
PMU’s use of force against the BNP’s political opponents in 1965 set precedence 
and created a culture that could facilitate the use, by those in government, of 
excessive force, including torture against political adversaries in violation of 
Lesotho’s international human rights obligations. There is no case law or human 
rights report, which shows that the families of the people, who died in the Thaba-
Bosiu killings, received any form of compensation from the government. Nor were 
there investigations or criminal and disciplinary action taken against members of the 
PMU who were involved in this operation. The pattern of killings with impunity started 
from this period of embryonic democracy and the discussion relating to other political 
phases in the next sections will reflect that this state of affairs persists to date, fifty 
years after independence.  
 
In the majority of cases in which members of the police service committed human 
rights violations, including torture, they acted on the basis of laws, which justified 
their actions. One of the laws, which created space for the arrest, detention and 
ultimately torture of people, mainly political adversaries, during this period, was the 
Internal Security (General) Act (ISA) 1967. Although it was later repealed and 
replaced by two others,1026 the 1967 Act allowed police officers to arrest suspects 
without warrants and to detain them without charges for prolonged periods.1027 It is 
during the prolonged detentions that the rights of suspects were violated. Many were 
subjected to torture as a result of which some died in police custody.1028 In its 
analysis of factors, which expose individuals to torture, the APT has identified 
detention as a major factor.1029 Therefore, by authorising prolonged detention, the 
Internal Security Act created an environment conducive for politically motivated 
torture. 
 
The political situation immediately after independence was fairly stable until the next 
elections in 1970. However, Matlosa and Pule argue that the sour fruits of human 
rights violations, including torture during the one party rule from 1970 to date, were 
                                                          
1026 ISA 1982 & ISA 1984. 
1027 ISA 1967 allowed detention for up to 60 days. 
1028 Amnesty International report 1972. 
1029 APT (note 1 above). 
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sown during the BNP’s five year rule from 1965 to 1970.1030 This argument is 
supported by Rosenberg and Weisfelder’s observation that during the period of 
embryonic democracy, the majority of police force personnel were drawn from BNP 
supporters.1031 One could therefore argue that this selective recruitment based on 
political membership created a partisan police force, which would easily follow orders 
to use force and even torture, against political opponents. Matlosa and Pule argue 
further that the sourcing of police personnel from the ruling party of that time, 
provided a back-up for the then Prime Minister, which in turn encouraged him to 
declare a state of emergency and stage the 1970 coup.1032 During the state of 
emergency, a number of political opponents were arrested and detained. Cases of 
torture following the 1970 declaration of a state of emergency are discussed below. 
 
4.2.3 Torture during the period of a state of emergency (1970 - 1986) 
 
As alluded to earlier in this chapter, the BNP won the 1965 election and was to be 
the ruling party until the following election in 1970. However, during the 1970 
election, before the results for all constituencies could be announced, the Prime 
Minister and leader of the BNP, acting in terms of section 21 of the Constitution of 
1966 and the Emergency Powers Act of 1966,1033 declared a state of emergency,1034 
annulled the elections1035 and suspended the Constitution.1036 Although the Prime 
Minister claimed that the election had not been free and fair because threats had 
been made against BNP supporters, constitutional and political analysts, such as 
Maqutu and Matlosa, argue that the Prime Minister was aware that the BCP had won 
most constituencies, and would defeat the BNP and therefore declared the state of 
emergency in order to maintain his grip on power, which he did for almost sixteen 
                                                          
1030 Matlosa & Pule (note 146 above) 66. 
1031 Rosenberg & Weisfelder (note 677 above) 472. 
1032 Matlosa & Pule (note 991 above) 42. 
 1033 Emergency Powers Act No. 14 of 1966. 
1034 Proclamation No. 1 of 1970. 
1035 Annulment affirmed by the Council of Ministers through The General (Invalidation) Order No.4 of 
1970. 
1036 The 1966 Constitution was suspended and replaced with Lesotho Order No.1 of 1970 which 
created amongst others, the executive and the legislative arms of government. The suspension was 
confirmed by The Constitution (Suspension) Order No.2 of 1970 made by the Council of Ministers. 
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years thereafter.1037 A conclusion that could be drawn from Maqutu and Matlosa’s 
observations is that the Prime Minister found comfort in the BNP’s hegemony and 
control over state security apparatus which he would then use to cling to power until 
1986 when his government was ousted through a military coup. 
 
Following the declaration of a state of emergency, the banning of political parties and 
the suspension of the 1966 Constitution in 1970, Lesotho experienced both political 
and legal instability. The instability was a result of the animosity between the self-
imposed BNP government and supporters of the opposition BCP. This era was 
characterised by many incidents of violence, arrests and detentions of political 
activists and critics of government, as well as the enactment of draconian laws, 
which justified and created space for human rights violations, as will be illustrated 
below.  Because official records reflecting the number of people who were detained 
in this era under the Internal Security (General) Acts of 1967, 1974 and 1984 are not 
available from official police records, analysis in this section of the research is based 
on data reported in the annual reports of Amnesty International.1038  
 
BCP supporters who opposed the Prime Minister’s move to annul the elections were 
arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act (General) of 1967, which 
permitted in communicado detention for up to sixty days.1039 One could therefore 
argue that increased periods of detention under the Internal Security (General) Act of 
1967 coupled with a huge number of political detainees during the state of 
emergency, contributed to the occurrence of torture in Lesotho. In the majority of 
reported cases, torture was alleged to have been committed by the police during 
interrogation.1040  
 
                                                          
1037 Maqutu (note 703 above) 33; K Matlosa ‘Lesotho’ in G Cawthra, A du Pisani & A Omari (eds) 
Security and democracy in Southern Africa (2007) 81; J D'Oliveira ‘Lesotho: 20 years of iron-fisted 
rule comes to an end’ (1986) 16 (1) Africa Insight 7. 
1038 Amnesty International has compiled reports of human rights abuses in all parts of the world, 
Lesotho included. Its work covers acts of torture and CIDT and contributed to the international ban on 
torture and the adoption of international standards against torture. Since it is an international 
organisation, which had no political interest in Lesotho, its findings are credible and are not influenced 
by the political ideologies, which prevailed in Lesotho at a particular period. 
1039 ISA 1967 section13. 
1040 Amnesty International Report (1972) 24. 
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An undisclosed number of members and supporters of the BCP, including its leader, 
Ntsu Mokhehle, were detained under ISA Act 1967 in 1970.1041 There were 
allegations that during their detention, some of the detainees were subjected to 
various forms of torture.1042 Many of the detainees were released in January 
1972.1043 Their release was commended by Amnesty International as a positive step 
towards eradication of torture in Lesotho and 1973 was marked as the period during 
which Lesotho politics were normalised.1044  
 
Contrary to the political normalisation that Amnesty International had forecasted in 
1973, in the following years, Lesotho experienced worse political instability and 
cases of torture increased.1045 Supporters of the BCP, including those who had been 
released from detention went into exile in neighbouring South Africa. While in exile 
they formed a paramilitary organisation, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA).1046 The 
LLA claimed responsibility for attacks launched against government’s essential 
facilities, such as hospitals, police stations, post offices, the international airport, two 
main hotels, as well as the deaths of government ministers and officials.1047 In 1974, 
there was also an abortive coup, which attempted to oust the BNP government.1048 
These attacks and the abortive coup, Lenka argues, precipitated the enactment of 
the Internal Security (General) Act of 1974, which replaced the 1967 Act. 1049 About 
170 people were arrested pursuant to the ISA 1974, but only 40 of them were tried 
and convicted for treason, while others were released without charges.1050 
 
Apart from the recorded detentions, the Internal Security (General) Act of 1974 
became a basis for arrest and detention without trial of several other people who 
were linked to BCP and activities of its military wing, the LLA. Although it did not 
authorise torture, the 1974 Act had provisions, which insulated the commission of 
                                                          
1041 As above. 
1042 As above. 
1043 Amnesty International Report (1973) 29 - 32. 
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1045 Amnesty International Report (1982). 
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torture. It retained the in communicado detention for up to sixty days, which was in 
the ISA 1967.1051 It also ousted courts’ jurisdiction in relation to people detained 
under its provisions.1052  
 
Because of extensive detention powers under the 1974 Act, the police used it to 
arrest and detain government critics, only to release them later without any charges. 
In 1980, four academic staff of the National University were arrested and detained 
for several weeks and released later without any charges.1053 In 1981, 40 other 
people were arrested and detained in relation to the airport and hotel bombings.1054 
In the same year, an undisclosed number of college students were arrested and 
detained in communicado in relation to bombings, which took place in Teya-
Teyaneng.1055 The following year, 1982, the LLA launched further attacks, which 
claimed the lives of two government ministers. Following this attack, an undisclosed 
number of suspects were arrested and detained under the ISA 1974.1056  
 
Amnesty International and other international organisations condemned the arrests 
and the Internal Security Act’s failure to comply with international standards. 
Consequently, it was repealed and replaced with Internal Security (General) Act of 
1984. The ISA 1984 contained some safeguards meant for the protection of 
detainees. For instance, it reduced the period of detention without trial from 60 days 
to 14 days. Further detention of up to 28 days could only be done with the approval 
of the commissioner of police (COMPOL). A further period of up to 42 days had to be 
authorised by the Minister.1057 However, it was also incompatible with international 
human rights standards against torture in that it retained a provision in terms of 
which the police could not be prosecuted for acts committed in the preservation of 
public order and national security.1058  The granting of immunity to perpetrators of 
human rights violation is tantamount to robbing victims off justice for such violations, 
                                                          
1051 ISA 1974; Amnesty International Report (1980) 53. 
1052 Maqutu (note 703 above) 67. 
1053 Amnesty International Report (1981) 52. 
1054 Amnesty International Report (1982) 49. 
1055 As above. 
1056 Amnesty International Report (1983) 52. 
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1058 As above. 
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as it fails to provide them with full reparation and the guarantee of non-repetition of 
such acts. This practice is incompatible with states’ obligations under ICCPR, CAT 
and the African Charter.1059 
 
Despite the reduction of the detention period under the ISA 1984, the police 
continued to detain people suspected of political offences in communicado beyond 
the permitted periods. For instance, despite the permitted 14 days without a charge, 
one, Thakane Mohapi, who was then pregnant, was arrested, detained and only 
released 17 days later without charge.1060 Hape Tsakatsi and his sister, Maleopo 
Tsakatsi, were detained in communicado for over a month and then released without 
charges.1061 Hape reported that he had been assaulted by the police during 
interrogation.1062 Although the exact numbers are not ascertainable from its report, 
Amnesty International also discovered that there were other people who were 
detained for three or more months and then released without any charges.1063  Their 
detentions had not been authorised by the Minister as required by ISA1984.1064 
Therefore, despite some safeguards, which were contained in the Internal Security 
Act, in practice human rights violations continued to take place. The culture of 
prolonged detention and detentions as forms of punishment with no intention to 
prosecute continued. It could therefore be argued that because of the immunisation 
provision in the Act, the police detained people and released them without charges, 
knowing that no consequences in the form of criminal or civil litigation would follow 
such wrongful detentions.   
 
Amnesty International reports also show that, although the number of people could 
not be verified, the majority of the political detainees who gave account of their 
arrests and detentions alleged to have been tortured by the police during 
                                                          
1059 HRC, GC 20 para 1; HRC, GC 29 para 3; Committee against Torture, GC 2 para 5 in which the 
Committee against Torture reiterated states’ obligation to remove amnesties and any impediments, 
which preclude prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of torture.  
1060See Joint Applications of Masebitsa Molise v Commander of Police & Others and Mamokhele 
Mohatla v Commissioner of Police & 2 Others CIV/APNS/107 and 108/1983 (High Court) 28 June 
1983. See also Amnesty International Report (1984) 61. 
1061 Amnesty International Report (1986) 59. 
1062 As above. 
1063 Amnesty International Report (1984) 61. 
1064 ISA 1984 section 15. 
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interrogation.1065  Some allegations of torture were also reported during criminal 
trials. An example is the case in which one woman and eleven men were arrested, 
detained, charged and prosecuted for treason. All twelve were, however, 
acquitted.1066 During trial, one of the accused persons testified that he was subjected 
to torture during interrogation. His evidence was that he was blindfolded and 
severely beaten by the police to the point that he confessed to being a member of 
the LLA.  
 
The allegations of torture and ill-treatment by the police also resulted in the deaths of 
about five detainees recorded by Amnesty International to have died in police 
custody under suspicious circumstances.1067 However, since there were no proper 
detention records within the police stations, there could have been more deaths than 
those formally recorded. Following the detention of college students in October 1981, 
the government announced that one, Setipa Mathaba, who was amongst the 
detained students, died in custody.1068 In violation of the obligation to prohibit torture 
by promptly investigating its allegations and punishing its perpetrators, no 
investigations were made into circumstances, which led to Mathaba’s death until four 
years later.1069 However, information obtained by Amnesty International was that his 
death resulted from being assaulted by the police while in detention.1070 The 
following year, Sophie Makhele was also reported to have died in custody.1071 
Details of her death were not disclosed.  
 
Although the police reported that some suspects had committed suicide while in 
detention, medical reports often suggested that the suspects had been killed and 
that the alleged suicide was faked.1072 Daniel Moeketsi was found dead, hanging 
                                                          
1065 Amnesty International Report (1981) 52; Amnesty International Report (1982) 51. 
1066 Amnesty International Report (1985) 58. 
1067 Amnesty International Reports (1981 to 1992). 
1068 Amnesty International Report (1982) 51. 
1069 SAPS v SALC (note 188 above) 81 in which the South African Constitutional Court held that the 
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comply; CAT article 12; Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above) paras 3.4 & 7.4. 
1070 Amnesty International Report (1986) 59. 
1071 Amnesty International Report (1983) 52. 
1072 Amnesty International Report (1983) 52 gave account of Moeli Tšenoli who the police said burnt 
himself alive for fear of being detained again; Amnesty International Report (1985) 58. In this report, 
Khahlanyetso Masheane was found dead in a police cell and the police claimed that he had committed 
suicide by hanging himself with his belt in the cell. A medical report, however, indicated that 
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over a cliff after he was arrested and detained.1073 The police claimed that he had 
disappeared from police custody and presumably threw himself over the cliff to avoid 
being re-arrested.1074 However, the medical report suggested that he must have 
been pushed over the cliff whilst still handcuffed.1075 The circumstances under which 
detainees died in police custody, the post-mortem reports by pathologists, as well as 
allegations of torture by other detainees lead to a conclusion that such deaths were a 
result of torture. Amnesty International attributed the deaths to what was discovered 
as ‘prima facie evidence of brutal and potentially fatal systems of interrogation and 
cruel and inhuman conditions of detention’, which it had uncovered during its 
investigations in Lesotho.1076 
 
Despite it having an international obligation to do so, 1077 the government of Lesotho 
failed to thoroughly investigate the allegations of torture stipulated above. It also took 
an unreasonably long time to investigate the deaths of suspects who died at the 
hands of the police.1078 In the limited cases in which investigations were made, no 
action was taken against responsible police officers. For instance, inquests were 
made in relation to some of the above cases including the deaths of Motuba, 
Masheane and Mathaba.1079  A pathologist, who carried out the post-mortem 
examination, reported the cause of death to be injuries sustained during 
interrogation.1080 The Magistrate referred the matters to the DPP for prosecution.1081 
Although it may be argued that the inquests were carried out in fulfilment of 
Lesotho’s obligation to investigate allegations of torture, the inquests can be 
criticised for failure to adhere to the international human rights standards discussed 
in chapter 2 for two reasons: firstly, although the causes of death were identified as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
considering the position in which his body was found, he must have died prior to being hung with the 
belt to simulate suicide. 
1073 Amnesty International Report (1985) 56; Lenka (note 716 above) 55. 
1074 As above. 
1075 As above 
1076 Amnesty International Report (1985) 58. 
1077 SAPS v SALC (note 188 above) 81; CAT article 12; Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 
above) paras 3.4 & 7.4. 
1078 Halimi-Nedzibi v Austria (note 383 above) para 13.5 in which the Committee against Torture 
considered a period of 15 months before initiating investigations to be unreasonably long. 
1079 Amnesty International Report (1985) 58. 
1080 As above. 
1081 As above. 
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assault, police officers responsible for such assaults were not identified.1082 
Secondly, despite the magistrates’ referral of the cases to the DPP, no criminal 
proceedings were instituted against the implicated officers. The failure to prosecute 
could also be attributed to the insulation of impunity by the immunisation provision 
which was contained in both ISA 1974 and ISA 1984 in violation of Lesotho’s 
international human rights obligations.1083  
 
During the state of emergency, the BNP government enacted the Human Rights Act 
of 1983, which entered into force in 1985. The Human Rights Act was a reaction to 
pressure from the international community, which vehemently condemned human 
rights violations, which were taking place in Lesotho.1084 The Human Rights Act was, 
however, criticised for having flaws, which made it fall short of human rights 
protection. For instance, Lenka argues that it did not rescue the situation because 
although it was a human rights Act, it did not have a Bill of Rights, which was 
previously enshrined in the 1966 Constitution.1085 Secondly, the guarantees it 
provided for were subject to the existing laws, including the ISA. The effect of this 
was that, although it provided for the right to be tried within a reasonable time and for 
freedom from torture and CIDT,1086 such reasonable time was subject to the 60 days 
under ISA 1974.1087 The Human Rights Act was also compromised by the provision 
of immunity to the police and other officials from civil or criminal prosecution when 
they acted in preservation of ‘good order or public safety and to prevent internal 
disorder’.1088  A consequence of immunising the police from prosecution is that 
victims of torture and members of their families did not get any form of redress in 
violation of Lesotho’s obligation to provide redress to victims of torture and other 
human rights violations.1089 
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An unstable political climate during the state of emergency and the BNP one-party 
rule from 1970 resulted in a military coup in 1986. The RLDF deposed the BNP 
government by force and took over government.1090 Lesotho was then under military 
rule and the police service also under direct control of the army. The impact on 
police torture that was brought about by the change of government is discussed 
below. 
 
4.2.4 Torture during the period of military rule (1986 - 1993) 
 
The BNP’s sixteen-year rule ended in 1986 when the RLDF, led by Major General 
Metsing Lekhanya, toppled it through a military coup.1091 Following this coup, senior 
officers and other members of the RLDF who had opposed the coup were 
arrested.1092 They were allegedly subjected to torture by members of the Lesotho 
Mounted Police.1093 The alleged torture led to the death of some officers in police 
custody and some shortly after being released from detention. Brigadier 
Ramotšekhoane, Colonel Sehlabo and Sergeant Tjane are some of the victims of 
police torture who died in police detention during this period.1094 The three died 
around March 1986. Inquests were made into the deaths of the two senior officers 
and none was made with respect to the sergeant’s death.1095 The inquests revealed 
that Brigadier Ramotšekhoane died from respiratory failure as a result of cerebral 
trauma caused by blows to the head while he was in custody, while Colonel Sehlabo 
died from secondary septicaemia, which resulted from infection to the burns, which 
had been inflicted on him while in detention.1096 The inquests identified the cause of 
the deaths, but failed to identify the perpetrators in violation of the obligation to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rights violations include compensation; Urmatbek Akunov v Kyrgyzstan (note 272 above) para 10 in 
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1091 As above. 
1092 Amnesty International Report (1992) 171. 
1093 As above. 
1094 Amnesty International Report (1987) 65. 
1095 Failure to launch an inquest into the death of sergeant Tjane violates Lesotho’s obligations under 
articles 2(3) and 7 of ICCPR, as well as article 12 of CAT.  
1096 Amnesty International Report (1988) 39.  
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investigate allegations of torture in order to establish the nature of the acts, the 
circumstances under which they occurred, as well as to identify the persons who 
were involved in such acts.1097 
 
Other people who were subjected to torture by members of the LMPS during this 
period include Lakia Pholo who was an official of Lesotho Bank.1098 He was arrested 
in July 1989 on suspicion of the commission of a crime. In his evidence in a civil 
case for damages against the state, he testified that on arrival at the police station, a 
blanket was thrown over his head, tied with a rope and a tyre thrown around his 
neck.1099 He was then handcuffed and stripped of his trousers and underpants.1100 
Crushed stones were put in his shoes and he was ordered to jump up and down. He 
was beaten on the hands and thighs and pinched on the thighs with an object, which 
he identified as a pair of pliers.1101 He lost consciousness and when he regained it, 
he found that the blanket had been removed. He was ordered to stand and when he 
could not because of the pain and numbness in his hands and feet, his interrogators 
inserted a stick into his anus, pulled it out and put it in his mouth.1102 He was finally 
given his clothes, handcuffed and forced to spend most of the night standing. He 
was released two days later without a charge.1103 He lodged a case for damages, 
which the High Court awarded because the Attorney General, who represented 
government, did not deny the alleged torture. However, despite the Court’s finding in 
the civil claim for damages that Lakia had been tortured, no criminal investigations 
were carried out to identify the perpetrators so that they could be prosecuted and 
punished accordingly. This could be influenced by the fact that there is no law, which 
criminalises torture law in Lesotho. The absence of an anti- torture law in Lesotho, 
which resulted in the failure to investigate with the view to prosecute and punish, 
thus violated a number of Lesotho’s international human rights obligations to 
                                                          
1097 Elaiba v Tunisia (note 377 above) para 7.6; F.K. v Denmark para 7.7 (note 484 above); Dzemajl v 
Yugoslavia (note 380 above) para 9.4; Abad v Spain (note 379 above). 
1098 Amnesty International Report Lesotho: Torture, political killings and abuses against trade unionists 
(1992) 7. 
1099 As above. 
1100 As above. 
1101 As above. 
1102 As above. 
1103 As above. 
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criminalise torture,1104 to investigate its allegations1105 and to prosecute and punish 
its perpetrators.1106 
 
The military regime ruled through a Military Council, which enacted laws referred to 
as Orders.1107 It issued a number of Orders in terms of which people who were 
tortured during this period could not lodge claims against the state. For instance, in 
August 1987, the families of Sehlabo and Ramotšekhoane lodged claims for 
damages against the government, but could not obtain any form of redress because 
of an Order in terms of which the state was granted immunity from civil litigation 
concerning all acts committed between 1986 and January 1988.1108 After 1988, civil 
claims, such as the one of Lakia Pholo were entertained and victims redressed 
although no criminal charges were lodged against implicated police officers. 
  
In 1991, another military coup, headed by Ramaema, toppled the Lekhanya-led 
government.1109 This group justified the coup on the ground that it was meant to 
restore power to the civilians.1110 In 1992, general elections were held and in 1993, a 
new government led by the BCP, which had won the democratic elections by an 
overwhelming majority, took power.  
  
4.2.5 Torture during the period of fragile democracy (1993 - 2012) 
 
In 1993, Lesotho returned to multi-party democracy and adopted a new Constitution. 
The 1993 Constitution established several organs of state, including the Police 
Force.1111 Lesotho experienced a number of political upheavals, which resulted in 
civil unrest, mutiny, killings, torture and detention during the period between 1993 
                                                          
1104 CAT article 4. 
1105 CAT articles 12 & 13; Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above) para 3.4 in which the 
Committee against Torture held that where there is a complaint about torture, the state has an 
obligation to promptly investigate such allegation. 
1106 CAT article 4; HRC, GC 20 paras 14 & 15 in which articles 2(3) and 7 were interpreted to entail the 
duty to prosecute and punish perpetrators of torture. 
1107 National Constituent Assembly Order, 1990 section 13(2) which provided that ‘All laws made by 
the Military Council shall be styled “orders”…; Tsang & Others v Minister of Foreign Affairs & Others 
(High Court) 25 February 1992 [1992] LSHC 23. para 3. 
1108 Amnesty International Report (1988) 49. 
1109 ‘Nyane (note 1079 above) 72. 
1110 As above. 
1111 Constitution section147. 
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and 2012, hence, Matlosa and Pule categorised this era as a period of fragile 
democracy.1112 Most of the political instability centred on the involvement of the army 
in politics and resulted in clashes within the army, between the army and the police, 
as well as within the police itself.1113 Later on, when efforts to civilise and 
professionalise the police were amplified, the police force was moved from the 
Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Home Affairs and Public Safety.1114 This was 
followed by the repeal of all laws, which governed the police, amendment of the 
Constitution to remove the word ‘force’ and promulgation of the Police Service Act of 
1998.1115 Matlosa rightly points out that the change to Police Service was one of the 
steps to professionalise, depoliticise and demilitarise the police in order to ensure 
efficiency and to eradicate corruption, as well as human rights violations, including 
torture of suspects.1116 
 
The Police Service Act must be commended for an attempt to implement Lesotho’s 
human rights obligations against torture in several ways although it still faces some 
challenges. Firstly, the Act does not have a provision, which immunises the police 
from prosecution. Section 43 of the Act provides for discipline of the police while 
section 54 provides for their criminal prosecution. That is, under this Act, the police 
can no longer commit criminal offences with impunity. Secondly, the Act establishes 
the PCA, a civilian body with a mandate to oversee the operations of the police 
service.1117 These two major steps notwithstanding, the main challenge of the Police 
Service Act, which falls short of implementation of the obligation under article 4 of 
CAT, is that the Act does not list torture as one of the offences for which disciplinary 
action or criminal prosecution may be taken against the police. 
 
The period between 1993 and 1998 did not only see change in attempts to 
professionalise the police and the military, but Lesotho also began submitting state 
                                                          
1112 Matlosa & Pule (note 991 above). 
1113 ’Nyane (note 1079 above) who analyses the involvement of the army in Lesotho politics from 1993 
to the present.  
1114 Dissel & Frank (note 977 above) 6. 
1115 Third Amendment to the Constitution Act 1997 section 2. 
1116 Matlosa (note 1026 above) 85. 
1117 Police Service Act section 22. 
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party reports to various human rights treaty bodies, including the HRC.1118 In 1998, 
Lesotho’s initial report to the HRC, which was due in 1993, was submitted, five years 
after its due date.1119 In this report, as well as in the meetings held between the 
Committee and Lesotho’s delegates, members of the HRC raised concerns that 
‘[t]here had also been numerous reports of the widespread torture and ill-treatment 
of detainees and of extrajudicial killings’.1120 In response, the delegates admitted that 
there had been torture in Lesotho, which was influenced by political instability prior to 
1998, but which had since stopped.1121 Another concern was that Lesotho ‘seemed 
to focus more on protecting detainees from torture rather than on suppressing and 
criminalising the practice of torture’.1122 The member also ‘wondered, in fact, whether 
national law characterized torture as a crime and, if so, how it was punished’.1123 He 
stated that ‘[i]t was not enough to ratify the Convention against Torture’, but there 
should be a step further to investigate the reports of torture and to punish the 
perpetrators.1124 
 
During the same year, Lesotho submitted a combined seventh to fourteenth report to 
the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination.1125 These reports were due between 
1984 and 1998 and were considered on 17 and 20 March 2000.  The combined 
report did not contain any information relating to the protection from violence as 
required by CERD article 5. In its concluding observations, the CERD Committee 
raised concerns about expressions of xenophobia, which result in racial 
discrimination, as well as the absence of a law, which criminalises and penalises 
                                                          
1118 HRC, Initial report of Lesotho 16 October 1998, UN Doc CCPR/C/81/Add.14 paras 58 & 59 in 
which Lesotho acknowledged that the ISA 1984 had been used by previous governments to justify 
detention of political opponents and other human rights violations. The government also undertook 
that victims may approach courts of law for compensation despite the amnesty granted to members of 
defence forces and LLA. 
1119 Lesotho’s initial report to the Human Rights Committee (note 1107 above); 1743rd Meeting (note 
950 above) para 55 in which a Committee member stated that there was no justification for the delay 
as the political instability, which was raised by the Lesotho delegation took place in September 1994 
and the report could have been submitted thereafter. 
1120 Summary Record 1743rd meeting (note 950 above) para 77; HRC, Concluding Observations on 
Lesotho’s initial report (note 974 above) para 16.  
1121 As above. 
1122 As above para 79. 
1123 As above. 
1124 As above. 
1125 CERD Committee Seventh to fourteenth periodic report of Lesotho  8 September 1998, UN Doc 
CERD/C/337/Add.1 
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such acts.1126 The Committee also urged Lesotho to establish effective remedies to 
comply with obligations under articles 2, 4 and 6 of CERD.  
 
Lesotho’s initial report to the CRC Committee was also submitted in 1998 although it 
was considered in 2001.1127 In its concluding observations, the CRC Committee 
raised its concern that the legal framework of Lesotho did not fully implement CRC 
and that there were acts of violence against children, including corporal 
punishment,1128  and beatings by law enforcement officials whose acts were not 
investigated and subjected to the criminal justice system.1129 The Committee 
recommended the establishment of a child-friendly complaint and investigation 
system and to ensure that perpetrators of violence against children do not enjoy 
impunity.1130 This recommendation was heeded in the Education Act 2010 and 
CPWA 2011, which are discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Despite the change in political landscape from 1993 to 2012, as well greater 
observance of human rights as illustrated by the fulfilment of reporting obligations, 
incidents of torture continued to take place within the LMPS although most of them 
were not outlined in the state party reports. This dire situation is reflected in the 
number of civil claims for damages arising out of torture, as well as anecdotal reports 
of torture considered below.  
 
In the case of Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General v Neo 
Rantjanyana,1131 Rantjanyana, a police officer was awarded damages for unlawful 
arrest, pain and suffering. In the High Court, the Commissioner of Police who was 
then the first defendant admitted that Rantjanyana was unlawfully arrested by 
another policeman on the allegation that he had aided Phakiso Molise to escape 
from prison. Rantjanyana was detained for three days, during which he was severely 
                                                          
1126 CERD Committee Concluding observations to Lesotho’s combined seventh to fourteenth report  
19 April 2000, UN Doc CERD/C/304/Add.99 para 7. 
1127 Lesotho’s initial report to CRC 
1128 CRC Concluding observations on Lesotho’s initial report para 31. 
1129 As above para 33. 
1130 As above para 34. 
1131 Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General v Neo Rantjanyana (2011) LSCA 42. 
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assaulted and then released without a charge.1132 After his release, he lodged the 
civil claim for damages against the Commissioner of Police for the torture he 
suffered. However, the LMPS did not investigate the allegations and no criminal 
prosecutions were carried out. That is, although the obligation to provide redress to 
the victim of torture as per article 14 of CAT has been fulfilled, this case also shows 
failure to comply with the obligation to investigate allegations of torture and to 
prosecute its perpetrators as mandated by articles 4, 12 and 13 of CAT.  
 
In Taole v Sehloho and others,1133 Taole, the plaintiff, alleged that he was arrested 
on suspicion of having stolen a laptop at his workplace. He was questioned about 
the laptop and when he indicated that he knew nothing about it, a police officer by 
the name of Sehloho, the first defendant, told him that he was going to ‘vomit the 
laptop’.1134  He was then handcuffed and ordered to take off his clothes still 
handcuffed. He was left naked and assaulted by the first defendant, who also kicked 
him in the ribs. He was then suffocated with a tube as a result of which he fainted 
about three times, and as this process was being repeated, vomited blood and 
urinated on himself.1135 The defendants, Sehloho and the Commissioner of Police, 
did not dispute liability, but challenged the amount he claimed as damages. The 
claim was upheld and Taole was awarded damages for the assault, unlawful arrest 
and detention and for medical expenses.1136 The Court expressed great concern 
about the practice of torture in police stations in Lesotho and noted that ‘it is a pity 
that it is always money coming from the government coffers that is going to be paid 
as compensation’.1137 
 
In Motiane v Officer Commanding Mabote Police Station and others, Hlajoane J 
awarded Motiane, the plaintiff, damages for pain and suffering, contumelia and 
medical expenses.1138 The Plaintiff had testified before the Court that he was 
arrested on suspicion of having killed Malitonki. Upon arrest, he was taken by four 
                                                          
1132 As above para 3. 
1133 Taole v Sehloho and others (2012) LSHC 68. 
1134  As above para 6. 
1135 As above paras 12 - 15. 
1136 As above para 46. 
1137 As above para 33. 
1138 Motiane v Officer Commanding Mabote Police Station and others (2010) LSHC 81. 
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police officers to an old building that used to be a hotel.1139 He was ordered to take 
off his clothes, handcuffed and tied with a rope. Whilst on the ground, one police 
officer sat on his back, he was suffocated with a tube, cold water was poured over 
him and he was ordered to wear wet clothes, not allowed to use the toilet, given stale 
bread and then released three days later without a charge. The Commissioner of 
Police, who was first defendant in the matter, did not dispute liability, but the amount 
in damages claimed. The Court stated in obiter that the ‘plaintiff was assaulted by 
the police in an effort of forcing him to admit that he had killed Malitonki’. This obiter 
thus highlights the motive for which the complainant was tortured, which is one of the 
prohibited purposes in article 1(1) of CAT. 1140  In a fashion similar to Sehloho case 
above, the Court awarded damages and no further criminal proceedings were 
initiated against the perpetrators. That is, states’ obligation to investigate and 
prosecute perpetrators of torture was not complied with. 
 
The case of one, Tšeliso Thatjane, who was arrested for suspicion of having stolen a 
DVD, is one of those cases, which although not taken to court, attracted international 
and local media attention.1141 It was reported that Thatjane’s wife was arrested and 
held in custody until Thatjane surrendered himself to the police. He was beaten and 
suffocated several times while in police detention.1142 The victim in this case did not 
lodge a case against Compol. This case represents many other cases which reflect 
the lack of access to justice for victims of police torture.1143 There are many factors, 
which influence this status: lack of information on human rights, including absolute 
prohibition of torture, lack of finances to lodge civil claims against the government, 
failure of the LMPS to carry out investigations and take perpetrators, who are mostly 
members of LMPS to the courts of law and failure of institutions, such as the PCA 
and Office of the Ombudsman to publicise their mandate to the people of Lesotho. 
All these factors stem from Lesotho’s failure to incorporate the international human 
                                                          
1139 As above (unnumbered pages and paras). 
1140 As above (unnumbered pages and paragraphs). In Evloev v Kazakhstan (note 111 above) para 
9.2, the Committee against Torture held that similar acts of beatings and choking amount to torture as 
defined in article 1 of CAT.  
1141 US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Lesotho (2012) 2. 
1142 As above.  
1143 Due to limited knowledge about their rights and how and where they can vindicate them, many 
victims of torture in Lesotho do not report it. 
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rights standards against torture into the national legal and institutional frameworks as 
illustrated in chapter 3. 
 
4.2.6  Torture during the period of coalition government (2012 - 2016) 
 
4.2.6.1  First three-party coalition government 
 
Lesotho had the first coalition government following general elections in May 2012 
whose results were such that no political party obtained an outright majority on the 
basis of which it could form a government.1144 Three political parties, the All Basotho 
Convention (ABC), the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the Basotho 
National Party (BNP) formed a coalition government which was led by Thomas 
Thabane of ABC who became Lesotho’s Prime Minister and was deputised by the 
leader of the LCD, Mothetjoa Metsing.1145 The three-party coalition government 
shuffled ministries that existed in the previous government and also created new 
ones. Amongst the changes were the removal of the police service from the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and the creation of a new Ministry of Police.1146 The Minister of 
Police became the Prime Minister, Thomas Thabane, who was Minister of Home 
Affairs and therefore responsible for the police in the previous LCD government. 
 
Thabane took a very hard stance towards crime prevention and stressed that his 
Ministry would not to go easy on criminals, and urged the police to use force, to ‘fight 
fire with fire.1147 Although the statements did not specifically authorise torture, they 
could, however, be interpreted as condoning torture as they encouraged the use of 
force where such would be justified as a crime-prevention strategy. The view that 
Thabane’s government condoned the use of torture as an interrogation tool could 
also be supported by the fact that during his two-year rule, there were more civil suits 
and media reports about police torture than in any other period.1148 In a media report, 
                                                          
1144 TW Letsie ‘The 2012 general elections in Lesotho: A step towards the consolidation of democracy’ 
(2013) 12 (1) Journal of African Elections 66. See also Weisfelder (note 1009 above) 51. 
1145 As above. 
1146 Legal Notice of 2012. 
1147 B Ntaote ‘Jail or death’ Lesotho Times 10 October 2013 www.lestimes.com/jail-or-death/ 
[Accessed 16 April 2017].   
1148 United States Department of State Lesotho 2012 Human Rights Report (2013) 1; United States 
Department of State Lesotho 2013 Human Rights Report (2014) 2; United States Department of State 
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two men of Tšakholo and Ha Keketsi died in Mafeteng Police Station in January 
2013.1149 At the time of this research, about three years after the deaths, 
investigations have not been carried out and no criminal prosecutions have been 
undertaken. These cases may, therefore, be amongst those in which torture is 
committed with impunity in Lesotho. 
 
The cases of PM v Commissioner of Police and MM v Commissioner of Police and 
others present a sexual form of torture, which was inflicted on female suspects.1150 In 
both cases the victims of torture are women who were arrested on 28 December 
2012.1151 Upon their arrival at the police station, they were ordered to take off their 
clothes, to sit down with their legs apart and the male police officers inserted fingers 
and sticks in their genitalia.1152 In the process, some police officers insulted them 
and assaulted them with sticks and fists.1153 The complainants lodged cases for 
damages in the High Court. The Commissioner of Police did not dispute liability but 
negotiated with the complainants’ lawyer that the amounts claimed in the summons 
be reduced. A settlement was reached and the matter was settled out of Court.1154 
Both criminal and disciplinary action was taken against the two police officers who 
had been identified by the victims as the perpetrators. The alleged police officers 
were remanded on bail. However, they fled and the disciplinary and criminal cases 
are still pending.1155 In these cases, the LMPS must be commended for 
implementing Lesotho’s obligations under ICCPR, CAT and African Charter to 
investigate allegations of torture, to prosecute its perpetrators and provide redress to 
its victims. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Lesotho 2014 Human Rights Report (2015) 2. The reports reflect a total number of 12 deaths in police 
custody, 32 cases of torture, which were investigated and the torture of 129 villagers who were 
arrested during a police operation to search for illegal firearms in their village. 
1149 ‘Police Brutality causes unnecessary expenses’ Informative 14 January 2013 
http://informativenews.co.ls [accessed 26 November 2013]. 
1150 PM v Commissioner of Police CIV/T/264/2012 (unreported) and MM v Commissioner of Police and 
others CIV/T/310/12 (unreported). The cases in the High Court are cited in the full names of the 
victims. However, due to the sensitivity of the facts, the author has elected to identify the case by 
using initials only. 
1151 Plaintiff’s Declaration annexed to the Summons (unreported) 
1152 As above. 
1153 As above. 
1154 Deed of Settlement filed of record (unreported) 
1155 Information supplied by the lawyer representing the two victims in PM v Commissioner of Police 
and MM v Commissioner of Police (note 1139 above). 
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In joint police and military operations, villagers have complained of being physically 
and emotionally tormented by both the police and soldiers who forced them to give 
information relating to illegal firearms. For instance, the police officers of Berea 
raided the village of Thota-peli in the district of Berea in the early hours in search of 
illegal firearms. Many villagers, men and women, including pregnant women were, 
regardless of their age, dragged to the chief’s place where they were collectively 
beaten and men’s private parts pulled while the women were ordered to roll in the 
cold morning dew. 1156 
 
In 2013, the LMPS investigated about twenty-four cases in which the police were 
alleged to have tortured suspects. For instance, on 1 January 2013, the Tšakholo 
Police arrested and interrogated the brother of a suspected rapist. The US 
Department of State report indicates that according to the LMPS, the police officers 
in this station tortured the brother and he died in police custody.1157 In another case, 
on 27 June 2013, members of the LMPS at Roma Police Station arrested one, 
Kabelo Makateng, for allegedly assaulting a police officer. He was released without a 
charge seven days later. Kabelo alleges that during his detention, about four police 
officers blindfolded him, burned his arms with an iron rod, poured hot water on his 
torso and assaulted him with a knobkerrie.1158 
 
In 2014, the LMPS investigated eight reported cases in which victims alleged to have 
been tortured at the hands of the police.1159 These included the case of residents of 
Ha Hlalele who were allegedly subjected to torture by the police of Ha Mokhalinyane 
Police Station.1160 The villagers claim that while the police were investigating one 
man for unlawful possession of a firearm, they dragged the villagers out of their beds 
at night, some naked while others semi-naked, assaulted them with blunt objects, 
including gun butts, sticks and knobkerries. Twenty-four residents, including women, 
                                                          
1156‘Cops terrorise villagers’ Lesotho Times 24 April 2010 http://www.sundayexpress.co.ls [accessed 
11 November 2015]. 
1157 US Department State Lesotho 2013 Human Rights Report. 
1158 At the time of submission of this research the case in which Kabelo Makateng sued Compol for 
damages is still pending before the High Court of Lesotho. 
1159 US Department of State Lesotho 2015 Human Rights Report (2016) 2. 
1160 As above. 
221 
 
were then arrested.1161 Those who were arrested and detained claim that while in 
detention, women were denied sanitary pads and those seriously injured were not 
afforded medical attention.1162 
 
The three-party coalition government was riddled with problems and it collapsed 
after two years in existence.1163 The collapse was preceded by parliament 
prorogation in June 2014 and what some scholars have termed an attempted coup 
of 30 August 2014.1164 The attempted coup involved the attack of the LDF’s 
Commander Mahao’s house, in the morning preceding his appointment, as well as 
the attack two of police stations and the State House by a group of soldiers.1165 The 
Prime Minister was tipped off about the attack and he fled to South Africa before the 
attackers arrived at the State House.1166 The BNP leader and other members of the 
LDF also fled to South Africa after being tipped off that they were going to be 
attacked.1167  
 
The failed military coup shook Lesotho’s rating as a free and democratic country as 
opposed to the ratings that it had in previous years after the restoration of 
democratically elected governments in 1993.1168 These events led to SADC 
intervention.1169 The final result of the talks and SADC intervention was for Lesotho 
to hold fresh elections as there was no longer co-operation within the coalition 
                                                          
1161 As above. 
1162 As above. 
1163Legal Notice No.42 of 2014. For further reading on the collapse of the coalition government see RF 
Weisfelder (note 1009 above) 62; ‘Nyane (note 1079 above) 79 who argues that civil-military relations 
were at the heart of collapse of Lesotho first coalition government. 
1164 Statement of Commonwealth Secretary General, Kamalesh Sharma  ‘Commonwealth Secretary 
General Statement on Lesotho’ 30 August 2014 
http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/commonwealth-secretary-generalsstatement- 
Lesotho [accessed 16 April 2017]. 
1165 ‘Nyane (note 1079 above) 63. 
1166 As above. 
1167 As above. 
1168 For instance, Freedom House, in its Freedom in the world - Lesotho  (2010), (2011), (2012), 
(2013) & (2014) rated Lesotho as a free country. However, in 2015 it gave Lesotho a downward arrow 
with a freedom rating of 2.5, a civil liberties rating of 3 and a political rights rating of 2. According to 
this report, the 2014 attempted coup, influenced the decline in the rating and increased the military 
influence in the government; Freedom House 2015, Freedom in the World – Lesotho 
http://www.refworld.org/country,,,LSO,,55cb45dc15,0.html [accessed 26 October 2015]. 
1169 TW Letsie ‘Lesotho’s February 2015 elections: A prescription that never cured the sickness’ 
(2015) 14 (2) Journal of African Elections 83. 
222 
 
government.1170 In February 2015, elections were held. Similar to the 2012 elections, 
poll results yielded no party with an outright majority on the basis of which a single-
party government could be formed.1171 This time, it took seven parties to form a 
coalition government. The Democratic Congress (DC) joined seats with the LCD and 
five other smaller parties to form a government.1172 The extent of torture within the 
LMPS during the two years of the seven-party coalition government is discussed 
below. 
 
4.2.6.2 Second seven-party coalition government 
 
It is important to indicate at the outset that at the time of submission of this thesis, 
the seven-party coalition government had just been dissolved after two years in 
existence, general elections were held on 3 June 2017 and the tenth parliament 
resumed on 12 June 2017. The dissolution of parliament follows the split of the DC 
and formation of a new political party, the Alliance for Democrats (AD) by the DC’s 
deputy leader, Monyane Moleleki. On 1 March 2017, political opposition parties, 
including the newly formed AD, tabled a vote of no confidence in Prime Minister, 
Pakalitha Mosisili. Amongst reasons advanced for the lack of confidence in the 
Prime Minister were corruption, human rights violations and failure to implement 
recommendations of the SADC/Phumaphi Commission, which are considered later 
on in this chapter. The June 2017 election results yielded yet another coalition 
government composed of the ABC, AD, BNP and RCL, headed by the leader of the 
ABC, Thomas Thabane who has become Lesotho’s Premier for the second time. 
Since the third coalition government had just been installed at the time of submission 
of this thesis, the cases during its reign are not covered in this research.  
 
                                                          
1170 Maseru Facilitation Declaration 2 October 2014 www.dfa.gov.za [Accessed 16 April 2017]. It 
provided for re-opening of parliament and preparation for elections; Maseru Security Accord 23 
October 2014 in terms of which the newly appointed Commander of the LDF, Mahao, and ousted 
commander Kamoli, as well as Commissioner of Police were to proceed on leave to enable 
stabilisation of the security institutions. 
1171 Letsie (note 1150 above) 82. 
1172 These parties are the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), the Lesotho Peoples’ Congress (LPC), the 
Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) and the National 
Independence Party (NIP). 
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Cases discussed in this section are those, which took place between January 2015 
and October 2016. Similar to the previous political phases, the reported cases are 
mainly civil suits for damages with no corresponding criminal cases against the 
police officers who have committed the alleged torture. This leads to a conclusion 
that despite the change of governments, up to this stage, Lesotho has failed to 
comply with its obligations to investigate allegations of torture and prosecute its 
perpetrators. The only obligation, which has been fulfilled, is the obligation to provide 
redress to victims of torture. However, the challenge, which remains, is that only 
those who are aware of their rights and have finances to lodge claims against 
government are compensated while the majority of victims remain without redress. 
 
Between 5 January 2015 and 20July 2017, the High Court registered about 229 civil 
cases against the Commissioner of Police.1173 These cases were lodged by victims 
who alleged to have been tortured by different police officers in different police 
stations throughout the country. Due to the challenge of the backlog of cases, which 
the High Court is experiencing, all of these cases had not been adjudicated by the 
time of the submission of this thesis and therefore are listed in names only and not 
full citations. Only a few of these cases have been cited in this thesis to indicate the 
nature of torture allegedly committed by the police officers, as well as the purposes 
for which such torture is committed. 
 
In the case of Thabo Shao v Commissioner of Police & others, the victim alleged that 
he was arrested and subjected to torture simply because he was wearing a T-shirt 
with colours of one of the opposition political parties. In the cases of Sello 
Masunhloane v Commissioner of Police, Mohlanka Morai v Commissioner of Police, 
Ramosenyehi Lepitsi v Officer Commanding Peka Police Station, Khabisi 
Mosunkuthu v Officer Commanding Maputsoe Police Station, ’Manthatisi Qhabu v 
Commissioner of Police and Thabang Ntjolo v Commissioner of Police, the victims 
claimed that they were subjected to both physical and psychological torture.1174 In 
                                                          
1173 Statistics obtained from the High Court Civil registry as at 21 July 2017. 
1174 Sello Masunhloane v O/C Pitso Ground CIV/T/530/16, in his declaration attached to the summons, 
the plaintiff alleged that he was severely assaulted by members of the LMPS at Pitso Ground police 
station. He alleges that he was beaten while his hands and feet were tied behind him and that due to 
the severity of the beatings, he defecated in the presence of female police officers. 
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the cases of Teboho Moferefere v Compol, Thabo Mopeli v Compol and Masetelli 
Mopeli v Compol, the victims alleged that they were subjected to severe beatings 
and suffocated with different objects.1175 In the case of Khauhelo Mabele v Compol, 
the victim alleges that he was thrown out of a moving vehicle.1176 A common factor in 
these cases is that the victims were detained for prolonged periods and they were 
released later without any charges. 
 
During this period (2015-2017), Lesotho submitted its initial report to the CMW 
Committee in terms of article 73 of CMW. The report was due in 2007, but was only 
submitted on 1 December 2015.1177 The CMW Committee considered the report on 
12 and 13 April 2016. With regard to Lesotho’s obligations against torture under the 
CMW, the report conceded to Lesotho’s non-compliance with CMW in various 
aspects. For instance, Lesotho has not adopted legislative measures to domesticate 
CMW.1178 Secondly, with regard to the obligation to protect migrant workers from 
arbitrary arrests and detention the Aliens Control Act authorises detention of migrant 
workers pending a decision on their status and because Lesotho does not have 
detention facilities specifically meant for migration-related detention, migrant workers 
are held in police and correctional service detention facilities,1179 thus exposing them 
to torture. The report also stated that in terms of the Aliens Control Act, expulsion of 
migrant workers and members of their families is done pursuant to a decision taken 
by the Minister responsible for Home Affairs, which decision is not appealable as the 
Act does not set out a procedure for such appeal.1180 In its concluding observations 
on this report, the CMW Committee raised its concerns about the lack of legislation 
to incorporate CMW into the legal system of Lesotho,1181 as well as the lack of 
sufficient information and statistics on cases of exploitation and other forms of ill-
treatment of migrant workers and members of their families.1182 
   
 
                                                          
1175 Teboho Moferefere v Compol CIV/T/474/16. 
1176 Khauhelo Mabele v Compol CIV/T/531/16. 
1177 Lesotho initial state party report to CMW UN Doc CMW/C/LSO/ 1  
1178 As above para 1. 
1179 As above para 105. 
1180 As above para 112. 
1181 CMW Committee Concluding Observations on Lesotho’s initial report paras 7 & 8. 
1182 CMW Committee Concluding Observations on Lesotho’s initial report paras 27 & 28. 
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4.2.7 Concluding remarks on torture within the LMPS 
 
The cases of torture within the LMPS from 1965 to 2017 have three common 
features:  Firstly, all of them fulfil the three elements of torture in article 1(1) of CAT. 
That is, in all of them, there is infliction of severe pain or suffering on the victim, 
which pain is inflicted for purposes of extracting information from the victim and the 
police do so in the cause of the performance of their official duty to detect crime and 
apprehend offenders. Secondly, in the majority of the cases, the Commissioner of 
Police did not dispute that the suspects were subjected to torture during 
investigations. Thirdly, in all the cases except two, there have not been 
corresponding criminal charges against the police officers implicated in the torture. 
This thus leads to a conclusion that the LMPS as an institution condones torture. As 
will be illustrated below, factors, which influence the resort to and condonation of 
torture within the LMPS, are different from factors, which influence the same within 
the military. 
 
4.3 Torture within the Lesotho Defence Force 
 
4.3.1 Overview of the LDF 
 
The LDF comprises the army and the air force of Lesotho. It was established 
sometime between 1978 and 1980, as a shoot off of the PMU.1183 The primary role 
of the LDF is ‘to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lesotho’.1184 The 
secondary roles include assistance in the preservation of life, health and property, 
provision and maintenance of essential services, upholding law and order in support 
of the police as directed by Government, support to state departments as directed by 
Government, compliance with international obligations, such as peace-keeping 
support operations and regional military co-operation. 1185 In the discharge of the 
duties listed above, some members of the LDF are alleged to have committed torture 
                                                          
1183 ‘Nyane (note 1079 above) 62. 
1184 Ministry of Defence and National Security ‘The role of Lesotho Defence Force’ 
www.gov.ls/gov_webportal/ministries/defence%20and%national%security/defence.html  [accessed 15 
June 2016]. 
1185 As above. 
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during different political phases during training of newly recruited members of the 
army,1186 and also against members of the LDF suspected of military and criminal 
offences, as well as the use of torture against civilians in joint police and military 
operations in villages as discussed in detail in the next sections. 
 
In this section, it is illustrated that similar to the LMPS, occurrence of torture within 
the LDF has been influenced by changes in the country’s political landscape. 
However, discussion of its extent within the LDF is limited to three political phases 
because, unlike the police service, which existed prior to independence, the LDF 
was only established in the middle of the second phase of Lesotho’s political history, 
the era of one-party rule, which started in 1970 and ended in 1986. 
 
4.3.2 Torture during the period of one-party government (1980 - 1986) 
 
The LDF was established at the time when Lesotho was experiencing political and 
security instability characterised by attacks of essential facilities by the LLA and 
other BCP supporters.1187 Apart from internal instability, there was animosity 
between Lesotho and neighbouring South Africa which was caused by South Africa’s 
accusation that the government of Lesotho harboured African National Congress 
(ANC) members who were fighting against apartheid in South Africa.1188  
 
Sechele argues that from the time when the LDF was established, torture was 
practised within the LDF. He asserts that inhuman and torturous training methods 
were used against newly recruited members of the army although the practice came 
to a halt around the year 2000.1189 Apart from Sechele’s work, there is no other 
literature, which confirms the practice of torture against new recruits and whether it 
has stopped or continues.  
 
 
                                                          
1186 Sechele (note 141 above) 33. 
1187 Matlosa & Pule (note 991 above) 42. 
1188 As above; J Ngwawi ‘A historical perspective of Lesotho’s political crisis’ (2014) 14 (48) Southern 
African News Features; www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/a-historical-perspective-of-
lesothos-political-crisis/ [accessed 16 April 2016]. 
1189 Sechele (note 141 above) 33. 
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4.3.3 Torture during the period of military rule (1986 - 1993) 
 
As indicated earlier, in 1986, the LDF overthrew the BNP government and seized 
power by force. Following this coup d’état and military seizure of power, both soldiers 
and members of the public were subjected to torture at the hands of the LDF, which 
had then changed to the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF).1190 Senior army 
officers who opposed the coup were arrested and tortured.1191 Two of them died in 
police custody while about 23 were tried before a court martial, without due regard to 
international standards on fair trial.1192 Most of the incidents of torture against 
members of the public as well as army officers were documented by Amnesty 
International in its 1992 report.1193 Members of the army who were tortured during 
this period include, amongst others, Colonel Sekhobe Letsie and Sergeant Ngoana-
Ntloana Lerotholi both of whom were charged with murder of two former ministers of 
the BNP government in 1986 (Bushmans Pass killings).1194  
 
Other army officers subjected to torture include Captain Samuel Mokete Tumo who 
was arrested and kept in solitary confinement,1195 kept naked, covered with wet 
blankets, had tyres placed over his head and was made to kneel on crushed 
stones.1196 The arrest, detention and ultimate torture of the Colonel Sekhobe Letsie 
and Sergeant Ngoana-Ntloana Lerotholi was subjected to political criticism. Although 
they were charged with murder, which is not a political offence, it is argued that their 
prosecution was politically motivated because they were only put to book in 1990 
when Lekhanya’s government was toppled. Had political power struggle not come 
into play, they would have gone unpunished as many members of the army had 
committed political assassinations with impunity.1197 This argument could be further 
                                                          
1190 ‘Nyane (note 1079 above) 71 argues that the army’s change of name to the Royal Lesotho 
Defence Force in 1986 after toppling the BNP government and establishing a convenience alliance 
with the Royalty is yet another sign of the army’s political interference and dominance. See also  
1191 Amnesty International Report (1992) 13. 
1192 As above 8. 
1193 As above 7. 
1194 As above. 
1195 As above. Tumo’s treatment was in contravention of Lesotho’s obligations under ICCPR as 
interpreted by the HRC, GC 20 para 6 (note 42 above) and obligations under CAT as reiterated by the 
Committee against Torture Concluding Observations to the Combined 3rd to 5th Periodic Reports of the 
United States. 
1196 R v Sekhobe Letsie & Another 13 July (1990) LSCA 114.  
1197 Lenka (note 716 above) 58. 
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supported by Browde JA’s dictum in which he said that ‘[an] inquest concerning the 
deaths was commenced in November, 1989 and it was not until 19th February 1990, 
after the change of government as a result of a coup d’état that the first appellant 
was arrested’.1198 Similarly, Lenka argues that ‘in fact it became apparent that if it 
were not for internal struggles, no further action was anticipated and hence cover-up 
was an inevitable result’.1199 
 
As indicated in more detail in section 4.2 above, there was another military coup in 
1990. The second military regime led by Ramaema did not spend much time in 
power, but prepared for democratic elections, which took place in 1992 and a civilian 
government was installed in 1993. Because there was at this time both internal and 
external political stability, the role to be played by the military in the years to come 
was expected to change. The military was to cease political participation and submit 
to civilian authority.1200 However, as illustrated in the next sections, the LDF 
continued to be embroiled in political controversy and this in turn impacted on its 
involvement in human rights violations, including the practice of torture.1201 
 
4.3.4 Torture during the period of fragile democracy (1993 - 2012) 
 
One of the major legal changes, which had been made during the period of 
embryonic democracy, was the promulgation of the 1993 Constitution, which is still in 
force currently. Chapter two of the 1993 Constitution entrenches fundamental human 
rights and freedoms. However, Amnesty International also remarked in its report that 
the Bill of Rights, in the then new (1993) Constitution did not provide an automatic 
guarantee that human rights violations would end.1202  
The reasons, which demanded the establishment of the LDF, had vanished; the LLA 
and exiled BCP supporters had returned home, apartheid in South Africa had ended. 
Therefore, the LDF simply had no work to do as its primary role of defending 
territorial integrity had become moot and it was left with the performance of its 
                                                          
1198  R v Sekhobe Letsie & Another (note 1177 above) para 246. 
1199 Lenka (note 716 above) 58. 
1200 ‘Nyane (note 1079 above) 71. 
1201 As above. 
1202 Amnesty International Report (1992) 9. 
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secondary roles such as agricultural projects and assisting the LMPS in the 
preservation of internal order. In 1994, just a year into the new democratic 
dispensation, the LDF found itself at the centre of political controversy. Four 
ministers were abducted and Selometsi Baholo, a Minister of Finance, was 
assassinated by the LDF during a strike for salary increments.1203 The Prime 
Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, established a Commission of Enquiry into the events, 
which took place from November 1993 to April 1994 and the role of the LDF in those 
events. The Commission was also meant to recommend the incorporation of former 
members of the LLA into the army.1204 The Commission recommended that the army 
should be restructured and professionalised.1205  
 
As a result of the Commission’s recommendations, the LDF Act of 1996 was 
enacted. It reinforced the protection of human rights as contained in the 1993 
Constitution. However, in 1998, the LDF was at the centre of political disturbances, 
which resulted in SADC military intervention, and the arrest and detention of other 
members of the LDF.1206 It is during this detention that torture is alleged to have been 
committed.1207 In its concluding observations on Lesotho’s initial report, the HRC 
raised a concern ‘about the continuing influence of the military in civilian matters’.1208 
With regard to pre-trial detention, the Committee raised a concern about the 
detention of suspects for periods longer than 48 hours before they are brought 
before a magistrate.  It noted that the army officers who were involved in the mutiny 
of 1994 were held for many months before the commencement of court martial 
                                                          
1203 Matlosa & Pule (note 991 above) 54. 
1204 Legal Notice No. 61 of 1994; H Mothibe ‘The military and democratisation in Lesotho’ (1999) 5 (1) 
Lesotho Social Science Review 50, who argues that the inclusion of a recommendation of the 
incorporation of LLA members into the LDF fuelled the suspicion that the BCP government had a 
vendetta against the army and wanted to dismantle it. This was an incentive for the army to assist the 
King in what was termed the ‘palace coup’ of 1994; Sekhonyana v Prime Minister of Lesotho (Dr Ntsu 
Mokhehle) & Others (High Court of Lesotho) 25 September 1995 LSCA 143 in which Legal Notice No. 
61 was challenged. 
1205 ‘Nyane (note 1079 above) 75. 
1206 For a thorough analysis of events of the 1998 political disturbance, see FJ Likoti ‘The 1998 Military 
intervention in Lesotho: SADC peace mission or resource war?’ (2007) 14 (2) International 
Peacekeeping 251; ‘Nyane (note 1079 above) 76. 
1207 Rantuba & Others v Commander of LDF (High Court) 27 November 1998 [1998] LSCA 110, 2 in 
which the wives of three of the soldiers who were arrested and charged with mutiny following the 1998 
political unrest brought the matter to court. The applicants sought the production of the three soldiers 
in court for them to be inspected as there were allegations that they were tortured and denied medical 
treatment.  
1208 HRC Concluding observations on Lesotho’s initial report (note 974) para 14. 
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proceedings as were the junior officers involved in the 1998 mutiny. It recommended 
that Lesotho must enforce compliance with the national laws, which prohibit 
detention for over 48 hours before being taken before a magistrate.1209 
 
In the case of Ntaote v Commanding Officer, LDF and Others the plaintiff alleged 
that he was an armourer of the LDF. He was arrested following breaking into the 
armoury on suspicion that he had participated in the stealing of military rifles. In this 
case, he gave evidence that during his interrogation, he was repeatedly beaten and 
suffocated with a tube and plastic bag and forced to confess to the alleged theft; he 
was also denied medical attention.1210 In Mathabeng Lechalaba v Commander LDF 
and Others,1211 the applicant was arrested and detained at Ratjomose Barracks 
military detention centre on allegations of theft of military rifles. He alleged that he 
was tortured until his release 20 days later. In Theko Lerotholi v Right Honourable 
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili & Others,1212 the applicant was arrested and 
detained in December 2004 on suspicion of having stolen military rifles and he was 
subjected to torture until his escape about 10 days later.1213 Subsequent to Theko 
Lerotholi’s flight, Tlhoriso Letsie was arrested on suspicion that he assisted Theko 
Lerotholi to escape from detention.1214 He was also subjected to torture until he was 
released by an order of habeas corpus, which was filed by his brother in Tlali Letsie 
v Commander LDF and Others.1215 In Motlemelo v The Commander LDF & Attorney 
General, the plaintiff alleged that the said pain and suffering resulted from torture, 
which he was subjected to by members of the LDF.1216 
 
The above cases have similar features. Firstly, all of them are civil claims for 
monetary compensation against the government through the Commander of the LDF 
                                                          
1209 As above para 18. 
1210 Ntaote v Commanding Officer, LDF and Others CIV/T/142/2001 High Court (judgement of 26 May 
2011). 
1211 Mathabeng Lechalaba v Commander LDF and Others (note 988 above). 
1212 Theko Lerotholi v Right Honourable Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili & Others (High Court of 
Lesotho) 7 September 2005 (unreported). 
1213 As above. 
1214 Commander Lesotho Defence Force & Others v Letsie (Court of Appeal) 22 October 2010 (2010) 
LSCA 26.  
1215 Tlali Letsie v Commander LDF and Others High Court judgment of 27 December 2004 
(unreported). 
1216 Motlomelo v The Commander LDF & Attorney General High Court judgment of 5 October 2015 
(unreported) para 1.  
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and the Prime Minister who was the Minister of Defence at that time. Secondly, in all 
of these cases, the Commander did not dispute that the torture was inflicted on the 
plaintiffs. Thirdly, although the complainants knew the officers who had ordered their 
torture, as well as those who inflicted the pain on them, they were not included in the 
civil proceedings. Fourthly, the allegations of torture were not investigated and the 
perpetrators were not prosecuted as there are no corresponding criminal cases. 
Lastly, the only form of redress, which the victims sought and the Court granted, was 
monetary compensation. It must be noted that at the time when all these cases were 
brought to court, Lesotho had already guaranteed the right to freedom from torture in 
section 8 of the Constitution and was already a party to ICCPR, African Charter and 
CAT, which contain specific measures, which must be put in place for the prevention 
and prohibition of torture, as well as the provision of an effective remedy to its 
victims, which effective remedy has been interpreted to include the investigation of 
allegations of torture, full rehabilitation of victims and change of national laws to 
ensure non-repetition of acts of torture.1217 These cases are, therefore, missed 
opportunities through which the courts could have reminded the executive branch of 
government of its obligations under international law. 
  
As far as Lesotho’s obligation to investigate allegations of torture and to prosecute its 
perpetrators is concerned, an argument could be that it is not possible to implement 
this obligation in the absence of an anti-torture law. However, this argument is 
countered by an argument that if the absence of an anti-torture law was the only 
impediment, there could have been prosecutions for lesser offences under both the 
Penal Code Act and Common Law that proscribe violent acts, such as assault or 
assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (Assault GBH).1218 A conclusion, 
therefore, is that there is more to the lack of prosecution than a weak legal 
framework, and that could only be the lack of political will and the state’s condonation 
of torture. This also concerned the HRC as stated in its Concluding Observations on 
                                                          
1217 CAT article 14 and Committee against Torture, GC 3; ICCPR article 2(3); Roy Manojkumar 
Samathanam v Sri Lanka (note 270 above) para 8 in which the HRC held that one of the remedies to 
which a victim of torture is entitled is harmonisation of the domestic laws with ICCPR to guarantee 
non-repetition of torture; Bendib v Algeria (note 113 above) para 6.7 in which the Committee against 
Torture held that effective remedy does not only refer to monetary compensation; Abdulrahman 
Kabura v Burundi (note 378 above) paras 7.6 in which the Committee against Torture held that in 
order to ensure non-repetition, the state has an obligation to investigate allegations of torture. 
1218 Penal Code Act sections 30 - 32. 
232 
 
Lesotho’s initial report in 1999 in which it raised a concern ‘about the climate of 
impunity for crimes and abuses of authority committed by members of the 
military’.1219 
 
4.3.5 Torture during the period of coalition government (2012 - 2015) 
 
4.3.5.1 First three-party coalition government 
 
As illustrated in section 4.2.6 above, Lesotho held elections, which led to a first 
coalition government in 2012. Following the 1998 political unrest, which was mostly 
caused by the involvement of the army in politics, an attempt was made to 
professionalise the LDF.1220 It was not long after the attempt to retrain the LDF by 
the Indian army that, in 2014, the BTI indicated that the government of Lesotho 
retained its monopoly on the use of force.1221 This monopoly, it is argued, was one of 
the warning signs that the army was not fully void of politics and that there could be a 
challenge for civilian authority to control the army.1222 It was not long after the BTI 
report that the challenge identified became a reality and once again the LDF was 
mired in political controversy.1223 The controversy led to yet another intervention by 
SADC, 2015 snap elections and a resultant seven-party coalition discussed in the 
previous section.  
 
4.3.5.2 Second seven-party coalition government 
 
The term of the seven-party coalition government began in 2015 and was to end in 
2020.1224 However, at the time of completing this thesis, the seven-party coalition 
government, which had only lasted two years and was dissolved by His Majesty the 
                                                          
1219 HRC Concluding observations on Lesotho’s initial report (note 974 above) para 14. 
1220 ‘Nyane (note 1079 above) 77. 
1221 BTI (note 978 above).5 
1222 As above. 
1223 Fearing a motion of no confidence, which was looming, in June 2014, the Prime Minister of the 
three-party coalition government prorogued parliament. On 29 August 2014, he appointed Mahao as 
the new army commander and removed Kamoli from the LDF command. See Legal Notice No. 64 of 
2014, which repealed Legal Notice No.41 of 2012 in terms of which Kamoli had been appointed as 
commander. The following day the house of the new commander, the State House and a few police 
stations were attacked by members of the LDF.  The Prime Minister fled the country and sought 
asylum in South Africa. 
1224 Constitution section 83(2) provides parliament with a five-year term unless dissolved earlier. 
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King in March 2017 following a motion of no confidence, which had been passed 
against the Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili.1225 In this section, it is illustrated that 
the politics surrounding Lesotho’s second coalition government also influenced the 
commission of torture within the LDF.  
 
When it came to power, the seven-party coalition government removed Mahao from 
army command and reinstated Kamoli.1226 Following Kamoli’s return to command, 
about fifty soldiers were arrested in terms of section 86 of the LDF Act 1996 on 
charges of plotting a mutiny against Kamoli’s command in favour of Mahao.1227  
Following Kamoli’s return to army command from 14 to 29 May 2015, several 
soldiers were arrested and about twenty-three were detained. Several habeas 
corpus applications were brought to the High Court by relatives, mainly wives of the 
arrested soldiers, who claimed that their husbands had been kidnapped as they had 
not been told of their whereabouts. Six of these applications were later consolidated 
into one in Jobo and others v Commander LDF and others.1228 In this case, the six 
applicants were all wives of soldiers who were detained on different dates. The Court 
granted interim orders for the production of the detained soldiers in Court. They were 
each brought to Court on different dates. All were escorted to Court by heavily armed 
military personnel who covered their faces with masks.1229 They came in with their 
feet shackled, blindfolded or hooded and handcuffed.1230 They each separately told 
the court that they had been subjected to torture and CIDT and they also had fresh 
cuts and bruises on their wrists, which could be attributed to the tightened 
handcuffs.1231  In considering the habeas corpus applications, the Court went further 
to order that the said ill-treatment must stop forthwith.1232 The court categorically 
stated that such treatment violates section 8 of the Constitution of Lesotho, which 
                                                          
1225 Legal Notice No. 22 of 2017.  
1226 Legal Notice No.60 of 2015, which re-appointed Kamoli to the office of Commander of the LDF 
and removed Mahao. 
1227 OHCHR Letter to the Government of Lesotho ‘Mandates of the Working group on Arbitration; the 
Special Rapporteur on independence of judges and lawyers; the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions; and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’ 30 November 2015. https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/31st/public_-
_UA_Lesotho_30.11.2015_(1.2015).pdf [accessed 17 April 2017] (Letter of Special Mandates) 1. 
1228 Jobo and others v Commander LDF and Others (note 841 above). 
1229 As above para 5; Letter of the Special Mandates (note 1216 above) 2. 
1230 Jobo and others v Commander LDF and Others (note 841 above) para 46. 
1231 As above para 5. 
1232 As above para 7. 
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guarantees the right to freedom from torture and other CIDT and further that it is not 
attenuated by section 24 of the Constitution, which states that the right to freedom 
from torture and CIDT cannot be deviated from pursuant to the law of disciplined 
forces, such as the LDF.1233 The Court equated the shackling of detained solders to 
slavery and warned the Ministry of Defence, the Commander of the LDF and the 
Director of the Military Intelligence of the irreparable damage that these acts could 
cause to the image of Lesotho in the eyes of the international community.1234  
 
Following the detention of the soldiers suspected of mutiny, the ousted army 
commander, Mahao, was killed under controversial circumstances on 25 June 
2015.1235 The government and the army contended that Mahao died in an exchange 
of fire while he was resisting arrest, whereas his family says he was 
assassinated.1236 The then Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, requested the SADC’s 
intervention.1237 Consequently, the SADC Troika established a Commission headed 
by Justice Phumaphi of Botswana to enquire into Mahao’s death, the alleged mutiny 
and other factors, which in the opinion of the Troika, were responsible for political 
instability in Lesotho.1238  The Troika made a decision that the Court Martial, which 
was meant to adjudicate the mutiny charges, should be suspended to allow the 
Commission to make its investigations.1239 This decision was, however, later 
withdrawn.1240 Prior to its withdrawal, the LDF issued a directive indicating that the 
detained soldiers would be under closed arrest until the Court Martial was 
convened.1241 Three of the detained soldiers lodged a case challenging this directive 
as a violation of Regulation 29 of the LDF (Discipline) Regulations of 1998 in terms 
                                                          
1233 As above para 6. 
1234 As above para 9. 
1235 News ‘Fired Lesotho army commander shot dead’ New Zimbabwe 28 June 2015. 
www.newzimbabwe.com/news-23431-Axed+Lesotho+army+chief+shot+dead/news.aspx [accessed 
17 April 2017] J Brock ‘Killing former Lesotho army chief deepens instability’ Mail & Guardian 29 June 
2015. 
1236SADC Commission of Enquiry to the Kingdom of Lesotho: 20 July 2015 - 6 November 2015 
(SADC/Phumaphi Commission) Report (2015) paras 42 - 49: evidence of Mahao’s wife giving details 
on earlier attempts to kill Mahao, including 30 August 2014. 
1237 SADC/Phumaphi Commission Report (note 1225 above) 6. 
1238 The SADC/Phumaphi Commission was domesticated through Legal Notice No. 75 of 2015, which 
was amended by Legal Notice No.88 2015 after the former was criticised for having included issues, 
which were not contained in the SADC Communique. Both Legal Notices were passed pursuant to 
Public Enquiries Act 1994 section 3.  
1239 Letter of Special Mandates (note 1216 above) 3. 
1240 As above. 
1241 LDF Directive of 10 July 2015 signed by Major General Poopa. 
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of which members were not to be detained for more than 42 days without trial.1242 
Two of the applicants had been in detention for 70 days while one had been in for 54 
days.1243 The High Court had ordered that the acts of torture and CIDT must be 
stopped.1244 The Court of Appeal found that detention beyond 42 days provided for 
in the in Regulation 11 of the LDF Regulations was unlawful.1245 Despite a finding 
that the alleged acts were unlawful, the Court did not order the release of the 
applicants. The Court of Appeal ordered that the only appellant (Jobo) who had 
pursued the appeal while the two others withdrew, must be placed under open 
arrest.1246  
 
Shortly after the commencement of the proceedings of the Phumaphi Commission, 
the LDF issued the detained soldiers with a notice indicating that the Court Martial be 
convened from 14 September 2015 to commence the mutiny trial.1247 The notice also 
indicated that the soldiers would remain in army detention throughout the trial.1248 
The detained soldiers then lodged an urgent application in the High Court of Lesotho 
in Mareka and others v Commander LDF and others.1249 In the High Court, the 
applicants challenged the decision of the Minister of Defence and the LDF 
Commander to convene a Court Martial to try them for the same issues, which the 
SADC Commission of Enquiry had been set up to investigate and also their denial to 
participate in the Commission’s proceedings.1250 They sought the order that the said 
closed detention is unlawful.1251 In response to this challenge, the LDF Commander 
and the Minister of Defence stated that the Court Martial was convened in order to 
comply with the provisions of the LDF Act, which requires that a detained soldier 
must be brought to court within a reasonable time.1252 On 5 September 2015, 
Makara J held that the holding of applicants under closed arrest without giving them 
a hearing is unlawful and cannot be justified under section 24(3) of the Constitution. 
                                                          
1242 Commander LDF & Others v Mohasi & Others C of A (CIV) 46/ 2015 [2015] LSCA 38.  
1243 As above para 67. 
1244 As above para 12. 
1245 As above para 73. 
1246 Open Arrest is defined as a form of military bail.  
1247 Letter of Special Mandates (note 1216 above) 4. 
1248 As above. 
1249 Mareka and others v Commander LDF and others (Court of Appeal) 29 April 2016 [2016] LSCA 9. 
1250 As above para 1. 
1251 As above. 
1252 Mareka and others v Commander LDF and others (High Court) unreported. 
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The learned judge went further to hold that although section 24(3) limits the rights to 
which members of the disciplined forces are entitled, it does not replace the common 
law principles of natural justice, which entail, amongst others, the right of everyone to 
be given a hearing before an adverse decision can be made against him or her.1253  
 
When it had completed the enquiry, the Phumaphi Commission made four 
recommendations, which were endorsed by the SADC. These recommendations 
were: 
 
1. Expeditious and comprehensive investigation into Mahao’s death;1254 
2. Removal of Kamoli from the LDF command;1255 
3. Security Sector reforms; and 
4. Granting of Amnesty to soldiers charged with mutiny in order to ensure their 
release and return of those who had fled the country.1256 
 
While the foregoing discussion was concerned with cases of torture against 
members of the LDF, there are also cases in which the LDF has been alleged to 
have committed torture against civilian members of society in operations intended for 
the preservation of internal order, in search of illegal firearms and in areas where 
they are deployed to combat stock theft. Deployment of the army in the preservation 
of internal order has been criticised as a recipe for human rights violations by William 
Adama in the following words: 
                                                          
1253 Despite this order, the applicants were not released from detention. See also Letter of the Special 
Mandates (note 1216 above) 7 in which the government of Lesotho was requested to provide detailed 
information as to the legal ground for continued detention of the soldiers. It was requested further to 
release them, pending its response to the letter of the Special Mandates. The soldiers were only 
released after a period of about 18 months due to pressure on government to implement the 
recommendations of the SADC-Phumaphi Commission. 
1254 SADC Commission of Enquiry to the Kingdom of Lesotho, Final Report 61. See also Press 
Statement issued by the Mahao family on SADC Report (16 February 2016) 1 
www.lcn.org.ls/news/FAMILY%20STATEMENT%20ON%20PHUMAPHI%20REPORT%202016.PDF 
[accessed 17 April 2016]. In this statement, the family expressed its concerns about the failure of the 
Phumaphi Commission to ‘uncover the names of all LDF personnel who participated in the operation 
that killed Lt General Mahao…as well as a complete ballistics portfolio of evidence necessary in a 
criminal case.’ 
1255 SADC Commission of Enquiry Final Report (note 1243 above) 61. 
1256 As above 62. The fourth recommendation is rather contradictory, as the Commission starts by 
considering that the torture of suspects in order for them to confess to having taken part in the mutiny, 
makes the case of mutiny highly suspect. Yet instead of unequivocally recommending their release, 
recommends amnesty, which suggests that mutiny had in fact been committed. 
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There’s a reason you separate the military and the police. One fights the enemies of the 
state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the 
enemies of the state tend to become the people.1257  
 
When admitting that it was wrong to have deployed the South African Defence Force 
who killed and tortured members of the community in the search for illegal firearms 
in Msinga, KwaZulu Natal, Mosiuoa Lekota, who was then South African Minister of 
Defence, said ‘we train our soldiers to kill and not to arrest. I do not want them 
among communities because they can be dangerous when provoked’.1258 That is, by 
authorising members of the LDF to undertake operations of the preservation of 
order, the LDF Act leaves room or creates an environment for the violation of human 
rights. This loophole has been summarised by Costa and Medeiros when they 
distinguished the police from the armed force in terms of the degree of force they are 
trained to use. They argue that the armed forces are not concerned about controlling 
the amount of force they use, while the police are trained to use minimal force, 
commensurate to the harm that is being averted.1259 
 
Deployment of the military in the preservation of internal order in Lesotho has 
resulted in human rights violations, including the deprivation of life, torture and CIDT. 
For instance, in Lebakeng, a remote area in the highlands of Lesotho, members of 
the LDF were deployed to assist in the prevention of stock theft across the borders of 
Lesotho and South Africa. While there, a report was made by villagers that one 
woman had insulted her aunt. She was brought to the military camp where she was 
assaulted with spades by the army officers and she died on the way to the clinic. The 
cause of death was certified to be the severe beatings to which she was 
subjected.1260 
 
 
                                                          
1257 W Adama ‘Battlestar Galactica, Miniseries Quotes’ http://www.quotes.net/show/-1 [accessed 17 
April 2016]. 
1258 X. Vapi ‘Lekota tackles anger over soldiers’ 29 June 2001 IOL News, www.iol.co.za/dailynews 
[Accessed 18 April 2016]. 
1259 A Costa & M Medeiros ‘Police demilitarisation: Cops, soldiers and democracy’ (2002) 28 (2) 
Conflict, Security and Development 25. 
1260 Development for Peace Education (DPE) (unpublished report) 2016.  
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4.3.6 Concluding remarks on torture within the LDF 
 
An observation that can be made, based on the analysis of cases of torture within 
the LDF, is that the civil-military relations in Lesotho have been highly influenced by 
political waves since Lesotho gained independence. The impact of these relations is 
characterised by the army’s violation of human rights with impunity, reflecting the 
states’ failure to implement the international human rights obligations to refrain from 
committing torture and CIDT, 1261 to investigate its allegations, 1262 to prosecute and 
punish its perpetrators and to provide its victims with redress beyond monetary 
compensation. The trend of non-prosecution of members of the LDF seems to have 
been a policy of the current command of the LDF. The Commander has refused to 
co-operate with the police in cases where members of the LDF are implicated in 
criminal cases. Two recent examples, which are not related to torture, but instructive 
to the present discussion are: a case in which about eight members of the LDF were 
alleged to have bombed the residence of the former Commissioner of Police and two 
other residences; the second case is the one, which involved the circumstances 
surrounding the death of the former Commander of the LDF, Mahao. In both cases, 
the Commander of the LDF refused to hand over the suspected members of the LDF 
to the police. Instead, the members of the LDF who were implicated in both cases 
were promoted to higher ranks shortly after the incidents in question.  
 
4.4 Torture within the Lesotho Correctional Service 
 
As in the case of the other two law enforcement institutions discussed above, resort 
to torture in the LCS also has a long history, spanning from the time of independence 
to date. The difference with the correctional institutions is that cases of torture are 
not as many as the ones within the LMPS and LDF. The other difference is that 
cases of torture within the correctional institutions can be divided into two categories: 
                                                          
1261 Mulezi v Democratic Republic of Congo (note 268 above) 5.3 and Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi 
(note 378 above) para 3.7 in which the HRC and Committee against Torture respectively, held that the 
state’s obligations against torture also include the obligation to treat detained people in a humane 
manner. See also Namunjepo v Commanding officer, Windhoek Prison & Another (note 1117 above) 
para 23. 
1262 ICCPR article 2(3), HRC, GC31. See also CAT articles 12 and 13 see also Abdulrahman Kabura v 
Burundi (note 378 above) paras 3.4 & 7.4 on states’ obligation to investigate allegations of torture; 
Robben Island Guidelines 17, 18 & 19; SAPS v SALC (note 188 above). 
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The first category is that of physical torture in which warders inflict severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering on inmates as a form of punishment. The second category is 
that of poor living conditions in most correctional institutions, which may reach the 
level of torture.  Each of these categories is discussed in detail below. 
 
4.4.1 Overview of the LCS 
 
The LCS is an institution responsible for the administration of correctional institutions 
in Lesotho. It was first established as the Basutoland Prison Service in 19571263 and 
changed to the Lesotho Prisons Services in 19931264 and then to Lesotho 
Correctional Service in 2004.1265 It is governed by the Correctional Service Act of 
2016, which details the main function of the LCS as ‘the performance of all work 
necessary for, arising from, or incidental to the safe custody and rehabilitation of 
inmates in relation to the administration of correctional institutions and such duties as 
may be assigned by the Commissioner’.1266 With regard to the treatment of inmates, 
section 40 of the Correctional Service Act provides that ‘[n]o inmate shall be 
subjected to torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment’. It must 
be noted that even prior to enactment of the Correctional Service Act, the Prisons 
Proclamation, as well as section 8 of the Constitution prohibited torture of inmates. 
Despite this clear prohibition in the law, the practice took place at Lesotho’s 
correctional institutions as illustrated in the discussions below.  
 
4.4.2 Torture of inmates by correctional facility warders 
 
Torture, which takes place in most correctional institutions, is not reported. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, the Ombudsman visits Lesotho correctional 
services once in a number of years. The earliest records of torture are those 
compiled by Amnesty International in its 1992 Report. It records the case of John 
Ralengana and Khabele Khaeeane who were subjected to torture by prison warders 
in the Maseru Central prison on 31 August 1991.  The prison warders found food in 
                                                          
1263 Basutoland Prisons Proclamation 1957. 
1264 Constitution of Lesotho 1993 section 149. 
1265 Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, Act No. 8 of 2004 section 4. 
1266 Lesotho Corrections Service Act No. 3 of 2016 section 6. 
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the cells of convicted inmates, which was then a breach of discipline, as only 
inmates awaiting trial were allowed to have food brought from outside the institution. 
Ralengana was punished by being subjected to solitary confinement. The other 
inmates protested and started breaking down their cells. The warders dispersed the 
rioting prisoners by use of guns and teargas and Ralengana was shot with a pellet 
gun on two thighs. The injured inmates were taken to hospital, but returned without 
treatment. On arrival at the correctional institution, Ralengana was stripped naked 
and placed in solitary confinement in a cell deliberately flooded with water.1267 In its 
concluding observations on Lesotho’s initial report on the implementation of the 
ICCP, the HRC expressed its concern about the treatment of detainees in 
contravention of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant.1268  
 
In August 2012, six inmates at the Leribe Correctional Facility were stripped naked, 
locked in a cell and given only two meals per day for four days as punishment for 
having fought amongst themselves.1269 Following a strike in July 2013 by the 
Correctional Officers at Maseru Central Prison, about 13 inmates were shot and 
injured in a fracas, which ensued between themselves and the senior warders who 
were on duty as the junior correctional officers were on a go-slow.1270 Thus, while no 
information was sought from the inmates by the prison warders, they were subjected 
to injuries by firearms, as well as assaults and insults for purposes of intimidating 
them. It is argued that these acts also fit the definition of torture stipulated in article 
1(1) of CAT.  
 
From January to October 2014, there were two complaints of assault of an inmate at 
the Leribe Correctional Facility and one in Maseru Female Juvenile Facility.1271 
Although neither of the two complaints amounted to torture, they are, however, 
indicative of a possibility of torture taking place in the correctional facilities. The LCS 
authorities investigated both cases and disciplinary action was taken.1272 The officer 
                                                          
1267 Amnesty International Report (1992) 172. 
1268 HRC, Concluding observations on Lesotho’s initial report (note 974 above) para 20. 
1269 US Dept of State, 2013 Human Rights Report for Lesotho (2014) 2. 
1270 ‘We are competent enough to run LCS’ Public Eye 16 August 2013. 
1271 US Dept of State, 2014 Human Rights Report for Lesotho (2015) 7. 
1272 Information obtained from the legal officers of the LCS, but the author did not have access to the 
disciplinary records.  
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implicated in the Leribe cases was dismissed while the two implicated in the Maseru 
case were placed on special probation. However, no criminal charges were laid 
against any of the officers. 
 
4.4.3 Prison conditions that amount to torture 
 
According to reports compiled by the Ombudsman, as well as the US Department of 
State, prison conditions in Lesotho are in an appalling condition. According to the US 
Department of States’ 2014 human rights report, prisons remained overcrowded as 
at 30 August 2014, with an adult prison population of 2 023, comprising 1 963 men 
and 60 women and a juvenile population of 50, made up of 36 boys and 14 girls. 
Pre-trial detainees constitute about 20% of the prison population.1273 The Maseru 
Central Prison, which is newly renovated and extended, had a capacity to hold 650 
inmates yet it housed 850. The poor quality of the food, and lack of sanitation and 
ventilation also contributed to the poor conditions. According to the CAT Committee, 
these dire conditions amount to torture. 
 
4.4.4 Concluding remarks on torture within the LSC 
 
The foregoing discussion has shown that unlike the LMPS and LDF, torture within 
the LCS is not influenced by political instability, but by the failure of the government 
of Lesotho to implement the minimum standards on the treatment of inmates. One 
factor whereby the LCS is similar to the LMPS and LDF is that there is a culture of 
impunity for officers who commit torture in as much as no criminal proceedings are 
taken against them and very lenient sanctions are imposed on those who are found 
guilty in disciplinary proceedings.1274 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
The cases discussed in this chapter show that although not widely publicised, torture 
in Lesotho is rife. Apart from the cases, which have been adjudicated upon by the 
                                                          
1273 United States Department of State Human Rights Report on Lesotho (2013) 4. 
1274 Letlaka Banyane v Commissioner of Correctional Services & Another (note 990 above).  
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courts of law, there are also anecdotal reports in both print and audio media, which 
show a huge number of torture cases in which the perpetrators, being members of 
the three disciplined forces, go unpunished and the victims thereof go without 
redress. Despite some isolated disciplinary measures against those responsible, 
impunity for acts of torture seems to be the order of the day. The impunity of law 
enforcement officers is also reflected by the 2013 and 2016 Afrobarometers, which 
indicate that the government’s failure to prosecute police officers for acts of torture 
and corruption had resulted in the decline of public trust in the police service in 
2013,1275 and also that in 2016, 37% of the Basotho were not happy with the way 
democracy works in Lesotho.  
 
In this chapter, it has been argued that although it may not appear to be prima facie, 
the use of torture as an interrogation tool by the police is also political. It is political 
because it is influenced by the failure of different regimes to enact anti-torture 
legislation and to prosecute under common law, members of the security forces who 
are implicated in the reported torture cases. The political motivation for the absence 
of a legal framework against torture, as well as the non-prosecution of those alleged 
to have committed torture, is discerned from the statements made by leaders of 
political parties during public rallies. These statements greatly reflect a lack of 
political will to have an anti-torture legal framework in place, as well as the lack of a 
political will to prosecute those responsible for torture. This status, therefore, 
encourages members of the law enforcement institutions, the police and the military, 
to use excessive force, which sometimes amounts to torture, with impunity. It is 
further argued that the political leaders make these statements in order to appease 
the electorate because many people in Lesotho subscribe to the notion that torture is 
an effective interrogation tool and a quick way of lowering the high crime rate.1276  
 
The occurrences of torture, coupled with the government’s failure to prosecute those 
responsible, as well as the failure to provide redress to victims of torture are a clear 
picture of two things: one, that the national legal framework is not adequate to 
protect the citizens from torture; and two, that there is a problem with the 
                                                          
1275 Afrobarometer (May 2013). 
1276 This is in accordance with the Sesotho saying the ‘Lesholu ke ntja le lefa ka hlooho ea lona’ 
loosely translated to mean that a thief must pay back with his head. 
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implementation of the existing inadequate legal framework. The problem of 
Lesotho’s implementation of international standards against torture confirms that the 
ratification of international human rights instruments alone is not enough to avert 
acts of torture, but that ‘prevention requires an effective national legal framework that 
incorporates international human rights standards and includes specific provisions to 
prohibit and prevent torture’.1277 In the next chapter, it is argued that, in order for 
Lesotho to comply with its human rights obligations, the ratification of treaties alone 
without the implementation of their provisions at the domestic level would not 
guarantee the enjoyment of the right to freedom from torture. Recommendations are 
therefore made aimed at ensuring the effective implementation of international 
human rights standards against torture in Lesotho. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1277 Association for Prevention of Torture (note 1 above). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
This study was conducted with the general objective of evaluating the domestic 
implementation of international human rights standards against torture in Lesotho. In 
order to achieve the main objective, the study started by discussing the international 
human rights standards against torture as contained in various human rights treaties 
and under customary international law. It then used these standards as a yardstick 
against which Lesotho’s legal and institutional frameworks were measured. This 
normative approach was also used to highlight the relevance of international human 
rights standards to the development of human rights, specifically the right to be free 
from torture, in Lesotho. Thus, a discussion of the place of international law in the 
legal system of Lesotho and how adherence to international law has helped to 
develop both laws and jurisprudence, particularly in the field of human rights, was 
undertaken. In this regard, the redundancy of the two theories of monism and 
dualism was highlighted and a conclusion made that by ratifying international human 
rights instruments, Lesotho has created law for itself and is therefore bound to 
comply with the said instruments. 
 
In this study, it has been demonstrated that the prohibition of torture is at the core of 
human rights protection. It has been illustrated that torture is one of the worst 
scourges of humanity, which has pushed the international community into adopting 
uniform standards to ensure that it is prohibited in all its forms. These standards 
have been adopted at the global (UN), as well as regional1278 levels through binding, 
as well as non-binding instruments, all aimed at ensuring that torture is prevented 
and prohibited, that its allegations are investigated and that those found liable are 
prosecuted and punished accordingly, and its victims are awarded appropriate 
redress. In the study, it was also illustrated through case law and anecdotal reports 
                                                          
1278 This study limited itself to the African regional human rights system, which is applicable to 
Lesotho. 
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that the practice of torture in Lesotho is as a result of two factors: firstly, failure to 
implement at the domestic level, the international human rights standards against 
torture; and secondly, political instability in the country. 
 
In line with the objectives set out in chapter 1 of this study, it has been illustrated that 
the legal system of Lesotho is international law friendly in that, from the formation of 
the Basotho nation, international law played a major role in settling boundary 
disputes and establishing relationships between Lesotho and other countries. From 
the time when Lesotho was a British Protectorate to date, Lesotho continues to be 
part of the international community and to adhere to some principles of international 
law, which are contained in both international treaties and customary international 
law. This is illustrated by the massive ratification of international instruments, as well 
as the application of international law in national courts. It has also been shown that 
although in theory, because of its Roman Dutch Law heritage, Lesotho has been 
categorised as a dualist state in which international instruments cannot be directly 
applied in domestic courts unless domesticated, the jurisprudential trend is slowly 
changing as the courts now lean more towards the protection of human rights and 
interpretation of domestic laws in accordance with the state’s international 
obligations. The courts have also asserted that the ratification of international human 
rights instruments should be viewed as a state’s indication to be bound by the ratified 
instruments and therefore should not be taken for granted, even in the absence of 
corresponding domestic laws.   
 
Several international human rights instruments were analysed in this research on the 
basis of which it is concluded that all core human rights instruments adopted at the 
global, as well as regional levels, explicitly, while some implicitly, proscribe torture in 
all its forms. From these instruments, the research categorised all the obligations 
placed on state parties into four broad categories, being the obligations to prevent 
and prohibit torture, to punish its perpetrators, to provide redress to its victims and to 
report on measures taken against torture. 
  
In the study, it has also been concluded that although Lesotho has ratified a number 
of international human rights instruments, which contain obligations and standards 
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against torture, the major problem lies with the practical implementation of the said 
instruments. The failure to implement international standards against torture is 
illustrated by the fact that apart from guaranteeing the right to freedom from torture in 
the Bill of Rights, torture is not proscribed as a distinct crime. That is, there is no 
domestic law, which criminalises torture and lists its elements in accordance with 
article 1(1) of CAT.  Because of the failure to criminalise torture as a distinct crime, 
the Constitution and the Penal Code Act have also failed to reflect the gravity of the 
offence of torture. Secondly, the law neither prescribes punishment to be imposed on 
those found guilty of committing torture nor spells out the form of redress to which 
victims of torture shall be entitled.  
 
Linked to the absence of anti-torture legislation is also weak investigation machinery, 
as well as a culture of impunity amongst law enforcement officers who are implicated 
in cases of torture. In this study, it has been highlighted that there are a number of 
cases in which the police are sued for civil damages arising out of torture, as well as 
those reported to the Office of the Ombudsman and the Police Complaints Authority 
in which the police are alleged to have committed torture. However, since 
investigative powers are vested in the police service itself, the Office of the 
Ombudsman and the Police Complaints Authority are unable to carry out their own 
investigations, but have to refer the cases to the police for investigation. The police 
in turn fail to take appropriate action against fellow police officers. In cases, which 
involve members of the army, the command of the LDF inhibits the police from 
making investigations. In cases where the courts have made findings in civil cases 
that police officers and army officers have committed torture, the Director of Public 
Prosecution has not lodged corresponding criminal proceedings against the 
implicated officers. This thus leads to a conclusion that torture is condoned by those 
in authority and therefore institutionalised. 
 
The government of Lesotho has also failed in its obligation to submit state party 
reports to relevant treaty bodies on measures taken to ensure full realisation of the 
right to freedom from torture. In limited cases, where state party reports have been 
filed, such as to the CMW, CEDAW and CRC Committees, the absence of specific 
laws and mechanisms that focus on torture has contributed to the government’s 
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inability to include relevant statistical data on torture in the reports. If torture was 
prohibited as a distinct crime, there would be statistics which highlight its prevalence 
as opposed to the current situation in which torture is absorbed by and recorded 
under other offences, such as assault. For instance, there would be clear statistics 
on gender-based torture submitted to the CEDAW Committee as required by 
CEDAW GR 12 and GR 19 and clear statistics of the torture of children as required 
by the CRC.  Torture-specific laws and mechanisms would have also been useful in 
informing the design of appropriate means of intervention in order to prevent and 
prohibit torture, to punish its perpetrators, as well as the design of other forms of 
redress for victims other than monetary compensation, which has been the only form 
of redress given to those who successfully prove to have been tortured. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
 
On the basis of the foregoing conclusion, it is recommended that in order to 
successfully implement its international human rights obligations against torture, 
Lesotho must adopt a multi-pronged approach, which involves the alignment of the 
national legal framework with international standards, the establishment of national 
torture-prevention mechanisms, holding perpetrators of torture accountable and 
punishing them accordingly, compiling statistics on torture and also putting in place 
mechanisms to redress victims of torture.  
 
Furthermore, the political history of Lesotho has reflected that members of the LDF 
have been involved in many human rights violations, including torture. An analysis of 
the relevance of the army in this day and age has also shown that for a long time, 
the army has done more harm than good to Lesotho as a nation. The 
recommendation in this regard, is that Lesotho should engage in the process of 
demilitarisation and the LDF should be abolished. The practical implementation of 
each of these recommendations is discussed below. 
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5.2.1 Domestication of international human rights instruments  
 
When a state has ratified a treaty, it has an obligation to incorporate the provisions of 
that treaty into its domestic legal system. The international human rights instruments 
discussed in chapter 2 provide clear guidelines on measures which states must take 
to prevent and prohibit torture, to punish its perpetrators and to provide redress to its 
victims. It is therefore recommended that in order for the aspirations contained in 
these treaties to be accessible to the people of Lesotho and for the practice of torture 
to be eradicated, these instruments must be incorporated into Lesotho’s national 
legal system. The benefits of domestication are that Lesotho would be complying 
with its treaty obligations; there will be direct application of the aspirations contained 
in these instruments in the courts of Lesotho without questioning their source and the 
citizens will be in a position to hold state officials accountable for commission of 
torture. Domestication may also include constitutional reform as well as enactment of 
an anti-torture law as further recommended next.  
 
5.2.2 Constitutional reform 
 
It is recommended that the Constitution of Lesotho be amended so as to include a 
provision on the application of international law in Lesotho. That is, Lesotho must 
adopt an approach, which Zimbabwe has adopted with respect to the application of 
international law. As regards customary international law, the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe clearly stipulates that ‘[c]ustomary international law is part of the law of 
Zimbabwe, unless it is inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament’.1279 
As regards conventional international law, a similar approach is adopted in relation to 
the interpretation of the human rights chapter of the Constitution that ‘[w]hen 
interpreting this Chapter, a court, tribunal, forum or body, must take into account 
international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party’.1280 
 
                                                          
1279 Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 section 325 (1). 
1280 Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 section 46; Sloth-Nielsen & Hove (note 668 above); Article 33(6) 
of the Constitution of Cape Verde (1980) which provides that ‘[a]ll evidence obtained by torture; 
coercion; assault on physical or moral integrity; illegal invasion of correspondence, telephone, 
domicile, or privacy, or other illicit means, shall be null and void’. 
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The recommended reform should also include practical aspects of prohibition against 
torture, such as the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution, which obliges courts 
to exclude evidence obtained through human rights violations. In this regard, there 
are two options, which different countries in Africa have adopted. The first one is the 
inclusion of a specific provision on the exclusion of evidence as has been done in the 
constitutions of Cape Verde,1281 Ethiopia,1282 Guinea Bissau,1283 Liberia,1284 
Mozambique,1285 Somalia1286 and Sudan.1287 The second option is to include this 
aspect as part of the right to a fair trial. The latter approach has been adopted in the 
Constitutions of South Africa,1288 Kenya,1289 and Zimbabwe.1290 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1281 Article 33(6) of the Constitution of Cape Verde (1980) which provides that ‘[a]ll evidence obtained 
by torture; coercion; assault on physical or moral integrity; illegal invasion of correspondence, 
telephone, domicile, or privacy, or other illicit means, shall be null and void’. 
1282 Article 19(5) of the Constitution of Ethiopia (1994) provides that ‘[p]ersons arrested shall not be 
compelled to make confessions or admissions which could be used in evidence against them. Any 
evidence obtained under coercion shall not be admissible’. 
1283 Article 35(6) of the Constitution of Guinea-Bissau 1984 provides that ‘[a]ny evidence or confession 
… obtained by torture, coercion, or physical or mental harm shall be null and void’. 
1284 Article 21(c) of the Constitution of Liberia (1986) provides that ‘[e]very person suspected or 
accused of committing a crime shall immediately upon arrest be informed in detail of the charges, of 
the right to remain silent and of the fact that any statement made could be used against him in a court 
of law. Such person shall be entitled to counsel at every stage of the investigation and shall have the 
right not to be interrogated except in the presence of counsel. Any admission or other statements 
made by the accused in the absence of such counsel shall be deemed inadmissible as evidence in a 
court of law’. 
1285 Article 65(3) of the Constitution of Mozambique (2004) provides that '[a]ll evidence obtained 
through the use of torture, coercion, offences against the physical or moral integrity of the person, the 
abusive intrusion into their private and family life or into their home, correspondence or 
telecommunications, shall be invalid’. 
1286 Article 35(4) of the Constitution of Somalia (2012) provides that ‘[e]very person may not be 
compelled to self-incriminate, and a verdict may not be based on evidence acquired by means of 
coercion’. 
1287 Article 156(c) of the Constitution of Sudan provides that ‘[p]ersonal privacy is inviolable and 
evidence obtained in violation of such privacy shall not be admissible in the court of law’. 
1288 Sec 35(5) of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa provides that ‘[e]vidence obtained in a manner 
that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would 
render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice’. 
1289 Article 50(4) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya provides that [e]vidence obtained in a manner that 
violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall be excluded if the admission of 
that evidence would render the trial unfair, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of 
justice’. 
1290 Section 70(3) of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that ‘[i]n any criminal trial, evidence 
that has been obtained in a manner that violates any provision of this chapter must be excluded if the 
admission of the evidence would render the trial unfair or would otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice or the public interest’. 
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5.2.3 Enactment of anti-torture legislation  
 
It is recommended that in order for Lesotho to effectively implement the international 
human rights obligations against torture, the first step must be to adopt anti-torture 
legislation, which conforms to, at the very least, the obligations contained in CAT. In 
terms of the APT Guide, anti-torture legislation will be CAT compliant if it takes into 
account all the provisions of CAT, as well as the general comments and concluding 
observations of the Committee against Torture. Such legislation must at the 
minimum contain the following elements: 
 
 Criminalise torture as a distinct crime and also cover other modes of liability, 
such as attempt to commit torture as well as participating in any manner in the 
commission of torture.  
 Define torture in accordance with article 1(1) of CAT. The definition in section 
94 of Penal Code Act may be used as it complies with article 1(1) of CAT. 
 Prescribe an appropriate punishment for those convicted. The APT Guide 
recommends imprisonment for not less than six years without an option of a 
fine. 
 Prescribe redress for victims of torture, which is not limited to monetary 
compensation, but also includes medical treatment and psychological support 
of the victim. 
 
An anti-torture legislation will be useful to the entire criminal justice system in that it 
will enable the police to investigate allegations of torture with a clear understanding 
of the elements of torture and how it is distinguished from other criminal offences. 
With this knowledge, prosecutors would be able to lead relevant evidence that is 
essential to secure a conviction against perpetrators of torture. The law will also 
assist the judicial officers with respect to sentencing as it must prescribe the 
appropriate sentence to be imposed on those convicted of torture. Over and above 
this, the government of Lesotho will be able to identify suitable forms of redress for 
victims of torture as the law will provide for redress, including counselling and 
rehabilitation of victims of torture. 
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It is also recommended that where the government is reluctant to enact an anti-
torture law, civil society organisations (CSOs) in Lesotho should take the lead and 
champion enactment of the said law. A similar approach was adopted in Kenya and 
Uganda where CSOs engaged parliamentary committees and individual 
parliamentarians to sponsor private member bills, which led to the Kenyan and 
Ugandan anti-torture laws. 
 
5.2.4 Compilation of statistics on torture  
 
It is recommended that Lesotho must establish mechanisms through which statistics 
on the practice of torture in all public institutions, including police, military, 
correctional and health detention facilities are compiled. The said statistics will 
enable the country to be cautious of the prevalence of torture, to formulate 
responses to it and also to include such statistics in the periodic reports as 
recommended next. These statistics may be compiled by the Human Rights 
Commission which although not yet operational, shall in terms of its establishing 
legislation, have mandate over human rights issues in Lesotho. 
 
5.2.5 Regular and timeous submission of state party reports 
 
It is recommended that in compliance with its obligations under various human rights 
treaty bodies, Lesotho must regularly and timeously submit the periodic reports 
which stipulate measures it has adopted to combat the practice of torture in Lesotho. 
The state reporting process would facilitate continuous introspection on the extent to 
which Lesotho complies with its international treaty obligations. It would also help to 
reflect on the prevalence of torture and factors which influence its practice in 
Lesotho. Lesotho would thus benefit from the concluding observations of various 
treaty bodies which would enable the state to formulate appropriate responses 
aimed at prevention and prohibition of torture, punishment of its perpetrators as well 
as provision of effective redress to the victims. 
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5.2.6 Effective implementation of existing laws as an interim measure 
 
While it is highly recommended that there be an anti-torture law in Lesotho, it is also 
recommended that while enactment of such a law is awaited, the existing laws 
should be fully implemented. This is where the role of lawyers and CSOs become 
important. There should be engagement in strategic litigation to ensure that cases of 
torture are brought to the courts of law and that they reflect the magnitude as well as 
methods of torture in Lesotho. There should also be advocacy, which makes the 
people of Lesotho aware of the gravity of the offence of torture, their rights and 
remedies where torture has been committed, as well as naming and shaming 
government officials and institutions, which are involved in or participate in the 
commission of torture.  
 
5.2.7 Establishment of national prevention mechanisms, reform of the 
judiciary, the police, the LCS and abolition of the LDF 
 
It is recommended that the Human Rights Commission, which is created in terms of 
the sixth amendment to the Constitution and the Human Rights Commission Act, 
must be established. Its existence would assist in the fulfilment of Lesotho’s 
obligations to prevent torture through the training of the public and law enforcement 
officers, through visits to places of detention, as well as receipt, investigations and 
adjudication over cases in which the law enforcement officers are alleged to have 
committed torture. 
 
There should be institutional reforms  specifically, reform of the judiciary, the police 
and the LSC. As far as the judiciary is concerned, the reforms should be directed at 
ensuring the independence of the judiciary as an institution, ensuring non-
interference by the executive, as well as competence and independence of individual 
judges. In this study and previous research, it has been reflected that the judiciary in 
Lesotho has been reluctant to apply international law in some cases and ignorant of 
international law in others.1291 The courts have also dealt with cases of torture as 
                                                          
1291 For a general discussion of courts’ reluctance to apply international law see chapter 3 of this 
thesis. 
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pure civil claims without taking into account Lesotho’s human rights obligations 
against torture. For instance, in all the cases discussed in chapter 4, the Court 
awarded damages to victims of torture, but did not order that the implicated officers 
must be prosecuted for the alleged torture.  Therefore, to ensure that domestic laws 
are interpreted in line with Lesotho’s international human rights obligations, there 
should be continuous legal training for all judicial officers from the magistrate courts 
to the highest court in Lesotho. The judiciary should also be reformed to eradicate 
the backlog of cases. This would enable the implementation of the obligation that 
Lesotho must establish competent and impartial courts to adjudicate over cases of 
torture. 
 
As illustrated in the history of the LDF in chapter 4 of this thesis, the main purpose 
for which the LDF was established was to ward off the attacks by the LLA during the 
liberation struggle from the authoritarian BNP government. However, when Lesotho 
became democratic, the LDF’s main objective became defunct. As a result of being 
an idle army, the LDF became involved in politics and consequently human rights 
violations. A rehabilitation programme worked for a very short time and the LDF did 
not totally cease being involved in politics. It is, therefore, recommended that 
amongst the security sector reforms, Lesotho should consider phasing out the army. 
This would be a torture-prevention measure, as well as ensuring stability in Lesotho. 
Due to Lesotho being enclaved within South Africa, which has a stronger defence 
force, the LDF is not capable of carrying out the main functions of an army, which is 
defence of territorial integrity. It is, therefore, recommended that there should be a 
plan not to recruit more members to the LDF and to phase out the current force 
within the next ten years.   
 
5.2.8 Redress for victims of torture 
 
As illustrated in chapter 4 of this thesis, redress to victims of torture is limited to 
monetary compensation despite the fact that other remedies would also be suitable – 
and even necessary − in some cases. It is thus recommended that the government 
effectively implements the obligation to provide full reparation, which has been 
interpreted to include other forms of redress, such as the provision of medical care 
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and psychological support of victims of torture and/or members of their families, 
investigation of allegations of torture,1292 and prosecution of perpetrators,1293 review 
and reform of the legal framework, as well as monetary compensation.1294 
 
5.2.9 Tackling impunity and holding perpetrators of torture accountable 
  
In order to deal with the culture of impunity for perpetrators of human rights 
violations, including those who commit or participate by other means in the 
commission torture, there must be proper investigation and prosecution of all 
allegations of torture. While prosecution under anti-torture legislation would be ideal, 
in the absence of such, it is recommended that those who participate in the 
commission of torture must, in the meantime, be prosecuted under the existing 
criminal law regime. The Penal Code Act 2010 already contains the offences of 
murder, assault and aggravated assault.1295 Law enforcement officers, alleged to 
have inflicted severe pain or suffering on any person should be prosecuted under the 
Penal Code Act. If the severe pain resulted in death, such deaths must be 
investigated and those responsible prosecuted for murder. That is, monetary 
compensation to the victims and or members of their families should not replace 
criminal prosecution. 
 
In order to ensure that there is genuine investigation, the institutions, which are 
already given the mandate to oversee the protection of human rights, should be 
strengthened both in law and through adequate financial and human resources to 
carry out investigations of allegations of torture and to report same to the DPP to 
                                                          
1292 ICCPR article 2(3), HRC, GC31; CAT articles 12 & 13; Abdulrahman Kabura v Burundi (note 378 
above) paras 3.4 & 7.4; Robben Island Guidelines 17, 18 & 19; SAPS v SALC (note 188 above). 
1293 Zhakhangir Barazov v Kyrgyzstan (note 272 above) in which the HRC held that article 2(3) of 
ICCPR mandates states to investigate allegations of torture; the HRC made similar findings in 
Urmatbek Akunov v Kyrgyzstan (note 272 above) para 10 and Manojkumar Samathanam v Sri Lanka 
(note 270 above) para 10. 
1294 Sergio Lopez Burgos v Uruguay,(note 281 above); Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago (note 282 
above) para 9. In this communication, the state party was ordered to compensate the author, to 
consider his early release and to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future; Kouider 
Kerrouche v Algeria (note 261 above) para 10 in which the HRC held that the state party has an 
obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy in the form of full and effective investigation 
as well as prosecution and punishment of his torturers; Evans v Trinidad and Tobago  (note 282 
above); Teesdale v Trinidad and Tobago (note 45 above) para 11, Boodoo v Trinidad and Tobago 
(note 282 above) para 8. 
1295 Penal Code Act sections 30, 31, 40, 42 & 52.  
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indict the implicated individuals and state officials. Such institutions include the 
Police Complaints Authority, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights 
Commission.  
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